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ABSTRACT  
 
Since 1979, British higher education has moved away from a model informed by 
traditional liberal values. Government now expects universities to serve the 
instrumental needs of the state. This thesis asks how and why this change was 
possible, arguing that this was not an inevitable, “natural” response to a modern 
society’s needs but, rather, a central aspect of the neoliberal revolution. It therefore 
has to be understood ideologically. Given that the Thatcher Governments (1979-
1990) exemplify an overtly ideological approach, what happened in political terms to 
higher education in that period serves as a case study through which to explore two 
interrelated meanings of ideology: first, ideology as a set of ideas; and, second, as a 
medium for framing, universalising and transmitting those ideas through selective 
and partial presentations of reality. I take the work of Marx and certain Marxists as a 
starting point in understanding ideology and through which to explore how higher 
education could be requisitioned as an “ideological state apparatus”. Speeches and 
writings of the New Right are considered and an account given of how the Thatcher 
Governments’ higher education policies were enacted, not only in terms of what 
policy papers and legislation actually stated but - crucially - how they were argued 
through Parliament. Some of these statements and policies appeared to be 
contradictory: however, the Thatcher Governments were able to capitalise on this. In 
conjunction with using the contradictions inherent in the traditional liberal view of 
higher education, it was possible to recruit ideological agents and “manufacture 
consent” so that a new ideological relationship between higher education and the 
state was constructed. I conclude that higher education became from this period 
onwards an explicitly ideological arm of the state, and that this analysis sheds light 
both on higher education’s current status and on how ideology works. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
(i) Higher education and the state1: from liberalism to instrumentalism 
Anyone looking even superficially at British higher education
2
 since 1979 cannot fail 
to be struck by how far it has shifted from a model informed predominantly by 
traditional liberal values. I am taking these as broadly those inherent in the liberalism 
associated in Britain from the mid-nineteenth century with John Stuart Mill, who 
emphasised, inter alia, the importance of the individual; equality; and minimal 
interference by government in individuals’ lives.3 Notwithstanding that, Mill 
considered that education was necessary for the individual’s progress and should 
therefore be required by the state (with subsidies for the poor), although not 
controlled by it.
4
 Consider, for example, Mill’s expression in 1867 of his view that 
the function of the university was to develop people as ‘cultivated human beings’, 
not train them for work: 
It is not a place of professional education. Universities are not intended to teach 
the knowledge required to fit men for some special mode of gaining their 
livelihood. Their object is not to make skilful lawyers, or physicians, or engineers, 
but capable and cultivated human beings. […] Men are men before they are 
lawyers, or physicians, or merchants, or manufacturers: and if you make them 
capable and sensible men, they will make themselves capable and sensible 
lawyers or physicians. What professional men should carry away with them from 
an University, is not professional knowledge, but that which should direct the use 
of their professional knowledge, and bring the light of general culture to  
illuminate the technicalities of a special pursuit.
5
 
Cardinal John Newman, too, had stated in 1852 that a liberal education should be 
‘the cultivation of the intellect [as] an end distinct and sufficient in itself’,6 arguing 
against a view of education whose proponents 
                                               
1 I am simply taking “the state” to mean the organisation of the body politic, managed by a centralised 
system of government, whose functions are carried out by state apparatuses.  
2 For reasons of space, this thesis concentrates on (a) English higher education (notwithstanding that 
the British Parliament’s discussions in the 1980s encompassed higher education in England, Scotland, 
Wales - this being prior to devolution to the latter two - and Northern Ireland, prior to its Parliament’s 
restitution); and (b) taught (and mainly undergraduate) state-funded higher education.  
3 Mill, J. S., On Liberty (London: The World’s Classics, Oxford University Press, 1952 [1859]). 
4 Ibid., p. 129. Michael Freeden summarises Mill’s position on education: ‘Education was itself 
immediately adjacent to the liberal version of rationality, the cultivation of talent and intelligence 
being essential to the ends of self-developing, active, and internally harmonious human beings.’  
- Freeden, M., Ideologies and Political Theory: a Conceptual Approach (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1996), p. 166. 
5 Mill, J. S., ‘Inaugural Address Delivered at the University of St Andrews, 1 February 1867’, in 
Cavenagh, F. A. (ed.), James and John Stuart Mill on Education (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1931), pp. 133-134.  
6
 Newman, J. H., The Idea of a University (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996 
[1899]), p. 93. 
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insist that Education should be confined to some particular and narrow end, and 
should issue in some definite work, which can be weighed and measured. They 
argue as if every thing, as well as every person, had its price; and that where there 
has been a great outlay, they have a right to expect a return in kind. This they call 
making Education and Instruction “useful”, and “Utility” becomes their 
watchword. With a fundamental principle of this nature, they very naturally go on 
to ask, what there is to show for the expense of a University; what is the real 
worth in the market of the article called “a Liberal Education”, on the supposition 
that it does not teach us definitely how to advance our manufactures, or to 
improve our lands, or to better our civil economy; or again, if it does not at once 
make this man a lawyer, that an engineer, and that a surgeon; or at least if it does 
not lead to discoveries in chemistry, astronomy, geology, magnetism, and science  
of every kind.
7
 
More recently, the twentieth-century conservative academic Michael Oakeshott 
considered that  
[a] university will have ceased to exist when […] those who came to be taught 
come, not in search of their intellectual fortune but with a vitality so unroused or 
so exhausted that they wish only to be provided with a serviceable moral and 
intellectual outfit; when they come with no understanding of the manners of 
conversation but desire only a qualification for earning a living or a certificate to  
let them in on the exploitation of the world.
8
 
 
Contrast these expressions with the avowedly ideological and instrumental role 
ascribed to education by Mao Zedong in 1966, launching the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution: 
While their main task is to study, [students] should also learn other things, that is 
to say, they should not only learn book knowledge, they should also learn 
industrial production, agricultural production, and military affairs. They should 
also criticize and repudiate the bourgeoisie. The length of schooling should be 
shortened, education should be revolutionized, and the domination of our schools  
and colleges by bourgeois intellectuals should not be tolerated any longer.
9
 
Furthermore, consider an extract from a British Tory Government policy document 
of 1987, expressing the purposes of higher education not in terms of the cultivation 
of the individual but, rather, predominantly in terms of economic objectives, stating 
that higher education should: 
 serve the economy more effectively 
                                               
7 Ibid., p. 110. 
8 Fuller, T. (ed.), The Voice of Liberal Learning: Michael Oakeshott on Education (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 104.  
9 Mao Zedong’s letter to Lin Piao in 1966, quoted in Kerr, C., Observations on the Relations between 
Education and Work in the People’s Republic of China: Report of a Study Group (Berkeley, 
California: Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, 1978), p. 111. For a comparison 
of Mao’s and Thatcher’s “vocationalisation” of higher education, see my ‘Maoist Britain? the 
ideological function of vocationalising the higher education curriculum’, Curriculum Studies, Volume 
1, Number 3, 1993, pp. 365-382. 
 12 
 
 pursue basic scientific research and scholarship in the arts and humanities 
 have closer links with industry and commerce, and promote enterprise.10 
A New Labour Government report in 2008 similarly sets government-defined 
purposes for higher education: 
We have set ambitious targets in response to the analysis of our skill needs […]. 
Meeting them will require a culture shift among higher education providers and 
employers. […] Universities need to help organisations through knowledge 
exchange as well as by supplying skilled graduates and post-graduates and by  
providing high level skills learning for those already in the workforce.
11
  
The end result, ‘student employability’, assumes paramount importance: 
We want to see all universities treating student employability as a core part of 
their mission. So we believe it is reasonable to expect universities to take  
responsibility for how their students are prepared for the world of work.
12
 
As the culminating expression of the shift away from liberal values, the Browne 
Review - commissioned by the New Labour Government in 2009 but reporting back 
to a Coalition Government of Tories and Liberal Democrats in October 2010 -
interprets higher education in terms almost exclusively concerned with its utility to 
‘the world of work’. Despite seeming initially to announce the role of higher 
education in developing the liberal individual, the Report goes on to characterise the 
former simply in instrumental terms as the route through to paid employment: 
Higher education matters because it transforms the lives of individuals. On 
graduating, graduates are more likely to be employed, more likely to enjoy higher 
wages and better job satisfaction, and more likely to find it easier to move from  
one job to the next.
13
 
Accordingly, the Report recommended, inter alia, retaining public funding only for 
subjects deemed best to equip students for work - namely, science, technology, 
engineering and mathematics - claiming that ‘there needs to be a closer fit between 
what is taught in higher education and the skills needed in the economy’.14   
 
                                               
10 Department of Education and Science (DES), Higher Education: Meeting the Challenge, White 
Paper, Cm. 114 (London: HMSO, April 1987), p. iv. 
11 Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills (DIUS), Higher Education at Work - High 
Skills: High Value (London: DIUS, April 2008), p. 4. 
12 Ibid., p. 6. ‘Education for the world of work’ was a slogan coined by James Callaghan’s Labour 
Government (1976-1979): see Jones, K., Right Turn: the Conservative Revolution in Education 
(London: Hutchinson Radius, 1989), p. 2.  
13 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), Securing a Sustainable Future for Higher 
Education: an Independent Review of Higher Education Funding & Student Finance (Browne 
Report), 12 October 2010: available at www.independent.gov.uk/browne-report [accessed 15 October 
2010], Chapter 1, section 1.1, p. 14. 
14 Ibid., Chapter 2, section 2.3, p. 23.  
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Why and how has the shift in Britain from an inherently liberal to an explicitly 
neoliberal, government-led instrumental view of higher education taken place; from a 
concern for the development of individuals as citizens to a concern solely with 
individuals’ putative self-interest? For that is fundamentally how neoliberalism 
distinguishes itself from Mill’s liberalism and from the 1940s “social democratic” 
liberalism of William Beveridge and the welfare state alike.
15
 Without implying that 
Newman’s, Mill’s and others’ liberalism is either value-free or unproblematic, I am 
using their views on what constitutes a university education as a foil, as the 
predominant idealisation of the university extant up to my starting-point of 1979.
16
 
So how did universities’ liberal traditions give rise to their neoliberal present-day 
characteristics? How has higher education been “neoliberalised”?17 Claiming that the 
most radical manifestations of this shift were laid down by the “New Right” Tory 
Governments of Margaret Thatcher (1979–1990), I use this period as an extended 
case study.
18
 My initial question is: how and why did the shift in the 1980s to an 
explicitly ideological relationship between British higher education and the state, and 
one that privileged a narrowly instrumental view, develop and take hold?  
                                               
15 After the Second World War, British governments mainly followed the economic strategies of John 
Maynard Keynes who, broadly speaking, advocated government intervention in the economy with the 
aim of providing full employment, economic growth and public welfare: see, for example, Stedman 
Jones, D., Masters of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of Neoliberal Politics (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2012), pp. 180-214. William Beveridge spearheaded the so-
called welfare state, put into operation by the Labour Governments of 1945-1951. For a history of 
post-war consensus politics, see Kavanagh, D., Thatcherism and British Politics: the End of 
Consensus? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Second Edition, 1990). 
16 For more historical detail, see Ch. 3, fn.78.  
17 I borrow the term from David Harvey, who identifies the impact of neoliberalism (or the “New 
Right”, as it was called in 1980s Britain) on all aspects of society as a ‘process of neoliberalization’: 
Harvey, D., A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 3. Another 
Marxist, Alex Callinicos, takes neoliberalism as the project which seeks to subject not just economic 
matters but ‘every aspect of social life to the logic of the market, and to make everything into a 
commodity that can be privately owned and bought and sold for a profit’: Callinicos, A., Universities 
in a Neoliberal World (London: Bookmarks Publications, 2006), p. 6. Daniel Stedman Jones describes 
‘transatlantic neoliberalism’ as ‘the free market ideology based on individual liberty and limited 
government that connected human freedom to the actions of the rational, self-interested actor in the 
competitive marketplace’: Stedman Jones, D., op. cit., p. 2. 
18 In common with many Tories/Conservatives, I use the terms interchangeably. See Gilmour, I., 
Inside Right: a Study of Conservatism (London: Hutchinson, 1977) for a history of the Tory Party, 
dating from its seventeenth-century beginnings, the subsequent absorption of some Whig elements, 
and the use of the term “Conservative” from the 1830s. Aspects of the New Right emerged within this 
Party in Britain in the 1960s with Enoch Powell and Angus Maude challenging the politics of Edward 
Heath and advocating the free market and a strong nation. For commentaries on the New Right or 
“Thatcherism” - its 1980s manifestation - see: Nairn, T., ‘Enoch Powell: the New Right’, New Left 
Review, Number 61, 1970, pp. 3-27; Knight, C., The Making of Tory Education Policy in Post-war 
Britain 1950-1986 (Lewes, Sussex: Falmer Press, 1990), p. 25; Gamble, A., The Free Economy and 
the Strong State: the Politics of Thatcherism (Basingstoke: Macmillan, Second Edition, 1994), pp. 77-
81; Gilmour, I., Dancing with Dogma: Britain under Thatcherism (London: Simon and Schuster, 
1992), the latter constituting a scathing critique of Thatcherism and its neoliberal manifestations by an 
ousted traditional Tory. 
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(ii) The context 
Before I can consider that question in detail, it needs to be established that the assault 
of “Thatcherism” on the British social democratic state and its institutions is 
positioned within the ideological “big picture” of the neoliberal project. This is 
represented by the objectives of the Mont Pelerin Society, formed in 1947 by 
Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman and other free-market economists much favoured 
by Thatcher, Keith Joseph and their supporters.
19
 That project sought to move 
Western democracies away from a broadly “social”/progressive liberalism (as 
developed in Britain by - for example - the later J. S. Mill through to L. T. 
Hobhouse) to “a new liberalism”, reflecting elements of the Manchester School of 
the 1830s.
20
 In terms of Newman, Mill and others, their idea of a liberal university 
education is to be understood as expressing the underlying notion of “social” 
liberalism, as something open and available, “liberal” in an everyday sense of the 
term.
21
 However, I am not setting up a dichotomy between liberal and vocational 
subjects. What I am highlighting is that neoliberal governments have identified 
                                               
19 The Mont Pelerin Society’s Aims assert a ‘belief in private property and the competitive market’ so 
that ‘freedom may be effectively preserved’: www.montpelerin.org [accessed 10 September 2012]. 
Daniel Stedman Jones (op. cit.) gives a comprehensive history and commentary on the various strands 
of neoliberalism and its liberal roots, showing that some aspects of neoliberalism derive from 
eighteenth and nineteenth century English Whig politics (from which the Liberal Party took elements 
in its development from the 1860s). Friedman called for a “new” liberalism, while Hayek rooted his 
neoliberalism back in the ideals of the Whigs, emphasising above all that he was not a Conservative. 
Stedman Jones tracks the influence of the Mont Pelerin Society on New Right politicians and its 
transatlantic cross-fertilisations. Thatcher recalls how, early in the 1950s, she was inspired as a Young 
Conservative by Hayek’s writings, which she commended to her Cabinet as Prime Minister: see 
Thatcher, M., The Downing Street Years (London: Harper Collins, 1993), p. 12. Similarly, Joseph 
circulated a reading list of these gurus’ texts to his civil servants at the Department of Industry when 
he became Secretary of State in May 1979: see Riddell, P., The Thatcher Government (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1985), p. 26. 
20 Eccleshall, R., Geoghegan, V., Jay, R., Kenny, M., MacKenzie, I. and Wilford, R., Political 
Ideologies: An Introduction (London: Routledge, Second Edition, 1994), pp. 49-53; Stedman Jones, 
D., op. cit., pp. 10-12. Hobhouse valued not just individual rights but ‘the common good’ and ‘social 
progress’, stating his ‘positive conception of the State’ which was ‘necessary to [the] effective 
realization’ of personal liberty: Hobhouse, L. T., Liberalism (London: Thornton Butterworth Ltd., 
1934), p. 134. Friedman characterised Thatcher, however, as a nineteenth-century liberal of the 
Manchester School, favouring laissez-faire economics and minimal government interference in the 
market: see Gilmour, I., Dancing with Dogma, op. cit., p. 13. 
21 The American educationalist John Dewey wrote: ‘Liberal education becomes a name for the sort of 
education that every member of the community should have: the education that will liberate his 
capacities and thereby contribute both to his own happiness and his social usefulness. […] In short a 
liberal education is one that liberalizes. Theoretically any type of education may do this.’ - Dewey, J., 
‘Liberal education’, in Monroe, P. (ed.), A Cyclopedia of Education, Volume 4 (New York: 
Macmillan, 1913), p. 6, quoted in Silver, H. and Brennan, J., A Liberal Vocationalism (London: 
Methuen, 1988), p. 4. 
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radically different neoliberal and, crucially, instrumental purposes for higher 
education as a whole. 
 
Positioning itself within the Tory Party, the British New Right set out systematically 
to put a free-market ideology into practice in government from 1979 through all the 
structures and organs - the state apparatuses - of British society.
22
 Thatcher and her 
followers were explicit about their radical agenda from the start and, once in 
government, they set to work to reverse the post-war “settlement” by cutting back 
government expenditure in publicly-funded areas; to curb the power of trade unions 
and to banish collectivism and socialism from Britain;
23
 and to shift people towards 
an overriding focus on the benefits of private property, enterprise and economic 
individualism. To achieve their ideological ends, the relationship which had 
developed post-war between the state and the people had to be reconfigured, so that 
the new liberalism would appear to be “common sense”. As Thatcher later wrote in 
her memoirs, she had hoped that, by the time they took office, ‘our agenda would, 
with luck, strike people as familiar common sense rather than as a wild radical 
project’.24 They needed to move people away from the post-war social democratic 
consensus of the welfare state and to bring into being instead the sort of individual -
and competitive relationship between individuals - that neoliberals took to be 
“natural” and demanded that everyone else take as “natural” too. The manner in 
which British higher education - and all areas of the public sector, gradually, one by 
one - has changed since 1979 and come to reflect neoliberal characteristics can best 
be understood as the outcome of this ideologically-driven agenda. 
 
                                               
22 The Tory Party had not previously identified itself with a radical ideological approach. Disraeli (in 
1867) stressed the importance of ‘the manners, the customs, the laws, and the traditions of a people’ as 
opposed to ‘abstract principles, and arbitrary and general doctrines’: quoted in Gamble, A., op. cit., p. 
139. Gilmour (Inside Right, op. cit., p. 83) draws attention to a later speech (1872) in which, in the 
tradition of Edmund Burke, Disraeli emphasised the importance of the country’s established 
institutions. Roger Scruton demonstrates traditional Tory scepticism about ideology: ‘[C]onservatism 
arises from the sense that one belongs to some continuing and pre-existing social order, and that fact 
is all important in determining what to do.’ - quoted in Hayes, M., The New Right in Britain: an 
Introduction to Theory and Practice (London: Pluto Press, 1994), p. 5. See also fn.18 above. 
23 To the Conservative Party Conference on 10 October 1975, Thatcher said: ‘Britain and Socialism 
are not the same thing. As long as I have health and strength, they never will be.’ -
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/102777 [accessed 26 July 2013]. By 1985, she confirmed 
even more confidently: ‘I have always regarded part of my job as - and please do not think of it in an 
arrogant way - killing Socialism in Britain.’ - Thatcher in Financial Times, 14 November 1985, 
quoted by Schwarz, B., ‘The Thatcher Years’, in Miliband, R., Panitch, L. and Saville, J. (eds), The 
Socialist Register (London: Merlin Press, 1987), pp. 144-145. 
24 Thatcher, M., The Downing Street Years, op. cit., p. 5. 
 16 
 
(iii) Commentaries on higher education in the Thatcher years 
There have been many scholarly accounts of the twentieth-century history of higher 
education, written around the 1980s, giving the background to successive 
government policies and their implementation. Most educationalists take up a 
position as “neutral” documenters of events, tracking the shift from an élite to a mass 
higher education system and concluding that, once student numbers grew 
substantially and the state became the predominant funder, then increased state 
intervention in higher education to make it serve government-dictated ends was 
either inevitable, or understandable given various factors, or just happened.
25
 Such 
commentators demonstrate an interest in the fact that higher education changed, and 
examine the policy implications, but they do not address how it is possible for a 
fundamental shift to have occurred. 
 
For example, John Carswell (in his study of the relationship of universities to the 
state, written in the mid-1980s) considers that different decisions in the policy-
making process could have been possible at various stages, but views such decisions 
as specific instances: he does not put the decision-making process as a whole into 
any political or ideological context. Characterising his story in somewhat gloomy 
tones as ‘the change from euphoria to despair’,26 he can conclude only that, dating 
from the early 1960s onwards, ‘the recognisable steps from a continuum to a formal 
and ultimately adversarial relationship [between government and the universities] 
can be seen as inevitable’.27 Similarly, in tracking specifically the changes leading up 
to the 1988 Education Reform Act, Gareth Williams characterises the Act as ‘the 
inevitable result of the public funding of the universities after the Second World 
War’, considering that history to be ‘a progression of incremental change’.28   
 
In his 1994 leading analysis of the relationship between the University Grants 
Committee (UGC) and the universities and government, Michael Shattock concludes 
                                               
25 Martin Trow’s widely accepted definitions are: élite higher education comprises up to 15% of 
school-leavers; mass higher education constitutes up to 40%; and universal higher education is over 
40%, quoted in Kogan, M. and Hanney, S., Reforming Higher Education (London: Jessica Kingsley, 
2000), p. 66. 
26 Carswell, J., Government and the Universities in Britain: Programme & Performance 1960–1980 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 117. 
27 Ibid., p. 161. 
28
 Williams, G., ‘Higher Education’, in Flude, M. and Hammer, M. (eds), The Education Reform Act 
1988: its Origins and Implications (Lewes, Sussex: Falmer Press, 1990), p. 262. 
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that the demise of the UGC was because it was overtaken by ‘the pressures of 
politics, demography and financial stringency’, which was not so much to do with 
‘political attitudes’ as ‘its inability to manage the university system effectively within 
the constraints imposed by its constitutional position’. ‘This inability’, he claims, 
‘was exacerbated by government policies but was not a product of them.’ He 
continues: ‘That government wanted more control of the university system is not in 
doubt and should not be surprising bearing in mind the rising cost of higher 
education.’ He appears to take the political context for granted. For instance, he 
seems to take as a given the first Thatcher Government’s decision to reduce public 
expenditure and encourage universities to seek private funding. He refers to ‘the 
Thatcher revolution’ without examining its interrelationship in ideological terms with 
the higher education sector.
29
   
 
Other commentators acknowledge that ideological factors were involved, but present 
little analysis either of what an ideological process actually is, or of how its specific 
manifestations worked in particular cases. For example, Maurice and David Kogan, 
writing soon after the 1981 university cuts, condemn the Government’s moves as an 
attack on higher education’s liberal values. However, while recognising the 
Government’s belief in market solutions, they conclude that the consequences of the 
Government’s actions were unintended, and they fail to comment on that assertion. 
They simply cast the Government’s actions as having been ‘begun in ignorance and 
confusion’, and having ‘gathered particular biases’ as the situation developed.30   
 
In a later text in 2000, Maurice Kogan and Stephen Hanney favour an explanation 
based on what they call ‘the power of intention and ideology’, but do not think it ‘to 
be always the driving force of change’, which happens ‘partly by the power of 
circumstances’.31 They do not explain what they mean by these phrases, simply 
stating that ‘the economic ideology’ was pushed to the fore by a more interventionist 
state, and that the former ‘clashed with the classic liberal notions the government 
espoused of rolling back the frontiers of the state and encouraging a market 
                                               
29 Shattock, M., The UGC and the Management of British Universities (Buckingham: SRHE and the 
Open University Press, 1994), p. 154, p. 136, p. 112 and p. 145 respectively. 
30
 Kogan, M. with Kogan, D., The Attack on Higher Education (London: Kogan Page, 1983), p. 12. 
31 Kogan, M. and Hanney, S., op. cit., p. 237.  
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system’.32 Summarising the history of this as largely one of ‘issue emergence and 
resolution’, they conclude that they are unable to present any clear picture as to ‘how 
policies emerged and ideologies were sponsored’.33  
 
Similarly, Brian Salter and Ted Tapper (in their extensive body of work from the late 
1970s onwards) view what happened as ‘the ideological struggle between the 
economic view of higher education and the traditional liberal ideal of the 
university’.34 Like others, they recognise the New Right’s attempts to bring the 
concept of the market into higher education. However, although frequently using the 
term “ideology”, their analysis of its effects is constrained by a lack of explanation of 
the way in which they are interpreting the term. They in fact use it (as do Kogan and 
Hanney) simply to denote single ideas or policy directions - for example, ‘the 
economic view of higher education’ - and to view these as clashes in ‘the continuing 
dynamic for change’.35 But what does this amount to as an explanation? 
 
Ron Barnett often returns to discuss ideology and ideologies in the university context 
in his considerable body of work. He views ideology as an externally-driven and 
nefarious force, and seeks to ‘neutralize’ it, expressing his interest in effectively a 
liberal higher education ‘in which the minds of students are really free, and do not 
succumb unwittingly to ideology’.36 Later, he applies the term “ideology” to specific 
trends and characteristics of university life, such as ‘entrepreneurialism’ or ‘quality’, 
which he characterises as either ‘pernicious’ or ‘virtuous’ ideologies.37 So, like both 
Kogan and Hanney and Salter and Tapper, he talks about ‘quality’ - for example - as 
an ideology, rather than seeing the former - as I do - as merely a specific 
manifestation of a much broader ideological structure, and so does not discuss in any 
detail the place of universities in the larger constructions more traditionally termed 
ideologies, such as liberalism or socialism or neoliberalism.
38
   
 
                                               
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., pp. 231-236. 
34 Salter, B. and Tapper, T., The State and Higher Education (Ilford, Essex: Woburn Press, 1994),  
p. x. 
35 Ibid., p. ix. 
36 Barnett, R., The Idea of Higher Education (Buckingham: SRHE and the Open University Press, 
1990), p. 91. 
37 Barnett, R., Beyond All Reason: Living with Ideology in the University (Buckingham: SRHE and the 
Open University Press, 2003). 
38 Indeed he is rather dismissive of those who set the discussion up in this way (ibid., p. 206, fn.2). 
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In his 1989 article on higher education in the Thatcher years, Peter Scott adopts the 
useful tool of organising others’ accounts into three categories. His first set of 
commentators describe the moves Thatcher made towards higher education as 
constituting a largely positive process of radical modernisation or reform; the second 
set tell the story as an evolution, stressing the continuity with what went before; and 
the third set consider Thatcher’s moves as a largely negative radical reaction to - and 
abandonment of - an earlier liberal agenda. In framing his own account, Scott takes 
elements from all three, structuring what happened to higher education under the 
Thatcher Governments into phases and trends, at the end of which he highlights the 
Government’s attempts to create ‘conditions in which free competition can thrive’ in 
higher education.
39
 He considers that the third trend - the subordination of 
universities to the state - ‘had already been set’ prior to the Thatcher Governments of 
the 1980s, that Thatcher simply accelerated its pace.
40
 However, Scott confesses that 
he was unable to conclude (at that time of writing) much more than that the effect of 
“Thatcherism” on higher education is ‘difficult to weigh up’ in ideological terms.41   
 
Political theorists have of course analysed extensively both ideology and 
Thatcherism (to which I turn in Chapters 2 and 3 respectively) but have paid scant 
attention to higher education’s place within an ideological framework. Dating from 
around the time it became apparent that the Governments of New Labour Prime 
Minister, Tony Blair (1997-2007), were intent on extending - rather than reversing - 
a Thatcherite agenda, many academics and political activists have written and 
campaigned against forms of neoliberalism now endemic in British universities.
42
  
                                               
39 Scott, P., ‘Higher Education’, in Kavanagh, D. and Seldon, A. (eds), The Thatcher Effect - a Decade 
of Change (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 210. 
40 Ibid., p. 209. 
41 Ibid., p. 210. 
42 See, for example: Robinson, A. and Tormey, S., ‘New Labour’s neoliberal Gleichschaltung: the 
case of higher education’, The Commoner, Spring/Summer 2003: available at 
http://www.thecommoner.org [accessed 22 February 2012], p. 8; Brecher, B., ‘Complicity and 
modularisation: how universities were made safe for the market’, Critical Quarterly, Volume 47, 
Issue 1-2, 2005, pp. 72-82; Callinicos, A., Universities, op. cit; Hotson, H., ‘Don’t Look to the Ivy 
League’, London Review of Books, Volume 33, Number 10, 19 May 2011, pp. 20-22: available at 
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v33/n10/howard-hotson/dont-look-to-the-ivy-league [accessed 15 August 2013]; 
Collini, S., What Are Universities For? (London: Penguin Books, 2012). See also Collini’s earlier 
articles: ‘Impact on humanities: Researchers must take a stand now or be judged and rewarded as 
salesmen’, The Times Literary Supplement, Number 5563, 13 November 2009, pp. 18-19; ‘Browne’s 
gamble’, London Review of Books, Volume 32, Number 21, 4 November 2010, pp. 23-25: available at 
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v32/n21/stefan-collini/brownes-gamble [accessed 8 November 2010]; and ‘From 
Robbins to McKinsey’, London Review of Books, Volume 33, Number 16, 25 August 2011: available 
at http://www.lrb.co.uk/v33/n16/stefan-collini/from-robbins-to-mckinsey [accessed 28 August 2011]. 
See also the debates on the websites of the Council for the Defence of British Universities, available at 
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Most view the manifestations of neoliberalism as external impositions on academe 
and, although they are very clear that this agenda stems from the Thatcher years, they 
do not offer explanations as to how neoliberalism was imposed on universities or 
how the latter permitted it to take hold. 
 
On a more general level, other commentators, politicians and journalists have written 
histories or commentaries of the Thatcher years or biographies of Thatcher (with her 
death in 2013 prompting some renewed interest). These contain useful contextual 
information but, by their nature, do not amount to either a detailed analysis of the 
ideological context of her Governments or of particular manifestations of the 
ideology in areas of the state apparatus, such as higher education.
43
 
 
In sum, educationalists’ early accounts of higher education under Thatcher contain 
many valid observations on the issues and events of those times but they stop short of 
analysing the ideological process that enabled fundamental change to be wrought; 
later analysts pinpoint the effects but do not study in detail their provenance; and 
political theorists do not include the place of higher education in their analyses of 
ideology or Thatcherism. Whilst in part some of these shortcomings may be due to 
the fact that it is now easier, with hindsight, to see the significance of certain factors 
and a process at work, I conclude that existing commentaries fail to address my 
initial question seeking explanation. I contend that it is inadequate to assert that the 
changes resulting in a more government-dominated, market-oriented, employment-
driven higher education system have occurred consequentially, inevitably, 
unavoidably, as a “natural” by-product of the move from an élite to a mass higher 
education system required to meet the needs of modern society.   
                                                                                                                                     
http://cdbu.org.uk, and the Campaign for the Public University, available at 
http://publicuniversity.org.uk [both accessed 5 March 2013].  
43 For discussions by political theorists and other general commentaries, see for example: Hall, S. and 
Jacques, M. (eds), The Politics of Thatcherism (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1983); Riddell, P., 
op. cit; Levitas, R. (ed.), The Ideology of the New Right (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986); Schwarz, B., 
op. cit., pp. 116-152; Dunleavy, P. and O’Leary, B., Theories of the State: the Politics of Liberal 
Democracy (London: Macmillan, 1987); Jessop, B., Bonnett, K., Bromley, S. and Ling, T. (eds), 
Thatcherism: a Tale of Two Nations (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988); Plant, R., ‘Ideology’, in 
Drucker, H., Dunleavy, P., Gamble, A. and Peele, G. (eds), Developments in British Politics 2 
(Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 8-33; Dunleavy, P., Gamble, A., and Peele, G. (eds), 
Developments in British Politics 3 (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1990); Gilmour, I., Dancing 
with Dogma, op.cit; Young, H., One of Us (London: Macmillan, Final Edition, 1993); Thatcher, M., 
The Downing Street Years, op. cit; Kavanagh, D. and Seldon, A. (eds), op. cit.; Gamble, A., op. cit; 
Hayes, M., op. cit; Moore, C., Margaret Thatcher: The Authorised Biography – Volume One: Not for 
Turning (London: Allen Lane, 2013). 
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(iv) An ideological process 
Higher education’s current neoliberal characteristics did not appear from nowhere. 
As others have argued more generally, the neoliberal ideological transformation did 
not occur ‘by accident’, as David Harvey puts it.44 That neoliberalism has become a 
dominant ideology in many parts of the world is often seen as ‘a necessary, even 
wholly “natural”, way for the social order to be regulated’, Harvey comments.45 It 
has developed ‘pervasive effects on ways of thought to the point where it has become 
incorporated into the common-sense way many of us interpret, live in, and 
understand the world’, he writes.46 Mary Evans also challenges the way in which 
‘present-day constructions of the needs of the marketplace’ are seen ‘as both 
definitive reality and definitive knowledge’.47 Doreen Massey similarly observes: 
‘That markets are natural is now so embedded in the structure of thought that even 
the fact that it is an assumption is rarely brought to light.’48   
 
My central claim is that we can begin to understand this radical change and its 
specific manifestations in organisational contexts, including how a neoliberal agenda 
has taken hold in a traditionally liberal higher education system, only if we 
understand the process ideologically. While it is the case that many of the changes to 
higher education under Thatcher took place in a ‘piecemeal and pragmatic fashion’,49 
this does not mean that no ideological process was at work. Universities are now 
operating to agenda that reflect neoliberal characteristics: centralised control, 
accountability, differentiation, specification, outsourcing and privatisation of 
services. But if one considers the changes in more detail, some appear to be puzzling, 
contradictory, paradoxical and even contrary to the theoretical goals of the political 
parties who proposed them or to the traditions of the sector which accepted them. For 
instance, how and why have historically liberal universities accepted the competitive 
and preferential funding and promotion of some subjects over others; the drive to 
                                               
44 Harvey, D., op. cit., p. 1. 
45 Ibid., p. 41. 
46 Ibid., p. 3. 
47 Evans, M., ‘A home of one’s own’, Times Higher Education, 12 April 2012, p. 26: available at 
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?sectioncode=26&storycode=419623 [accessed 14 
April 2012]. 
48 Massey, D., ‘Ideology and economics in the present moment’, Soundings, Issue 48, Summer 2011, 
p. 33. 
49
 Bird, R., ‘Reflections on the British Government and Higher Education’, Higher Education 
Quarterly, Volume 48, Number 2, 1994, p. 83. 
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increase vocational, part-time and work-related courses, “delivered” via distance 
and/or e-learning; the publication of university “league tables”; the use of selectivity 
and “impact” in funding academic research; centralised admissions; learning being 
expressed in industrial and commercial language, with courses divided up into bite-
sized “modules” whose “outcomes” are documented in “programme 
specifications”?50 Why was increasingly centralised - indeed, ironically, 
‘nationalised’51- control of higher education institutions by government and quangos 
exercised initially by a Tory government? Surely Tories believe in the power of the 
individual, the free market, minimal interference by the state, and even ultimately 
privatised independent institutions? Furthermore, why was this centralisation 
accepted and mirrored at institutional level by many university managers (often 
formerly practising academics) whose precursors had reflected traditional liberal 
values? Did the former want to be dominated by government; did they change their 
views; or did they have no choice? Why did some of these changes at national level 
come to be supported, defended and even actively promoted - and in later decades 
extended - by those who were originally political opponents of the Tories? What 
sense can be made of this? 
 
Some might say, as we noted earlier, that the changes “just happened” or could not 
be resisted; others that higher education had to change in this way because more 
people need a more “relevant” higher education to enable Britain to become more 
economically competitive in world markets, or that universities needed to come 
down from their “ivory towers”, be “modernised” and join “the real world”.52 Or it 
could be claimed that some of the changes have engendered a better and more 
accessible form of higher education, morally and/or pedagogically, than the earlier 
traditional three-year full-time state-funded undergraduate course of study.
53
 
However, irrespective of one’s view of these or any other changes, I maintain that 
                                               
50 Brecher, B., ‘Complicity and modularisation’, op. cit. 
51 Lal, D., Nationalised Universities: Paradox of the Privatisation Age (London: Centre for Policy 
Studies, Policy Study Number 103, 1989), p. 4. 
52 See, for example, DIUS, op. cit. Peter Scott reminds us that ‘modernisation’ was a term much 
favoured by Tony Blair: see Scott, P., ‘The Case for Public Universities’, The Future of Public 
Universities (web forum) (New York: Social Sciences Research Council, 2006): available at 
http://publicuniversities.ssrc.org/commentaries/ [accessed 4 June 2013]. 
53 See, for example, The Guardian (author not stated),14 April 2008, ‘Man with a mission to open 
universities to the many’, interview with John Denham, Labour Secretary of State for DIUS (2007-
2009): available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2008/apr/14/highereducation.accesstouniversity [accessed 20 
June 2010]. 
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they were not simply either inevitable or random responses to economic or social 
needs. What might otherwise appear as an unstructured, often arbitrary and in many 
instances a simply contradictory narrative can be explained if we understand it 
ideologically. In this way, we can see why and how it has been possible to bring 
about radical change from a liberal to an instrumental relationship between higher 
education and the state, and to understand that history and the present day reality in a 
way that a simply descriptive account cannot provide.    
 
Why does this matter? It matters, first, because it enables us to interpret the progress 
of history: what is happening to and in higher education can best be understood on 
the basis of what happened in a particularly politically and ideologically formative 
period - from 1979-1990 - for British society and its institutions, and this helps us to 
understand what happened after and what might happen next, if no other intervention 
is made. Otherwise, it is as if we are simply taking events for granted. Second, it 
offers a case study of how ideological rupture and change - and, ultimately, 
hegemony - is brought about through the construction of a new “common sense” that 
becomes dominant. 
 
(v) Two applications of ideology 
I am claiming that what has occurred is not as simple as it might appear to be, or as 
those who profess a “value-free” or “unbiased” stance would have us believe. If we 
interpret the shift as an ideological process, how are we to understand the workings 
of the term “ideological” in this context? I shall apply Marxist theories of ideology, 
using them as a framework within which to interpret my case study. While my 
approach itself involves assuming an ideological position, namely that the 
development of higher education under Thatcher and since can best be explained by 
applying a Marxist model of ideology, rather than simply accepting that things were 
bound to happen in the way they have, my thesis offers a theory through which to 
test evidence, whereas “simply” descriptive approaches (with their inbuilt 
assumptions) do not. For as Terry Eagleton says: ‘[I]deology offers a set of reasons 
for [particular] material conditions.’54 And as Michael Freeden puts it: ‘Ideologies 
                                               
54 Eagleton, T., Ideology: an Introduction (London: Verso, 1991), p. 209. 
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are the arrangements of political thought that illuminate the central ideas, overt 
assumptions, and unstated biases that in turn drive political conduct.’55   
 
I am looking at how ideology functions in two ways. First, I am considering ideology 
as a set of ideas. Second, I am using the term to designate the way it works to distort 
reality and engineer consent. What follows, then, is to be understood in this “double” 
context of the interplay between ideas and political practice: understanding British 
higher education under Thatcher as an ideological process, we at the same time come 
to understand how such a process works in practice, on the ground. 
 
In the first sense, we can see the Tories’ set of ideas in their 1979 Manifesto and 
other tracts, as was the case with the other political parties seeking election. The 
basic tenets of what they stood for were there for all to see. What was different from 
previous post-war governments was that Thatcher and the New Right Tories had not 
just a set of ideas but an approach that signalled a definitive break with the past, 
including their own party’s middle ground politics of consensus, continuity and ‘one-
nation’ Conservatism.56 The new ideas and approach were far more explicitly 
ideologically driven than had been the case with earlier Tory governments; and this 
was openly acknowledged.   
 
In 1979 the New Right Tories had in outline a set of radical moves which they fully 
intended to make in government. However, not everyone - not even their own 
supporters - had been involved in formulating these ideas; nor were they fully 
worked out. Apart from the committed, many Tories who espoused the traditional 
one-nation Conservatism of ‘the wets’,57 were not even sure whether they agreed 
with the ideas or the approach or that the ideas would work in practice.
58
 The New 
Right needed to make the Tory Party and the general public take their ideas on board 
and make them work. It was not simply a matter of implementing policies to enact a 
                                               
55 Freeden, M., Ideology: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 127. 
56 Disraeli had advocated ‘one nation’ politics: see Gamble, A., op. cit., p. 150. There is also a sense, 
however, in which Thatcherism can be seen, in part, as seeking to re-establish the old order: see 
Freeden, M., ibid., pp. 34-35 and p. 90. 
57 The term ‘wet’, first noted by Jim Prior in 1976, characterised those who opposed, or did not 
demonstrate wholehearted enthusiasm for, Thatcher’s proposed policies: see Young, H., op. cit., pp. 
198-199; Gamble, A., op. cit., p. 118; and Gilmour, I., Dancing with Dogma, op. cit. 
58
 Thatcher later termed the process of bringing her own Party around to her views as ‘the Party’s 
conversion to its own philosophy’: see Thatcher, M., The Downing Street Years, op. cit., p. 13. 
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pre-determined detailed plan. In order to understand what happened and why, it is of 
course necessary to consider the content of their ideas; but this will not on its own 
explain why and how the ideas developed in certain ways and came to be accepted. If 
it were simply a matter of presenting ideas and putting them into practice, the New 
Right Tories might have stated from the outset what they wanted to achieve for 
higher education. For example, they could have said in the run-up to the election in 
1979 that they wanted to cut undergraduate student numbers in universities because 
fewer and only rich people should have access to a university education at taxpayers’ 
expense, while others should be directed towards a technical training at a much lower 
level. They could have stated in their 1979 Manifesto that they needed to limit access 
to higher education as a means of safeguarding standards for the élite because only 
the rich and those of a certain ideological persuasion should go to the “best” 
universities, as only those graduates were likely to remain ‘one of us’,59 and only 
they would be able to afford to pay tuition fees and maintenance costs once 
universities had been privatised. They could have said that, for all other students and 
higher education institutions, they wanted to cut the length of degrees and change the 
predominant mode of undergraduate degree study from full- to part-time so that 
students could live at the parental home and undertake paid work at the same time as 
their studies; that there should be an increase in class sizes and academics’ and 
administrators’ workloads; that courses should be modularised, in order to fragment 
sustained and coherent study by stunting critical thought; that they wanted radically 
to undermine the previously widely-accepted idea of a “student”; that the power of 
students’ unions should be curbed; and that a PR sham of “quality assurance” should 
be created to paint a gloss over it all.  They could have clearly stated that all this was 
to be done to promote a radical agenda of “higher education” for the masses 
consisting of short-term, cheap, narrowly occupational training as opposed to 
education, which they saw as politically dangerous (as proved to them by the 
students' and workers' demonstrations and strikes of the 1960s and 1970s). They 
could have said that, in order to promote neoliberalism, they needed to restructure 
higher education in a neoliberal mode, to create a market in higher education, and to 
make it serve government-dictated instrumental ends. However, even if they had 
fully known at that stage what could - or even should - be done and had presented a 
                                               
59
 Thatcher apparently asked advisers when considering people for appointments: ‘Is he one of us?’: 
see Gamble, A., op. cit., p. 145. 
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ready worked-out “blueprint”, such plain talking would hardly have been likely to 
win votes. If they had explicitly stated that they wanted to change the ideology of 
students and academics, to cut provision, and to engineer demand to follow a 
government agenda, then their own backbenchers and the electorate would have 
rejected both their ideas and their dictatorial imposition. Newly won over to 
Thatcher’s enchanting promises of personal freedom and material gain, the post-war 
rising working and middle classes, who were now increasingly expecting their 
children and grandchildren to go to university, would not have voted them in. 
 
As the ideas of the incoming Thatcher Government were by no means watertight and 
did not necessarily “hang together”, persuading people to convert to the ideas could 
not be achieved by argument alone. As the set of ideas constituting Thatcherism was 
often incoherent and contradictory, it had to be a matter of trial and error to see what 
could be borne at any one time, and what might be helped along by a combination of 
existing circumstances and chance occurrences and exigencies. The politicians 
needed to work at the interface and on the contradictions, using what Harvey terms 
‘the tension between the theory of neoliberalism and the actual pragmatics of 
neoliberalization’.60 They had to proceed step by step and make their moves look 
“common sensical” and thus legitimate. Acceptance of New Right ideas and 
practices had to become a free choice but adherence needed to be constructed and 
seem inevitable. For example, it had to be made to be common sense to MPs and 
“the taxpayer” to cut universities’ funding in 1981 because too much public money 
was being spent on them - and that this was simply wrong per se. In any case, the 
Government would argue, the cost outweighed the benefit because standards were 
falling because there were too many universities; that they were in any case teaching 
the “wrong” subjects; and, on top of that, producing students with a lack of social 
responsibility. Once - if - people were persuaded of this, further steps could be taken. 
In short, and as I will show later, Thatcher needed to build her ideology.   
 
How could this be achieved? How could people be eventually won over? To explain 
what happened to higher education under Thatcher, it is necessary to go beyond a 
merely descriptive - as it were, phenomenological - account of the set of ideas that 
developed over the decade. This requires using the term ideology also in a second 
                                               
60 Harvey, D., op. cit., p. 21. 
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sense, to designate the way in which it functions to distort reality and build consent. I 
am therefore starting from the notion that this sense of ideology, in going beyond its 
referring to a set of ideas, captures how people are brought to experience a particular 
view of the world, to accept a particular set of ideas. In this sense, ideology is a 
medium through which interests come together, or can be brought together, to create 
a common interest or “common sense” to which people can be recruited and in turn 
recruit others. In order to make this work, it draws a veil over some things; and in 
this way may be said to mask reality. I am not arguing here for any particular 
conception of what “reality” is or what I think it should be. I am not making an 
epistemological claim about Thatcherism or one about whether or not its “real” ideas 
can be uncovered. In short, I am not subscribing to any particular epistemological 
view of what is “really” real and what is not. Rather, I am asking a particular 
question in one context and at one time: why and how is it that these conditions 
produced this set of ideas, forms and practices which were able to hold sway, 
working partly by the distortion of “reality”, and amounting to such radical changes 
in the relationship between higher education and the state? We shall see that the 
“reality” presented by Thatcher and her followers in respect of the actual situation in 
higher education and their relation to it was, even in their own terms, ‘manifestly not 
the case’,61 because circumstances in particular instances had been obscured and 
distorted. But through a series of projects on many different fronts, and by winning 
battles along the way, the New Right was able to build people’s acceptance of a 
changed way of looking at higher education. “Key messages” and the publication of 
successes in one sector could be made to reinforce the new “reality” in all.62 Over 
time, people would come to accept this new state of affairs as “normal” and 
understand themselves as actors within its parameters, rather than in terms of the 
status quo ante.   
 
(vi) The role of pragmatism and contradiction  
So if we stand back and offer an ideological account of the changes to higher 
education in the Thatcher years, we can test the premise that ideological change was 
in part the outcome of a deliberate agenda, and in part functioned through distorting - 
                                               
61 Eagleton, T., op. cit., p. 14. 
62 Thatcher’s appointment of Bernard Ingham as her chief press secretary and propagandist marked 
the beginnings of the explicit “politicisation” of government communications, later consolidated 
under the Blair governments. My thanks to Pauline Sinkins (formerly Head of Communications, 
Directorate of Health and Social Care [South]) for this point. 
 28 
 
or only partially representing - reality. These two interrelated ways in which ideology 
operated were strengthened by the New Right simply capitalising pragmatically on 
events and circumstances. The progress of the ideology was not thwarted by whether 
or not individual elements of the Thatcher Governments’ policies made sense in 
themselves or in relation to others, or whether or not they succeeded in imposing this 
or that individual policy in the way it was originally presented. The way in which a 
situation unfolded enabled them to see what could and could not be achieved at the 
most appropriate time. Something else could always be tried instead, or the original 
attempt resurrected later. For example, the idea of two-year degrees was at the time 
presented as an end in itself, and believed to be so both by those in favour and those 
against. That they did not materialise did not matter: once resources became tighter, a 
variant of the idea - so-called ‘Foundation’ degrees, for the less able - would be taken 
up by the former polytechnics and colleges of higher education. That might be 
perceived as a victory by those opposing two-year degrees since they were kept out 
of most universities. However the New Right’s ability to capitalise on whatever was 
“going on” - or allegedly going on - lent strength to its project overall. What was 
most important was that the ideology was being practised and the “endgame” 
remained clear: to move people to a predominantly neoliberal way of thinking, so 
that neoliberalism became people’s “new reality”. If the situation availed itself, 
‘shock tactics’63 could be used, whereby a crisis was created or a state of affairs 
embellished in order to force change:
64
 for instance, the “need” for immediate cuts to 
                                               
63 Naomi Klein describes how Friedman advised the Chilean dictator General Augusto Pinochet on the 
need for ‘shock treatment’ in order to embed free market economics and banish Allende’s socialism 
from Chile, stating that ‘it was the only medicine. Absolutely. There is no other. There is no other 
long-term solution.’- quoted in Klein, N., The Shock Doctrine (London: Allen Lane, 2007), p. 81. The 
Thatcher Government did not use physical violence to the same extent as Pinochet but did use attack 
(such as by the police against the striking mineworkers and their supporters), either deliberately or 
opportunistically, to obtain submission. Peregrine Worsthorne, in 1978, expressed his fear of ‘the 
spectre haunting Britain’, that is, that ‘ordinary people [are] being allowed to run wild’, whereas what 
was required was ‘an ugly battle to restore some minimum of social order’: quoted in Hayes, M., op. 
cit., p. 7. William Whitelaw is reported to have said: ‘If we hadn’t had the Toxteth riots, I doubt if we 
could have dealt with Arthur Scargill.’ - quoted in Young, H., op. cit., p. 368. Thatcherite Alfred 
Sherman considered that ‘if the unemployed get lower benefits, they will be quicker to start looking 
for work. […] As for the lumpen proletariat, coloured people and the Irish, let’s face it, the only way 
to hold them in check is to have enough properly trained police.’- quoted in Gilmour, I., Dancing with 
Dogma, op.cit., p. 117. See also Ch. 3, fn.34. 
64 Friedman advised that ‘only a crisis - actual or perceived - produces real change. When that crisis 
occurs the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are around. […] Our basic function [is] to 
develop alternatives to existing policies […] until the politically impossible becomes politically 
inevitable.’- quoted in Hall, S., ‘The neoliberal revolution’, Soundings, Issue 48, Summer 2011, p. 11. 
Martin Cohen writes: ‘A crisis is never bad news for a shrewd politician: it is an opportunity to 
implement an agenda’; and he quotes Rahm Emanuel, former policy adviser to Barack Obama 
(President of the United States, 2009- ), who stated: ‘You never want a serious crisis to go to waste.’ - 
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universities in 1981 or the alarmist allegations that some higher education institutions 
or educational bodies were being overrun by “ideological” or “biased” Marxist 
academics and students, thus requiring investigation by government agents.
65
   
 
But wasn’t it contradictory to Tory ideas of freedom to impose cuts in particular 
subject areas on free universities, for example, or to intervene in their internal 
affairs? As we shall see later, distortions, contradictions, limitations and 
inconsistencies inherent in the Thatcher Governments’ own practices and in those of 
their liberal opponents could be harnessed to force change and help build consent to - 
or at least acceptance of - policies.
66
 For example, we shall see that the 1981 
university cuts would in fact cost more than they would save, even though the 
Government claimed that the cuts were necessary to save money.
67
 Liberal-minded 
educationalists and politicians could help here as they could be won over for 
                                                                                                                                     
‘Reversing into trouble’, Times Higher Education, 9 December 2010: available at 
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/414510.article [accessed 12 December 2010]. See also 
Monbiot, G., ‘For the Tories, this is not a financial crisis but a long-awaited opportunity’, The 
Guardian, 19 October 2010, p. 31. 
65 Julius Gould (a sociologist at the University of Nottingham) and his fellow ‘Black Papers’ 
contributors accused left-wing teachers and students at the Polytechnic of North London (PNL) of 
denying others freedom of speech and imposing a Marxist ideology: see Gould, J. (ed.), The Attack on 
Higher Education: Marxist and Radical Penetration - Report of a Study Group of the Institute for the 
Study of Conflict (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1977); and Jacka, K., Cox, C., Marks, J., 
Rape of Reason: the Corruption of the Polytechnic of North London (London: Churchill Press, 1975). 
The Secretary of State, Keith Joseph, ordered an investigation. The resultant report alluded to the 
possibility of bias and alleged low academic standards, making various recommendations which were 
implemented: see Department of Education and Science, Report by HM Inspectors on the Polytechnic 
of North London: BSc Sociology, BA Applied Social Studies courses, Inner London, inspected 27-29 
April and 3-6 May 1983, DES 177/83 (London: HMSO, 1983). The validating body - the Council for 
National Academic Awards (the CNAA) - criticised the HMI report and was subsequently “punished” 
(it was widely thought) by not being invited to sit on the 1984 Lindop Committee, set up to consider 
the future of the very validation process it ran for polytechnic courses: see Silver, H., A Higher 
Education: the Council for National Academic Awards and British Higher Education 1964-1989 
(Basingstoke: Falmer Press, 1990). Thatcher’s and Joseph’s dislike of the social sciences and the 
Social Science Research Council (SSRC), with its “wrong” economic theories, is notorious, Joseph 
repeatedly attempting to cut its funding and change its focus: see, for example, Halsey, A. H., Decline 
of Donnish Dominion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 181-182. Thatcher also interfered at local 
levels, such as by criticising Brighton Polytechnic’s BEd degree for putting too little emphasis on 
‘factual knowledge’ and ‘practical classroom experience’ and too much on “trendy” equal 
opportunities issues: see The Downing Street Years, op. cit., p. 598. 
66 As Slavoj Zizek puts it, an ideology ‘really succeeds when even the facts which at first sight 
contradict it start to function as arguments in its favour’: Zizek, S., The Sublime Object of Ideology 
(London: Verso,1989), p. 49. 
67 For a strikingly similar later example of the same contradiction, see Morgan, J., ‘Reforms’ impact 
on deficit may be less than zero, says Hepi’, Times Higher Education, 25 October 2012, p. 6: 
available at http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/421590.article [accessed 25 October 2012]; 
Million Plus, ‘Economic cost of higher tuition fees almost 6.5 times greater than potential Treasury 
savings’, 18 February 2013: available at http://www.millionplus.ac.uk/press-releases/latest-press-
releases/economic-cost-of-higher-tuition-fees-almost-6.5-times-greater-than-potential-treasury-
savings/ [accessed 25 March 2013]. 
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“change” as they were, for example, finding it increasingly difficult to support élite 
universities which very largely excluded lower social classes and “non-standard” 
entrants. Situations could be harnessed to the service of a much larger goal: 
destabilising universities in order to further a neoliberal agenda. In fact, their 
opponents not perceiving the full extent of how this worked stymied their opposition, 
as specific policies - together with the contradictions in the opponents’ own position 
- often masked the “bigger picture” they ultimately served.68 The internal tensions in 
the Thatcher Governments’ positions, which appear at times to suggest that an 
argument was being lost or did not make sense, did not matter. For even if a 
particular policy or argument was lost, the terms in which the debate was conducted 
in itself helped to bring about the more important fundamental aim. Even if a 
proposal did not make sense, even if reality and reason had been distorted and 
“common sense” made to prevail, there nonetheless had to be an apparently practical 
and pragmatic solution to the “problem” it purported to address. Conditions could be 
created in which people were sufficiently disoriented to believe that a new order was 
“given”, to accept that - in Thatcher’s infamous phrase - there was ‘no alternative’.69   
 
The New Right themselves might have thought (or purported to think) that their ideas 
were not ideological. They might have presented them as pragmatic responses to 
material, economic and social needs, to situations outside their control, a set of ideas 
and solutions based simply on “common sense”. But on both counts they would have 
been mistaken. This sort of ideology works through being deliberately inexplicit, 
through diverting attention from what is actually being sought, or by actually 
distorting “reality”. It functions to further one or other set of interests, irrespective of 
whether or not those promoting these interests know that it is ideology which is at 
work. If people can be brought to believe this “common sense” view of the world, 
the resultant ideological shift will at once reinforce its foundations and set up the 
next step.   
 
 
 
                                               
68 For example, see Brecher, B., ‘Complicity and modularisation’, op. cit. 
69 The phrase “There is no alternative” (TINA) was first used by nineteenth-century liberal Herbert 
Spencer. Young describes Thatcher’s use of the phrase as ‘an assertion that mesmerised the anti-
monetarists, terrorising them into spellbound if curmudgeonly acquiescence’: see Young, H., op. cit., 
p. 205. 
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(vii) Language and practice 
To bring about the changes required, it was vital to start to change the language, 
assumptions, attitudes and practices of those in higher education and, indeed, of 
parents, funders of research, potential employers of graduates, etc. The New Right 
Tories made use of a discourse which served to promote their set of ideas to the 
electorate and, crucially, to their own backbenchers in acceptable, normalising terms. 
To put in place a lasting “cultural revolution”, a movement that would continually 
reinforce and reproduce its basic premises, the New Right - ironically in a quasi-
Maoist way - needed to change material conditions in such a way that the changed 
situation would itself lead to ever more radical ideological change.
70
 That process 
had to be pursued methodically and repeatedly over time, so that the messages would 
be embedded and the ideology internalised and put into practice by the very people 
who might previously have opposed the ideas. In this way, the reality - the practice 
of everyday life in universities - would help to bring about radical changes in ideas, 
without many practitioners, let alone the general public, even noticing the nature of 
developments. Most would not be aware of the wider context and significance of 
changes in higher education until such time as the material conditions had 
themselves determined a new reality. As Stuart Hall puts it:  
[This practice] changes the field of struggle by changing the place, the position, 
the relative weight of the condensations within any one discourse and constructing 
them according to an alternative logic. What shifts them is not ‘thoughts’ but a 
particular practice of class struggle: ideological and political class struggle. What 
makes these representations popular is that they have a purchase on practice, they 
shape it, they are written into its materiality. What constitutes them as a danger is 
that they change the nature of the terrain itself which struggles of different kinds 
are taking place; they have pertinent effects on these struggles, their effect is to  
constitute a new balance of political forces.
71
 
In other words, the practice of an ideology changes the original ground on which its 
ideas are formed.   
                                               
70 John Gray later bemoans ‘the undoing of conservatism’ which had been ‘thrown away in the pursuit 
of a managerialist Cultural Revolution seeking to refashion the entire national life on the 
impoverished model of contract and market exchange’, calling this a ‘Maoism of the Right’, 
amounting to a ‘permanent revolution of unfettered market processes’: Gray, J., Enlightenment’s 
Wake (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 87. Similarly, Tory ex-Cabinet Minister Douglas Hurd, warned: 
‘We shouldn’t give the impression that we believe in a sort of permanent cultural revolution in the 
style of Chairman Mao or Comrade Trotsky.’ - speaking at a fringe meeting, Tory Party Conference, 
Blackpool, 7 October 1993, reported on BBC News at Ten. At the time of the 1988 Education Reform 
Act, Peter Scott wondered whether government had now become ‘an arena for cultural counter-
revolution rather than […] an exercise in rational public administration’: Scott, P., ‘On the silly side’, 
Editorial, The Times Higher Education Supplement, 11 November 1988, p. 40. 
71 Hall, S. and Jacques, M. (eds), op. cit., p. 39. 
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Ideological change can be brought about by persuading people to adopt certain 
concepts, practices and forms of expression - a subtle introduction of ‘newspeak’.72 
The new ideas and directed use of language helps further to shape material changes 
in conditions, which will in turn further shape the reality in question. To take an 
example: the concept of the consumer and the language of the market is now 
accepted and used by higher education managers and even by many practising 
teachers and researchers. How and when and why did this become general parlance 
and practice? The original concept of “student” has in many universities been 
rejected in favour of seeing the student as a “customer” or a “client”. The words are 
used in internal institutional discussions and papers, not only in government policy 
documents. Similarly, the phrases “delivering a module” or “facilitating” a class are 
often used instead of, say, “teaching students”. The language masks and then 
people’s perceptions and practices change. The one reinforces the other.73 To pursue 
the example: the customer, because s/he pays for the service “delivered”, is, of 
course, always right; is entitled to a contract or charter which splits up what they get 
into bite-sized and measurable goods and services; needs to be wooed through glossy 
publicity and bonus offers on the internet into buying the product; gives “consumer 
feedback” through national student surveys as a result of which the service has to be 
changed if the university wants to remain “competitive”; can always complain or 
send it back if it is not good enough or not what they now want; wants access to the 
goods on offer day and night; demands choice; and can always change their mind, 
complain and get a refund, shop around and buy something else somewhere else 
instead. This commercial business language and practice is now used by 
governments, higher education quangos and university managements alike, and is 
changing how some (albeit not all) students and academics see themselves.
74
 As we 
saw earlier, the 2010 Browne Report - a government-commissioned review - on 
                                               
72 A word coined by George Orwell: Orwell, G., Nineteen Eighty-Four (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1970).  
73 Richard Pring describes this process as follows: ‘The “vocationalizing” and the “economizing” of 
the language through which education is described and evaluated (with its audits, performance 
indicators, cost-effectiveness of curriculum delivery, quality assurance, competency-based objectives, 
value-addedness, inputs and outputs, usefulness) transforms [my emphasis] our understanding of 
educational activities and of the values attributed to them.’ - Pring, R., ‘Liberal Education and 
Vocational Preparation’, in Williams, M., Dougherty, R. and Banks, F. (eds), Continuing the 
Education Debate (London: Cassell, 1992), p. 63. 
74 See, for example, Ch. 8, fn.26. 
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higher education conceived and expressed the notions of student and higher 
education almost entirely in this instrumental and business mode.   
 
(viii) The role of universities 
Universities had a central role to play in serving this hegemonic process - but it was 
to be a battle.
75
 Education is the ground on which ‘a major battle for the soul of 
society must be fought’, as the Conservative philosopher Roger Scruton puts it.76 
Thatcher had told the Federation of Conservative Students in 1975: ‘The time has 
come to counter-attack. […] The universities and colleges of education are central 
features in the battleground of ideas.’77 The Thatcherites needed to create conditions 
in which the previously-accepted liberal purposes of higher education could be 
reinterpreted to bring universities and students into the service of a government 
agenda. As if taking a leaf out of a text by Antonio Gramsci or Louis Althusser (to 
whom I turn in Chapter 2), the Tories recognised education’s key role as a state 
apparatus. Along with other aspects of the state, it had become tainted with the 
“wrong” ideology and needed to be “brought round” to the “right” way of thinking. 
For example, a briefing paper for Tory MPs from the Conservative Research 
Department Education Desk Officer, leaked around the time of the 1985 White Paper 
on schools, demonstrates the Government’s commitment to what needed to be done:  
The present government is determined to undo the damage caused by the 
misconceptions of the 1960s. A series of policies is being painstakingly developed 
and gradually implemented - policies necessarily using many different 
instruments, but unusually coherent in their approach and with the potential to 
bring about a restoration of a common-sense approach to education in place of  
Labour’s dogma.78 
Higher education institutions needed to be requisitioned to help bring about a 
fundamental shift in people’s political and social views, attitudes and practices. They 
were a crucial component to be used by politicians in the conversion process of 
others. Everyone - especially young people, whether studying, employed or 
unemployed - had to be re-educated, to be made to reject the excesses of the 1960s 
                                               
75 A ministerial spokesperson termed the Thatcher Government’s actions as a deliberate ‘Kulturkampf 
against British universities’: see Anderson, P., English Questions (London: Verso, 1992), p. 194. 
76 Scruton, R., The Meaning of Conservatism (London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 147. Although an early 
supporter of Thatcherism, Scruton, like other Tory traditionalists (see Chapter 7), became opposed to 
the instrumentalist undermining of liberal higher education. 
77 Thatcher’s Speech to the Federation of Conservative Students’ Conference, 24 March 1975, 
available at http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/102663[accessed 26 July 2013]. 
78
 Knight, C., op. cit., p. 175. The word “systematic” (rather than “coherent”) describes the process 
better. See also fn.65 above. 
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and 1970s and to turn instead to those values that would furnish neoliberalism with 
the rigidly instrumental social structures and attitudes it required for its success. 
People needed to be taught a business-oriented approach to life; the pleasures of 
productivity and competitiveness; and bourgeois/puritan values, such as hard work. 
Those converted to these values could then become the agents who further 
developed, reconfirmed and reproduced the new practices. To this end, higher 
education needed to be - ironically and contradictorily - at once less reliant on public 
funding and more responsive to government-dictated “employment needs”. 
Scrutinising higher education in this context enables us to understand the seemingly 
puzzling shift I outlined at the start; tells us something about the nature of ideology; 
shows how ideological change works; and brings into focus the ideological function 
of higher education itself.   
 
(ix) Evidence, method and structure  
In order to trace this hegemonic process, I start by setting out in the next two 
chapters the senses of “ideology” I am adopting and the contexts of my study. In 
Chapter 2, I consider in more detail Marxist interpretations of the concept and 
workings of ideology and how they might elucidate my initial question. Next I 
consider, in Chapter 3, the two main contexts of my study: first, Thatcherism and 
how it used a “common sense” approach in presenting its ideas and establishing their 
predominance; second, a brief history of the relationship of higher education to the 
state prior to 1979, drawing out those broad concerns on which Thatcher and her 
followers could later capitalise in the construction of their ideology in respect of 
higher education.   
 
The second part of the thesis - from Chapter 4 onwards - narrates the unfolding 
ideological strategy by considering a substantial body of parliamentary documents, 
processes and debates. I have selected these sources as evidence because Parliament 
is where a government’s ideological projects are argued, debated and implemented. 
My analysis constitutes an explication de texte of the relevant parliamentary 
documents and discussions, since Parliament is where the terms of the political 
debate are set, where an ideology is constructed through linguistic activity in the 
legislative context, where ideology is in fact “materialised”.79 Chapters 4-6 set out 
                                               
79 See Ch. 2, fn.71. 
 35 
 
the detailed changes and show how the emerging ideology was formed in theory and 
refined in practice through policy drafts and debates. In Chapter 7, I consider ways in 
which it was strengthened or challenged. I conclude, in Chapter 8, by evaluating the 
extent to which my application of these methods can further an understanding of how 
ideas and practices moved in the way they did in higher education under Thatcher 
and, more generally, the complex way in which an ideology is generated and comes 
to be accepted and put into practice. From my analysis of the arguments and debates, 
I show how a neoliberal ideology began to emerge and take shape for higher 
education, moving from a stage of zealotry amongst Thatcherite supporters to take 
hold more widely as a new consensus came to be constructed and disseminated 
through political and organisational forms. Even though ideological stances assumed 
in respect of higher education were not coherent at the start, or even into the mid-
1980s, the ideology needed to appear as if it were coherent and would succeed, 
gathering its own remorseless momentum as it progressed. Particularly with the 
benefit of hindsight, we can see how this process operated and how a new “common 
sense” was made to prevail.   
 
I shall argue that a successful challenge to the traditional liberal principles and 
structures of higher education was brought about by a combination of the New Right 
being able to gain support for the broad principles underlying their political agenda - 
their set of ideas - and by the way in which ideology worked to make those ideas 
acceptable and coherent. The interplay between these two factors, combined with the 
lack of effective resistance, enabled the New Right to pursue an agenda of radical 
ideological change and thus allowed not only Thatcher but her successors - the New 
Labour Governments from 1997 and, latterly, the Coalition Government of Tories 
and Liberal Democrats since 2010 - to embed an ever more radically instrumental 
view of higher education into its state apparatus and, by extension, out to society as a 
whole. 
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Chapter 2 Marx and Marxists on ideology 
 
(i)  A framework 
This is not intended as a detailed history of the concept or genealogy of ideology or a 
critical evaluation of the various meanings and uses attached to the term. This has 
been voluminously covered elsewhere.
1
 In brief, the term “ideology” was first coined 
by Antoine Destutt de Tracy in the aftermath of the French Revolution to refer to 
“the science of ideas” or “idea-logy”.2 De Tracy was head of the Institut de France, 
founded by the Revolutionary Convention, with Napoleon’s patronage, to spread the 
ideas of the Enlightenment and the new revolutionary social order as the idéologues 
considered these could be established, studied and laid down in the same way as the 
empirical certainties of science. However, as Napoleon began to build an empire 
with himself at its head, the idéologues criticised his increasingly despotic rule; in 
turn, he attacked them, even blaming them for his eventual downfall. In this way, the 
term came to acquire the negative interpretation that ideas - other people’s ideas - 
were “merely” ideology and not “the real world” of human experience. Writing in 
the mid-nineteenth century, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels took up ideology’s 
negative aspect, using this more recently acquired pejorative connotation to criticise 
prevailing German idealist notions. In reaction to - but building on - the work of  
G. W. F. Hegel, Marx and Engels wrote The German Ideology (1845-6), in which 
they rejected the Hegelian notion that ideas “come first” and have some sort of 
“independent” existence, claiming, rather, that “material practice” “came before” 
ideas, and not vice versa.
3
 They gave a ‘critical edge’4 to the notion of ideology, 
which they set at odds with “the truth” inherent in their developing theory of 
historical materialism. Not least because it is from Marx and Engels that much 
                                               
1 See, for example: McCarney, J., The Real World of Ideology (Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press, 
1980); Geuss, R., The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981); Larrain, J., Marxism and Ideology (London and Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1983); McLellan, D., Ideology (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1986); Meszaros, 
I., The Power of Ideology (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989); Eagleton, T., op. cit; Freeden, M., 
Ideology: A Very Short Introduction, op. cit. 
2 For the early history of the usage of the term “ideology”, see Freeden, M., ibid., p. 4; McLellan, D., 
ibid., pp. 5-6.   
3 McLellan (ibid., p. 21) points out that the collection was never properly finished or edited by Marx 
and Engels, only being published in the 1920s. So Gramsci (as Larrain notes, op. cit., p. 78) would not 
have seen their interpretation of ideology in the pejorative sense at the time he was writing in prison, 
although he would of course have been aware of the negative connotation it had already acquired.  
4 McLellan, D., ibid., p. 10; Eagleton, T., op. cit., pp. 43-45. 
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subsequent thinking about the concept of ideology and its applications derives, this is 
my starting-point.
5
 
 
I am drawing on these and later Marxian interpretations of ideology in order to 
develop the two aspects which will elucidate my study: namely ideology as a set of 
ideas; and ideology as a distorting mechanism and a means through which people are 
brought to access and adopt that set of ideas and put them into practice. I am not 
examining everything that Marx and Marxists have said about ideology, or others’ 
commentaries on them, in order to evaluate the validity or otherwise of usages of the 
term ideology within the history of Marxism. Rather, I am using strands of Marxist 
thought on ideology selectively to help frame a theoretically informed account of a 
set of events - changes to higher education in Thatcher’s Britain - that otherwise 
appear contradictory and puzzling. As a means of navigating a way through the many 
interpretations of ideology in order to harness those appropriate for my purposes, I 
adopt Raymond Geuss’s three descriptors of ideology: ideology in terms of its 
descriptive, pejorative and positive connotations.
6
 This is not to imply that these 
descriptors simply follow consecutively in the genealogy of Marxist notions of 
ideology. Rather, I am using them as markers in my framework for the consideration 
of the two concepts of ideology to be applied to my case study.   
 
(ii) The descriptive  
In the first of Geuss’s categories, the ‘descriptive’, one way of viewing ideology is as 
‘an empirical study of human groups - call it “anthropology” ’, as he puts it, ‘[…] 
and how they change over time’.7 Terry Eagleton describes ideologies as ‘belief-
systems characteristic of certain social groups or classes’ which provide a ‘frame’ for 
their views and can be seen as ‘a body of meanings and values encoding certain 
interests relevant to social power’.8 Although clearly descriptive, ideology in this 
mode is not simply a “value-free” scientific phenomenon, as even descriptions are 
located in a particular social context. I employ this sense of ideology in laying out 
the set of ideas that the New Right Tories wanted higher education to espouse; and I 
shall also be describing the traditions and assumptions inherent in higher education 
                                               
5 Marx brought the concept of ideology into ‘intellectual currency’, as McCarney puts it (op. cit., p. i). 
6 Geuss, R., op. cit. 
7
 Ibid, p. 4. 
8 Eagleton, T., op. cit., pp. 43-45. 
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and various understandings of its role, in order to consider the interplay between 
these ideas and those of the Thatcher Governments. I shall address these matters 
largely in Chapters 3 and 4.   
 
(iii) The pejorative 
The study of the “ideology in practice” in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 - and how it relates to 
ideology as a set of ideas - is more complex and uses Geuss’s notion of ideology in 
both ‘pejorative’ and ‘positive’ senses. Using the former, I analyse what was said and 
what happened in Parliament, and the reactions of different interest groups, as a way 
of showing how the proponents of an ideology present it as their version of the truth; 
and how their opponents, contrariwise, consider the situation presented as an 
ideological construct, as a dissimulation and distortion of reality, built on 
contradictions. I shall go on to consider how a Thatcherite ideology came to 
dominate and how opponents were brought to believe, or at least accept, it in Geuss’s 
positive sense.   
 
In the pejorative sense, ideology appears to function not just by means of the strength 
of the ideas but by supporting a flawed or narrow or - not even pejoratively - simply 
a specific set of ideas, and making them look as if they are “truth claims”, with the 
result that people are led to accept a set of beliefs as if these were “the full story”.9 
For example, the New Right Tories wanted from the mid-1970s to bring about public 
acceptance of a radically new set of ideas and a new way of “doing politics”.10 Even 
once in government, they needed to get their policies accepted. As I asked in Chapter 
1, how were they to do this? If they had said, for instance, that they wanted to cut all 
public funding of higher education - a logical extension of the neoliberal position, 
that is that individuals as consumers should pay directly for their own higher 
education and that institutions would survive or fall in the free market - they would 
have been unlikely to get sufficient support at that time. So, as Chapters 4 and 5 will 
show, what they actually argued was that higher education had to take cuts like all 
other areas of public expenditure, that it was costing too much, and that there were in 
any case too many higher education institutions providing an inferior higher 
                                               
9 Freeden, M., Ideology: A Very Short Introduction, op. cit., p. 6. 
10
 Thatcher said in her memoirs: ‘[W]e intended to achieve a fundamental change of direction. We 
stood for a new beginning, not more of the same.’ - The Downing Street Years, op. cit., p. 15.  
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education. Ideology needed to be set to work as a mechanism or means by which 
New Right ideas could be introduced in acceptable terms.   
 
Using the concept of ideology in a pejorative sense, Marx and Engels in The German 
Ideology argue that in capitalism the dominant set of ideas, and therefore the 
ideology supporting it, is bound to be wrong because the ideas are expressions of the 
capitalist way of looking at the world; and that that view is wrong. They claim that, 
in one sense, ideology as a “concrete” set of ideas is both the product and the 
rationalisation of material economic interests, of the economic relations of 
production and the class system. In a second sense - partly inevitably, on account of 
how ideology works, and partly by contrivance (“according to plan”, so to speak) - 
they claim that these ideas also mask and mystify the reality which produces them. 
Ideology, then, works to promote and reproduce the material economic domination it 
represents; and is thus flawed, for it helps to legitimate a mistaken view of the world 
and an unjust form of power. Marx and Engels claim that those who control the 
economic base (the material production) also - and thereby - control ideas, which are 
then used to conceal and justify what is wrong, namely the unequal distribution of 
resources: 
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class 
which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling 
intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its 
disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that 
thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental 
production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal 
expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material 
relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one 
class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance [...]. Insofar, therefore, 
as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-
evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as 
thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the  
ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch.
11
   
Because the ideas of the ruling class are false, the way in which the ruling class 
controls, regulates, and disseminates those ideas - ideology - is also wrong. In sum, 
ideology covers things up and gives rise to what appear to be solutions. It is, as 
                                               
11
 Engels, F. and Marx, K., The German Ideology, ed. Arthur, C. J. (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 
1970), pp. 64-65.  
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Eagleton puts it, ‘an imaginary resolution of real contradictions which blinds men 
and women to the harsh actuality of their social conditions’.12 As McLellan explains:  
What made ideas into ideology was their connection with the conflictual nature of  
social and economic relationships which characterized the labour process. […] It 
was their connection with this class struggle and its social and economic basis that 
gave certain ideas their ideological force. Society was in fact riven by conflicts of 
interest, but in order for it not to fall apart these oppositions were covered up by 
ideas which represented attempts to portray society as cohesive rather than 
conflictual by justifying the asymmetrical distribution of social and economic 
power. [...] What made ideas ideological, therefore, was that they concealed the 
real nature of social and economic relationships and thus serve to justify the 
unequal distribution of social and economic resources in society. It followed that 
not all ideas were ideological but only those which served to conceal social 
contradictions. Hence, while all classes, including the working class, could 
produce ideology, it was only ideology in so far as it served to further the interest  
of the ruling class.
13
 
It is as if things were the wrong way round: ‘[I]n all ideology men and their 
circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera obscura’.14 But this supposes that 
ideology creates nothing more than an illusion, an inversion of a reality which is in 
itself distorted. As Freeden states, for Marx ‘the very notion of ideology served the 
one critical purpose of alerting us to its insidious nature and the need to unmask it’.15 
Its very purpose is to mask reality. The correct way of looking at things - a true 
experience of the material world - would be achieved by confronting the social 
contradictions of the capitalist mode of production through the class struggle.
16
 So, to 
return to the higher education context, while the Government presented the 1981 cuts 
(for example) as an essential saving, its (simply) allegedly saving money was not the 
main ideological point: its purpose (Marx might have said) was to cloud the reality of 
the New Right Tories’ need to regain control of higher education.    
 
For Marx and Engels, ideology operates - in a pejorative sense - as an accessory to 
the crime, so to speak, of the wrong way of looking at things. It helps the ruling class 
                                               
12 Eagleton, T., op. cit., p. 77. 
13 McLellan, D., Ideology, op. cit., pp. 13-14. 
14 Engels, F. and Marx, K., The German Ideology, op. cit., p. 47. For interpretations of the fraught 
concept of the camera obscura, see Mepham, J., 'The theory of ideology in Capital', Radical 
Philosophy, Volume 2, Number 2, 1972, p. 18, fn.31; and Freeden, M., Ideology: A Very Short 
Introduction, op. cit., p. 5.  
15 Freeden, M., op. cit., p. 18. 
16 In his famous statement of the primacy of material practice, Marx wrote in the ‘Preface to A 
Critique of Political Economy’ (1859):‘The mode of production of material life conditions the social, 
political, and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines 
their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness’: in McLellan, 
D. (ed.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 389. 
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to get away with asserting partial truths and to legitimate their ideas by making them 
appear to be universally true. As Marx and Engels wrote: 
[I]f we confine ourselves to saying that these or those ideas were dominant at a 
given time, without bothering ourselves about the conditions of production and 
the producers of these ideas, if we thus ignore the individuals and world 
conditions which are the source of the ideas, we can say, for instance, that during 
the time the aristocracy was dominant, the concepts honour, loyalty, etc. were 
dominant, during the dominance of the bourgeoisie the concepts freedom, 
equality, etc. The ruling class on the whole imagines this to be so. This conception 
of history [...] will necessarily come up against the phenomenon that increasingly 
abstract ideas hold sway, ie ideas which increasingly take on the form of 
universality [...]. [E]ach new class [...] is compelled, merely in order to carry 
through its aim, to represent its interests as the common interest of all the 
members of society, that is, expressed in ideal form: it has to give its ideas the 
form of universality, and represent them as the only rational, universally valid  
ones.
17
      
This incomplete, false, partial ‘idea-ology’ is a phenomenon which is ‘supposed to 
deceive’.18 This is because there is ‘a kind of dissembling or duplicity built into the 
very economic structures of capitalism, such that it cannot help presenting itself to 
consciousness in ways askew to what it actually is’.19 Marx famously said about 
people’s belief in religion: ‘The demand to give up the illusions about their condition 
is a demand to give up a condition that requires illusion.’20 People are drawn in to 
seeing things incorrectly or incompletely: for Marx, ideology is not so much ‘a 
question of logical or empirical falsity but of the superficial or misleading way in 
which truth is asserted’, as McLellan puts it.21 Or, as Norman Geras has it, 
mechanisms are in force such that ‘capitalist society necessarily appears to its agents 
as something other than it really is’.22 Ideology works to convince those within it that 
something is universally rather than contingently true; that is, that something is not 
what it actually is. This needs to be believed both by the dominant class and by those 
being dominated: a dominant ideology works to ‘persuade us to see the world as our 
rulers see it, not as it is in itself’.23 What makes the ideas seem coherent and 
“timeless” is the tendency in ideology to universalise from a particular economic, 
                                               
17 Engels, F. and Marx, K., The German Ideology, op. cit., pp. 65-66. 
18 Eagleton, T., op. cit., p. 39. 
19 Ibid., p. 86. 
20 McLellan, D. (ed.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings, op. cit., p. 64; McLellan, D., Ideology, op. cit.,  
p. 11. 
21 Ibid., p. 18. 
22
 Quoted in Mepham, J., op. cit., p. 14. 
23 Eagleton, T., op. cit., p. 43. 
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social and political context in favour of the proponent’s own ends. Bhikhu Parekh 
describes how, for Marx, ideology helps to present this partial point of view: 
[E]very narrow point of view offers a limited and distorted knowledge of its 
subject matter, and has an inherent tendency to universalise its assumptions and 
categories of thought [...]. [T]he knowing subject is a socially situated being who 
perceives the world from a specific social position characterised by specific 
conditions and forms of thought [...]. [E]very social point of view claims universal 
or absolute validity [...]. For [Marx] an ideology is a body of thought 
systematically biased towards a specific social group. It turns the latter’s 
requirements into universal norms, its needs and interests into the sole criteria of 
human well-being, its view of reason into the sole criterion of rationality, the 
limits of its world into those of the world itself, and so on. In so doing, an 
ideology is forced to [...] give a biased and distorted account of its subject  
matter.
24
 
Ideology in this pejorative sense works, as Eagleton summarises it, to make 
acceptable a set of ideas through ‘processes whereby interests of a certain kind 
become masked, rationalized, naturalized, universalized, legitimated in the name of 
certain forms of political power’.25 This enables an ideology to present itself as if it 
were a ‘world view’.26 Again, to repeat the central point here: what is contingent and 
local is presented as universal, such as in Thatcher’s ‘there is no alternative’ claim. 
No doubt there were alternatives, but she had to make people believe that her set of 
ideas was “right”. In this way, whether they shared it or not, people could be 
persuaded to start putting her view - and policies that derived from it - into practice.   
 
In a Marxian sense, ideology helps to conceal the social contradictions and 
inequalities engendered by capitalism. In Marx’s understanding of “real” as opposed 
to “logical” contradiction, capitalism is inherently contradictory. The principal 
relation between the capitalist and the wage-labourer ‘lies at the origin of, and needs 
to be concealed by, ideology’, so that the contradictions can continue to reproduce 
themselves, Jorge Larrain explains.
27
 “Reality” may be hidden from even those 
actively engaged in perpetrating an ideology, as John Mepham demonstrates: ‘In 
these terms the theory says that it is a feature of social life, and in particular the life 
of social production, that it is so structured as to render that social reality sometimes 
                                               
24 Parekh, B., Marx's Theory of Ideology (London: Croom Helm, 1982), p. 214. 
25 Eagleton, T., op. cit., p. 202. 
26 Ibid., p. 43. Geuss stresses that this is not the same as ideology in a purely descriptive sense: Geuss, 
R., op. cit., p. 9. 
27 Larrain, J., op. cit., pp. 28-29 and pp. 122-168. 
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opaque to its participants.’28 Ideology can be seen as generating illusion and 
mystification but not necessarily in the sense of being deliberately false: ‘Marx’s 
theory postulates that ideology arises from the fact that the situation might be such as 
to provide a person with reasons for thinking in terms of categories which necessarily 
generate falsehood and illusion.’29 It could be that those ‘who believe what they 
believe about social relations […] are aware of the connection between such beliefs 
and the advancement of their own interests [because] it is in the interests of that 
person or group of persons that such beliefs be held’.30 Whether Marx meant that 
such distorted truths arise (perhaps unwittingly) from an incomplete and incoherent 
view of the world, or whether illusions are more deliberately contrived, is an 
important distinction for some Marxists but is not a matter with which I am 
concerned here. I am not particularly concerned with the derivation of ideology, or 
the motivation of those pursuing a specific ideology, but rather with how an ideology 
is produced, functions and comes to succeed. Either way, the important point here for 
my thesis is that ideology functions - in this Marxian sense - to mask what its 
opponents would call reality, to conceal what is “really” going on.  
 
According to Marxist scholars, in Marx’s later work ideology functions in a related 
but rather different manner. It is claimed that the later Marx still views ideology as 
distorting and concealing things but, as McLellan puts it, also ‘as reflecting 
something real, if decidedly partial, and also as being itself a real force’.31 Eagleton 
similarly takes the view that, in Marx’s later work, there is a built-in structural way 
in which “reality” is falsified by ideology, which now has ‘a secure grounding in the 
material practices of bourgeois society’; whereas, in The German Ideology, ideology 
is considered as simply illusory and can therefore more simply be ‘unmasked’.32 It is 
the more nuanced sense of ideology as the distortion or selective or partial 
presentation of reality that I am adopting here. 
 
So, to turn to my case study and consider how ideology in this pejorative sense might 
usefully be applied to it: Thatcher and the New Right Tories had a vision of how 
things should be and, although that vision was bound to be partial, they either 
                                               
28 Mepham, J., op. cit., p. 14. 
29 Ibid., p. 19. 
30 Ibid. 
31
 McLellan, D., Ideology, op. cit., p. 15. 
32 Eagleton, T., op. cit., p. 87. 
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genuinely believed that it was not, that it was the only one, or they wanted it to 
become so. Either way, they wanted it to be everyone’s vision. The vision could be 
held together by various universalising notions which they either thought did make 
sense, or thought could be made to look as if they made sense (and thus come to 
make sense), to be everyone’s “common sense”, in order to progress their ideas.  
These included notions such as: “Great” Britain; freedom; democracy; the free 
exchange or sale of labour; the free purchase of goods; the virtue of hard work; the 
benefits of “standing on your own two feet” and not relying on publicly-funded 
services; privatisation and the personal buying of services like the utilities, housing, 
education and health and social care; low taxation; owning your own property; and 
heterosexual marriage and family life. As we have already noted, according to 
Marxists, if ideas are universalised and accepted as true without scrutinising the 
social, political and economic context in which they are produced - that is, their 
relation to economic material interests - then this is going to further the interests of 
the producers of those ideas, namely the ruling or dominant class. However, their 
ideas will necessarily be flawed, because they are either understood by the dominant 
class as though they were universal, without consideration of the conditions in which 
the ideas are produced, or are presented as such. For example, the New Right Tory 
Government’s view in the early 1980s that public expenditure on universities should 
be cut was a part of the universalising notion that the state was spending too much. 
But the proposed remedy did not in itself make sense because it would in fact have 
cost the same or more to keep prospective students unemployed and to make staff 
redundant: the purported saving had not been costed. However, although true, to 
criticise the “remedy” as not properly costed is to miss the wider ideological point. 
That it was not costed was not simply an oversight: it was in the interests of those 
wanting to cut higher education precisely not to undertake any costings. Furthermore, 
as noted in Chapter 1, the specifics of individual policies did not matter as much as 
the way in which a proposal could be used to contribute to the message that the state 
was spending too much money on universities. Individual policies become clearer 
when one understands the overall ideological process within which the Thatcher 
Government was working.  
          
Marx would have said that what was really taking place was the domination of one 
class by another; and that this could be masked or disguised by making it appear that 
 45 
 
something other than that was going on because control was in the hands of the 
ruling class. For example, New Right Tories might have said that it was people’s 
own choice as to whether or not they went to university: people needed to be made to 
suppose that those attending fee-paying public schools, which coached their pupils 
specifically to pass Oxbridge entrance examinations, were “naturally” more 
intelligent than they were; had fairly won their places at Oxbridge; and therefore 
deserved to go there. Privilege had to be disguised as the “natural” course of things. 
Similarly, cutting public spending in general and reducing university places in 
particular needed to be considered as good ideas per se, as part of the wider ideology 
of the free market and free choice, as the “only” solution.   
 
In sum, ideology in Geuss’s descriptive and pejorative senses allows one to examine 
what happened to higher education under Thatcher in two ways. First, it is a question 
of how a group becomes and remains dominant, resisting others’ contentions of their 
ideas as mistaken or flawed, and claiming that it has the coherent - the right - set of 
ideas. Second, it is a question of how ideology works to distort any given situation, 
by promoting and universalising a particular set of interests and mystifying their 
relation to reality. I consider further below how ideology does this, how it distorts 
reality and uses contradictions for its proponents’ own ends; how ideology helps to 
make its proponents’ position appear as “common sense” and brings others to 
assume that set of beliefs which they then adopt and practise. 
 
(iv) The positive 
In terms of the Geussian positive sense of ideology, my question is this: irrespective 
of what views one holds oneself about any ideology in question, how can an ideology 
- such as a certain view of the purpose of higher education - be assembled and 
constructed, working as a promoter or active agent or carrier of ideas, which people 
then come to accept, adopt and promote? How does that process work in practice? 
How did the set of ideas with regard to higher education promoted by the Thatcher 
Governments in the 1980s come to be refined and strengthened by an ideological 
process, one involving both intellectual distortion and practical pragmatism? How, 
then, did the New Right actively use or take advantage of the way ideology functions 
in this positive sense in order to progress their radical political agenda, and how did 
others of an opposing view fail to promote their own ideology?   
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Lenin, Gramsci and Althusser need to be considered here. Although Marx had said 
that ‘[t]he philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is 
to change it’,33 he did not provide a detailed strategy for bringing this to fruition. 
Geuss identifies Lenin as the first theorist to construct an ideology in a positive 
sense. He considered how a practical and strategic Marxist/socialist ideology could 
be created and used most effectively to bring about an actual revolution; here 
ideology is ‘something to be constructed, created, or invented’, as Geuss puts it.34 
Lenin was adamant that each “side” in the class war had to draw up their battle lines, 
and be guided by one or other of the only two ideologies:  
[T]he only choice is: either the bourgeois or the socialist ideology. There is no 
middle course (for humanity has not created a “third” ideology, and, moreover, in 
a society torn by class antagonisms there can never be a non-class or above-class 
ideology). Hence, to belittle the socialist ideology in any way, to turn away from  
it in the slightest degree means to strengthen bourgeois ideology.
35
  
This uncompromising view requires that leaders of a political group work out their 
ideology in theoretical terms and then consider strategically and tactically how to 
promote and ultimately impose their ideology on others: this is the only means of 
countering the ideology of their opponents. Lasting power could not be seized by 
emotion or force alone. His strategic solution to bringing about the revolution was 
that a vanguard Party of ‘professional revolutionaries’ had to be formed to develop 
the theoretical basis and give political leadership to the workers’ movement.36 Just as 
bourgeois ideology controls centralised national institutions or functions (such as the 
media) in order to disseminate its views, so the same methods can in principle be 
used to promote socialist ideology: if socialism is to win through, there has to be, or 
to seem to be, no alternative. Metaphorically speaking, the New Right approached its 
campaign in Leninist fashion, in so far as its approach towards bringing down 
socialism was similarly deliberate and strategic, in sharp contrast to the consensus 
politicians of the post-war era.   
 
                                               
33 ‘Theses on Feuerbach, XI’, in McLellan, D. (ed.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings, op. cit., p. 158.  
34 Geuss, R., op. cit., p. 23. 
35 Lenin, V. I., What Is To Be Done? (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1973), p. 48. 
36 Ibid., p. 152. For a detailed study of the development of Lenin’s theoretical ideas and his practical 
solutions, see Harding, N., Lenin’s Political Thought, Volume 1: Theory and Practice in the 
Democratic Revolution; Volume 2: Theory and Practice in the Socialist Revolution (London and 
Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1977). 
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Mepham argues that, for Marx, the construction of an ideology and its dissemination 
works only to the extent that the ideas have ‘a sufficient degree of effectiveness both 
in rendering social reality intelligible and in guiding practice within it for them to be 
apparently acceptable. It is the relation between ideology and reality that is the key to 
its dominance.’37 As we shall see from the development of Thatcherism, its 
proponents needed to convince themselves, and then others, that what they thought 
was not just coherent, but was in fact true. It thus appears that Marxists and New 
Right Tories have something in common: they agree that there is some set of 
coherent ideas available, that there are truths about how the world is and that they are 
the ones who have discovered them. Both insist that their own beliefs are not 
ideological, because true; and that it is their opponents who are ideological, because 
what they think is not true. Both are in this sense ideological, although of course, for 
Marx, what constitutes the “set of coherent ideas” is historical materialism and the 
class struggle, while for the New Right Tories in the 1980s, it is their vision of 
“Great” Britain, the free market and minimal public services. Both hold a powerful 
set of ideas which for them are true (and for their opponents false) and they need to 
bring others to espouse them. As we shall see from Chapter 3 onwards, the New 
Right Tories needed to embark on and win a “battle of ideas” in which education – 
and, in my case study, higher education - plays a central role. To achieve this, they 
would need to harness ideology working to make their ideas seem to be “the truth”: it 
had to seem to make sense to adopt them. But this is not to be understood in any 
conspiratorial sense. As I shall go on to show, ideology did not work this explicitly 
but had to be constructed. 
 
Two interrelated aspects of Gramsci’s work will help further to elucidate this. First, 
Gramsci considered that the power of the bourgeois state and the ideology it wielded 
was exercised in multiple lived experiences of everyday life; in Eagleton’s words, as 
‘lived, habitual social practice - which must then presumably encompass the 
unconscious, inarticulate dimensions of social experience as well as the workings of 
formal institutions’.38 Second, Gramsci considered how this process helped a 
dominant class to win consent, and ultimately attain hegemony, by using a range of 
means at their disposal; how those governing govern, not simply by force but by also 
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 Mepham,  J., op. cit., p. 12. 
38 Eagleton, T., op. cit., p. 115. 
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winning the consent of the governed. Ideology here adopts an intermediary role, 
offering a mechanism through which people can be persuaded to think and act 
differently; and this opens up space for those aspiring to domination. Thus, while 
Thatcher’s modus operandi was clearly - and deliberately - far from consensual, she 
had to win - and sustain - agreement to her ideas and policies. She was intent on 
creating a new baseline by shifting the assumptions underpinning social practices - 
partly by reworking elements of existing beliefs and practices. 
 
Through what mechanism could this kind of ideological change be achieved? 
Although Gramsci’s interest was in bringing about a socialist revolution, the process 
he discusses describes no less the Thatcherite “revolution”. He does not deny the 
primary importance ascribed by Marx to the mode of production in defining and 
controlling people’s lives but considers why the domination of the ruling economic 
class has not - and would not - come to an end of its own accord. It was because, he 
claimed, ideology has such a powerful role, inhabiting and reflecting all aspects of 
society, whose structures can be made to function in support of the dominant 
system:
39
 ‘The superstructures of civil society are like the trench-systems of modern 
warfare.’40 The situation, he had written earlier, ‘is complicated by all these political 
superstructures, created by the greater development of capitalism. This makes the 
action of the masses slower and more prudent, and therefore requires of the 
revolutionary party a strategy and tactics altogether more complex and long-term 
[…].’41 Relationships are forged between the state and its ‘apparatuses’, that is the 
institutions and cultural forms which reflect and strengthen the predominant ideology 
of the ruling class.
42
 While that power is based on economic material interests - ‘the 
decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic 
                                               
39 Gramsci summed up this interrelationship in the phrase: ‘material forces are the content and 
ideologies are the form’: Selections from the Prison Notebooks, eds Hoare, Q. and Nowell Smith, G. 
(London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), p. 377. 
40 Ibid., p. 235.   
41 Gramsci, A., Selections from Political Writings 1921-1926, ed. Hoare, Q. (London: Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1978), pp. 199-200. 
42 The state operates, Gramsci wrote, on two major levels: ‘[T]he one that can be called “civil 
society”, that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called “private”, and that of “political society” 
or “the State”. These two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of “hegemony” which the 
dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of “direct domination” or 
command exercised through the State and “juridical” government.’ - Prison Notebooks, op. cit., p. 12. 
For a discussion on the differences Gramsci drew between the state and civil society, see Showstack 
Sassoon, A. (ed.), Approaches to Gramsci (London: Writers and Readers, 1982), pp. 94-115. 
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activity’43- it is not immovable because it can also be “accessed” through the 
workings of ideology in other structures.
44
 Where Marx had concentrated mainly on 
the “raw” domination exercised by the mode of production, Gramsci argues that, in 
addition to ‘the economic conditions of production’, there are other subtler - and 
more resilient - forms of ideological control through which people act and which 
strengthen the repressive structures of capitalism; but which might also permit 
another “reality” to be achieved. Playing on Marx’s words, Gramsci argues that ‘it is 
on the level of ideologies that men become conscious of conflicts in the world of the 
economy’.45 So, for instance, to return to Thatcher and the New Right: they wanted 
others to believe that the free market was the one and only model by which people 
should live, but they realised (see Chapter 3 onwards) that it was going to be within 
and through the superstructures of civil society that the ideological battle would have 
to be fought.   
 
Through his key notion of hegemony, Gramsci explores how domination is achieved 
through the consent of the governed, gained through all aspects of social life, 
comprising ‘the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the 
ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the 
active consent of those over whom it rules’, including the organs of the state: ‘the 
state apparatuses’.46 These constitute, as Carl Boggs puts it, ‘an entire system of 
values, attitudes, beliefs, morality, etc. that is in one way or another supportive of the 
established order and the class interests that dominate it’.47 For Gramsci, an ideology 
achieves its domination ‘not just by its receipt of a majority vote, but because it is 
propagated and supported by the institutions of civil society and the state’.48 The 
established religion of Christianity, for example, is one form of ideological control 
which justifies existing civil structures (such as the family and established 
hierarchies of obedience and patterns of ownership) as “God-given” and its values 
                                               
43 Gramsci, A., Prison Notebooks, op. cit., p. 161. 
44 The later Marx alluded to how ideology might serve groups other than exclusively the ruling class: 
‘[A] distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic 
conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, 
political, religious, aesthetic, or philosophic - in short, ideological forms in which men become 
conscious of this conflict and fight it out.’ - ‘Preface to A Critique of Political Economy’, in 
McLellan, D. (ed.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings, op. cit., pp. 389-390.  
45 Gramsci, A., Prison Notebooks, op. cit., p. 162. 
46 Ibid., p. 244. 
47
 Boggs, C., Gramsci's Marxism (London: Pluto Press, 1976), p. 39. 
48 Levitas, R. (ed.), op. cit., p. 17. 
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are put to use to rationalise political and social control.
49
 People’s relationship to the 
state is mediated by organising and operating ideological control so that people feel 
they are consenting to this control and come to see and accept the dominant ideology 
as “normal”, as “common sense”.50 The predominant ideology is thus internalised, its 
manifestations appearing as “the natural order of things”. In this way, ideology 
mystifies the truth and ‘manufactures consent’51 for its cause, engendering in people 
a passive acquiescence in their own exploitation, to which they regard themselves as 
freely giving consent. Existing beliefs and values can be reworked and put to use in 
helping to create the new ideology. It is not that ideology necessarily proceeds 
through intellectually, or even rhetorically, tricking people. Rather, it is constructed 
by taking a plausible belief (such as, as Thatcher would claim in the 1970s, that 
university standards are falling because there are too many students and therefore we 
need to cut university provision) and reworking it to fit the preferred ideological 
direction. To take another example: as we shall see later, Labour MPs’ celebration of 
vocational higher education and the polytechnics could be used by the Thatcher 
Governments to reinterpret higher education’s major purpose as instrumentally 
serving the state’s needs. Manufacturing consent is thus a matter not of imposing by 
sleight of hand a new set of beliefs and attitudes, but rather of either engaging with 
existing ones (which the “old” ideology has never quite dispelled or does not need 
to) or inserting into the debate a new belief which reconfigures its terms. This is 
how, according to Gramsci, even a seemingly educated person can become a ‘trained 
gorilla’,52 who performs within the bounds of standardisation and control 
(misrepresented as efficiency or loyalty), oiling the ideological machine and helping 
to obscure and reinforce the social contradictions of class and economic relations. 
Free-thinking liberals might think that their movement within the institutions of civil 
society is independent and “value free” but they would be failing to see that it is 
through this that ideological domination is achieved and furthered. In the Marxist 
tradition, Istvan Meszaros maintains that ideology ‘affects no less those who wish to 
                                               
49 Gramsci, A., Prison Notebooks, op. cit., p. 302. 
50 Gramsci criticises the use of ‘common sense’ as ‘an ambiguous, contradictory and multiform 
concept’, so that ‘to refer to common sense as a confirmation of truth is a nonsense’. Furthermore, 
‘common sense cannot constitute an intellectual order, because [it] cannot be reduced to unity and 
coherence even within an individual consciousness, let alone collective consciousness’: Gramsci, A., 
ibid., p. 423 and p. 326.  
51 Freeden, M., Ideology: A Very Short Introduction, op. cit., p. 20. 
52
 Gramsci, A., op. cit., p. 302. Gramsci is using a phrase coined by Frederick Taylor, American 
engineer and manager, to describe workers’ repetitive tasks on the assembly line. 
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deny its existence than those who openly acknowledge the interests and values 
intrinsic to the various ideologies’.53 A dominant ideology makes one version of 
reality come increasingly to hold sway, not just in economic terms, but in wider 
social and cultural forms, everyday practices, behaviour, language, and so on. 
Through such hegemonic means, according to Gramsci, advanced capitalism has 
found ever more subtle ways of exercising power through institutionalised and 
psychologically internalised norms and a successful assimilation of those who might 
have been expected to resist. This is how, as I shall demonstrate, well-meaning MPs 
in Parliament and officers in quangos and other higher education bodies who tried to 
point out the inconsistencies or contradictions in Thatcher’s policies, could - in the 
main - be silenced, appeased or - even better - won over to the new - and increasingly 
dominant - ideology. 
     
How might the ideological “high ground” be captured? As Anne Showstack Sassoon 
puts it, for Gramsci, the hegemony of a class ‘consists in its ability to represent “the 
universal” interests of the whole of society and to unite to itself a group of allies’.54 
Or, as Chantal Mouffe expresses it, Gramsci’s hegemonic class is able ‘to articulate 
the interests of other social groups to its own by means of ideological struggle’.55 She 
represents Gramsci’s claim that a class ‘must genuinely concern itself with the 
interests of those social groups over which it wishes to exercise hegemony’, in order 
to exercise leadership, by transforming, neutralising, gradually absorbing even 
initially hostile and seemingly irreconcilable elements.
56
 Ralph Miliband sets out 
how, for Gramsci, hegemony or consent 
means the capacity of dominant classes to persuade subordinate ones to accept, 
adopt and ‘interiorise’ the values and norms which dominant classes themselves 
have adopted and believe to be right and proper. This might be described as the 
strong meaning of hegemony-as-consent. A weaker version is the capacity of 
dominant classes to persuade subordinate classes that, whatever they might think 
of the prevailing social order, and however alienated they might be from it, any 
alternative would be catastrophically worse, and that in any case there was 
nothing much they could do to bring about any such alternative. Weaker though 
this second version might be, it is not much less effective than the first one in 
consolidating the social order. In either version, however, hegemony is not 
something that can ever be taken to be finally and irreversibly won: on the 
contrary, it is something that needs to be constantly nurtured, defended and  
                                               
53 Meszaros, I., op. cit., p. 10. 
54 Showstack Sassoon, A. (ed.), op. cit., p. 111. 
55
 Mouffe, C. (ed.), Gramsci and Marxist Theory (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 181. 
56 Ibid. See Gramsci, A., Prison Notebooks, op. cit., p. 59 and p. 161. 
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reformulated.
57
 
Applying this interpretation to my case study, we shall see in later chapters how the 
terms of the neoliberal hegemony Thatcher was striving for had to be fought out and 
modified along the way, in a Gramscian process of obtaining consent. For, as Geuss 
claims, differences within a group can actually help to strengthen an ideology;
58
 and 
contradictions used to construct a “common sense” view of the world, through what 
Hall terms Gramsci’s identification of ‘the necessarily fragmentary, contradictory 
nature of common sense’.59 There were uncertainties, contradictions and dissonances 
within Thatcherism but the very struggle for hegemony, and the processes necessary 
to persuade not only opponents but also supporters, served to strengthen the 
neoliberal position (as we shall see later). 
 
Building on contradictions and working through a process of consent, then, one 
ideology can overturn another. Like Lenin, Gramsci saw the need to bring strategies 
into play in the development of ‘a politically-strategic Marxism’.60 A lasting 
revolution, in all social and political forms and values, would require destroying the 
network of existing ideological superstructures and building up an alternative in their 
place. Gramsci thus developed Marxism as a means ‘to open the way to a 
“revolutionary”, i.e. political, use of historical materialism’, as one commentator puts 
it,
61
 Gramsci being 
the first Marxist to insist upon the role of consciousness in shaping revolutionary 
change. As the Prison Notebooks repeatedly stressed, material forces acquire 
meaning only through human definition and engagement […]. In Gramsci’s 
dialectical conception of history, then, we find a theory of human activity as 
shaped or ‘determined’ by social structures and which is also the subject, creator  
of new forms that challenge and overturn those same structures.
62
 
The material base shapes the superstructures but through the latter, people’s social 
and political activities can influence the development of history - and even replace 
                                               
57 Miliband, R., ‘Counter-hegemonic struggles’, in Miliband, R. and Panitch, L. (eds), The Socialist 
Register (London: Merlin Press, 1990), p. 346. 
58 Geuss, R., op. cit., p. 5. 
59 Hall, S., The Hard Road to Renewal (London: Verso in association with Marxism Today, 1988),  
p. 167. 
60 Boggs, C., op. cit., p. 12. 
61 Paggi, L., ‘Gramsci’s general theory of Marxism’, in Mouffe, C. (ed.), op. cit., p. 114. 
62 Boggs, C., op. cit., p. 31. See also Femia, J. V., Gramsci's Political Thought: Hegemony, 
Consciousness and the Revolutionary Process (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1981), pp. 77-78, who 
commented that ‘[f]or Gramsci, the essence of Marxism (and the dialectic) [...] resides [...] in the 
dialectical, or reciprocal, relationship between human will and material reality, superstructure and 
base, theory and practice.’ 
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one dominant ideology with another. For Gramsci, then, ideologies are a fact of life, 
of everyday practice, and need to be recognised for what they are and as a means of 
persuading people to think and act differently: ‘To the extent that ideologies are 
historically necessary they have a validity which is “psychological”; they “organise” 
human masses, and create the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of 
their position, struggle, etc.’63   
 
Human agency is needed to bring about change. Crucial in promoting a dominant 
ideology, or bringing about a counter-hegemonic challenge, Gramsci argues, are 
education and the intellectuals. As the editors of the Prison Notebooks explain, 
Gramsci identifies two groups: the ‘traditional’ or ‘professional’ intellectuals who 
are deemed to be so by virtue of their work and position in society; and the ‘organic’ 
intellectuals who are ‘the thinking and organising element of a particular 
fundamental social class’.64 I am only interested for my purposes in Gramsci’s 
concept of the ‘professional intellectuals’, using this category to encompass those 
working in higher education and its agencies, the politicians and those in think-tanks. 
According to Gramsci, everyone is a carrier of the bourgeois ideology in which they 
live and work, and the professional intellectuals work in a particularly nefarious part 
of the superstructure.
65
 They are the paid agents of the dominant ideology in which 
they exercise a mediating function in passing on its norms to others and regulating 
their actions: 
The relationship between the intellectuals and the world of production [...] is, in 
varying degrees, “mediated” by the whole fabric of society and by the complex of 
superstructures, of which the intellectuals are, precisely, the “functionaries”[...]. 
The functions in question are precisely organisational and connective. The 
intellectuals are the dominant group’s “deputies” exercising the subaltern  
functions of social hegemony and political government.
66
   
These intellectuals (and the related fields of ecclesiastics, doctors, etc.) acquire 
vested interests and privileges in return for agreeing to ideological conformity. Some 
‘professional’ intellectuals might consider themselves to be “free agents”, acting 
outside the ideology and class context in which they live; but they would be wrong, 
as, for Gramsci, 
                                               
63 Gramsci, A., Prison Notebooks, op. cit., p. 307. 
64 Ibid., Editors’ introduction, p. 3. 
65
 Ibid. 
66 Ibid., p. 12. 
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the intellectuals of the historically (and concretely) progressive class, in the given 
conditions, exercise such a power of attraction that, in the last analysis, they end 
up subjugating the intellectuals of the other social groups; they thereby create a 
system of solidarity between all the intellectuals, with bonds of a psychological 
nature (vanity, etc.) and often of a caste character (technico-juridical, corporate,  
etc.).
67
   
Gramsci argues that the ‘traditional intellectuals’ need to be won over:  
One of the most important characteristics of any group that is developing towards 
dominance is its struggle to assimilate and to conquer “ideologically” the 
traditional intellectuals, but this assimilation and conquest is made quicker and 
more efficacious the more the group in question succeeds in simultaneously  
elaborating its own organic intellectuals.
68
   
Intellectuals and other agents - the ‘functionaries’ - have an important role to play in 
constructing consent to a new ideology, a new way of looking at the world, that 
could be facilitated by a changed relationship between higher education and the state. 
 
Gramsci’s identification of the role of the institutions of civil society - the 
superstructures - and of the intellectuals in mediating a dominant ideology and 
helping to manufacture consent is taken further in Althusser’s development of the 
role of education as an ‘ideological state apparatus’ (ISA). He considers that the 
superstructures are particularly influential in upholding and - crucially - reproducing 
ideological domination through, as Freeden summarises it, ‘the multiplicity of 
ideological apparatuses as against the singularity of the illusion that Marx and Engels 
had decried’.69 Althusser argues that 
a revolution in the structure does not ipso facto modify the existing 
superstructures and particularly the ideologies at one blow (as it would if the 
economic was the sole determinant factor), for they have sufficient of their own 
consistency to survive beyond their immediate life context, even to recreate, to 
‘secrete’ substitute conditions of existence temporarily.70 
Althusser maintained that ‘an ideology always exists in an apparatus, and its practice, 
or practices. This existence is material.’71 As Paul Ricoeur notes, Althusser links 
ideology explicitly to a political function: the capitalist economic base has produced 
the system but it is ideology which maintains and reproduces it and it does this by 
exercising its power through the agency of various reinforcing ideological 
                                               
67 Ibid., p. 60. 
68 Ibid., p. 10. 
69 Freeden, M., Ideology: A Very Short Introduction, op. cit., p. 25. 
70 Althusser, L., For Marx (London: Verso, 1969), pp. 115-116. 
71
 Althusser, L., 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses', in Essays on Ideology (London: Verso, 
1984), p. 40. 
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superstructures, such as the political structure itself and education.
72
 Althusser, like 
Gramsci, locates state repression in institutions and cultural forms (such as religion, 
education, the family, the communications media) - the ISAs - which mediate state 
power. Althusser sees ideology as ‘that which helps to “cement” together the social 
function and [to] adapt individuals to its requirements’, as Eagleton puts it.73 
Education both reproduces the labour skills required and teaches people how to keep 
on obeying - or running - the system, and is therefore, for Althusser, the most 
powerful ISA: 
I believe that the ideological State apparatus which has been installed in the 
dominant position in mature capitalist social formations [...] is the educational  
ideological apparatus.
74
       
This is because, first, it reproduces the labour power (both workers and bosses) 
required to keep capitalism going and, second, it teaches ‘rules of respect for the 
socio-technical division of labour and ultimately the rules of the order established by 
class domination’.75 He continues:  
[T]he reproduction of labour power requires not only a reproduction of its skills, 
but also, at the same time, a reproduction of its submission to the rules of the 
established order, i.e. a reproduction of submission to the ruling ideology for the 
workers, and a reproduction of the ability to manipulate the ruling ideology 
correctly for the agents of exploitation and repression, so that they, too, will 
provide for the domination of the ruling class ‘in words’[…]. All the agents of 
production, exploitation and repression, not to speak of the ‘professionals of 
ideology’ (Marx), must in one way or another be ‘steeped’ in this ideology in 
order to perform their tasks ‘conscientiously’ - the tasks of the exploited (the 
proletarians), of the exploiters (the capitalists), of the exploiters’ auxiliaries (the  
managers), or of the high priests of the ruling ideology (its ‘functionaries’), etc.76   
Ricoeur summarises how, for Althusser, ISAs support the basic repressive power of 
the state over individuals and are key to its reproduction: 
A system of oppression survives and prevails thanks to this ideological apparatus 
which both places individuals in subjection and at the very same time maintains 
and reproduces the system. Reproduction of the system and ideological repression 
of the individual are one and the same. […] We have to join two ideas: a state 
functions not only by power but also by ideology, and it does so for the sake of its 
own reproduction.
77
      
                                               
72 Ricoeur states that Althusser, in his later work, ‘identifies the political structure as a particular 
ideology’: Ricoeur, P., ‘Althusser’s Theory of Ideology’, in Elliott, G. (ed.), Althusser: a Critical 
Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 49-51. This extends Gramsci’s position that ideological 
hegemony is located in the structures of civil society.  
73 Eagleton, T., op. cit., p. 147. 
74 Althusser, L., 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses', op. cit., p. 26. 
75 Ibid., p. 6. 
76
 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
77 Ricoeur, P., op. cit., p. 52. 
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Ideologies are - as Ricoeur sums up Althusser’s analysis - ‘a vital illusion’.78 As 
Freeden comments: ‘Ideology does that by obscuring from a society the illusory and 
[…] distorted nature of that representation.’79 People are in some sense “trapped” 
within the unconscious ideologies in which they live. Alluding to Freud, Althusser 
says that ‘ideology is eternal, exactly like the unconscious’.80 In Althusser’s world 
then, no individual or society can escape ideology; indeed, ‘there is no ideology 
except by the subject and for subjects’.81 Ideology works ‘in such a way that it 
“recruits” subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or “transforms” the 
individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) by that very precise operation which 
I have called interpellation or hailing […]’.82 An understanding of this can be used to 
come to a “real”, as opposed to a mystified, consciousness about what is going on: 
[M]en live their actions [...] in ideology, by and through ideology; in short, that 
the ‘lived’ relation between men and the world [...] passes through ideology, or 
better, is ideology itself. This is the sense in which Marx said that it is in ideology 
(as the locus of political struggle) that men become conscious of their place in the 
world and in history, it is within this ideological unconsciousness that men 
succeed in altering the ‘lived’ relation between them and the world and acquiring 
that new form of specific unconsciousness called ‘consciousness’ [...]. This 
relation [...] only appears as ‘conscious’ on condition that it is unconscious [...].   
Ideology, then, is the expression of the relation between men and their ‘world’.83 
Althusser later sets this out more clearly: 
[I]t is not their real conditions of existence, their real world, that ‘men’ ‘represent 
to themselves’ in ideology, but above all it is their relation to those conditions of 
existence which is represented to them there. It is this relation which is at the  
centre of every ideological, i.e.imaginary, representation of the real world.
84
  
In some way, through the mechanism of ideology, people fool themselves and are 
fooled (as Ian Gilmour’s insider stories of Thatcher’s Cabinet proceedings 
demonstrate
85
). People are brought to believe, or at least accept, that all sorts of 
“illusions” - or incomplete truths - are in fact the whole truth; and they will then live 
this out. The discourse of ideology makes it seem to be describing the way things 
actually are, whereas it is partially selecting or simply falsifying evidence to describe 
the way its proponents want or think things should be. For Althusser, even the 
oppressors want to deceive themselves. As Geuss puts it: ‘the bourgeoisie, 
                                               
78 Ibid., p. 56. 
79 Freeden, M., Ideology: A Very Short Introduction, op. cit., p. 27. 
80 Althusser, L., 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses', op. cit., p. 35. 
81 Ibid., p. 44. 
82 Ibid., p. 48. 
83 Althusser, L., For Marx, op. cit., pp. 233-234. 
84
 Althusser, L., 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses', op. cit., p. 38. 
85 Gilmour, I., Dancing with Dogma, op. cit. See Ch. 4, fn.16. 
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paradoxically enough, has an interest in being self-deceived’.86 According to 
Althusser, ideology distances us from the reality of the situation: 
[A]ll ideology represents in its necessarily imaginary distortion not the existing 
relations of production (and the other relations that derive from them), but above 
all the (imaginary) relationship of individuals to the relations of production and 
the relations that derive from them. What is represented in ideology is therefore 
not the system of the real relations which govern the existence of individuals, but 
the imaginary relation of those individuals to the real relations in which they  
live.
87
     
Whereas Gramsci offers a positive way forward, Althusser’s human beings are 
agents, ‘social subjects’,88 bearers of the diseased structures in which they live, often 
unaware of ideology’s pernicious effects, playing parts assigned to them by the 
mechanism of the process.
89
 Ideology serves to achieve ends whether they are 
intended or not. Agents assume their positions in the division of labour and are 
inculcated with the appropriate beliefs through which to carry out their function in 
society, under the illusion that they do this freely.
90
 These ideological agents help to 
secure and reproduce the power of the ruling class through institutional forms and 
practices - and the most dominant of these is education. These agents are both 
subjected themselves and subject others in turn to the dominant ideology. As 
Eagleton puts it: ‘Ideology is now not just a distortion or false reflection, a screen 
which intervenes between ourselves and reality or an automatic effect of commodity 
production. It is an indispensable medium for the production of human subjects.’91 In 
addition, it ‘adapts individuals to their social functions by providing them with an 
imaginary model of the whole, suitably schematized and fictionalized for their 
purposes’.92 In sum, ideology makes subjects of us all. 
 
For Althusser, then, ideology has a powerful practical and psychological role in 
persuading people (both oppressors and oppressed) to believe and act in certain ways 
in support of a particular cause or dominant power. With Lenin, Gramsci and 
                                               
86 Geuss, R., op. cit., p. 24. 
87 Althusser, L., 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses', op. cit., pp. 38-39. 
88 Eagleton, T., op. cit., p. 198. 
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Althusser, as with Thatcher and the New Right, if the “wrong” ideology can subject 
people, then surely so could the “right” ideology be brought to the fore to help bring 
about change and enable people to see through to “the truth”, that is the formulation 
of what the proponent considers to be the “correct” - universalised - position. 
 
(v) The application of Marxist notions of ideology 
To sum up: I claimed earlier that the way in which British higher education has 
changed since 1979 has to be understood as the outcome of an ideological process; 
that is, the Thatcher Governments set out to overturn the post-war consensus of a 
progressive social agenda and, in so doing, capitalised on pragmatic circumstances 
and contradictions to help them build an ideological hegemony reflecting neoliberal 
values. The concepts of ideology I have outlined provide a means of explaining how 
this works: people could be brought to accepting the New Right’s set of ideas by the 
latter’s strategic use of ideology to mask other “realities” and make people accept a 
neoliberal ideology as the correct interpretation of the situation, and that it was 
simply “common sense” to follow it. Geuss’s three descriptors of ideology - as 
descriptive, pejorative and positive - help to elucidate Marxist interpretations of the 
way ideology works. I am drawing on the importance Lenin ascribed to building a 
practical and strategic ideology simply to show how the New Right confronted an 
existing ideology - the post-war social democratic welfare state - and in 
revolutionary terms how they constructed the means to overthrow it. Gramsci’s work 
illuminates my study because he showed how a dominant ideology could be 
constructed through consent, playing deliberately on contradictions, and working 
through a whole range of social structures and practices to achieve ideological 
hegemony. I shall demonstrate, in particular in Chapters 3 and 4, how sets of 
contradictions in social, political and historical aspects of British higher education 
were used by the Thatcher Governments to bring people to consent to their set of 
ideas. I am also drawing on the ideas of Althusser for whom education was the most 
pernicious ISA through which the dominant ideology could be secured. The 
application of these Marxist theories will elucidate how the Thatcherite ideology 
functioned in working to change the relationship of higher education to the state.   
 
By way of context, I next consider some understandings of Thatcherism, together 
with a brief survey of higher education prior to 1979. 
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Chapter 3 Building an “ideology of common sense” 
 
(i)  Setting the contexts 
This chapter examines the two central political, social and historical contexts of my 
study, namely Thatcherism and higher education. From these, I draw out key pointers 
to the issues that shaped the relationship between higher education and the state in 
the 1980s, evidenced from my study of the relevant documents, texts and debates in 
subsequent chapters.   
 
I share some of Mark Neocleous’s reasons for reconsidering Thatcherism, even 
though, as he pointed out in 1999, it is a rather long time after the event to be 
rehearsing discussions about Thatcherism - and now even more so, although 
Thatcher’s death in 2013 prompted some renewed interest.1 I am not attempting to 
evaluate the many different interpretations of Thatcherism: whether it constituted a 
definitive break with the “old regime” or whether, basically, it reflected continuity; 
whether it can ultimately be termed a coherent and successful phenomenon, ideology 
or hegemonic project or whether it was simply a mishmash of ill-thought out and 
patchily-executed policies.
2
 Rather, my interest in it arises from the way in which it 
succeeded (and especially in light of its legacy) in disrupting hitherto accepted norms 
of British party politics, institutions and society. It destabilised - as Neocleous puts it 
- political vocabulary, practices and understandings.
3
 Recognising that dislocation as 
an ideological process can help explain the central movement of ideas and practices 
identified in Chapter 1: how and why the shift in the 1980s to an explicitly 
ideological relationship between British higher education and the state, and one that 
privileged a narrowly instrumental view, took place and took hold. The way that 
process, that disruption, was achieved through the workings of what may broadly be 
described as Thatcherism demonstrates the dual models of ideology I am using: first, 
that Thatcherism promoted a broadly neoliberal set of ideas; second, how 
circumstances were used pragmatically - often in a distorting and contradictory 
                                               
1 Neocleous, M., ‘Radical conservatism, or, the conservatism of radicals: Giddens, Blair and the 
politics of reaction’, Radical Philosophy, Number 93, January/February 1999, pp. 24-34. 
2 See the debates between Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques, on the one hand, and Bob Jessop, Kevin 
Bonnett, Simon Bromley and Tom Ling, on the other, in New Left Review in the 1980s, reproduced in 
Hall, S. and Jacques, M. (eds), op. cit., and in Jessop, B. et al. (eds), op. cit. See also Bill Schwarz’s 
commentary on these debates (op. cit., pp. 116-152). 
3 Neocleous, M., ibid., p. 24. 
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fashion - to build this as an “ideology of common sense”,4 as I outline in sections (ii) 
to (vi) below. And that, or so I shall go on to argue, enables us to understand how 
governments gained acceptance - however grudgingly - of their higher education 
policies in the 1980s and beyond.   
 
In order then to consider how that process - the development of an ideology of 
common sense - worked in higher education, we need to set the scene by charting, in 
section (vii), the latter’s relationship to the state, drawing out key preoccupations 
prior to 1979. As noted in Chapter 1, some educationalists’ accounts demonstrate 
aspects of continuity in higher education’s history up to and including the 1980s, 
while others point to 1979 as marking the beginning of a more radical process. 
Mindful of both positions, what I seek to emphasise in my brief historical survey are 
the matters that set up the opportunities that the Thatcher Governments could exploit 
ideologically. This will enable us, in subsequent chapters, better to understand how 
and why higher education could itself contribute to the construction of a Thatcherite 
ideology.   
 
(ii) Thatcherism 
My first claim is that the broad project on which the Thatcher Government embarked 
from 1979 was explicitly and deliberately radical and ideological from the outset in 
terms of intent.
 
Initially, this is more overt outside higher education: cutting income 
tax, tackling inflation, cutting public sector borrowing and expenditure, and defeating 
trade unions and vested professional interests were some of the pre-requisites to be 
tackled before the reworking of the more resilient state apparatuses - such as 
education, health and welfare services - could be attempted.
5
 My use of the term 
ideological here draws again on Geuss’s descriptive and positive applications.   
                                               
4 See Ch. 2, fn.50 for Gramsci’s critique of “common sense”. 
5 The unpublished report ‘Stepping Stones’ (November 1977, drafted by business man John Hoskyns, 
Thatcher’s Policy Adviser, 1975-1979) considered how to break the power of the trade unions, and 
radical plans were also prepared by Nicholas Ridley in 1978: see Young, H., op. cit., pp. 358-368. For 
examples of the radical actions taken once in government, see Young, H., op. cit., pp. 146-151, 195-
230, 316-341, 529-542; Gamble, A., op. cit., pp. 108-123, 192-233; Thatcher, M., The Downing Street 
Years, op. cit., p. 43; Anderson, P., op. cit., pp. 274-275. Young describes the clashes with the trade 
unions, the miners’ strike 1984-1985 representing the strongest opposition to Thatcherism, but it was 
eventually defeated at a cost to the Government of approximately £2.5 billion. One minister described 
a ploy to weaken trade unions as a ‘demonstration effect’: that is, Thatcher repeatedly held out against 
public sector union claims and strikes, even if it cost more money than it saved. Thatcher’s press 
secretary, Bernard Ingham, summed up what these disputes were really about, ideologically: ‘It took 
the steelworkers thirteen weeks and the civil servants twenty-one weeks to realise that we meant 
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My second claim is that the contradictions and inconsistencies that came to the fore 
in the Thatcher Governments’ implementation of their neoliberal ideas, together with 
those in their opponents’ positions, required her Governments to work to a large 
extent pragmatically, using whatever opportunities came to hand along the way. 
What mattered is that, in order to gain consent, policies had to be presented as 
coherent, and this is where the pejorative notion of ideology as distortion is 
illuminating. It was this dual modus operandi - the radical set of ideas and the way in 
which they were presented and tested - that helped to build the hegemonic project in 
general and its higher education version in particular: namely to change its 
ideological relationship to the state. 
 
(iii) ‘We must have an ideology.’ 
The New Right’s project gathered momentum from the mid-1970s onwards, when 
Thatcher became leader of the Tory Party. Its expression was explicitly 
revolutionary: it was, as Thatcher insisted, ‘time to begin the march back to 
freedom’.6 At a meeting of the newly-formed Conservative Philosophy Group 
(whose founder-members included Roger Scruton) in 1975, she said (following 
Hayek’s example): ‘We must have an ideology. The other side have got an ideology 
they can test their policies against. We must have one as well.’7 This rhetoric, this 
“call to arms”, was novel for a Conservative Party that did not traditionally express 
or take an ideological, dogmatic or adversarial stance. In some ways of course, the 
incoming 1979 Thatcher Government was simply expressing the Conservative 
Party’s traditional belief that they were the country’s rightful political and moral 
leaders and needed to regain that control.
8
 There were also policy continuities with 
                                                                                                                                     
business.’ However, the pay of the ‘functionaries’ (using Gramsci’s term) of the strong state rose. For 
example, a police constable’s pay went up by 25% more than average earnings and 30% more than 
prices during the first Thatcher administration: see Young, H., op. cit., p. 229, p. 238 and p. 353.   
6 Thatcher, M., Speech to Christian Democratic Union Conference, 25 May 1976, available at 
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/103034 [accessed 26 July 2013]. 
7 Quoted in Young, H., op. cit., p. 406. Hayek stressed the need to engage in ‘the struggle of ideas’: 
see The Constitution of Liberty (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960), p. 404. 
8 Contrast Thatcher’s expression of her ‘Conservative revolution’ (Speech to Federation of 
Conservative Students Annual Conference, 6 April 1984, available at 
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/105653 [accessed 26 July 2013]) with Ian Gilmour’s more 
traditionally Tory stance: ‘Nothing is more divisive than ideology. […] Ideology is therefore a threat 
to national unity, and as such is abhorrent to Conservatives. […] [T]he fundamental concern of 
Toryism is the preservation of the nation’s unity, of the national institutions, of political and civil 
liberty, and not the achievement of some ideological victory.’ - Gilmour, I., Inside Right, op. cit., pp. 
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both Labour and Conservative Governments of the 1970s, who had increasingly been 
expressing the view that post-war social democratic commitments - notably to full 
employment and an expanding welfare state - were untenable.
9
 In others, however, 
Thatcher’s project was qualitatively different. Its aim was to halt and then reverse the 
post-war movement of her own Party towards the middle ground; to break the post-
war social democratic consensus - and indeed, the very idea of political consensus on 
which that depended; and to put neoliberalism in place.
10
 Thatcher and the New 
Right had become conscious that they needed to use an explicitly ideological and 
strategic approach, if they were to change the political landscape of Britain.
11
 
 
Nevertheless, in order to build consent (and avoid making detailed policy proposals), 
Thatcher presented her politics as conviction rather than ideology: ‘I stress vision, 
not blueprint; values and principles, not doctrines.’12 Although she professed to 
distrust theory, the underlying ideological and strategic question was how to set 
about achieving a radical shift towards neoliberal beliefs and practices. The vision, 
values and principles would need to appear as “common sense”.   
                                                                                                                                     
132-143, noting Disraeli’s identification of the Tory Party as the country’s ‘natural leaders’ (ibid., p. 
84). See also Ch. 1, fn.22. 
9 Labour Governments in the 1960s and 1970s - especially Callaghan’s - were moving away from a 
Keynesian approach to economic policy and towards monetarism as the solution, as curbing inflation 
began to predominate as the major issue: see Young, H., op. cit., p. 154; Gamble, A., op. cit., p. 7 and 
p. 99; Anderson, P., op. cit., p. 177; Riddell, P., op. cit., p. 2; Stedman Jones, D., op. cit., pp. 241-242. 
As Joseph put it, commenting on the Wilson Government’s strategies: ‘We are all monetarists now.’ -  
Stranded on the Middle Ground? Reflections on Circumstances and Policies (London: Centre for 
Policy Studies, 1976), p. 17. In this respect, Labour did the groundwork for the New Right. As Daniel 
Stedman Jones comments (op. cit., p. 258): ‘The Thatcher government’s strategy grew incrementally 
during her first administration.  But it began from the base of the Labour Party’s tempered 
introduction of monetarism.’ In his inaugural speech as Labour leader in 1976, Callaghan maintained 
that ‘the cosy world […] where full employment would be guaranteed […] is gone […]. We used to 
think you could spend your way out of a recession […] by cutting taxes and boosting government 
spending. I tell you […] that option no longer exists […].’ Friedman welcomed this speech as ‘[t]he 
most hopeful sign I have seen in Britain […], one of the most remarkable talks - speeches -  which any 
government leader has ever given’: quoted in Newman, A., ‘Don’t let the Labour Right tell fairy 
stories about the 1980s’, Left Futures, 2 June 2011: available at 
http://www.leftfutures.org/2011/06/dont-let-the-labour-right-tell-fairy-stories-about-the-1980s/ 
[accessed 24 September 2011]. 
10 Thatcher considered that ‘the Tory Party [had] merely pitched camp in the long march to the left’: 
The Downing Street Years, op. cit., p. 7. Joseph described ‘the middle ground’ as ‘a guarantee these 
days of a left-wing ratchet’: Stranded, op. cit., p. 19. 
11 Various commentators describe this as a self-consciously radical and strategic approach: Hall, S. 
and Jacques, M. (eds), op. cit., pp. 10-11; Schwarz, B., op. cit., p. 118; Anderson, P., op. cit., p. 178; 
Gamble, A., op. cit., p. 6; Neocleous, M., op. cit., p. 24; Robinson, A. and Tormey, S., op. cit., p. 8. 
Ralph Miliband identifies Thatcher as being ‘quite consciously bent on something like a counter-
revolution in British life and politics’: Miliband, R., 'Class war Conservatism', New Society, 19 June 
1980, p. 278. See also Ch. 1, fn.70. 
12
 Thatcher, M., Speech to Greater London Young Conservatives (Iain Macleod Memorial Lecture),  
4 July 1977, available at http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/103411 [accessed 26 July 2013]. 
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First it needed to be stated - to the Conservative Party as much as to anyone else - 
that there was a crisis and a battle to be won.
13
 Thus, speaking in 1974, Joseph 
proclaimed that he was explicitly setting out to fight about ideas as this was 
‘essential to a political party’s intellectual health’.14 Speaking to the Oxford Union in 
December 1975, he argued that the Conservative Party had lost power ‘because we 
ceased to fight the battle of ideas’.15 Thatcher emphasised this again in 1978, 
drawing (somewhat ambiguously) on Marxist theory:  
We should look more to ideas and realise that people respond to them often more 
than they respond to appeals to their material interests. Communists know the 
power of ideas, despite their doctrine of historical materialism. We too should  
show we are aware of their importance, despite our material success.
16
   
What were the ideas they wanted people to adopt and how could the New Right 
make them dominant?   
 
Reflecting Mont Pelerin doctrines, a central idea presented as universal by Thatcher 
and others in tracts and speeches in the 1970s was to free people from the clutches of 
the state and give them back their “freedom”.17 Free market economics was 
presented as not just the most efficient system for the economy but also as a means 
to, and guarantee of, all other freedoms. Joseph’s insistence ‘that a free society 
requires a free economy as its basis’ echoes Friedman’s statement that ‘economic 
freedom, in and of itself, is an extremely important part of total freedom’.18 This 
freedom makes humanity what it is, as Thatcher opined: ‘Because we see man as a 
spiritual being, we utterly reject the Marxist view, which gives pride of place to 
economics. […] Money is not an end in itself, but a means to an end.’19 So despite 
                                               
13 See Ch. 1, fn. 63. 
14 Joseph, K., Reversing the Trend (Chichester and London: Barry Rose Publishers Limited, 1975),  
p. 4. 
15 Joseph, K., Stranded, op. cit., p. 25. 
16 Thatcher, M., Speech to the Bow Group, 6 May 1978, available at 
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/103674 [accessed 26 July 2013].  
17 See Ch. 1, fn.19 and www.montpelerin.org (op. cit.). 
18 Joseph, K., Maude, A. and Percival, I., Freedom and Order (London: Conservative Political Centre, 
1975), p. 7; Friedman, M. with the assistance of Friedman, R., Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 9. 
19 Thatcher, M., Speech 4 July 1977, op. cit. Thatcher misrepresented Marx who had in fact written 
that it was under capitalism - not communism - that ‘money becomes an end instead of a means’: see 
Grundrisse in McLellan, D. (ed.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings, op. cit., p. 363. She clearly believed 
that monetarism was a means to a more important end when, speaking in 1981, she stated: 
‘Economics are the method; the object is to change the heart and the soul.’ - Interview for Sunday 
Times, 3 May 1981, available at http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104475 [accessed 26 July 
2013]. 
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fore-fronting monetarism, she claimed that freedom was the all-important goal. The 
free market was presented as more democratic and morally better than central state 
planning and intervention, which offered no choice to the individual. The Centre for 
Policy Studies (CPS), founded by Joseph in 1974, presented its case ‘in moral as well 
as economic terms, emphasizing the links between freedom, the standard of living 
and a market economy based on private enterprise and the profit discipline’.20 
Friedman’s view was that ‘[f]reedom to own property is [an] essential part of 
economic freedom’, as is ‘freedom to use the resources we possess in accordance 
with our own values’, giving us ‘freedom to enter any occupation, engage in any 
business enterprise, buy from and sell to anyone else’.21 Angus Maude wrote in 1975 
that ‘it is only from the freedom of choice of the consumer as an individual that real 
progress comes. This is not only true of industry and commerce. It is true of society 
as a whole.’22 Two years later, Thatcher emphasised that people 
must be free to choose what they consume, in goods and services. […] A man 
must choose between spending and saving, between housing himself or depending 
on the state to house him at his fellow-citizen’s expense, between paying for his 
children’s education and accepting whatever the state provides.23  
The over-bureaucratic, over-spending, “nanny” state was curtailing people’s 
freedom, and this had to be changed. Once allowed their independence, people would 
be free to spend their money as they wished; and thus free in every other way. The 
market was the model for a sound way of life, replacing the weaknesses of 
collectivism: ‘The disciplines of the market - competition, profit, loss, bankruptcy - 
which transform self-interest into service are destroyed by socialism, and no 
effective alternative disciplines replace them.’24 In beguilingly simplistic terms, 
Thatcher stated:   
Let me give you my vision. A man’s right to work as he will, to spend what he 
earns, to own property, to have the State as servant and not as master - these are 
the British inheritance. They are the essence of a free economy. And on that 
freedom all our other freedoms depend. […] Every family should have the right to 
spend their money, after tax, as they wish, not as the Government dictates. Let us  
extend choice, the will to choose and the chance to choose.
25
   
                                               
20 Denham, A., Think-Tanks of the New Right (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, 
1996), p. 42. 
21 Friedman, M. and Friedman, R., Free to Choose (London: Penguin, 1980), pp. 90-91. 
22 Joseph, K. et al., Freedom and Order, op. cit., p. 28. 
23 Thatcher, M., Speech 4 July 1977, op. cit. 
24 Joseph, K. et al., Freedom and Order, op. cit., p. 17. 
25
 Thatcher, M., Speech to Conservative Party Conference, 10 October 1975, available at 
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/102777 [accessed 26 July 2013]. 
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This ideal world, this ideology, was based on the centrality of the purchasing power 
of the individual as an autonomous actor. Thatcher and the New Right therefore 
needed to bring about three inter-related fundamental shifts: from public to private 
ownership; from a perceived reliance on the state to individual responsibility and 
private enterprise; from citizen rights to market values. They needed to change 
people’s understanding of the post-war settlement as ‘the natural and irreversible 
order of things’, as Joseph remarked, and put their own in its place.26 How were they 
to persuade people to do this? 
 
(iv) Free economy:strong state 
As noted in Chapter 1, if the Thatcher Governments had been able to promote a 
single coherent set of ideas in immediately acceptable terms to the electorate and 
MPs, they might have done so. Certainly they would not have needed to make use of 
an ideological process to effect their plans. Jessop points out that the Thatcher 
Governments’ ‘coherence of strategy’ does not presuppose ‘logical consistency out 
of time and place’; rather, we need to consider the operation of Thatcherism in terms 
of ‘how far different elements fit together over time and in different areas in pursuing 
the primary strategic goals’.27 Elements would need to work well enough together, to 
appeal to at least some common interests, in order to serve the construction and 
imposition of the ideology of common sense. So what were these elements, tensions 
and contradictions? 
 
They are well expressed by Gamble’s slogan, ‘free economy:strong state’, which he 
describes as ‘the combination of a traditional liberal defence of the free economy 
with a traditional conservative defence of state authority’,28 with the aim of creating 
‘the conditions for a free economy by limiting the scope of the state while restoring 
its authority and competence to act’.29 To achieve this state of affairs, it was useful 
for the New Right to adopt aspects of the Conservative tradition, notably the 
advocacy of authority, discipline, social order and hierarchy and strong national 
defence, a tradition forcefully represented by Scruton:   
                                               
26 Joseph, K., Stranded, op. cit., p. 29. 
27 Jessop, B. et al. (eds), op. cit., p. 9. 
28
 Gamble, A., op. cit., p. 36. 
29 Ibid., p. 4. 
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It is through an ideal of authority that the conservative experiences the political 
world. […] He must first seek to rule, and must therefore pursue the power that 
will enable him to do so. […] [F]or the conservative, power […] is not the means 
to ‘social justice’, or ‘equality’, or ‘freedom’. It is power to command and coerce 
those who would otherwise reform or destroy, and its justification must be found  
within itself, in an idea of legitimacy or established right.
30
  
It was justifiable for governments to intervene (by using the law) in social spheres, 
even in “private” individual matters such as the family, education, abortion, if the 
continuity and tradition of the nation’s customs, interests and institutions was at risk. 
As Scruton said: ‘[I]t is as deep an instinct in a conservative as it is in a socialist to 
resist the champions of “minimal” government.’31  The New Right Tories thought 
that authority had broken down, or was at least seriously under attack, particularly 
since the 1960s and especially in education, Thatcher expressing the view, for 
example, that 
[a] large part of the problem we are having now has come from a weakening of 
authority […]. [W]e are reaping what was sown in the 1960s. The fashionable 
theories and permissive claptrap set the scene for a society in which the old 
virtues of discipline and self-restraint were denigrated […]. [W]e have got to  
recover from the effect of the 1960s.
32
  
People had to be taught the right kind of attitudes, by changing the values and habits 
which had underpinned the creation and expansion of the welfare state, post-war 
moves towards greater social equality and, in particular, young people’s challenge to 
the status quo. Teachers and students had to be put on the “right” path, as Thatcher 
later pontificated in 1988 - the year she had ‘just in time’ requisitioned the education 
state apparatus to her ideological purposes through the Education Reform Act: 
Some academics and intellectuals do not understand and are putting out what I 
call poison. Some young people who were thrilled to bits to get to university had 
every decent value pounded out of them. Luckily, it takes a long time to destroy 
fundamentally what people feel and I just got it in time. Had we had another 10  
years of that, it would have gone beyond repair.
33
 
The education system needed to be brought into use not to extend equality but to help 
curb social mobility and disturbance, and teach people their place so that 
                                               
30 Scruton, R., The Meaning of Conservatism, op. cit., pp. 19-25. Anthony Arblaster considered that 
Thatcher shared these views, ‘even if, for electoral reasons, she [could not] be quite so blunt about it’: 
Arblaster, A., 'Scruton: Intellectual by Appointment', New Socialist, November 1985, p. 19. 
31 Scruton, R., ibid., p. 48. 
32 Quoted in Hayes, M., op. cit., pp. 84-85. 
33 Interview with Thatcher in the Sunday Times, 8 May 1988, in Shattock, M., The UGC, op. cit.,  
p. 135. See also Thatcher, M., Let Our Children Grow Tall: Selected Speeches 1975-1977 (London: 
Centre for Policy Studies, 1977), p. 32, in which she accuses teachers at the Polytechnic of North 
London (PNL, see Ch. 1, fn.65) of ‘ruthlessly attacking the minds of the young’.   
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neoliberalism could thrive.
34
 As Richard Johnson puts it: ‘An education based on 
business criteria makes its own closures on knowledge and on the social future.’35 
The social democratic post-war gains had to be reversed and the predominance of the 
market restored. Education had to be seen as a private, and not a public, good. Thus 
the main issue, as Gamble identified it, facing neoliberals was ‘creating the 
conditions in which markets can function by removing whatever obstacles exist or 
may arise to their operation’.36 Or, as Daniel Stedman Jones puts it: ‘The central 
function of the neoliberal state was the proactive construction and protection of the 
conditions for the market economy.’37 As Johnson argues: ‘The free market requires 
the strong state as an initial condition.’38 Crucially, if the “natural course” of the free 
market order was challenged, it would have to be policed to make it work; if 
something stood in the way, then the law would need to be used to remove it. The 
authority of the state had to be reasserted, ironically, through the use of central 
government resources, direction and control to preserve a free economy and, thus, a 
free society.   
 
The apparent paradox or contradiction of the free economy:strong state model was 
not a hindrance but, on the contrary, a successful “marriage of convenience”, a 
mechanism through which the New Right could muster support from various quarters 
to bring its ideology into the dominant position. It needed not only to remove the 
obstacles to the successful operation of neoliberalism, but to make things change in a 
way that would last, and this would be achieved not so much through an acceptance 
of the theory but through its everyday practice. Clashes with those who resisted were 
not simply to be policed but were also to be welcomed, because they helped to build 
the strategy: the assertion of authority could be “marketed” as determination to 
achieve the all-important objective of securing “freedom” for all.  
 
                                               
34 A leaked DES report in 1983 said: ‘We are in a period of considerable change. There will be unrest, 
but we can cope with the Toxteths […] but if we have a highly educated and idle population we may 
possibly anticipate more serious conflict. People must be educated once more to know their place.’ 
 - quoted in Robinson, A. and Tormey, S., op. cit., p. 2. See also Ch. 1, fn.63. 
35 Johnson, R., ‘A new road to serfdom? A critical history of the 1988 Act’, in Department of Cultural 
Studies, University of Birmingham, Education Limited: Schooling, Training and the New Right in 
England since 1979 (London: Unwin Hyman Ltd., 1991), p. 80. 
36 Gamble, A., op. cit., p. 46. David Harvey also commented that ‘[t]he neoliberal project is to 
disembed capital from […] constraints [such as state-led planning and ownership of key sectors]’: 
Harvey, D., op. cit., p. 11. 
37
 Stedman Jones, D., op. cit., p. 335. 
38 Johnson, R., ibid., p. 81. 
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(v) Towards the construction of an “alternative logic” 
How were the Thatcher Governments going to persuade people, including those who 
worked in the state apparatuses, such as higher education, that everyone needed not 
only to conform to neoliberalism but to participate in its material and social 
construction? As I have indicated, the first stage was to get different elements in their 
own party to fit together, or seem to fit together, or at least be prepared to work 
together. They also needed to upstage the Labour Party and get “ordinary people” on 
board, by constructing - in Gramscian mode - an alternative logic with popular 
appeal, so that people would get used to a new norm. Such a call - an Althusserian 
‘interpellation’ or ‘recruitment’ of the individual39 - was assisted by circumstances. 
By the end of the 1970s, Labour Governments had antagonised some of their 
traditional supporters by failing to achieve - and, in some cases, by putting into 
reverse - post-war social democratic goals. For example, the comprehensivisation of 
schools had not resulted in the children of manual workers being substantially more 
likely to go to university.
40
 Given the limitations of post-war governments’ attempts 
(and particularly Callaghan’s Labour Government in “the winter of discontent”) to 
solve Britain’s deep economic and social problems, voters became attracted to 
Thatcher’s proposed solutions. If people simply worked harder, accepted social 
control, and adopted free market economics and values, then they and Britain would 
be saved and - importantly - would prosper, or so the story went. Thatcherism’s 
initial appeal, combined with the Left’s failure to counter it with a strong ideological 
alternative, was enough to allow Thatcherism to get the toehold it needed.
41
 ‘We 
were the ones in touch with the popular mood’, Thatcher claimed later.42  
                                               
39 Althusser, L., 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses', op. cit., pp. 44-51. 
40 Chitty, C., Towards a New Education System: the Victory of the New Right? (Lewes, Sussex: 
Falmer Press, 1989), pp. 53-54. 
41 Perry Anderson (op. cit.) and Gregory Elliott (in Labourism and the English Genius: the Strange 
Death of Labour England? (London: Verso, 1993)) analyse the ways in which the post-war Labour 
Party was ideologically weak and suffered from internal strife, leading to the purging of the leftwing 
element Militant and the breakaway of other members to form the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in 
1981. Labour MP Barry Sheerman, speaking in 2013 on the occasion of Thatcher’s death, confirms 
this: ‘Mrs Thatcher was not only talented as a leader, but lucky. I was on the Opposition Benches 
knowing what a shambles the Opposition were. We spent more time fighting each other within the 
Labour party than we had time to fight the Government. It is not good for democracy to have such a 
weak Opposition as we had post 1979. […] [P]eople were let down by the Opposition because we 
could not get our act together to defeat her.’ - Hansard, House of Commons Debates (hereafter, HC 
Deb or, in the case of the House of Lords, HL Deb), 10 April 2013, vol.560, c.1663, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmhansrd/cm130410/debtext/130410-
0002.htm#13041013000082 [accessed 15 April 2013]. Furthermore, the Falklands War boosted 
Thatcher’s standing at a time of low polls, costing £1,000 million, precisely at the time of the 
university cuts: see HC Deb, 22 June 1982, vol.26, c.148. The Association of University Teachers 
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Hall sees Thatcherism as having a particularly powerful ideological dimension in 
terms of constructing consent to a right-wing agenda.
43
 Seeing it as a form of 
‘authoritarian populism’,44 he analyses it as a specific ‘historical conjuncture’, in a 
Gramscian sense.
45
 Different forces and contradictory elements could come together 
and come to be “lived”. People’s perceptions of what is going on could be changed 
through the mediation of what might appear initially to be an ideology at odds with 
their socio-political conditions and traditions or their class or material interests. The 
mismatch between elements of neoliberalism’s theory and practice, and the paradox 
of the free economy:strong state, might initially appear to be a weakness. But as Ruth 
Levitas points out, ‘given the lack of logical coherence required by common-sense 
ideologies, contradictions may be a strength rather than a weakness, enabling the 
New Right to switch the grounds of its legitimations at will’.46 This way of working 
has a “built-in” flexibility which allows the ideology to be crafted according to 
circumstances. Thatcher could play on the contradictions, could operate ‘directly on 
the real and manifestly contradictory experience of the popular classes under social-
democratic corporatism’.47   
 
A new way of addressing people would translate, as Hall puts it, ‘economic doctrine 
into the language of experience, moral imperative and common sense’, to turn ‘a 
theoretical ideology into a populist idiom’.48 “The national interest” was asserted 
through the use of universal terms such as “freedom” and the use of myths - such as 
“Great” Britain - to woo popular consent.49 The New Right needed to persuade 
people as individuals to jump onto the neoliberal bandwagon, to believe that each 
                                                                                                                                     
(AUT) realised that press coverage of the university cuts was even less at this time than it might have 
been: see paper AUT/HQ/341, May 1982, UCU archives. 
42 Thatcher, M., The Downing Street Years, op. cit., p. 40. 
43 Jessop, B. et al. (eds), op. cit., p. 105. 
44 Hall, S. and Jacques, M. (eds), op. cit., p. 10 and p. 22, who acknowledge Ernesto Laclau’s work on 
the concept of ‘populism’: see Laclau, E., Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory (London: Verso 
Editions/NLB, 1982).  
45 Hall, S., The Hard Road to Renewal (London: Verso in association with Marxism Today, 1988),  
p. 163. 
46 Levitas, R. (ed.), op. cit., p. 11. 
47 Hall, S. and Jacques, M. (eds), op. cit., p. 31. 
48 Ibid., p. 28. 
49 Scruton said: ‘No-one, least of all a conservative, is likely to believe that a government is possible 
without the propagation of myths.’ - quoted in Hayes, M., op. cit., p. 13. Enoch Powell similarly 
maintained (after Plato): ‘The greatest task of the statesman therefore is to offer his people good 
myths.’ - ‘Speech at Trinity College, Dublin’, 13 November 1964, available at 
http://enochpowell.info/Resources/July-December1964.pdf [accessed 16 November 2012].  
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could have access to the benefits of the free market and thus to all other freedoms, to 
forget (or never be brought to realise) that capitalism was based - necessarily - on a 
radically unequal distribution of resources. As Scruton put it, the rhetoric needed ‘to 
establish in the public mind the inseparability of market freedom and economic 
leadership and to integrate the philosophy of the market into the underlying principle 
of order’.50 Thatcher commented: ‘I did not feel I needed an interpreter to address 
people who spoke the same language.’51 The terms of the debate needed to be 
controlled through discourse masking and neutralising objections.
52
 “The man in the 
street” (rather than “the worker”) needed to identify with a new kind of terminology 
rather than that of the Left which had traditionally represented popular causes, 
through terms such as “class” and “unions”, now made to sound “old-fashioned” and 
irrelevant to everyday experience. Thatcher did not consider she needed to bargain 
with organised interests but could make it look as if people’s concerns were being 
addressed above class and sectional interests.
53
 She was on the side of ordinary 
people: ‘What I am desperately trying to do is to create one nation with everyone 
being a man of property.’54 Everyday language and experience was ‘the material 
grounding for the construction of consent’.55 For example, with the Government able 
to pass the necessary legislation, council-house tenants could be wooed into buying 
public housing at a substantially lower cost than on the open mortgage market 
(ironically) and public utility shares could be sold cheaply to the public, thus 
achieving privatisation at a stroke.
56
 As Oliver Letwin later wrote: ‘What makes this 
feature of privatisation particularly interesting is that it constitutes a stealing of the 
clothes of the left by the right.’57 Once people literally “bought into” the Thatcherite 
project, it would become possible to effect ever more radical change. A new way of 
                                               
50 Quoted in Hayes, M., op. cit., p. 21. 
51 Thatcher, M., The Downing Street Years, op. cit., p. 10. 
52 Eagleton, T., op. cit., p. 9. 
53 Gamble, A., op. cit., p. 30. 
54 Thatcher in 1983, quoted in Hayes, M., op. cit., p. 57. 
55 Harvey, D., op. cit., pp. 40-41. Hall, S. and Jacques, M. (eds), op. cit., p. 38, make the same point.  
56 The number of individual shareholders grew from three to nine million from 1979 to 1987: see 
Gamble, A., op. cit., p. 245. A million council houses were sold: see Anderson, P., op. cit., p. 305. 
57 Letwin, O., Privatising the World (London: Cassell, 1988), p. 48. Letwin (a Cambridge academic 
and frequent participant at the Conservative Philosophy Group) was one of Thatcher’s advisers before 
the 1987 election, having earlier been one of Joseph’s. He describes (p. 106) the tactics used to 
persuade people to buy shares, such as the advertising campaign to privatise British Gas, as ‘exercises 
[…] conducted with the precision of military manoeuvres by armies of professionals’. He identifies 
the success of the political shift by noting the different language used by the Labour Party in its 1987 
Manifesto, for example, where the phrase ‘social ownership’ replaces the earlier usage of the word 
‘nationalisation’.   
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appealing to people’s needs, through private ownership rather than public provision 
of services, could be put in place. People would lose interest in the old values and 
accustom themselves to the new. A new logic, located deliberately on ‘the terrain of 
contradictions’,58 could be brought into play and then made to stick. If “ordinary” 
people could be brought to accept the ideological change, then the state apparatuses 
would have to fall in behind. Having adopted Thatcherite values, people would want 
different things. They would not want a “useless” liberal higher education, nor would 
they want their taxes to pay for others’ access to it. Higher education (and other 
ISAs) would have to conform to the changed circumstances. Hall describes such 
crafting as a Gramscian ‘process of transformism’ which changes the terms of the 
debate ‘in disorganizing the labour movement and progressive forces […], in 
reorganizing the political terrain and in changing the balance of political forces in 
favour of capital and the right’.59 There had indeed to seem - both to the Tory Party 
and to the wider public - to be no alternative. And once initial obstacles were cleared 
away and basic new “truths” laid down, the construction sites for this struggle for 
ideological hegemony would be found in the state apparatuses, including, and 
perhaps especially, education. 
 
(vi) Building the theory and promoting the message 
Even before its structural reformation, higher education was able to contribute to the 
neoliberal mission. It could provide authors, locations, speakers and audiences for 
researching and evangelising the ideas from which the ideological project could be 
launched.   
 
First, the fundamental intellectual message was explicitly propagated by New Right 
politicians, particularly Thatcher herself and Joseph, who from the 1970s onwards 
took it to influential groups, including those who studied or worked in universities, in 
business and in the Tory Party itself. In April 1974, just after the Tory Prime 
Minister, Edward Heath, had lost the general election, Joseph described his adoption 
of a rejuvenated kind of Conservatism in terms of an ideological ‘conversion’, which 
others needed to join.
60
 He made scores of speeches around Britain from the mid-
                                               
58 Larrain, J., op. cit., p. 89. 
59 Hall, S. and Jacques, M. (eds), op. cit., p. 13. 
60
 Joseph used this religious metaphor again in 1974 when he said: ‘I had tried to convert [Edward 
Heath] and failed’: quoted in Schwarz, B., op. cit., p. 121. The CPS website describes Joseph’s task at 
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1970s to 1979, and at over 150 meetings at higher education institutions.
61
 In 
Birmingham in October 1974 he said: ‘We must fight the battle of ideas in every 
school, university, publication, committee, TV studio even if we have to struggle for 
our toehold there […]. We shall need intellectual as well as moral courage.’62 As 
Thatcher was to acknowledge: ‘It was Keith who really began to turn the intellectual 
tide back against socialism. He got our fundamental intellectual message across, to 
students, professors, journalists, the “intelligentsia” generally.’63 And again, speaking 
in 1988, she describes his role in building the ideology:   
Now we have a record to point to; but at that time we just had beliefs, faith in 
what could be done. Keith made that faith into something that intelligent people 
were willing to share. And their acceptance spread the message through the press 
and other media to everybody. If Keith hadn’t been doing all that work with the 
intellectuals, all the rest of our work would probably never have resulted in  
success.
64
  
Joseph saw his task as overturning - as he put it to the Oxford Union in 1975 - the 
‘nihilistic left-wing influence over thought and education’.65 Things had to be turned 
round, if neoliberalism were to take its rightful place, because 
a whole range of difficulties [has been] created by the anti-profit, anti-private 
industry climate which has prevailed in parts of government, media, universities 
and trade unions. […] In Britain, a large proportion of political and intellectual  
opinion-formers is convinced that we can dispense with profits.
66
 
People - especially the middle class - needed to hear and heed his message: ‘A large 
part - perhaps a majority - of the intelligentsia are either ignorant of or hostile to the 
mechanisms of the market.’67 Speaking in Norwich in 1976, he enthusiastically 
celebrated the irrational, almost magical, powers of the market, claiming that  
the blind, unplanned, uncoordinated wisdom of the market is overwhelmingly 
superior to the well-researched, rational, systematic, well-meaning, co-operative, 
science-based, forward-looking, statistically respectable plans of governments, 
bureaucracies and international organisations preserved from human error and  
made thoroughly respectable by the employment of numerous computers.
68
   
                                                                                                                                     
its inception as needing to ‘convert the Tory Party’: see http://www.cps.org.uk/ [accessed 30 June 
2012]. See also Ch. 1, fn.58. 
61 Joseph, K., Stranded, op. cit., p. 8; Halcrow, M., Keith Joseph – a Single Mind (London: 
Macmillan, 1989), p. 98. 
62 Ibid., pp. 81-82. 
63 Ibid., p. 97. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Joseph, K., Stranded, op. cit., p. 20. 
66 Joseph, K., Reversing, op. cit., p. 15. 
67
 Joseph, K., Stranded, op. cit., p. 59. 
68 Ibid., p. 57. 
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This was a doctrine claiming not to be a doctrine, appearing to rely “simply” on 
intuitive laws of nature and common sense. It was made to appear as if it could be 
justified in its own terms, as if it had some kind of inbuilt rationality. It was being 
claimed that the free market was both “natural” and scientifically certain. Joseph  
believed that  
in a sense the market is a state of nature, with empirically observable laws, like 
the laws of nature. Indeed inasmuch as economics is a social science, it studies 
laws of human nature […]. [W]e can no more override the laws of the market  
[…] than we can repeal the law of gravity, mechanics, physics.69   
The intelligentsia had to be brought to adopt this belief in the market as it was the 
only solution to Britain’s problems. 
 
Some, at least, were already on board, indeed steering the ship. A second way in 
which higher education contributed to the neoliberal mission was by providing the 
New Right politicians with ideologues. These thinkers, in universities and other 
influential organisations (Gramsci’s ‘professional intellectuals’), developed and 
debated New Right ideas, giving legitimacy and academic respectability to 
Thatcher’s political instincts, and backing up her proclamations. Ironically, given her 
dislike and distrust of universities, Thatcher used think-tanks and special advisers 
(both when she was in Opposition and in Government) who constituted an inner 
circle of ideologues outside cabinet and parliamentary processes. The building of the 
ideology was further prosecuted by others operating outside party politics within a 
variety of other institutional and social structures, notably the right-wing “tabloid” 
press. Right-wing economic journalists took the message out to the “serious” press 
and appeared regularly in the 1970s and 1980s on the growing number of TV “chat” 
shows to explain what monetarism was all about.
70
    
                                               
69 Joseph, K. et al., Freedom and Order, op. cit., p. 19. 
70 I am drawing on Andrew Denham’s work (Think-Tanks, op. cit.), although he does not cover higher 
education, and Clyde Chitty’s on the think-tanks’ education initiatives (op. cit., pp. 10-12).  See also 
Jones, K., op. cit.; Halcrow, M., op. cit; Knight, C., op. cit. The latter describes (p. 19) an ‘invisible 
college’ of right-wing educationalists intent on bringing about ‘an educational counter-revolution’. 
These included: Brian Cox and Tony Dyson (university English teachers, previously Labour 
supporters) who edited the ‘Black Papers’ series from 1969 onwards, condemning perceived threats to 
education standards and discipline, celebrating the “excellence” of the public schools, and urging a 
move away from comprehensives back to grammar schools; Rhodes Boyson (a former “hardline” 
headteacher and ex-member of the Labour Party) and Harry Greenaway (Tory, and Head of a school 
English department), who sponsored Boyson to join the Conservative Party in 1967; Hugh Thomas (a 
former academic, and Chair of the Centre for Policy Studies [CPS] after Joseph) who supported 
Thatcher’s anti-establishment stance, having written in 1959 in favour of abolishing public schools. 
Other British academics who worked with Thatcher included Alan Walters (Thatcher’s economic 
adviser from 1981, previously at Birmingham University, the London School of Economics [LSE], 
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The first influential New Right think-tank was the Institute of Economic Affairs 
(IEA) founded in 1955. New Right ideologues built on Thatcher’s election as leader 
of the Conservative Party in 1975, and other key institutes were founded, such as the 
Adam Smith Institute in 1976 (with Madsen Pirie as President, aided by fellow St 
Andrews graduate Eamon Butler). The explicitly ideological brief of the Centre for 
Policy Studies (CPS) was to 
work towards influencing policy, rather than just producing research briefs […].  
We shall work to shape the climate of opinion […]. We shall see in greater detail 
what people are doing in other lands. We shall look at the success stories and ask 
why they succeeded. But the main thing is that we shall argue. In the first  
instance, we shall argue the case for the social market economy.
71
  
With some membership shared between it and the Party, the CPS was a launching-
pad for the development of New Right ideas amongst academics and for the transfer 
and assimilation of those ideas into the Conservative Party and then out to the public. 
With Joseph as the first Chair and Thatcher as President, the first Director of Studies 
Alfred Sherman (a journalist and, crucially and ironically, a former socialist) brought 
ideological commitment to the exercise. The New Right gave a home to those Tory 
academics who were critical of the universities in which many of them were based, 
either because these had historically adopted an overly-conservative, gradualist 
approach to reform or because they had given succour to socialist students and staff 
or “the chattering classes” opposed to an “enterprise culture”. Although the think-
tanks did not produce as many publications on higher education as on schools, they 
provided ideological “backbone”  to the New Right in opposition and then in 
government, even if government action might not always go as far or as fast as they 
wished. Hayek had claimed that ‘we can beat the Socialist trend only if we can 
                                                                                                                                     
and latterly at Johns Hopkins, USA); Patrick Minford at Liverpool University; and Brian Griffiths, an 
economist at City University. Once in government, Thatcher strengthened the Number 10 Policy Unit 
(originally set up by Harold Wilson and retained by Callaghan), especially from 1983. It was headed 
first by Hoskyns (whose heated clashes with Thatcher are described in Charles Moore’s biography), 
then by Ferdinand Mount, and then by Griffiths. See also Stedman Jones, D., op. cit., pp. 134-179, on 
how a ‘transatlantic network’ of business people, journalists, politicians and academics exchanged, 
developed and spread ideas on neoliberalism from the 1940s onwards.   
71 Quoted in Denham, A., Think-Tanks, op. cit., p. 39. The language reflects how Thatcherism in its 
early phase was influenced by the West German post-war ‘economic miracle’, achieved through 
‘ordo-liberalism’ (a free market in an ordered society), sometimes then referred to as ‘the social 
market’: see Runciman, D., ‘Rat-a-tat-a-tat-a-tat-a-tat’, London Review of Books, Volume 35, Number 
11, 6 June 2013, pp. 13-18. 
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persuade the intellectuals, the makers of opinion’.72 New Right academics helped to 
build a counter-force of intellectuals to propagate the project as a whole.  
 
This recruitment of academics and thinkers enabled the New Right to build its 
ideological strategy, in the main, outside the party political machinery, and thus 
unencumbered by the “one-nation” Conservatism which had held sway for decades. 
In quasi-Leninist mode, one CPS Chair described how they could operate: ‘We act as 
outriders, scouts, as a vanguard - who can […] if necessary be disavowed.’73 As the 
ideas were developed in independent organisations - universities and think-tanks - 
they did not need initially to win internal Party agreement.
74
 Ideologues could 
explore radical views more openly than politicians with elections to worry about; and 
academics could use their university facilities to work in collaboration with 
politicians, yet appear to be independent. Joseph pointed out how ‘people experience 
events from a particular angle, and see them to some extent indirectly, through the 
prism of their viewpoint, which is shaped by opinion formers, who include 
politicians, communications media and teachers’.75 While he was here alluding to the 
way in which he considered socialist teachers and others were corrupting the youth, 
what he said in fact aptly characterises the New Right’s own methods in using right-
wing academics to propagate its ideology, however different that was in terms of 
content. As if mindful of Gramsci and Althusser, the New Right recruited academics 
as the ‘professional’ intellectuals or agents of the ideology.   
 
Before we can see the results of their groundwork, however, we need to consider the 
second relevant context: the relationship of higher education to the state prior to 
1979. 
 
(vii) The relationship of higher education to the state  
Having identified how Thatcherism could be presented as an ideology of common 
sense, let us turn to how British higher education was in a position to help in this 
                                               
72 Thatcher quoted this in a letter to the IEA in 1980, praising their propagation of the ideas which had 
‘commanded increasingly wide acceptance in the universities and the media’: see Knight, C., op. cit., 
p. 144.  
73 Lord Thomas of Swynnerton, quoted in Denham, A., Think-Tanks, op. cit., p. 42. 
74 Thatcherites purported that Heath’s Selsdon Conference of the Shadow Cabinet in 1970 agreed to a 
radical free market programme to be implemented if elected, although Heath supporters disputed this: 
see Stedman Jones, D., op. cit., p. 177 and p. 369. 
75 Joseph, K., Stranded, op. cit., p. 26.   
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mission. Just as the seeming contradictions of the free economy:strong state could be 
put to work to further Thatcher’s neoliberal project, so aspects of higher education’s 
history and traditions would be opportunities to be exploited in the 1980s to help 
build and embed the Thatcherite ideology in this state apparatus.
76
    
 
From a 1979 vantage point, I survey three broad and inter-related aspects which 
Thatcherism could put to ideological use: first, that an élite and liberal university 
sector had been expanding into a higher education system more accessible to a 
greater number - and wider range - of people; second, that greater governmental 
emphasis was being given to encouraging applicants to take science, technology and 
vocational courses, in order to meet the country’s perceived economic and 
employment needs; and third, that higher education was being enjoined to be more 
responsive to social and national needs in a system funded and co-ordinated by the 
state.   
 
Let us briefly consider the development of these three broad themes up to 1979.  
Prior to 1945, only 3% of the pre-war age group entered university.
77
 In the kind of 
liberal model favoured by Newman and Mill, many universities saw their role as the 
cultivation of the minds of the élite, together with the conduct of research. Graduates 
would assume their rightful positions of leadership in high public office and the 
professions.
78
 Instituted by Royal Charter, universities were independent of 
government. British academics were thus not civil servants, neither employed by, nor 
                                               
76 As Marx puts it: ‘Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do 
not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, 
given, and transmitted from the past’: Marx, K., The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in 
McLellan, D. (ed.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings, op. cit., p. 300. 
77 Kogan, M. and Hanney, S., op. cit., p. 13; Kogan, M. with Kogan, D., op. cit., p. 15. 
78 The main aim of the medieval universities had been to produce theologians, lawyers and doctors of 
medicine, grounded in the (then) liberal arts: see, for example, Hamlyn, D. W., ‘The concept of a 
university’, Philosophy, 71, 1996, pp. 205-218. What is now considered by many liberal 
educationalists to be the standard practice of combining university teaching with research came much 
later, following the German lead in the nineteenth century. The idea/ideal of a liberal university 
education became predominant in Britain, with Oxbridge and arts subjects assuming privileged 
positions at the top of the university hierarchy. In 1935, half of university students overall were in arts 
faculties. At Oxford, 80% studied arts, whereas at Cambridge it was 70%: see Ashby, E., Technology 
and the Academics (London: Macmillan, 1963); Halsey, A. H., op. cit; Rothblatt, S., The Modern 
University and its Discontents (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Carswell, J., op. cit., 
pp. 8-9. Peter Scott comments that ‘Newman […] clearly regarded a liberal education as the 
intellectual means by which the political and administrative elite should be educated to fill the 
commanding positions in society’: see Scott, P., The Crisis of the University (London and Sydney: 
Croom Helm, 1984), p. 49. Perry Anderson describes the traditional liberal university education as ‘a 
training for rule, not for trade’: see Anderson, P., op. cit., p. 147. 
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answerable to, the state. Save for being subject to the law of the land, universities 
were autonomous institutions with academic freedom.
79
 One Tory (later) 
characterised them as ‘self-governing corporations, articulating for themselves the 
ends for which they existed, and pursuing these ends according to their own inner, 
self-moving dialectic’.80 Universities had a status within the British Establishment 
and their value was, broadly speaking, taken for granted by the rest of society.   
 
With the beginnings of the welfare state and social movements towards greater 
equality after the Second World War, there was a growing expectation that access to 
secondary and tertiary education should be a democratic right for all. The 1944 
Education Act - whose architect was the reforming Tory Minister R.A. Butler - 
established the principle of equality of access to educational opportunity, specifically 
the entitlement to state-funded secondary level education, albeit in a stratified and 
selective system which retained the separate public schools.
81
 To fund those few 
students entering the élite university system but unable to pay for themselves, a 
patchwork of different support systems had grown up. A small number of students 
obtained awards directly from universities (mainly Oxbridge), or the highly 
competitive and discretionary state scholarships, or less remunerative local county 
scholarships, or industrial sponsorship for vocational degrees, or grants pledging 
students to the teaching profession, or support from charitable organisations. Post-
war, a special grant scheme supported ex-service personnel to study at university, 
most opting for technological and vocational degree subjects, some over a 
compressed two-year timescale.
82
 Even though universities expanded, there was 
increasing pressure from applicants for university places, at the same time as 
government was recognising the need for a more highly educated workforce to match 
international competitors.   
 
But how should universities be funded and administered by the state, given the need 
to safeguard their autonomy? Instituted in 1919, the University Grants Committee 
                                               
79 For a history of academic freedom and university autonomy, see Tapper, E. R. and Salter, B. G., 
‘The changing idea of university autonomy’, Studies in Higher Education, Volume 20, Number 1, 
March 1995, SRHE, pp. 59-71. 
80 Kedourie, E., Diamonds into Glass: the Government and the Universities (London: Centre for 
Policy Studies, Policy Study Number 89, 1988), p. 6. 
81
 Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, The Education Act 1944 (London: HMSO, 1944). 
82 Robinson, E., The New Polytechnics (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1968), pp. 18-19. 
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(UGC) was a non-statutory body advising universities and government on the 
amount and distribution of the comparatively little financial support from the state to 
the small number of universities in existence at that time.
83
 As universities grew, up 
to and beyond the Second World War, national public funding came to form the 
major source of university finance.
84
 From its initial role as simply the disburser of 
funds, the UGC came to be perceived also as an independent check - a “buffer or 
shock-absorber” between government and the universities - on how that public 
money was spent, safeguarding the universities from direct political intervention.
85
 In 
1946 its terms of reference were augmented to include advising government on 
“national needs” and planning student numbers and subject mix.86   
 
In the 1950s, it was becoming apparent that, given the booming post-war birth rate, 
universities would not be able to meet the growing demand for undergraduate student 
places. There was also pressure to modernise British industry through the education 
and training of more technicians, professionals and managers needed to meet “the 
technological revolution”.87 The 1956 White Paper recognised the growth and 
importance of the technological diplomas and degrees taught in technical colleges 
(and awarded largely by the University of London externally), designating the most 
prestigious as the Colleges of Advanced Technology (CATs).
88
 The remaining 
colleges were local and regional in focus with the ability to take both full- and part-
                                               
83 The UGC recurrent grant in the inter-war years represented about 30% of university income, with 
the rest of universities’ funding coming from student fees, charitable donations, endowments, civic 
support and various revenues: see Shattock, M., The UGC, op. cit., p. 107.  
84 Carswell, J., op. cit., pp. 14-19. 
85 University Grants Committee, Report of the University Grants Committee to the Secretary of State 
for Education and Science, Cmnd. 3820 (London: HMSO, November 1968) dates the first use of the 
term to 1948. 
86 Tapper, E. R. and Salter, B. G., ‘The changing idea’, op. cit., p. 62; Scott, P., The Meanings of Mass 
Higher Education (Buckingham: SRHE and the Open University Press, 1995), p. 16.    
87 The founding of the University of London in 1826 (that part of it that became University College) 
had spearheaded the scientific revolution, according to Ashby (op. cit.), with its curriculum of new 
subjects such as experimental sciences and economics. Further colleges teaching the sciences, 
technologies and other applied subjects were added in Manchester, Birmingham, Leeds and other 
cities, the “redbrick” university colleges and the civic universities developing fully into universities in 
the twentieth century.   
88 Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, Technical Education (White Paper), Cmd. 9703 (London: HMSO, 
1956). Shattock (The UGC, op. cit., pp. 143-144) documents the UGC’s lack of response in the 1950s 
to the growing demand for a new technological university, preferring instead to direct any extra 
resources into existing universities. The ten CATs provided higher technological education outside the 
universities, until Robbins accorded them university status in 1966. Several would suffer 
disproportionately in the UGC’s 1980s cuts. 
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time students at various levels up to and including degree work, perceived as a kind 
of “overflow” from the universities.89 
 
In view of the substantial actual and projected growth in university places, Harold 
Macmillan’s Tory Government set up the Robbins Committee review in 1961.90 
Their Report in 1963 reiterated higher education’s widely-accepted liberal objectives 
- the promotion of ‘the general powers of the mind’, ‘the advancement of learning’, 
‘the transmission of a common culture and common standards of citizenship’ - but 
added a fourth, the importance of ‘instruction in skills’.91 Moreover, it was given 
equal weight to the other three. The Report recognised explicitly a relationship 
between universities and the state, albeit with continuing safeguards for university 
autonomy, and it firmly took control of higher education as a national system and a 
matter of public concern.
92
 Building on the notion of equality enshrined in the 1944 
Act, the Report established the principle that anyone qualified to go to university 
should be able to do so, and at public expense: ‘[W]e have assumed as an axiom that 
courses of higher education should be available for all those who are qualified by 
ability and attainment to pursue them and who wish to do so.’93 Access to higher 
education would be enabled by the 1960 Anderson Report’s recommendations 
whereby, since 1962, a national state-funded mandatory grant system for full-time 
undergraduates had been in place, comprising payment of tuition fees and a means-
tested maintenance grant, on a sliding scale according to personal/parental income.
94
 
The Tory Government accepted in principle Robbins’ recommendations for the 
further expansion of existing universities, the granting of university status to the 
CATs, the designation of three special high-level science and technology universities 
                                               
89 Robinson, E., op. cit., pp. 15-41. 
90 Carswell, J., op. cit., p. 19. The so-called ‘new’ or ‘Murray’ (after the then Chair of the UGC) 
universities (Warwick, Kent, Sussex, York, Lancaster, East Anglia and Essex) were designated pre-
Robbins, with Keele having been designated earlier.   
91 Committee on Higher Education, Higher Education: Report of the Committee appointed by the 
Prime Minister under the Chairmanship of Lord Robbins 1961-3 (Robbins Report), Cmnd. 2154 
(London: HMSO, 1963): available online at http://www.educationengland.org.uk/documents/robbins/ 
[accessed 16 July 2012], paragraphs 25-29. 
92 Eric Robinson (op. cit., p. 29) points out that higher education in the technical colleges was virtually 
ignored by Robbins’ terms of reference and treated like ‘a temporary expedient’. For a discussion on 
whether higher education could be said to have constituted ‘a system’ at this time, and on the 
hierarchy of universities, see Halsey, A. H., op. cit. 
93 Robbins Report, op. cit., paragraph 31. 
94 Robert Stevens considers that the Anderson Committee ‘gave the last clear endorsement of the 
Newman view of the university’ but that it was working on ‘the assumption that going to university 
was for the few’: Stevens, R., University to Uni: the Politics of Higher Education in England since 
1944 (London: Politico’s, 2004), p. 19. 
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and the establishment of six more new universities.
95
 When the new Department of 
Education and Science (DES) was set up in 1964, it assumed ministerial 
responsibility for the UGC from the Treasury, a move perceived by educationalists 
and civil servants as a downgrading, as it cut the UGC’s direct Treasury link. In 
1966, UGC/university finances were made subject to oversight by the Public 
Accounts Committee (PAC), as were other publicly-funded areas.
96
 The national 
administration of university education was now firmly part of the governmental 
machine.  
 
In the same month as the Robbins Committee reported, Harold Wilson, the then 
leader of the Opposition, spoke at the Labour Party Conference on the need for the 
further expansion of higher education to give wider educational opportunity, but also 
to meet society’s new industrial demands and promote economic growth. Wilson 
promised that a Labour Government would embark on  
a tremendous building programme of new universities [with] more of them […] 
sited in industrial areas where they can in some way reflect the pulsating throb of 
local industry, where they can work in partnership with the new industries we  
seek to create.
97
 
Reflecting their commitment to equality, the Labour Party wanted to make higher 
education accessible to more people, including those who could not necessarily 
attend full-time. Accordingly, at the same conference, Wilson trailed a “university of 
the air”, later translated into the 1966 Labour Party manifesto pledge to found the 
Open University (OU), which admitted its first students in 1971. 
 
                                               
95 Robbins’ proposed Special Institutions for Scientific and Technological Education and Research 
(the SISTERs) were to be equivalent in status to, for example, Imperial College, London, or the high 
level institutes in France - the grandes écoles - or in Germany – the technische hochschulen. By 1960, 
the percentage of the annual participation rate (APR, the number of home initial entrants to higher 
education aged under 21, expressed as a percentage of the age group) was 6% - still low, relative to 
other competitors: see BIS, Browne Report, op. cit., fn.30. In the 1960s, there was cross-party 
agreement that higher education should be expanded to satisfy unmet demand, a position supported 
(even) by the Conservative Party Conference in October 1962: see Kogan, M. and Kogan, D., op. cit., 
pp. 18-19. Robbins recommended an increase of full-time student places from 195,000 in 1962/63 to 
507,000 in 1980/1, designed to raise the APR from 8% to 17%: see Robbins Report, op. cit., Chapter 
VI, paragraph 167, p. 65 and paragraph 171, p. 66. In all, the number of university institutions grew 
from 28 in 1960 to 44 in the following two decades: see Shattock, M., The UGC, op. cit., p. 107.  
96 Ibid., pp. 16-17. 
97 Quoted in Bell, R., Fowler, G. and Little, K. (eds), Education in Great Britain and Ireland: a 
Source Book (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul with the Open University Press, 1973), pp. 192-
194. 
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However, the Labour Party distrusted the traditional universities, those exclusive 
“ivory towers”, part of the Establishment and the class system that had kept out those 
whom Labour had traditionally represented.
98
 This resonated with the view that 
many universities or faculties were divorced from the need to contribute to industrial 
progress. Reminiscent of Mao’s view (as noted in Chapter 1), some British (and 
particularly English) people - on both the Left and the Right - distrusted and resented 
what they perceived as the universities’ aloofness, considering - rather - that the best 
“education for life” was available through experience in the factory or business 
rather than from a higher education.
99
 The Labour Party had a stronger allegiance to 
the local education authority (LEA) further and technical education colleges, which 
had given access to the working class to take liberal or vocational studies part-time.  
 
Assuming government in 1964, Labour decided not to implement all Robbins’ 
recommendations (notably, not the creation of the new universities and scientific 
higher institutes), claiming pressure on resources. This was not resisted by the UGC 
which favoured a cautionary brake on establishing more universities, maintaining 
that the Robbins target for extra student places could be reached (or even exceeded) 
                                               
98 Trow, M., ‘Binary dilemmas – an American view’, Higher Education Review, Volume 1, Number 
3, 1969, pp. 33-34. The Labour Party in the 1960s considered some radical proposals for full 
integration of further and higher education: see Salter, B. and Tapper, T., The State and Higher 
Education, op. cit., pp. 22-29. 
99 Desmond Ryan dates the anti-university stance of manufacturers from the early nineteenth century 
onwards, showing how the Thatcher Governments in particular drew on both a British anti-
intellectualism (which favoured the idea of ‘the practical man’) in their attack on universities, in their 
drive to promote a more utilitarian purpose for higher education: see Ryan, D., 'The Assault on Higher 
Education', New Left Review, Volume 227, January/February 1998, pp. 3-32. Thatcher was impressed 
by the views of Corelli Barnett who decried the mid-nineteenth century ‘takeover bid for the soul of 
British education […] by the highminded liberal-studies lobby’, with ‘the practical man’ being 
relegated to carry out industrial development. Barnett argues that this “snobbism” led to under-
investment in advanced science and technology teaching and research (unlike in Europe), and that the 
‘false antithesis’ set up between arts and sciences damaged both industrial progress and the 
development of British higher education: see Barnett, C., The Audit of War (London: Macmillan, 
1986), pp. 99-220. The Secretary of State for Education, Keith Joseph (and other Cabinet ministers, 
Nigel Lawson and Michael Heseltine), similarly admired Barnett’s ‘declinist’ analysis, with its 
criticism of the anti-business culture prevalent in higher education: see Denham, A. and Garnett, M., 
Keith Joseph (Durham: Acumen, 2001), p. 300. Joseph and Thatcher were also impressed by Martin 
Wiener’s criticism of the English ruling establishment for having privileged its values over middle-
class industrial Victorian values: see Wiener, M. J., English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial 
Spirit 1850-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Joseph distributed Wiener’s book 
to the Cabinet: see The Economist online (author not stated), 27 April 2010, ‘Empty shelves’: 
available at http://www.economist.com/node/15996751/print [accessed 17 June 2012]. Eric Robinson 
(op. cit.) attacks the “anti-intellectualism” of British industry and the universities’ élitism and 
adherence to a traditional liberal higher education alike. Stefan Collini criticises the setting up of 
dichotomies between ‘the useful’ and ‘the useless’: What Are Universities For?, op. cit., pp. 39-60. 
Newman had pointed out in fact that nothing could be more ‘useful’ than a liberal education: 
Newman, J. H., op. cit., p. 117.  
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by enlarging existing universities, now comprising (since 1966) the former CATs.
100
 
The Government seized the chance to designate a higher education sector more 
directly under social control, moving radically in 1966 to create a “binary policy” for 
higher education, consisting of the universities on the one hand and the polytechnics 
and higher education colleges on the other - a public sector of higher education 
(PSHE), to be administered by the LEAs. Their justification for the separate sector 
included the ‘need and demand for vocational, professional and industrially-based 
courses in higher education’, in addition to maintaining that ‘a substantial part of the 
higher education system should be under social control, and directly responsive to 
social needs’.101 The institutions in the new sector were not to be given university-
style charters to award their own degrees. Instead, the Government created the 
Council for National Academic Awards (CNAA), as Robbins had recommended, 
with a charter to validate higher education in the existing colleges and award degrees 
of comparable standard to those awarded by the universities. 
 
Although governments, both Labour and Tory, in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
remained committed to the personal value of a liberal higher education, there were 
also repeated attempts to shift more higher education applicants towards studying 
science and technology and vocational subjects. Robbins had emphasised the 
importance of expanding university provision in science and technology, but there 
                                               
100 UGC, Cmnd. 3820, op. cit. (The only new “Robbins university” in the end was Stirling in 
Scotland.)  
101 Statement by Anthony Crosland, Secretary of State, to the House of Commons, 24 February 1965: 
UGC, ibid., paragraph 226. For Crosland’s speeches at Woolwich Polytechnic, 27 April 1965, and at 
Lancaster University, 20 January 1967, see Pratt, J. and Burgess, T., Polytechnics: a Report (London: 
Pitman, 1974) and Robinson, E., op. cit., pp. 249-256. For the paper confirming the binary policy, see 
Department of Education and Science, A Plan for Polytechnics and Other Colleges: Higher Education 
in the Further Education System, Cmnd. 3006 (London: HMSO, May 1966). Robbins criticised 
Crosland for rejecting the conception of a unitary university system and for implying that the 
polytechnics (on less resources and lower status) would be able to equal the idea of the SISTERS or 
their continental counterparts. He considered – as did Carswell - that Crosland’s justification for 
creating a public sector of higher education was confused and created artificial barriers between the 
public and university sectors which had not existed beforehand: see Robbins, L., Higher Education 
Revisited (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1980), pp. 99-101. According to Carswell (op. cit., 
pp. 71-93), one impelling reason for Crosland’s binary policy was because Labour would have found 
it politically impossible to take local higher education out of predominantly Labour-controlled LEAs, 
as the latter’s influence over their local colleges and universities had been eroded and many had not 
favoured the Robbins proposals, which would have further diminished their control. Many at the time 
(Eric Robinson, for example) thought that the creation of PSHE was a way of challenging what were 
considered to be the overly-conservative universities. Others, like Martin Trow, thought it would 
reinforce the hierarchies, as ‘the realities which justify (and perhaps require) a binary system in the 
short run may be creating a system which threatens to perpetuate just the caste system, just the 
prejudices and snobberies and hierarchies, that are Britain’s greatest social handicap, and one that 
Crosland would most like to destroy’: Trow, M., op. cit., p. 43.   
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was a shortfall of home students in these subjects coming through from school to 
university, as the 1968 Dainton Report confirmed.
102
 Successive governments tried 
to encourage applicants to take those subjects deemed to serve “the needs of the 
economy” and to get universities to involve students in their employment futures. For 
example, Labour Minister Shirley Williams invited universities in September 1969 to 
consider inter alia a scheme to tie some students to specific employment on 
graduation;
103
 Secretary of State Thatcher’s 1972 White Paper encouraged applicants 
to consider the ‘relevance’ and ‘usefulness’ of their proposed subject of study.104 
 
Britain’s deep economic and social problems in the 1970s (as well as a declining 
birth rate) meant that governments halted higher education expansion and student 
number targets were progressively reduced.
105
 In the 1973 public expenditure cuts, 
the Government cancelled already agreed compensation funding to universities for 
inflationary costs, claiming that universities could accommodate this reduction 
without damaging growth. It amounted to a 10% cut which sent shock waves through 
the universities which had never before been so drastically cut.
106
 With the demise of 
the quinquennial grant system in 1974/5, an annual allocation on a four-year 
planning cycle gave politicians the greater flexibility they needed, and universities’ 
actual income fell year on year, while student numbers continued to increase.
107
   
 
                                               
102 Carswell, J., op. cit., p. 44 and pp. 104-105; Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, Council for Scientific 
Policy: Enquiry into the Flow of Candidates in Science and Technology into Higher Education 
(Dainton Report), Cmnd. 3541 (London: HMSO, 1968). In 1975, there were 30,000 science and 
engineering places vacant: see Callaghan, J., ‘Towards a national debate: speech by the Prime 
Minister James Callaghan at a foundation stone-laying ceremony at Ruskin College, Oxford, on  
18 October 1976’: available at 
http://education.guardian.co.uk/thegreatdebate/story/0,9860,574645,00.html [accessed 2 October 
2012]. 
103 Universities largely ignored Shirley Williams’ ‘13 points’ for consideration: see Kogan, M. and 
Hanney, S., op. cit., pp. 146-147.  
104 Department of Education and Science, Education: a Framework for Expansion, White Paper, 
Cmnd. 5174 (London: HMSO, December 1972), paragraph 117, p. 35. It projected a science:arts mix 
of 53%:47% respectively by 1976/7, revised down from the Robbins figure of 60%:40% (paragraphs 
141-142 and paragraph 136). See also: Kogan, M. with Kogan, D., op. cit., p. 18; Carswell, J., op. cit., 
p. 140; Shattock, M., The UGC, op. cit., p. 10.  
105 Robbins had projected the 1980 APR as 17% but by 1971 it was already 15%. The 1972 White 
Paper projected an APR of 22% by 1981 - an increase from the then current 463,000 full-time and 
sandwich student places to 750,000. This had been reduced down from the 1970 projection of 835,000 
places by 1981. By 1974, the target was set at 650,000 and in 1976 at 600,000 to be reached by 1981: 
see Kogan, M. with Kogan, D., op. cit., pp. 18-25; Carswell, J., op. cit., p. 43. 
106
 Ibid., p. 132 and pp. 145-146.  
107Kogan, M. and Hanney, S., op. cit., p. 48; Shattock, M., The UGC, op. cit., pp. 16-20. 
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Meanwhile, PSHE expanded, not just in business and technological subjects but also 
in the arts and social sciences. The latter was partly due to the UGC advising 
government against the automatic incorporation of the colleges of education into the 
universities, so that many of these colleges became part of the new polytechnics.
108
 
Ironically, PSHE had a “market advantage” outside government reach: whereas 
university student numbers were under DES/UGC control, PSHE funding - called the 
Advanced Further Education (AFE) “pool” - came from central government to the 
LEAs which were generally well-disposed towards encouraging the growth of their 
local higher education institutions. LEAs were entitled without limitation to charge 
to the pool the expenditure on courses of higher education. If a higher education 
institution admitted a student, the latter was entitled to a mandatory grant, so PSHE 
expanded. This - and the more gradual expansion of student numbers in universities - 
put severe pressure on the student grant scheme in the 1970s. Not matched by the 
soaring rate of inflation, the value of the student maintenance grant was falling to the 
extent that it could no longer support the cost of living. Regarding overseas students, 
a Labour Government had instituted a higher differential fee rate in 1967 and 
successive governments increased these fees up to 1979.
109
   
 
A speech by the Labour Prime Minister, James Callaghan, in 1976 explicitly queried 
why ‘our best trained students’ had ‘no desire to join industry’.110 Like Thatcher in 
1972, he wanted to forge a link between academic study and its application to ‘the 
world of work’.111 Another political imperative was to keep or increase student 
numbers in higher education but at no extra - or even at reduced - cost to 
government. A ‘Brown Paper’ in February 1978 demonstrates government’s 
expectation of a closer involvement in planning the higher education system it 
financed, especially in view of the declining birth rate since 1964, set to impact on 
higher education from the early 1980s.
112
 Two-year higher education 
diplomas/degrees - successfully mounted post-war for ex-forces personnel and 
                                               
108 Ibid., p. 11. 
109 Ibid., p. 109. 
110 Callaghan, J., op. cit. He told Gordon Oakes to ensure that the latter’s enquiry directed higher 
education towards meeting the needs of the economy: see Kogan, M. and Hanney, S., op. cit., p. 60. 
111 See Ch. 1, fn.12. 
112 Department of Education and Science and the Scottish Education Department, Higher Education 
into the 1990s: a Discussion Document, Brown Paper (London: HMSO, 1978). The student numbers 
projection for 1981 was now assumed at 560,000. Shattock observes how seriously inaccurate the 
1972 White and 1978 Brown Papers were in their numerical projections of student demand: see 
Shattock, M., The UGC, op. cit., p. 8 and p. 149. 
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mooted by Shirley Williams back in 1969 and Thatcher in 1972 - were again 
proposed, as was encouragement towards greater provision of part-time degrees. A 
month later, the Oakes Report made recommendations on the management and 
control of PSHE and its better coordination with the university sector. The most 
significant recommendation was for the establishment of a national body for PSHE, 
to be provided via the LEAs collectively, to advise on planning and resource 
allocation in that sector.
113
   
 
In the mid- to late-1970s, government problems in funding an ever-expanding higher 
education system, as national resources were falling, helped to confirm the opinion 
of some traditional Tories that more had meant worse. They rejected the social 
democratic striving for equality and had not favoured the Robbins expansion or the 
growth of the polytechnics. They espoused the idea of a liberal university education 
but only for an élite. Exemplifying this view, Scruton in 1980 maintained (in relation 
to education in general): ‘It is not possible to provide universal education. Nor, 
indeed, is it desirable.’114 Furthermore, Thatcher and her followers blamed higher 
education for the country’s ills, including moving the country more towards ‘extreme 
Socialism’, through ‘the agitations of Marxist students’.115 For Joseph, speaking in 
1974, higher education had become so dangerously “large” that the views of its 
students and teachers were difficult to control: 
Whatever we may have thought 15 years or so back, it is our right and duty to 
question, in the light of experience, the rapid expansion of the universities, and the 
belief that by increasing the number of undergraduates we necessarily multiply 
the benefit either to the young people concerned or to the nation. When young 
people are taken away from their home milieu, in late adolescence, crowded 
together in age groups, with diminished parental, and indeed, adult influence, and 
without the social disciplines which the need to earn a living impose, is it 
surprising that their late adolescent rebelliousness should feed on itself, and seek 
ideological rationalisation? [...] No doubt many will grow out of it when they 
leave for the world, but not all. Some will carry on an extended adolescence as 
teachers in schools and in polytechnics and in universities, helped by the like- 
minded, where they will co-operate with left-wing gangs.
116
 
And a year later he queried: ‘Has it been wise to expand our universities quite so 
fast?’117 In the Preface to an IEA pamphlet in the early 1980s, Arthur Seldon 
                                               
113 Department of Education and Science, Report of the Working Group on the Management of Higher 
Education in the Maintained Sector (Oakes Report), Brown Paper, Cmnd. 7130 (London: HMSO, 
March 1978), p. 1, paragraph 1.1; p. 9, paragraph 3.4; p. 55, paragraph 13.10 (ii). 
114 Scruton, R., The Meaning of Conservatism, op. cit., p. 157. 
115
 Thatcher, M., Speech 25 May 1976, op. cit. See also Ch. 1, fn.65. 
116 HC Deb, 18 November 1981, vol.13, c.299. 
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condemned the ‘over-expansion after the Robbins Report’ and ‘its (unintended) 
encouragement of irrelevant courses and irresponsible teachers’ and ‘fashionable but 
questionable subjects like sociology and mathematical economics without micro-
economic foundations’.118 The pamphlet’s author, Professor H. S. Ferns, an Emeritus 
Professor of Political Science at the University of Birmingham, considered there had 
been ‘[t]oo rapid expansion in the 1960s [which had] resulted in the recruitment of 
second-class people in large numbers’.119 He dismissed the post-war university 
expansion as a ‘politically-determined policy of providing university education for 
all qualified young people at the expense of the taxpayers’.120 It was not just that 
higher education had grown too much and too fast but that, as Thatcher saw it, ‘a 
generation of easy liberal education has accustomed many to suppose that Utopia 
was soon to be achieved. Such education left the belief that, with the welfare state, 
all ills would soon vanish […].’ That, she said, ‘has proved an illusion’.121 Education 
was too easily becoming a route to greater equality. People needed to be more 
“realistic”, that is to adopt the truths of an altogether different ideology. Why, Joseph 
had posed in 1975, should this over-large higher education system - which had set 
itself against a “common sense” view of the market - expect state funding?:   
Some would explain academic hostility [to profit, commerce, etc] as a by-product 
of the tendency of academic establishments to grow by natural processes. They 
want a larger academic sector, hence a larger state sector, given the present 
system of financing higher education. Would this necessarily be the case if higher  
education were financed differently? We should be asking these questions.
122
 
Seldon proposed, rather, in 1982, that universities and the DES should adopt a  
worldly realism that the taxpayer will not pay universities to produce graduates in 
useless subjects, students will not pay for studies that do not prepare them for the 
real world, and industry will not pay to support life tenure for teachers ignorant or 
scornful of industry in a competitive world.
123
  
Standards were falling precisely because higher education was too “liberal”, was 
against “enterprise” and dependent on the state, as Thatcher had observed in 1978:  
                                                                                                                                     
117 Joseph, K., Reversing, op. cit., p. 8. 
118 Seldon’s Preface to Ferns, H. S., How Much Freedom for Universities? Towards Independent 
Universities (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1982), pp. 7-8.  
119 Ferns, H. S., op. cit., p. 27. 
120 Ibid., p. 15.  
121 Thatcher, M., Speech 6 May 1978, op. cit. 
122
 Joseph, K., Reversing, op. cit., p. 61. 
123 Seldon in Ferns, H. S., op. cit., p. 8. 
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There is cause for alarm at the extent to which greater State involvement, to the 
point of virtual monopoly in higher education, has coincided with a decline in 
educational standards.
124
 
 
So what did the neoliberals propose as the solution? Like everything else, higher 
education was a commodity to be bought by the individual.
125
 Entrants to higher 
education should be free to choose to do so as individual consumers of private goods 
and services - like purchasing a car, private schooling or private hospital treatment - 
rather than take that provided by the state, funded collectively through direct 
taxation. Universities should be taken out of government control altogether, and “de-
regulated”, which would encourage the diversity and healthy competition between 
institutions required by the free market, as Ferns had argued, with his colleague John 
Burton filling in the detail: 
In the absence of state finance, each academy would have the incentive to 
specialise according to its comparative efficiency in different types of academic 
work. Some might choose to specialise primarily as ‘think-tanks’, on the model of 
the RAND Corporation in the USA, earning income primarily through research 
and consultancy work. Some might specialise as low-cost providers of large-scale 
higher education, while others as high-cost providers of smaller-scale courses 
(such as post-graduate work or short courses of a post-experience nature). Some 
academies might find it beneficial to specialise in certain subjects (such as 
engineering and technology), while others might find a niche in the academic 
market by offering a large ‘basket’ of disciplines.126 
A free market economy simply did not require public investment in higher education. 
Prior to the neoliberal revolution, if individuals and higher education institutions did 
still want the state to pay, then the latter - the strong state - could use higher 
education - its ideological state apparatus - to help create neoliberalism, and thereby, 
ironically, to bring about liberal higher education’s own demise.   
 
(viii) Next steps 
Returning to the eve of Thatcher’s first government, three crucial issues in the 
relationship of higher education to the state were apparent: first, access to higher 
education and how expansion should be financed; second, how to persuade more 
applicants to take science, technology and vocational courses, to meet perceived 
national economic needs; and third, how higher education could better respond to 
                                               
124 Thatcher, M., Speech 6 May 1978, op. cit. 
125
 See, for example, Friedman, M. and Friedman, R., Free to Choose, op. cit. 
126 Ferns, H. S., op. cit., p. 14; John Burton in Ferns, ibid., p. 49. 
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social and national needs. There was an ideological difference between those Tories 
who favoured élitism and those in the Labour Party who favoured expansion and 
wider access. But the outgoing Labour Government and the incoming Thatcherites 
shared a growing instrumental view of higher education. The Thatcher Governments 
would - over time - be able to exploit the tensions and contradictions in both parties’ 
positions, combined with those inherent in higher education’s history and traditions.   
 
At the start of this chapter, I drew attention to the way that Thatcher framed her 
project as an explicit, deliberate and radical break with the past. With reference to 
Thatcherism, I demonstrated how the New Right took their set of ideas out to people, 
urging them to reject existing values, forms and practices and adopt the new ideology 
instead, as if it were simply common sense; and why higher education might occupy 
a particularly important place in that enterprise. The next chapters will show how the 
ideology of common sense was built in the practices of higher education. First, I 
shall look at what the Tories set out for higher education in their manifestos, papers 
and Acts of Parliament; second, I shall demonstrate how the process of debates in 
Parliament - and reactions to those debates and events - contributed to the 
construction of the ideology. Key aspects from these documents and debates - 
élitism, excellence and standards versus expansion; liberal versus instrumental and 
vocational; the free market and privatisation versus public funding, planning and 
control - appear to have contradictory meanings but it will be seen that they could be 
constructed into working together.
127
 This will show how the ideology was formed 
not just from the neoliberals’ beliefs but on the contradictions in the Tory Party and 
in the position of opponents. We can then see how an ideological attack on an 
apparently robustly liberal higher education system could be attempted, and how 
people could be led into following and practising an ideology which they had to date 
appeared to be against. 
                                               
127 See Ch. 2, fn.27. I am considering these contradictions as both “logical” and, in the Marxist sense, 
as “real” contradictions that help to conceal what is “actually” going on. Marx wrote (in relation to the 
contradictions inherent in exchange value in capitalism) that ‘equality and freedom’ prove to be 
‘inequality and unfreedom’: Nicolaus, M. and Fowkes, B. (eds), Karl Marx: Grundrisse (London: 
Penguin Books in association with New Left Review, 1973), p. 249. 
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Chapter 4 Higher education policies and legislation 
 
(i) Constructing the ideology through the parliamentary process 
The Thatcher Government started its first term of office without any vision or 
blueprint for higher education.
1
 Other matters - notably the application of monetarist 
policies to inflation, the commitment to reduce the public sector borrowing rate 
(PSBR) and tackling trade union power - took precedence.
2
 Higher education would 
be further down the agenda.
3
 Even if the politicians lacked a coherent strategy for 
higher education, however, we have already noted that neoliberal ideologues were 
framing a blueprint in the early 1980s.
4
 It is not surprising, therefore, that a Central 
Policy Review Staff (CPRS) paper, drafted behind the scenes in September 1982 
with the involvement and approval of the Treasury, identified four big areas of public 
expenditure for radical reform, one of which was higher education. As the logic of 
the free market dictated that students should buy their higher education directly at 
source, the complete withdrawal of state funding from higher education was 
proposed, with student fees to be set at market rates. About 300,000 state 
scholarships would be made available, with student loans for the rest. But after its 
leak, this blueprint for an ideal neoliberal solution had to be shelved, for the time 
being at least.
5
 
                                               
1 Scott, P., ‘Higher Education’, op. cit., p. 198. 
2 See Ch. 3, fn.5.   
3 Thatcher’s seven Education Secretaries of State later confirmed this, realising that higher education 
reform was going to be difficult: see Ribbins, P. and Sherratt, B., Radical Education Policies and 
Conservative Secretaries of State (London: Cassell, 1997). 
4 See Ch. 3, fns.125-126. 
5 The Economist (author not stated) (18 September 1982), ‘Thatcher’s think-tank takes aim at the 
welfare state’, pp. 25-26. The plan was leaked by Peter Walker (a ‘wet’) who wanted to scupper it 
(detailed in an email from Hugo Young to me). Set up in 1971, the CPRS think-tank was disbanded 
by Thatcher in 1983, and favoured advisers moved to the Downing Street Policy Unit. Nine policy 
committees were set up in 1982 to identify radical moves but, in the event, the 1983 Manifesto did not 
go as far as the radicals wished: see Denham A., Think-Tanks, op. cit; Young, H., op. cit; Hennessy, 
P., Morrison, S., Townsend, R., Routine Punctuated by Orgies: the Central Policy Review Staff, 1970-
83, Strathclyde Papers on Government and Politics, series ed. Jeremy Moon, Number 31, December 
1984. As if building on the CPRS recommendation, the Coalition Government (2010- ) took a Browne 
Report proposal and withdrew funding from all subjects except science, technology, engineering and 
mathematics, so that the remaining subjects are now funded directly and solely from the £9,000 per 
annum student fees: see Ch. 1, fn.13 and Department for BIS, Higher Education: Students  
at the Heart of the System, White Paper, Cm. 8122, June 2011: available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://discuss.bis.gov.uk/hereform/white-paper/, and 
Government Response, June 2012, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32405/12-890-
government-response-students-and-regulatory-framework-higher-education.pdf [accessed 20 July 
2012]. 
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If - as she and others later claimed
6
 - Thatcher was trying to “decentralise” higher 
education institutions and set them free, and if overt privatisation was not yet 
politically possible, what could be done that would lay foundations for that 
hegemonic project? Experience would prove that greater central control of higher 
education would be needed to enforce “freedom”, as Johnson comments: ‘Although 
the need to centralize could have been derived from Hayekian principles, it took time 
to learn in practice.’7 First, like other publicly-funded areas, higher education could 
be, and was, subjected to cuts. Yet, by the end of the 1980s it had also become much 
more closely aligned to the New Right’s ideological agenda, even though not yet 
privatised. The Government had to build its ideological project gradually over the 
1980s, as if adopting a Gramscian method, by intervening in the institutions of civil 
society in order ‘to reshape the institutional framework of the free economy’, as 
Gamble puts it.
8
 It is through the state apparatuses - as we noted from Althusser - that 
the dominant ideology is actually expressed.
9
 I am adopting here Perry Anderson’s 
view - consonant with Althusser’s10 - that the parliamentary system itself is crucial, 
acting as ‘the hub of the ideological apparatus of capitalism’.11 So how did the 
developing ideological process work on both the parliamentary system and higher 
education? How did they contribute towards the construction of hegemony? 
 
(ii) ‘A strategic line’: from cuts to legislation 
To help answer those questions, this section comprises a factual summary of the 
higher education cuts, policies and legislation from 1979 to 1990, on which basis I 
give a more analytical account from section (iii) onwards. Thatcher’s policies might 
be viewed in phases or trends, as by Scott,
12
 or as comprising ‘a strategic line’, in 
which different elements contributed to ‘the primary strategic goals’, as Jessop 
describes it.
13
 Thatcher’s three successive election victories gave her the majorities 
and timescale she needed to turn ideas into legislation.
14
 Even though legislation on 
                                               
6 Thatcher, M., The Downing Street Years, op. cit., p. 599. See also Ch. 7, fn.115. 
7 Johnson, R., op. cit., p. 49. 
8 Gamble, A., op. cit., p. 42. 
9 Ch. 2, fn.71. 
10 Ch. 2, fn.72. 
11 Quoted in Eagleton, T., op. cit., p. 112, who contends that it fosters ‘the illusion of self-government 
on the part of the populace’. 
12 Ch. 1, fns.39-40. 
13 Ch. 3, fn.27. 
14
 In 1979, the Tories won 43.9% of the vote with a majority of 43 seats; in 1983, 42.4% of the vote 
with a majority of 144; and in 1987, 42.3% of the vote with a majority of 102: BBC Politics website, 
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higher education was not an immediate priority, we can trace a line from the early 
cuts through the major policy papers - notably, the 1981 Green Paper on PSHE, the 
1985 Green Paper, the 1987 White Paper, the 1988 Top-up Loans for Students White 
Paper - to the culminating legislation of the 1988 Education Reform Act and the 
1990 Student Loans Act.
15
 It was a small amount of legislation that achieved such a 
major turnaround in higher education’s structures, governance and ideological 
alignment; yet as one ideological shift was achieved, each that followed contributed 
to what came to appear as an unstoppable momentum towards a new consensus in 
and about higher education.   
 
In the Government’s first term there was no specific legislation on higher education. 
Following through the 1979 Manifesto commitments, the first budget in June 1979 
insisted simply that ‘we must make savings in public spending and roll back the 
boundaries of the public sector’.16 The budget cuts to higher education affected LEA 
grants (which funded PSHE), UGC recurrent grants, the real value of student grants, 
capital and building monies, and funding for scientific research across both sectors.
17
 
This set the scene for higher education in the early 1980s: repeated and substantial 
cuts, preparing the ground for the policy papers and legislation to follow.   
 
                                                                                                                                     
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/special/politics97/background/pastelec/ge79.shtml [accessed 
24 June 2013]. Jessop, B. et al. (eds), op. cit., p. 18, identify Thatcher’s third term as ‘consolidated 
Thatcherism’.   
15 Department of Education and Science (DES), Higher Education in England outside the 
Universities: Policy, Funding and Management, Green Paper (London: HMSO, July 1981); DES, The 
Development of Higher Education into the 1990s, Green Paper, Cmnd. 9524 (London: HMSO, May 
1985); DES, Higher Education: Meeting the Challenge, op. cit; DES, Education Reform Act (No. 2) 
(London: HMSO, July 1988); DES, Top-up Loans for Students, Cm. 520 (London:  HMSO, 
November 1988); HMSO, Education (Student Loans) Act 1990 (London: HMSO, 1990). In 
comparison, the legislative and organisational changes visited on schools and further 
education/training colleges were substantial from the start: see Lawton, D., The Tory Mind on 
Education 1979-94 (London: Falmer Press, 1994).  
16 The Manifesto claimed that ‘the balance of our society has been increasingly tilted in favour of the 
State at the expense of individual freedom’. The state had to be cut by using its power to reduce its 
functions and liberate the free economy, so that services would then be improved through private 
enterprise: Conservative Party, The Conservative Manifesto (London: Conservative Central Office, 
April 1979), pp. 5-6. Ian Gilmour considers public spending cuts were based on two mistakes, or 
delusions as he terms them. Quoting from the Government’s first White Paper, which claimed that 
‘[p]ublic expenditure is at the heart of Britain’s present economic difficulties’, he pointed out that, 
‘apart from Greece, Britain’s ratio of public expenditure to GDP was then the lowest in the European 
Community’. The second delusion, he continued, was the Government’s ‘deeply held conviction that 
a high PSBR produced an enlarged money supply’. That, he claimed, ‘was simply wrong’: Gilmour, 
I., Dancing with Dogma, op. cit., pp. 22-23. 
17
 HC Deb, ‘Public expenditure’, 12 June 1979, vol.968, cc.246-249. For commentary, see Kogan, M. 
with Kogan, D., op. cit., pp. 32-33. 
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The PSHE pool was ‘capped’ as part of the move to curb local authority spending 
and power, and then progressively cut in the Government’s first term, amounting to a 
reduction overall of about 6.5% between 1980/81 and 1982/83. It is not possible to 
gauge the extent to which the cut to the pool was passed on to PSHE institutions by 
LEAs, as many “softened the blow” by making up at least part of the difference from 
other income. However, the PSHE cuts amounted to a 20% reduction in real terms of 
the unit of resource between 1980/81 and 1984/5 while, as we will see later, the 
sector’s student numbers rose.18 As for the universities, the UGC warned them in 
August 1979 that, to retain the unit of resource, it looked as if universities would 
have to reduce their intakes by 6% in 1980/81. A reduction of £411M on the 
education budget overall for 1980/81 was announced in November 1979 but the 
proportion of the cut to higher education was still not specified. The UGC asked 
universities to prepare various planning scenarios, including a possible 5% cut in 
funding for the forthcoming year.
19
   
 
The Government’s raising of overseas student fees to full-cost from 1980 amounted 
to a cut of up to 10% because the savings to public expenditure were not 
reimbursed.
20
 Although this had been presented as the only way to maintain level 
funding for home students, the Government announced further reductions on 16 
December 1980, on top of the 1979 cuts and the withdrawal of the overseas student 
subsidy. The March 1981 Public Expenditure White Paper confirmed a ‘progressive 
reduction’ over the next three years, 1981/2 to 1983/4, to the higher education 
                                               
18 The 1980 Education Act gave the DES powers to limit the pool, first capped at the 1979/80 level of 
£320 million, then reduced to £313 million, with further reductions envisaged to bring it down to £281 
million by 1983/4. The cut to polytechnic lecturer posts was estimated at about 13%. - see Kogan, M. 
with Kogan, D., op. cit., pp. 128-129; Kogan, M. and Hanney, S., op. cit., p. 88; HC Deb, 18 
November 1981, vol.13, c.361; HC Deb, 26 October 1984, vol.65, c.921; HC Deb, 4 June 1985, 
vol.80, cc.205-245. Despite Government/National Advisory Body (NAB) attempts to cut Humanities 
at Newcastle Polytechnic, Brighton Polytechnic, and Humberside College of Higher Education, only 
the subject area of Town Planning was cut from the polytechnics: see Cowan, A., ‘History UK (HE)’, 
The Institute of Historical Research, 2008: available at 
http://www.history.ac.uk/makinghistory/resources/articles/HE.html [accessed 31 December 2012],  
p. 2. 
19 Kogan, M. with Kogan, D., op. cit., pp. 32-33. 
20 HMSO, Education Act 1980, April 1980: available at  
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1980/20/pdfs/ukpga_19800020_en.pdf  [accessed 21 July 2013], 
section 2.10, paragraphs 14-16, pp. 96-97. David Watson and Rachel Bowden advise that this 5-10% 
reduction in funding had a particularly severe impact on the universities, as some LEAs made up some 
of the shortfall for PSHE institutions: see Watson, D. and Bowden, R., Ends without Means: the 
Conservative stewardship of UK higher education 1979-1997 (Brighton: University of Brighton 
Education Research Centre Occasional Paper, April 1997), p. 5. See also Kogan, M. with Kogan, D., 
op. cit., p. 46. 
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recurrent grant. This cut in institutional resources for both sectors of about 8.5% 
(below the level announced only a year earlier) constituted, with the withdrawal of 
the overseas student fees subsidy, a ‘double cut’, as it was termed.21 
 
The UGC responded by reviewing university grant allocations and decided on 
differential cuts between universities, informing them on 1 July 1981. The UGC 
estimated the total university cuts as a loss of income for the period to 1983/4 of 
approximately 11%.
22
 Later, the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals 
(CVCP) reported that the cuts ranged from 44% to 6% for individual universities, the 
average being around 17%.
23
 The overall accumulative loss of recurrent resources 
was in the end estimated to have been around 13% up to 1983/4. Although there was 
a 4% increase in student applications to universities in October 1981, university 
admissions that year were 3% down on the previous year. In the end, there were no 
compulsory redundancies, however, as job cuts were achieved through early 
retirements and voluntary redundancies.
24
 As I explore further below (and in Chapter 
7), the differential cuts set universities up in competition with one another, and 
against PSHE, and against the UGC that had implemented the cuts, engendering a 
state of affairs that would serve the progress of the Government’s ideology.  
 
With regard to PSHE, the new Government had not acted on the 1978 Oakes 
Report’s recommendation for a national planning body, supported by the LEAs.25 
Finally, in July 1981, the Government brought out a Green Paper which resolved that 
                                               
21 HMSO, The Government’s Expenditure Plans 1981-2 to 1983-84, Cmnd. 8175 (London: HMSO, 
March 1981), section 2.10, paragraph 14, p. 106. See also Baroness Young in HL Deb, 24 June 1981, 
vol.421, cc.1068-1146, p. 45. For comment, see Sizer, J., ‘British universities’ responses to events 
leading to grant reductions announced in July 1981’, Financial Accountability and Management, 
Volume 4, Number 2, June 1988, p. 79; and the following Association of University Teachers (AUT) 
papers, UCU archives: AUT President’s Opening Address to Council meeting, 14 May 1981; Briefing 
Paper to Branch Secretaries, 16 June 1981; and Statement for MPs, October 1981. 
22 UGC Circular Letter 10/81 to universities, 1 July 1981; HC Deb, 2 July 1981, vol.7, cc.448-455W. 
The Government summarised university savings as £212 million over the three year period, to be 
deducted from the £1 billion current grant: HC Deb, 1 December 1981, vol.14, cc.108-109W. The 
heaviest cuts to student numbers and resultant loss of posts were predominantly to the technological or 
newer universities of Salford, Aston, Keele, Bradford and Stirling. For example, Bradford was to be 
cut by 29%, Stirling by 23%: see HC Deb, 18 November 1981, vol.13, cc.291-376. Peter Scott 
(‘Higher Education’, op. cit., p. 200) estimated the cuts to both Aston and Salford as 40%. Between 
1980-1983, about 2,300 university academic staff (from a total of about 34,000) left their posts: HC 
Deb, 28 February 1984, vol.55, c.134. By June 1985, it was reported that 3,318 had retired or taken 
redundancy in academic years 1981 to 1984: HC Deb, 26 June 1985, vol.81, c.419W.   
23 CVCP, Report of the Steering Committee for Efficiency Studies in Universities (Jarratt Report) 
(London: CVCP, March 1985), paragraph 2.8.  
24
 For details and comment on the cuts, see Kogan, M. with Kogan, D., op. cit., pp. 44-65. 
25 Ch. 3, fn.113. 
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the ‘open-ended commitment of national resources’ to PSHE via the LEAs should be 
halted to enable ‘overriding national priorities’ to be pursued and that this would 
necessitate taking PSHE out of the LEA framework.
26
 However, the proposals 
became too difficult politically to effect at the time. Instead, in 1982, the National 
Advisory Body for Local Authority Higher Education (NAB) was formed, whose 
remit was to advise the Secretary of State directly on the distribution of resources 
and the approval of degree and higher diploma courses.
27
 Although delayed, PSHE at 
last had their planning body. 
 
The student grant system was also a focus for cuts. Thatcher’s advisers explored the 
idea of “education vouchers” for higher education (as was being investigated for 
schools), making numerous study visits to the United States to look at their student 
support and funding mechanisms, but there was insufficient support in the Party to 
proceed.
28
 Joseph confirmed to Parliament that he favoured 'a part-loan scheme' but 
the opportunity for the Government to put this into practice did not come until the 
end of the 1980s.
29
 Acting pragmatically, Joseph pushed instead to require middle- 
and higher-income parents to contribute more to student maintenance and to pay 
students’ tuition fees. Over 1984, he first halved and then abolished the minimum 
maintenance award (which even students with the richest parents received) but - 
bowing to enormous opposition from backbench Tory MPs - withdrew his proposal 
that the richest parents should also pay tuition fees, although he then took savings 
from other higher education budgets instead. The Government also moved to change 
students’ travel allowances, seeking to abolish individual differential travel claims 
and bring in a flat-rate instead. Despite considerable opposition by Tory MPs, 
separate reimbursement for travel was abolished, together with access to other 
individual benefits (such as income support, unemployment and housing benefits) to 
                                               
26 DES, Higher Education in England outside the Universities, op. cit., paragraph 3, p. 1 and 
paragraph 30, p. 6. 
27 The title was amended in February 1985 to the National Advisory Body for Public Sector Higher 
Education. 
28 For arguments in favour of education vouchers and loans, see Friedman, M. and Friedman, R., Free 
to Choose, op. cit., p. 193; Hayek, F. A., op. cit., p. 381; Thatcher, M., The Downing Street Years, op. 
cit., p. 278. Boyson was an enthusiast for vouchers, for which he and Number 10 policy advisers 
campaigned up to 1986, but failed to convince Secretaries of State Carlisle and Joseph: see Scott, P., 
‘Higher Education’, op. cit., p. 198.  
29 HC Deb, 5 December 1984, vol.69, c.369.  
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which students had previously been entitled.
30
 Student maintenance was consolidated 
into a single system, and eventually (from 1990) made available on a part- and then 
full-loan basis.
31
 As I shall demonstrate further below, the shift from student grants 
to loans came to be seen by the end of the 1980s as the only course of action 
apparently available. 
 
By the mid-1980s, the Government’s policy papers on higher education reflect a 
sharpened focus. First, an instrumental view of higher education is put to the fore, as 
those subjects deemed most useful to the economy are promoted and higher 
education institutions, staff and students are enjoined to adopt entrepreneurial and 
business values; and second, it becomes clear that increased central planning and 
control of higher education - by the now strengthened state - is to be used to enforce 
the first. 
 
The major expression of these developing trends is the 1985 Green Paper. It takes a 
directive stance, asserted in confident “business-speak” language. This step change is 
confirmed in the May 1987 Manifesto for the third term, with a whole section on 
higher education. While recognising ‘the value of research and scholarship for their 
own sake’, it emphasises in stronger terms a much more instrumental view: ‘At the 
same time we must meet the nation’s demand for highly qualified manpower to 
compete in international markets.’32 A month earlier, the April 1987 White Paper had 
confidently laid down higher education’s aims and purposes, to: 
 serve the economy more effectively 
 pursue basic scientific research and scholarship in the arts and humanities 
 have closer links with industry and commerce, and promote enterprise.33 
                                               
30 HC Deb, 4 April 1984, vol.57, c.544; 30 October 1984, vol.65, c.1256; 12 November 1984, vol.67, 
cc.55-58W; 5 December 1984, vol.69, cc.360-369.   
31 The grant was cut progressively and the loan element increased over the 1990s. The 1997 Dearing 
Report recommended that graduates pay a flat-rate of about 25% of tuition fees by taking out an 
income-contingent loan to be repaid once they started earning, together with the existing loan for 
maintenance costs: National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education, Higher Education in the 
Learning Society (Dearing Report) (London: HMSO, July 1997): available at 
https://bei.leeds.ac.uk/Partners/NCIHE/ [accessed 22 March 2013], Chapter 17, paragraph 17.16.  
The New Labour Government went further, charging fees up front and bringing in means-tested loans 
in totality for maintenance: Teaching and Higher Education Act 1998 (London: The Stationery Office 
Ltd., 1998): available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/30/pdfs/ukpga_19980030_en.pdf  
[accessed 2 January 2013]. As noted, the Coalition Government abolished grants for tuition fees, now 
charged up to £9,000 per annum, and replaced them with loans from September 2012. 
32 Conservative Party, The Conservative Manifesto: The Next Moves Forward (London: Conservative 
Central Office, May 1987), p. 21. 
33 DES, Higher Education: Meeting the Challenge, op. cit., referenced in Ch. 1, fn.10. 
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Although ‘meeting the needs of the economy is not the sole purpose of higher 
education’, it was clearly the major one to be ‘vigorously pursued’. The point is that, 
by now, not only the content of these views but the manner in which they are 
presented is to be taken as read, simply as common sense, offering no room for 
debate. With higher education weakened by cuts, once the Government was re-
elected for a third term the way was clear for the ‘next moves forward’ - to quote the 
title of the 1987 Manifesto. 
 
Back in 1982, the Secretary of State had launched a consultation exercise with the 
UGC and the NAB on the development of higher education for the rest of the decade 
and into the 1990s. A flurry of other reviews was undertaken around this time. In line 
with the efficiency studies being required of all government departments, the CVCP 
commissioned the Jarratt review (chaired by a businessman who was Chair of 
Birmingham University’s Board of Governors) which concluded its findings in 1985 
with recommendations at various levels on university governance, accountability and 
management. The NAB published its complementary Good Management Practice 
report in 1987, recommending corporate status (that is, independent governance) for 
polytechnics, although still within the LEA framework, but this was not acceptable to 
the Government.
34
 The UGC’s 1984 response to the consultative exercise had, 
unsurprisingly, recommended its own continuation. The Croham Report (1987) 
recommended major reform and restructuring of the UGC to ensure improved 
efficiency and accountability.
35
 It looked as if the higher education sector bodies 
were moving towards better collaboration. However, within two months, the 
Government’s 1987 White Paper simply abolished the UGC and the NAB - a way of 
proceeding I return to later. Johnson sums up this period for education as a whole: 
                                               
34 The Government would have seen the draft of the report it had commissioned (at a cost of 
£350,000: see HC Deb, 1 April 1987, vol.113, cc.1091-1100), but pre-empted its publication. On 1 
April - only days before the NAB was due to publish - the Government published the 1987 White 
Paper, recommending the abolition of the NAB and the UGC, the formation of the PCFC and the 
UFC, and the incorporation of the polytechnics and major colleges outside LEA control. See also  
Ch. 7, fn.47. 
35 For details of the consultative exercise, see UGC Circular Letter 16/83, 1 November 1983. For 
responses and related reports, see UGC, A Strategy for Higher Education into the 1990s: the 
University Grants Committee’s advice (London: HMSO, September 1984); CVCP, Jarratt Report, op. 
cit; DES, Academic Validation in Public Sector Higher Education (Lindop Report), Green Paper, 
Cmnd. 9501 (London: HMSO, April 1985); NAB, Management for a Purpose: the Report of the 
Good Management Practice Group (London: NAB, 7 April 1987); DES, Review of the University 
Grants Committee (Croham Report), Cm. 81 (London: HMSO, 1987). For comment, see Kogan, M. 
and Hanney, S., op. cit., pp. 150-152; Shattock, M., The UGC, op. cit., pp. 128-129. 
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‘The most important lesson of 1982-6 was that reform, even on neo-liberal lines, 
required decisive central control. It was a lesson that was to be well learned.’36 
 
The April 1987 White Paper gave the go-ahead for two new central funding and 
planning bodies. Technically, they were independent of government, but would be 
given a strong steer by the Secretary of State.
37
 They would “contract” with higher 
education institutions as businesses. To furnish the information required to evaluate 
the contract, business techniques and performance indicators would be developed 
including, inter alia, systems for teaching quality assurance (QA), selectively-funded 
research, and staff development and appraisal. At the same time as the new funding 
councils would be deploying public money, they were also charged with encouraging 
higher education institutions to be more enterprising in attracting contracts from 
private sources, to lessen dependence on public funding. The 1988 Education Reform 
Act confirmed independent status for the polytechnics and major colleges and 
established the two new bodies: the Universities Funding Council (UFC) and the 
Polytechnics and Colleges Funding Council (PCFC). The Act also abolished tenure 
in the universities (which I consider further in Chapters 5 and 6) and the ‘no 
compulsory redundancy’ agreements in PSHE: from now on academics’ jobs - as just 
one example of features which had traditionally set higher education apart from other 
areas of employment - were no longer sacrosanct. Higher education was being re-
modelled on private business lines and at the same time being brought under central 
control.   
 
The next step was a paper in April 1989 setting out how the balance of funding to 
higher education would be shifted further from state support to institutions to a 
model based on individual fees “following the student”.38 The Government would 
raise the standard maximum full-time mandatory award-bearing undergraduate fee 
(still publicly funded): first to a flat rate, with a corresponding shift downwards from 
the central grant to fees, and then to four differential bands. These reflected the 
                                               
36 Johnson, R., op. cit., p. 59. 
37 Since 1981, the Secretary of State’s ‘letters of guidance’ to the UGC had ensured that universities 
were informed of his decisions, to avoid the kind of furore that arose over the 1981 cuts (see Chapter 
5). The guidance was designed to ‘relate to the reorientation of effort within existing resources’ but 
‘on occasion’ was intended to ‘extend to earmarking of resources for particular purposes’: see DES, 
The Development of Higher Education into the 1990s, op. cit., paragraph 8.5, p. 36. 
38
 DES, ‘Shifting the balance of public funding of higher education to fees: a consultation paper’, 
April 1989.  
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differing costs of science/arts teaching, thus encouraging internal competition: ‘A fee 
structure which took account of this variation would clearly apply the desired market 
disciplines more widely within institutions.’39 The market benefit would be that 
institutions’ income would be more dependent ‘on their ability to attract and satisfy 
student demand’: this would ‘both promote effectiveness in marketing and teaching, 
and enhance the scope of institutional independence’, and ‘assist in encouraging 
institutions to exploit spare capacity by taking in additional students, so contributing 
to the objective of widening access to those able to benefit and wishing to do so, 
while in the process reducing unit costs’.40 The mechanism would allow student 
numbers from tuition fees paid through mandatory awards to be managed by an 
institution across its academic departments, depending on the ability to attract 
students to a particular subject at a particular institution. By the time Thatcher was 
ousted from office, it was clear that the market had come to higher education - and 
vice versa. 
 
(iii) Using contradictions 
In order to understand how the transformation from one ideological construct to 
another could have come about in only ten years, and to the extent that neoliberal 
characteristics became embedded and reproduced in higher education’s structures 
and practices, further explanation is required. I now turn to offer a more analytic 
commentary on how hegemonic domination was built - a process that is further 
demonstrated by my analysis in Chapters 5 and 6 of the parliamentary debates. For 
ideological change to become accepted at a level deeper than the legislative changes 
alone, I shall argue, sets of seeming contradictions were used in practical ways to 
help achieve ideological shifts, whenever opportunities for their implementation 
presented themselves.   
 
As I have already established, Thatcher inherited certain underlying political 
positions: the traditional Tory view of higher education as an élite privilege, 
alongside the post-war commitment by all parties - particularly the Labour Party - to 
the expansion and extension of educational opportunity, not just for the individual 
but to meet national needs. The apparent dichotomies or contradictions I identified at 
                                               
39
 Ibid., paragraph 9, p. 4. 
40 Ibid., paragraph 4, p. 2. 
 99 
 
the end of Chapter 3 - élitism, excellence and standards versus expansion; liberal 
versus instrumental and vocational; the free market and privatisation versus public 
funding, planning and control - could work together to craft an ideological process. 
Various elements - seemingly contradictory - could contribute to building the 
Thatcherite ideology in higher education and, in the absence of a strong and co-
ordinated opposition, the progress of that ideology began to seem unstoppable. To 
explain how this worked, I consider each set of these contradictions. 
 
(a)  Elitism, excellence, standards and expansion 
Returning to the 1979 Conservative Manifesto, its one short paragraph on higher 
education states the need to maintain excellence but within existing resources - while 
also encouraging more vocational studies.
41
 This panders to traditional and New 
Right Tories alike - as well as to the electorate - and gives some pointers to policy 
priorities. The word “excellence” is a kind of shorthand, a code word for both élitism 
and cuts, a signal that a Thatcher Government would break earlier governments’ 
commitments to publicly-funded expansion.
42
  
 
The early cuts were the first building-block in the construction of an ideological 
process: they weakened, undermined and destabilised the whole of higher education.  
First of all, there was that useful lever to ideological change: the shock element.
43
 
The Times Higher Education Supplement described the universities in particular in 
1979 as ‘stunned by the nature, intensity and timing of the cuts […] and confused 
because they still [did] not have hard figures or prospective student targets with 
which to work’.44 Similarly, the July 1981 notification of reduced budgets constituted 
a crisis partly because it was so close to the start of the new academic year, giving 
little room for negotiation or manoeuvre. Second, the remorseless repetition of cuts 
demoralised higher education institutions, making liberal educationalists less likely 
to resist the next round: they started taking them for granted. As one commentator 
                                               
41 The Conservative Manifesto (1979), op. cit., p.25. The Labour Party’s 1979 Manifesto is also sparse 
on higher education policy, pledging to expand further education and widen access to higher 
education: see Dale, I. (ed.), Labour Party General Election Manifestos 1900-1997 (London: 
Routledge, 2000), p. 225. 
42 Lord Glenamara pointed out how the words “élitism” and “excellence” were being used 
interchangeably, incorrectly and confusingly by the Tories: see HL Deb, 14 March 1984, vol.449, 
cc.758-851, p. 13. 
43 See Ch. 1, fn.63. 
44
 Quoted in Kogan, M. with Kogan, D., op. cit., p. 33. For an example of the universities’ shock, 
confusion and disbelief, see AUT, Universities at Risk (London: AUT, January 1980). 
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observed: ‘Cutting services and expenditure seemed to have become an irrefutable 
and higher truth incapable of logical critique or explanation.’45 The Government 
promoted the need to economise as a positive virtue. It acquired the status of a - 
indeed, the only main - policy direction, with Joseph advising that efficiency would 
be achieved through ‘tighter staffing ratios in many sixth forms and in further and 
higher education’ and ‘rationalisation within and between universities and colleges’.  
‘Everyone’ was enjoined ‘to contribute to this search for efficiency’. Priorities would 
simply have to change: ‘Where a problem’s solution does require extra money, can 
that money not be found from what is currently being spent in education. Through a 
reordering of priorities and improvements in efficiency?’46 “Efficiency” and 
“rationalisation” become code words for cuts.47 The language presented the partial or 
clouded view that cuts were inevitable, acceptable, desirable or just plain common 
sense.    
 
But the cuts were not just an imposition: they also contributed to building the 
ideology by playing successfully on the contradictions inherent in the structures. For 
what the cuts meant for the universities on the one hand and PSHE on the other, both 
literally and ideologically, was different, though interrelated. Student intakes to 
universities had been rising by about 9,000 per year, but the sector was concerned 
about the pressure on resources.
48
 The UGC tried to retain the unit of resource and 
academics’ availability to undertake research, prioritising the conservation of 
“standards” or - as some would have it - preserving university élitism.49 In the end, as 
we noted above, the UGC presided over accumulative cuts of around 13%. Its 
attempt to protect universities’ unit of resource ended up as chaos and then 
collaboration - however unwittingly - in a process that weakened their resistance to 
central government control and ushered in all that followed (see Chapter 7). 
Seemingly contradictorily, student numbers in PSHE were at the same time 
increasing, albeit “on the cheap”. The Government could capitalise on each sector’s 
response to cuts, setting them up in competition with one another: ‘Between 1979 
                                               
45 Kogan, M. with Kogan, D., op. cit., p. 38. 
46 Joseph, K., ‘Speech to the North of England Education Conference in Sheffield, 6 January 1984’, 
Oxford Review of Education, Volume 10, Number 2, 1984, p. 137. 
47 As one AUT President put it: ‘What perversion of language we have seen – the meaning of words 
like rationalisation, voluntary, excellence being corrupted to accommodate the cuts’: AUT President’s 
Opening Address to Council meeting, 15-17 May 1985, UCU archives. 
48
 AUT, Universities at Risk, op. cit., p. 3. 
49 UGC Circular Letter 13/79, 15 August 1979.  
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and 1983 admissions to universities fell slightly, but admissions to public sector 
higher education increased by about 30 per cent.’50 Students who could not obtain 
university places had simply gone to polytechnics or colleges. While the UGC had 
clung to safeguarding the unit of resource as the hallmark of university standards, 
polytechnic directors were “wooed” - in Althusserian mode - to increase student 
numbers at their institutions, even if staff numbers and other resources did not 
expand to match. It could not be claimed that standards were at risk because public 
sector degrees were validated through the agency of the CNAA, on which there was 
extensive university representation, guaranteeing their equal standing to university 
degrees. Universities could keep their “standards” intact while at the same time the 
“knock-on effect” of cuts to their student numbers could be made to look as if this 
was - as indeed it was - an extension of access to PSHE. The Government could state 
that both sectors had acted freely and got what they had apparently wanted: 
[W]e have had to ask the local authority sector and polytechnics to stretch their 
resources, and they have done so and have shown that there was room to take in a 
considerable number of extra students. They have done that and I do not hear 
complaints that standards are under pressure. In the universities, the alternative 
view was taken, which was that the unit of resource was so stretched already that 
we had to ask for a limitation of numbers, because otherwise the unit of resource 
would be stretched to such a point that research, the other great output of  
universities, would come under serious pressure.
51
 
While it is unlikely that the Government could have foreseen at that stage the way in 
which each sector would react, it was able to capitalise pragmatically and act 
opportunistically to build its ideological agenda, working on the contradictions long 
present in British higher education.     
 
At first, the Government could make it look as if cuts would help “standards” to be 
“rescued”; there would be 'a smaller system at the end of the period with 20,000 
fewer student places'.
52
 At the very time when the number of qualified school leavers 
was to reach its peak, it was estimated that the cuts would cause the annual 
participation rate (APR) to fall from the 12.9% it had been projected to reach in 
                                               
50 DES, The Development of Higher Education into the 1990s, op. cit., paragraph 3.1, p. 10. In 1979 
there were 131,000 FTE students in PSHE, rising to 171,000 by 1984, an increase of 30%. By 
1980/81 PSHE’s share of higher education student numbers was 39%. Between 1979-1986, the 
amount of money spent per PSHE student decreased by 25%: see HC Deb, 8 July 1986, vol.101, 
cc.151-153. By 1987, PSHE was the larger of the two higher education sectors, with about 300,000 
students: see HC Deb, 3 November 1987, vol.121, cc.771-772. 
51
 HC Deb, 29 July 1982, vol.28, c.1348. 
52 HC Deb, 21 December 1981, vol.15, c.766. 
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1981/2 to a lower projection of 11.2% for 1984/5.
53
 Pandering to the traditionalists 
and neoliberals alike, Thatcher runs cuts and standards together, as if they were 
logically connected, turning ad hoc actions into policy: ‘[I]t is likely that entry 
standards will rise as the universities reduce [their] intake by about 5 per cent as 
compared with 1979-80 to meet the [revised] targets set by the UGC.’54 After some 
intense parliamentary opposition to the cuts (as we shall see in Chapter 5), events 
moved on and, by the end of the 1980s, the Government appeared to have “changed 
sides” in favour of expansion. It was as if the New Right Tories had stolen the 
clothes of the Left. How did this come about? By taking advantage of contingencies, 
a government that had initially promoted the need for a smaller higher education 
system ended up expanding it in order to serve explicitly instrumental purposes. 
 
Although much of the growth was due to factors not of its making, the Government 
claimed it as a measure of its success, reporting towards the middle of the decade 
that the overall APR had in fact risen from 12.4% in 1979 to around 14% in 1985.
55
 
What had happened was that rising intakes mainly to the polytechnics had - 
pragmatically - “come to the rescue” and could show, in addition, that higher 
education could be “delivered” “on the cheap” (as I explore further in Chapter 5), as 
Thatcher herself realised.
56
 Doing more with less (“efficiency gains”) now becomes a 
virtue, indeed, a paradigm of how the job is done. With higher education expenditure 
reduced by about 3.5%, academic staffing had fallen by 1 in 7 in universities and 1 in 
12 in PSHE, while overall student numbers had risen.
57
 The Government and the 
UGC had been accused in the midst of the 1981 cuts of drawing conclusions about 
academic provision on the basis of flimsy evidence and poor statistics. The 1985 
Green Paper shows how the Government could use statistics to its advantage, to back 
up premises or what it wanted people to believe. It claimed that the projected 
decrease in the number of 18 year olds would constitute a fall of 33% between 1984 
and 1996, the paper using the lower of two variants to drive down the projection of 
                                               
53 HC Deb, 8 March 1982, vol.19, c.312. For an explanation of - and the vicissitudes in - the APR, see 
Ch. 3, fns.95, 105 and 112. 
54 HC Deb, 10 December 1981, vol.14, c.460W. 
55 HC Deb, 15 May 1984, vol.60, c.90W; 10 June 1986, vol.99, c.165. 
56 Charles Moore reports that Thatcher (as Education Secretary in 1972) had favoured increasing 
admissions to polytechnics over universities because the former ‘were cheaper and, in her eyes, 
crucial to the expansion of higher education’: Moore, C., op. cit., p. 226. 
57 DES, The Development of Higher Education into the 1990s, op. cit., paragraph 9.1, p. 39. 
Student:staff ratios (SSRs) “improved” from 9.3:1 in universities and 8.4:1 in PSHE in 1979/80 to 
10.3:1 in universities and 12:1 in PSHE by 1985/6: see Watson, D. and Bowden, R., op. cit., p. 14. 
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the number of full-time student places required to the level of expenditure the 
Government wished to deploy.
58
 The PSHE teaching staff union, the National 
Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education (NATFHE), characterised 
the similar use of statistics in the 1987 White Paper as an ‘overt attempt to use the 
demographic downturn as a pretext to restrict the size of the student population’.59 
However, it was more than that: these factors were being used to “rig the market”, to 
recast student demand and expansion on Government terms.   
 
To meet employer demands for a more highly educated workforce, and assuage 
social democratic pressures, all the Government had to do was support PSHE’s 
strengths in vocational studies and its developing practice of extending access to 
higher education to mature and part-time entrants. The polytechnics and major 
colleges were well set up to accommodate such students, unlike many universities. 
NATFHE might bemoan that the Government’s concept of access was ‘essentially 
geared to ad-hockery and access for vocational purposes only’ but, in the face of 
increasingly tight resources, PSHE went with the political flow.
60
 Some polytechnics 
and colleges proposed more “flexible” modes of study, a move welcomed by the 
1985 Green Paper: 
The demand projections […] allow for [numbers of mature students] to increase. 
[…] Mature students with families will find it difficult to give up their earnings 
for as long as three or four years. They and other students could be helped by the 
availability of modular courses and the possibility of credit transfer, which allow 
students to build on their studies progressively and to mix full-time and part-time 
study. A wider development of credit transfer and of experimental modes of study 
are needed. In response to a Government approach the CNAA is exploring  
how best to promote further developments.
61
  
The Robbins recommendation that university degrees should be broadened was now 
being recast as modularity
62
 - an industrial, Fordist, term from the production line 
being applied to learning:  
The Robbins Committee regarded the broadening of the undergraduate curriculum 
as a necessary condition for the expansion of higher education. Outside the 
universities there has been such a broadening: an estimated one in four students in 
                                               
58 DES, ibid., paragraphs 3.4-3.6, pp. 11-13. Neoliberalism ‘requires technologies of information 
creation and capacities to accumulate, store, transfer, analyse, and use massive databases to guide 
decisions in the global marketplace’, David Harvey observes (op. cit., p. 3). 
59 NATFHE, Higher Education at the Crossroads: NATFHE’s Response to Government Plans for 
Higher Education (London: NATFHE, 1987), p. 1. 
60 Ibid., p. 3. 
61
 DES, ibid., paragraph 4.9, p. 18. 
62 Brecher, B., ‘Complicity and modularisation’, op. cit. 
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voluntary colleges and one in fifteen in local authority institutions are following a 
modular or combined studies degree programme. Within the universities, too, 
growing numbers of students are studying combinations of (mostly related)  
subjects.
63
 
The modular “product” could, of course, more easily be varied in length or level, 
chopped and changed, with staff hired and fired at will, if financial constraints 
required. The Government leant on the NAB to promote the DipHE (the two year 
sub-degree diploma), in an attempt to cut humanities degrees in the polytechnics.
64
 
Arts, humanities and social studies courses should be studied by only a few because  
arts provision should to some extent be concentrated in the interests of cost-
effectiveness; consideration for quality argues that for the most part it should be 
within the university sector. […] Those responsible for counselling intending 
students (and, perhaps, particularly girls) about their subject choices should be 
aware that the proportion of arts places in higher education as a whole can be  
expected to shrink.
65
 
Thus the commitment of liberal educationalists to extend access to higher education 
was being turned by the Government into an opportunity to cut provision and 
differentiate between the two sectors, retaining “standards” in the universities, while 
the polytechnics would teach students on shorter courses with lower and more 
flexible resources. Although shorter degrees and the threatened limitation of 
provision did not, in the main, occur, PSHE demonstrated that it could be compliant. 
The two sectors were cutting and undermining both themselves and each other, while 
the Government could say that student numbers overall had grown and access had 
been widened.   
 
Thus we can see that the simple act of cutting higher education funding delivered up 
more than some, at least, had bargained for. In one sense, the original plan failed, as 
student numbers did not fall as would have been in line with some Tories’ 
ideological stance. As if contradictorily, cuts in the one delivered up expansion in the 
other; universities’ adherence to their status quo delivered up expansion in PSHE, 
and then a government push to make the curriculum - especially in PSHE - 
concentrate on training for jobs. As Scott points out: ‘It was the cuts that allowed the 
government, under the guise of value-for-money accountability, to extend its 
                                               
63 DES, ibid., paragraph 6.3, p. 25. 
64
 Ibid., paragraph 6.4, p. 25. 
65 Ibid., paragraph 2.11, p. 9. 
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political control over the system.’66 Once the groundwork had been done, it was 
comparatively straightforward for the Secretary of State, Kenneth Baker, to set in 
motion from May 1986 the structural and statutory changes required for a higher 
education system that could now expand on the Government’s terms. If universities 
wanted ‘to play their part in the future’, then Vice-Chancellors would have ‘to study 
their market’ and meet the Government’s interpretation of ‘the country’s need for 
highly qualified manpower’.67 Meeting the Government’s needs now appeared to be 
the only reasonable “way forward” for higher education. 
 
(b)  Instrumentalising higher education 
Having at once destabilised higher education, but unable to stop the expansion of 
PSHE, the Government needed to consider “the product” itself; what they wanted to 
use an expanded higher education system for.   
 
As we noted earlier, in the early 1980s the Government did not have a clearly 
articulated policy for higher education. Even the 1982 CPRS proposals were about 
the complete privatisation of higher education, rather than any government-led use of 
the existing system. But if a liberal higher education should be reserved for the élite, 
to what ideological use could the rest be put? A comment from Rhodes Boyson 
(Under-Secretary of State for Education and Minister for Higher Education) in 1979 
- that universities facing cuts should reduce intakes in some subjects in order to allow 
more “relevant” ones to expand - is an early expression of the developing ideology.68 
In 1982, William Waldegrave (Boyson’s successor) asserted that ‘a strong utilitarian 
wind [was] blowing through higher education as students accurately assess the needs 
of a Britain which has a long slow job ahead of it building a better economic 
performance’. He warned that this would be ‘a chill wind for some of the less well 
founded liberal arts and social studies departments, and for some of the less practical 
science courses too’.69 Although some Tories opposed an instrumental view of 
higher education, not many spoke up, with some notable exceptions.
70
 But even those 
                                               
66 Scott, P., ‘Higher Education’, op. cit., p. 206. 
67 Speech by Kenneth Baker to the CVCP Residential Conference, 23 September 1986: UCU archives. 
68 Quoted in Kogan, M. with Kogan, D., op. cit., p. 32. 
69 Quoted in Ryan, D., op. cit., pp. 16-17. 
70 Enoch Powell described it as ‘barbarism to attempt to evaluate the contents of higher education in 
terms of economic performance or to set a value upon the consequences of higher education in terms 
of a monetary cost-benefit analysis’: HC Deb, 21 May 1985, vol.79, c.861. See further examples of 
such views in Chapters 5 and 7.   
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against were generally in favour of safeguarding an élite liberal university education 
rather than extending it.   
 
Higher (or perhaps lower) level technical education was the role envisaged for 
many.
71
 The ‘key contribution’ of PSHE was to provide ‘courses specifically 
designed to reflect the opportunities and requirements of the country’s employment 
market’, as the July 1981 Green Paper had specified.72 At the same time, the Labour 
Party continued to express its commitment to extend access to higher education by 
similarly favouring growth predominantly in vocational courses, thus unwittingly 
contributing to what the Government would turn into higher education’s predominant 
purpose: to serve the instrumental needs of the state.
73
   
 
The 1983 Tory Manifesto admonished that ‘[t]he very large sums of public money 
now going to higher education must be spent in the most effective way’. They 
spelled out what they meant by this: ‘[W]e want to see a shift towards technological, 
scientific and engineering courses’. Money would be set aside for 700 ‘new blood’ 
lectureships, primarily in applied science and information technology courses, with 
other funding in support. The role for most higher education institutions would be to 
‘train the skilled workforce of the next generation’.74 The 1985 Green Paper followed 
this up by stating that ‘it is vital for our higher education to contribute more 
effectively to the improvement of the performance of the economy’. Unless it did, 
‘we’ would be ‘even less able than now to afford many of the things that we value 
most - including education for pleasure and general culture and the financing of 
scholarship and research as an end in itself’.75 If public money had to be spent on 
higher education, then there would be “strings attached” to a higher education 
brought to serve particular ends: 
The future health of higher education - and its funding from public and private 
sources - depends significantly upon its own success in generating the qualified 
                                               
71 As Tory MP John Stokes put it in 1981: ‘[T]he basic problem is that we have too many universities 
[…]. What the country really needs is more students with national certificates and fewer graduates, 
some of whose courses are half-baked.’ - HC Deb, 7 April 1981, vol.2, c.810. 
72 DES, Higher Education in England outside the Universities, op. cit., paragraph 9, p. 2. 
73 Dale, I. (ed.), op. cit., p. 253 and p. 264. 
74 Conservative Party, The General Election Manifesto, The Conservative Party: the Challenge of our 
Times (London: Conservative Central Office, 1983), section headed ‘Higher education’.  
75 DES, The Development of Higher Education into the 1990s, op. cit., paragraph 1.2, p. 3. See 
Desmond Ryan (op. cit.) for a scathing attack on the Government for blaming higher education - a 
successful “enterprise” - for the failure of British industrial competitiveness, and the irony in the 
Government’s introduction of outmoded industrial methods into higher education. 
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manpower the country needs. […] Of special importance are the innovators and 
entrepreneurs who will create new jobs and those who achieve vocational 
qualifications, for which there is a market need.
76
  
It was ‘right to maintain a distinct emphasis on technological and directly vocational 
courses at all levels, leading to a switch in output in favour of graduates and 
diplomats with corresponding qualifications’.77 But, even as the Government tried to 
plan for this, there was a problem:   
The increased numbers of science and technology places in public sector 
institutions planned by the NAB for the 1984-85 academic year have not been 
fully taken up. This is remarkable - given high youth unemployment and the fact 
that graduates in maths- and physics-based disciplines stand a better than average 
chance of getting jobs.
78
  
Students were just not choosing the “right” subjects, were failing to see that  
[o]ne of the potentially surer routes to a successful business career […] for those 
with an enterprising and innovative attitude of mind ought to lie through  
competence in science, engineering, technology or mathematics.
79
 
As the PCFC later bemoaned: 
[S]ome of the factors which influence choice […] do not lead to choices which 
necessarily accord with the Government’s or the PCFC’s priorities for qualified 
manpower. For example, the strong demand to study humanities has not abated in 
recent years despite clear signals from the centre for a shift to science and 
technology and despite evidence that the employment prospects of arts graduates 
may be less than those of graduates in other subjects.
80
 
 
How could this be turned around? How could it become a matter of common sense 
that there should be a greater proportion of students undertaking vocational courses 
in publicly-funded higher education, when even the Government’s own evidence 
showed that students - in the free market of student choice - were not seeking places 
on them? To serve the Government’s ideological aim of training a next generation of 
technically skilled but compliant workers, higher education - and particularly the 
polytechnics - needed to be weaned away from arts subjects. The Government 
recognised some 
areas of learning and scholarship which have at most an indirect relationship to 
the world of work. The encouragement of a high level of scholarship in the arts, 
humanities and social sciences is an essential feature of a civilised and cultured 
                                               
76 DES, ibid., paragraphs 2.1-2.2, p. 6.   
77 Ibid., paragraph 2.9, p. 8. 
78 Ibid., paragraph 2.4, p. 7. 
79 Ibid., paragraph 2.6, p. 7. 
80
 PCFC, Funding Choices: a Consultative Document (London: PCFC, March 1989), paragraph 38,  
p. 13.  
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country. Clearly too, undergraduate education of quality in these disciplines is 
valued by employers, both as a basis for professional training and in its own  
right.
81
 
But, in general, students needed to be deflected from arts and social science courses 
and enticed into those areas of study the Government saw fit:   
[A] modest increase in opportunity to enter university as demand falls is to be 
welcomed. But a move in this direction should not lead to automatic admission to 
the universities, and particularly onto humanities courses, of those who might be 
more likely to profit in terms of personal development and future employment 
prospects from the vocational and technological courses offered by the public  
sector.
82
   
Continued public spending on higher education could be justified only by tailoring 
student “demand” more closely to the country’s economic interests, by ensuring that 
higher education “produced” more scientists, engineers, technologists and 
technicians. The Government was directing applicants in a free market to take up 
higher education places in scientific and technological subjects, for which extra 
funding was repeatedly specifically earmarked without proving demand.
83
 A market 
had to be created and presented as a “natural” development, a free choice. 
Government initiatives in schools would prime higher education applicants to choose 
the Government’s favoured subjects over others, a preference which would be 
reinforced if student grants or bursaries could be tailored to those subjects. In 
addition, all higher education institutions had to be made to reflect a more 
enterprising and work-related approach, ‘to be concerned with attitudes to the world 
outside’, ‘to beware of “anti-business” snobbery’ and ‘to foster positive attitudes to 
work’. Furthermore, ‘our higher education establishments need […] to go out to 
develop their links with industry and commerce’.84 Postgraduate work should be 
                                               
81 DES, Higher Education: Meeting the Challenge, op. cit., paragraph 1.2, p. 1. 
82 DES, The Development of Higher Education into the 1990s, op. cit., paragraph 3.7, p. 14. 
83 In December 1982, Joseph announced a £100 million three-year programme for boosting 
information technology courses and bringing ‘new blood’ into higher education. This involved 
allocating an additional 2,000 student places for 1983/84, building up to 5,000 by 1985/86, plus extra 
staff posts, research grants and fellowships: see DES Press Notice 299/82, 16 December 1982, UCU 
archives. The 1985 Green Paper announced some £43 million over the three years 1985/86-1987/88 to 
provide under- and postgraduate places in the applied sciences and IT, building up to an estimated 
4,000 additional places: DES, ibid., paragraph 2.10, p. 8. See also HC Deb, 12 February 1985, vol.73, 
c.124. See Kogan, M. with Kogan, D., op. cit., pp. 67-68, for details of these and other similar 
Government initiatives around this time, provided - according to the authors - without demand having 
been proven. Parallels can be drawn with contemporary government policy and practice: see fn.5 
above. 
84
 DES, ibid., paragraph 1.6, p. 4. Initiatives - such as, the Enterprise in Higher Education scheme - 
attracted bids from the sector. 
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given ‘a closer industrial orientation’ with more employer involvement.85 Research 
aligned to the demands of business and industry would fortuitously offer 
opportunities to raise income lost as a result of the cuts: ‘Researchers should be more 
aware of the commercial exploitation and of their responsibilities for its 
promotion.’86 As higher education - and even employers - were to blame for the 
country’s poor economic situation, they had to find other forms of funding, such as 
employer sponsorship of students or consultancy or industrial donation of 
equipment.
87
 Staff had to adopt the “correct” ideological attitude and take up more 
‘relevant’ research, which could then be “measured” for promotion: 
Institutional attitudes and action are important. The Government hopes that all 
institutions […] will […] encourage all relevant departments to follow […] the 
good practices now to be found in many, such as […] taking consultancy and 
other beneficial industrial work fully into account when assessing candidates  
for promotion.
88
 
The UGC would  
ensure that universities’ efforts and successes in industrial research and 
consultancy receive due recognition in the process of grant allocation and that 
universities are aware of this practice. […] [U]niversities which are successful  
in carrying out such work should be helped to build on their strengths.
89
 
The notions of concentration, selectivity and differentiation between the universities 
and PSHE in a market system had to be reinforced: 
Both quality and economy argue for some concentration of research activity - 
particularly where expensive equipment is needed - and concentration implies 
selectivity. There is a debate about whether research and teaching need to be 
carried out together. The UGC argues that research stimulates the teaching of able 
students; but there is no evidence that all academic staff must engage in research.  
[…] Research will be a consideration in the necessary process of  
rationalisation.
90
 
As for research in the humanities, this is glossed over in the briefest possible way: 
most of it was not needed in the utilitarian “real” world.91 If those who worked in 
higher education could be brought to internalise the apparent “problems” they had 
helped to create, they could be brought to take the consequences and come up with 
“common sense” solutions. 
 
                                               
85 Ibid., paragraph 5.17, p. 23. 
86 Ibid., paragraph 5.9, p. 21. 
87 Ibid., paragraph 2.3, p. 6. 
88 Ibid., paragraph 5.10, p. 21. 
89 Ibid., paragraph 5.11, p. 22. 
90
 Ibid., paragraphs 5.4 and 5.7, pp. 20-21. 
91 Ibid., paragraph 5.15, p. 23. 
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So how were students to be encouraged to choose “useful” subjects? The 
Government’s funding choices had to be made to make sense, so business tools such 
as “rates of return” were brought into play. Reflecting the 1985 Green Paper, two 
DES policy papers in 1987 showed the personal financial benefits - the “value 
added” - of a higher education.92 The social rates of return on particular subjects 
(unsurprisingly, those favoured by the Government, like applied science and 
‘business-related social sciences’) are shown as high, while - not surprisingly - a 
negative rate of social return is shown on arts degrees. Why then should public 
money be spent on the latter, if ‘A’-level earners had the same rate of return? As a 
leaked Government document put it, there was ‘scope for substituting non-graduates 
for graduates’.93 If arts graduates accrued such a high rate of personal gain, why 
shouldn’t they pay for their own higher education? Statistics could reinforce the 
conclusion the Government wished to draw: that funding students and their places 
should ideally be linked to the subject’s perceived usefulness. As there needed to be 
a limit on ‘the numbers of publicly funded places to be provided in particular subject 
areas’,94 the 1985 Green Paper asserted that the student’s “employability” in the 
labour market should be a key indicator of quality: 
External judgements about quality can be attempted by comparing the success of 
students in obtaining jobs, their relative salaries and their reported performance in 
employment, and by reference generally to the international standing of our  
academic qualifications.
95
  
“Choice” had to be engineered more forcibly.  
 
Thus in the late 1980s, the four new fee bands set up by the funding councils were 
designed to steer institutions towards expanding in the Government’s preferred 
                                               
92 DES, ibid; Clark, A. and Tarsh, J. (as officers of the DES), ‘How much is a degree worth?’, 
Education & Training UK 1987: an economic, social and policy audit (London: Policy Journals, 
1987), pp. 109-115; Tarsh, J. (as an officer of the DES), ‘What happens to new graduates?’, Education 
& Training UK 1987: an economic, social and policy audit (London: Policy Journals, 1987), pp. 50-
60. 
93 Chevening Discussion Paper (1988), ‘ “Manpower planning” in higher education’, 25 July 1988, 
covering letter from Norman Lamont (Financial Secretary to the Treasury) to Robert Jackson (Under-
Secretary of State for Education and Science), 18 July 1988. 
94 Ibid., paragraph 7.  Economists of education treated with caution claims that graduates of some 
subjects (apart from those graduating in the most obviously vocational subjects, such as medicine) are 
more suitable for employment than others: see, for example, Fulton, O., Gordon, A., Williams, G. 
(eds), Higher Education and Manpower Planning: a Comparative Study of Planned and Market 
Economies (London and Paris: International Labour Office and UNESCO, 1982); Williams, G., 
‘Graduate Employment and Vocationalism in Higher Education’, European Journal of Education, 
Volume 20, Numbers 2-3, 1985, pp. 181-192.  
95 DES, The Development of Higher Education into the 1990s, op. cit., paragraph 6.11, pp. 27-28. 
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subjects. One commentator did not consider this move to be as disingenuous as some 
others seemed to think: 
[U]niversities and polytechnics will find it more profitable to recruit science and 
engineering than arts and social science students […]. [T]he main effect of higher 
fees, which will be exacerbated if the Treasury shaves central grants accordingly, 
will be to drive down unit costs […]. One outcome of [the resultant] disparity 
[between universities and polytechnics] no doubt is planned. Polytechnics and 
colleges with their lower unit costs will have a stronger incentive to recruit extra  
students, which would confirm their role as the engines of mass access.
96
 
The new top-up loans ought to steer students towards choosing the subject with the 
best “rate of return”. This, according to another commentator, was effectively a 
“Trojan horse” that would usher in students eventually funding their own degrees:   
The real question is who will pay the fees in the long run? The present proposal is 
that they will be paid through the grant system and students will not even notice. 
The problem is that there are powerful voices saying the fees should be paid by  
the students themselves.
97
 
The overall strategy was to shift the balance of funding to income received directly 
from the student, that is the purchase of the services directly at source by the 
customer, in true neoliberal mode. But, the same commentator warned, one thing 
could lead to another:   
[O]ne does not have to be a conspiracy theorist to envisage the possibility that 
[…] the loans will be extended to fees as well. What then will become of the 
claim that fees will increase participation in higher education? [...] Some vice-
chancellors have welcomed the proposals. They need to be careful […]. If some 
universities are able to provide student places at lower average costs the UFC will 
expect them all to do so. There will be downward pressure on costs and on quality 
everywhere. The contents of the chalice the government is offering them  
will need to be tasted very cautiously.
98
 
As the President of the National Union of Students (NUS) concluded, this was 
clearly not just about saving money or increasing access but was part of an 
ideological strategy: ‘the idea of the individual only getting what they pay for, 
regardless of the cost to society as a whole’.99 But “society” was not a significant 
consideration for Thatcherites: what was crucial was to set up, on the one hand, 
competition between institutions and subjects and, on the other, to engineer students 
away from a free choice and towards vocational subjects deemed by the Government 
                                               
96 Scott, P., ‘Goodbye to vouchers?’, Editorial, The Times Higher Education Supplement, 5 May 1989, 
p. 40.  
97 Williams, G., ‘Sipping the fee-paying chalice’, The Sunday Times, 30 April 1989. 
98 Ibid.  
99
 Sherlock, M., ‘Real cost of pay as you learn’, The Times Higher Education Supplement, 25 
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to be most “useful” for employment - or even to wean them away from a higher 
education at all. 
 
The Thatcher Governments were only partly successful in achieving their ideological 
goal of instrumentalising higher education: there was a small shift in students’ 
subject choices.
100
 The original aim that fewer people should have access to a liberal 
higher education would take longer to effect. Nevertheless, a successful challenge 
had been made to the previously accepted post-war norm that students should be 
publicly funded in full to pursue the higher education of their choice. Furthermore, 
from the mid- to late-1980s, higher education managers were working with the new 
Government-dominated funding and planning regimes, which brought higher 
education institutions closer to embracing the practices and values of neoliberalism, 
and, by extension, accepting whatever the Government might require.   
 
(c)  Freedom and control  
The 1979 Manifesto had promised that a Thatcher Government would ‘restore the 
balance of power in favour of the people’. This was, it claimed, ‘based not on dogma, 
but on reason, on common sense, above all on the liberty of the people under the 
law’.101 Even though jobs and services would be cut to achieve “freedom”, we 
would, somewhat contradictorily, ‘all be on the same side’.102 People were being 
recruited - in Althusserian fashion - to inhabit a neoliberal world, to ‘come to terms 
with reality’, to listen to and accept ‘the truth’, and to reject the ‘make-believe’ of 
what had gone before.
103
 As the Manifesto puts it: ‘Those who look in these pages 
for lavish promises or detailed commitments on every subject will look in vain.’104 
The detail did not matter as long as the main neoliberal ideological message was 
clear: education, like other public services, needed to be liberated from the state and 
become the responsibility of parents and individuals.
105
 The message was 
consolidated in the 1987 Manifesto: people had to be given ‘greater choice and 
responsibility over their own lives in important areas such as housing and 
                                               
100 The increase was from 50% to 53% in universities and from 36% to 41% in PSHE: see DES, 
Higher Education: Meeting the Challenge, op. cit., paragraph 2.2, p. 5.   
101 The Conservative Manifesto (1979), op. cit., p. 5. 
102 Ibid., p. 9. David Harvey quotes a Thatcher advisor saying that cuts could be used as (my 
emphasis) ‘a cover to bash the workers’: see Harvey, D., op. cit., p. 59. 
103 The Conservative Manifesto (1979), ibid., p. 32. 
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education’.106 How come, then, that the freeing of PSHE from LEA bureaucracy, and 
of universities from the closed-door and allegedly biased workings of the UGC, 
resulted by the end of the 1980s in higher education coming under increased central 
government control?   
 
After the flawed student number projections of the 1970s and the ad hoc cuts and 
confusion of the early 1980s, both higher education sectors were pushing for better 
planning and funding mechanisms. Given the difficulties of working under so many 
different LEA bureaucracies, together with the fact that PSHE recruited students not 
just locally but nationally and internationally, it is understandable that polytechnic 
directors and college principals welcomed the idea of a national body. Fortuitously, 
this coincided with the Government’s ideological imperative to rein in the LEAs, for 
both financial and political reasons. Higher education’s apparently reasonable 
demands for more openness and better information in order to manage and plan their 
resources played unwittingly into the way in which the two new funding councils 
were set up and used by the Government as a means of acquiring and enforcing 
greater control.
107
 Performance indicators were a key instrument here. As a market 
system relied on the concepts and practices of competition, differentiation and 
selectivity, the Government needed data to compare one institution to another. 
Higher education institutions would be drawn into accepting the use of business tools 
as a “necessary evil” in exchange for planning and funding information. Broad 
measures were deemed insufficient; what was needed was something measurable; 
and once higher education accepted that, much else could, and would, follow: the 
way in which findings could be interpreted was merely the next reasonable step. The 
funding of whatever number of students in higher education could be justified by 
demographic trends and whatever number of graduate employees it was deemed “the 
market” required. A whole set of business phrases and techniques were brought to 
bear: unit costs, inputs and outputs, effective staff development, appraisal, 
adaptability and accountability, supply and demand, cost-benefit analysis, 
performance measurement, rate of return, value for money and more. Such forms of 
quantification were needed in the emergently market system of higher education in 
                                               
106 The Conservative Manifesto (1987), op. cit., p. 9. Labour’s 1987 Manifesto resolved to make good 
the cuts and increase resources for expansion: see Dale, I. (ed.), op. cit., p. 301. 
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order to measure and control production targets and rates. And so higher education 
institutions allowed themselves to be “educated” away from a collegiate model and 
towards setting themselves up in competition with one another, stratified by different 
“mission statements”.   
 
The differences required in a competitive higher education market place could, 
conveniently, even be represented as evidence of the Government’s commitment to a 
liberal pluralism. Thus the Government claimed that it had 
no wish to impose a uniform pattern on higher education; on the contrary, the 
Government would like to see even greater vitality and flexibility. […] [E]ach 
type of institution has a valuable contribution to make, provided that what each 
does is fit for the purpose which it serves.
108
 
Diversification and differentiation were “natural” results of greater competition, 
especially across the binary divide. If some institutions went to the wall, then so be 
it: that simply proved that they were not “fit for purpose”. The Government could 
now openly admit that it was ‘not improbable that some institutions of higher 
education will need to be closed or merged at some point during the next ten 
years’.109 “Quality assurance” was a useful technique, to be applied as required. For 
example, if the traditional three-year degree course in the humanities or social 
sciences were to be reserved for the universities, as only they could be considered to 
maintain proper academic standards (simply by virtue of their élitism), then shorter, 
sub-degree vocational courses (the DipHE or the HND) would be what PSHE should 
predominantly offer, suitably quality-assured by higher education practitioners 
themselves.   
 
Even if business techniques were inimical to higher education, the central planners 
would still insist on their use: 
The pursuit of value for money in higher education can only be successful if it is 
based on an analysis of benefits and their related costs in different activities. 
There are significant difficulties in measuring performance in higher education. 
Some benefits may not be quantified readily or at all. Activities and objectives are 
multiple, and relative values are not readily assigned. But the effort has to be 
made if the Government is to pursue its objectives of controlling public 
expenditure and of making the most effective use of the taxpayers’ money; and if 
institutions and others concerned with higher education planning are to be fully  
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 DES, The Development of Higher Education into the 1990s, op. cit., paragraph 1.8, p. 5. 
109 Ibid., paragraph 1.13, p. 5. 
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informed in taking their decisions on the allocation of the resources available.
110
 
And later, the PCFC demonstrated its difficulty in applying market techniques to 
higher education, acknowledging that ‘[e]ducation is not like other products’.111 
Despite the barely-concealed civil service and funding council officers’ reservations, 
the model would be applied anyway. After all, it was “simply” a matter of helping to 
control public expenditure and assisting institutions in planning their finances 
accordingly. 
 
Planning projections need no longer be based solely on student demand, since that 
could be engineered, at least in part, by central government, as Secretary of State 
Baker made plain in 1987: ‘[S]tudent demand will no longer be a sufficient basis for 
planning. A major determinant must also be the nation’s demands for highly 
qualified manpower.’ Therefore the Government had to ensure ‘that within the total 
numbers the shift towards scientific and other vocational courses should be carried 
through’. Giles Radice (Labour Shadow Education Spokesperson) riposted: ‘Higher 
education will now be run on the basis of Whitehall diktat, and the view that the 
Secretary of State always knows best.’112 Despite the New Right’s claims that the 
market was supreme, student demand was no longer to be ‘the sole indicator of 
which subjects and institutions ought to be supported’.113 Acting on the 
Government’s behalf and in the guise of “the people”, the PCFC justified its attempts 
to influence the market, claiming to represent  
the taxpayer who, through the funding council, meets some 80% of the total 
funding going to polytechnics and colleges, [and who] may feel that the PCFC, 
the conduit for that finance, ought to have some say in the pattern or quality of 
educational provision. In addition the Government may wish to set priorities for 
qualified manpower. These reservations have encouraged the group to look at 
ways in which the PCFC might try to influence the range of courses and quality of  
teaching directly.
114
 
The PCFC was prepared to put into place mechanisms designed to influence student 
choice in the directions the Government wished. There would simply have to be a 
certain loss of freedom if public funding was to be forthcoming. Hiding behind the 
funding bodies, government dirigisme is presented in the guise of common sense. 
Furthermore, because ‘better management’ was needed to ‘[yield] greater value for 
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money’,115 this would require matching internal management controls run along 
business lines from Vice-Chancellors’ offices: there really was no alternative. 
 
Higher education had to be shifted away from its post-war reliance on public funding 
and back to the pre-war practice of raising income from private sources. In the face 
of the cuts in the early 1980s, the UGC had urged universities to put more effort into 
raising private sources of income. Despite protests, the position of liberal 
educationalists was compromised in accepting full-cost overseas student fees as their 
institutions needed the resources to shore up the shortfall in public funds. In the end, 
this aspect of privatisation has been a success story for neoliberalism, as higher 
education institutions have learnt to compete in the free market for overseas students, 
this crucially important “income stream”. 
 
Although the Government freely admitted that it wanted to shed its responsibilities 
for the public funding of higher education, it could only go so far. In a letter to the 
UGC Chair on 1 September 1983, Joseph had urged universities, contradictorily, that 
raising private income would free them from the very government control he was 
imposing on them: ‘The higher the proportion of university income that comes from 
non-Government sources, the greater their freedom of action and their capacity to 
survive fluctuations in the level of recurrent grant.’116 As the 1985 Green Paper 
confirmed, public funding would ‘be determined in the light of [the Government’s] 
assessment of what the country can afford’, so it made sense for the universities to 
‘seek to maximise their income from other sources as a supplement to their grant’.117 
In 1984 the CVCP had duly set up a committee to look into resources from the 
private sector. The 1985 Green Paper emphasised ‘the importance to higher 
education of seeking to derive more of its total income from sources other than the 
taxpayer and the ratepayer’.118 After all, ‘with the right approach and input of effort, 
more income for higher education can be obtained from business and private 
sources’.119 Salford University could be cited as proof that universities could be 
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116 Letter from Secretary of State, Keith Joseph, to UGC Chair, Edward Parkes, 1 September 1983: 
UCU archives. 
117 DES, ibid., paragraph 9.5, p. 40. 
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successfully ‘forced to be free and enterprising’.120 Having suffered a 42% cut in 
1981, it had since obtained significant funding from industry.
121
 With regard to 
research, the Government’s prediction was already coming true by 1985:  
The UGC and other commentators have claimed that cuts in university budgets 
have fallen especially on research. […] University income from research grants  
and contracts has nevertheless been rising in real terms in the last few years.
122
 
By 1987, universities’ research income from industry had doubled since 1981.123 The 
free market was working. Centrally imposed cuts were fostering a stronger 
entrepreneurial spirit, in turn leading to the reproduction - in Althusserian fashion - 
of greater freedom from public funding. 
 
The 1985 Green Paper urges university senior academics and administrators, who 
had now become managers, to do just that: to manage diminishing public funds more 
efficiently and strictly according to Government policy.
124
 However, the status of 
universities posed a difficulty: ‘[U]niversities, although dependent on public funds, 
are privileged institutions with a very significant degree of self-government’. The 
Government needed to deal with that constitutional position so that they could, for 
example, intervene in institutions to stamp out alleged ‘political bias in teaching’.125  
Tenure in the universities and ‘no compulsory redundancy’ agreements in PSHE 
were an ‘impediment to reorganisation’, so legislation was needed to enable higher 
education managers ‘to terminate academic appointments on grounds of redundancy 
or financial exigency’.126 Differential pay and ‘merit awards’ to staff were 
recommended in order to set up “healthy competition” between and within higher 
education institutions, departments and staff. Not all these policies could be put into 
place immediately, but the important thing was to set up the structures and pass the 
initial legislation so that institutional managers would increasingly have to carry out 
the Government’s ideological agenda on its behalf at institutional level. 
 
Even though the Government was now promoting higher education’s purpose as 
instrumental to the needs of the state, it needed to find a way of making the expanded 
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population of students pay individually for both their maintenance costs and tuition 
fees. True to the spirit of the 1979 Manifesto, the Government was considering by 
the mid-1980s ‘the extent to which students, their families and other sponsors might 
progressively assume greater responsibility for their participation in higher 
education’.127 We have seen how Joseph’s attempts to make richer parents pay more 
met with fierce Tory backbench opposition, partly on the grounds that these MPs 
thought that students should not be dependent on their parents. (I return to this debate 
in Chapter 5.) As if meeting that objection, the 1988 ‘Top-up loans’ White Paper 
stated that ‘a system in which students rely on just two main sources of support - 
parents and grants from public funds - is unsustainable’.128 Bringing in top-up 
maintenance loans of up to 50% and cutting student benefits was presented not 
simply as a means of saving public expenditure, but as a way of freeing students 
from dependency on the state and their parents, as a form of liberation: 
It is undesirable that students should learn to depend upon a wrong understanding 
of the reciprocal obligations of the citizen and the state. […] The Government 
believes that ending students’ dependence on social security benefits will, like the 
availability of a loan, contribute to increasing their economic awareness and their  
self-reliance.
129
 
It could be all things to all people: it would help students to choose their subject of 
study more responsibly, and would constitute the means whereby access to higher 
education would be extended.
130
 Despite repeated objections from both Opposition 
MPs and Vice-Chancellors, the Student Loans Bill (to which I return in the next two 
chapters) was presented to Parliament in 1990 as if there were no alternative.
131
 What 
are effectively cuts are presented as an extension of freedom and responsibility, and 
quickly enabled to become so. Students should choose those “useful” subjects that 
would be publicly funded. Alternatively, a student can of course choose to study a 
subject not publicly funded - as long as they pay for this themselves. Thus a financial 
cut is made to look like freeing up access to study vocational subjects at a lower 
level, rather than what in fact it was: a form of social engineering and central control.   
                                               
127 Ibid., paragraph 9.11 (vi), p. 42. 
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As I have already suggested, given the Government’s repeatedly expressed views 
that public and private organisations should be freed from domination by the state, it 
appears to be a contradiction that increasingly greater central controls were imposed 
on higher education by the end of the 1980s. But the contradiction disappears as soon 
as it is understood in terms of the bigger ideological picture. The Government uses 
the expansion it had not set out to put into place to fulfil its ideological goal of both 
creating a market in higher education and planning the subject areas and student 
numbers it wished to fund, irrespective of demand, which it was then effectively 
fashioning.
132
 In this way, the higher education state apparatus could be brought to 
reflect a developing ideological purpose. 
 
(iv) A renewed purpose 
It seems surprising in hindsight that higher education expanded under Thatcher. Full-
time undergraduate student numbers increased by 80,000 from 1979 to 1986 and by 
1989 the APR was at a record 18.3%.
133
 However, funding in real terms fell 
sharply.
134
 Between 1976-1997, the unit of resource per student was reduced by 
46.5%, and between 1989-1997 funding per student dropped by 36%.
135
 By the end 
of the 1980s, the “centralisers” in Thatcher’s Government saw how they could 
harness a weakened higher education apparatus to serve neoliberal interests in 
practical ways, in ‘the real world [my emphasis] of industry, business, administration 
and the professions’.136 Access was no longer to be exclusively the realm of the 
polytechnics and colleges. The value of the unit of resource in the polytechnics had 
been significantly reduced, so why not in the universities too? The ‘productivity’ of 
higher education institutions needed to be ‘improved’, as the Under-Secretary of 
State put it in 1988, as it was simply a matter of ‘[looking] at the amount of money 
                                               
132 This was made explicit in the Chevening Discussion Paper which sought ‘to formulate a policy on 
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which is spent and the number of graduates that are produced’.137 Neoliberalism 
needed the mass production of highly skilled - but compliant - workers, as Althusser 
might have put it, to replace the social democratic system designed to encourage a 
wider range of people to undertake a higher education “for its own sake”. Higher 
education’s renewed purpose was to provide companies with graduates who would 
bring ‘intellectual power to bear in the market-place’.138 A revised role had been 
developed for a previously liberal higher education system: the explicit production 
and reproduction of students, workers and managers to design and implement the 
New Right world order. 
 
How successful, then, had the legislation been in re-engineering the ideological 
relationship of higher education to the state? The evidence shows that by 1989 the 
policy papers at least were expressing a considerably different view of higher 
education from the previously accepted liberal model inherited from Newman and 
Mill; and that higher education institutions were conforming - in the main, or at least 
officially, at institutional level - to their newly-crafted role. The universities, in 
particular, had been undermined by cuts. Working on ideological “fault-lines” and 
exploiting hierarchies, PSHE could be expanded but on a lower unit of resource, and 
with attempts to tie its curriculum to the needs of the state. Government quangos 
reflected and passed on to higher education institutions the need to bow to the 
Government’s ideological agenda. Higher education managers were embracing the 
language and style of business, enterprise and the market. Through legislation 
culminating in the 1988 Education Reform Act, the Thatcher Governments had 
brought higher education under central government control and shifted its focus 
towards neoliberal ideas and practices, based on commerce and competition, using 
devices borrowed from the private sector, seeking to destroy forms of collegiality 
and organised labour, and generally gearing the sector more towards a notion of 
service delivery, responsive to the demands of the customer and the ups and downs 
of the free market. By 1990, cuts and legislation had brought higher education into 
being at once more subservient to Government diktat while also subject to market 
forces: a neoliberal ideological “dream ticket”, whereby the contradiction worked to 
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further the ideology.
139
 Higher education could now be reined in more easily under 
government control, that is effectively “nationalised” to support a New Right 
ideological agenda: the instrumentalisation of the very idea of a university education, 
whose organisations and practices should be exposed to market forces.
140
 
 
Although the Thatcher Government might have started the decade by wanting to 
keep higher education small and to preserve the élite universities for the few, the 
progress of a neoliberal agenda crafted by contradictory elements amounted to 
something much more than that. In order to achieve and embed a lasting ideological 
revolution, Thatcherites realised they could harness an expanded higher education 
system more explicitly in the role of an ideological state apparatus, a means of 
converting people to a different ideology, to accepting a more narrowly vocational 
and instrumental higher education, tied more closely to the wishes of the state. And 
by so doing, people could become converted to a different way of looking at things 
within higher education and - beyond that - in “the real world”. The way the New 
Right Tories achieved this was as much due to the operation of one contradiction on 
another, helping to craft the seemingly unstoppable ideological changes, as it was to 
winning higher education over to their point of view.   
 
Having considered how this process worked through documents and legislation, I 
next turn in Chapters 5 and 6 to look in more detail at how these were debated in 
Parliament and how the proposed changes were resisted or supported on the level of 
the contradictions identified.   
                                               
139 Andy Green comments: ‘Even those measures which appear to be increasing central control in 
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Chapter 5 Higher education debated: the House of Commons  
 
(i) Using the parliamentary process  
Here I focus on the House of Commons Hansard record of higher education debates 
in the 1980s, considering what exactly proponents and opponents of the 
Government’s legislation argued, and how these debates may be understood as 
contributing to the construction of consent to the Government’s “common sense” 
ideology through the workings of those dichotomies or contradictions I identified 
earlier: élitism, excellence and standards versus expansion; liberal versus 
instrumental and vocational; the free market and privatisation versus public funding, 
planning and control.
1
 I have concentrated on the House of Commons’ and in 
Chapter 6 on the House of Lords’ records - as opposed to, say, interviewing those 
involved - because I aim to show from the record itself how the debates on higher 
education legislation helped to construct the ideology.
2
 The focus of this and the 
following chapter’s material is thus dictated to a large extent by those issues that 
dominated each House’s debates. So, for example, as the Lords spent more time 
discussing the detail of the 1988 Education Reform Act than did the Commons, this 
is one of my emphases in Chapter 6. Although there is no one review of all higher 
education legislation of the 1980s or the parliamentary debates on it, the columns of 
The Times Higher Education Supplement (together with articles and letters in the 
broadsheets from time to time) provide a kind of commentary on academics’ and 
trade unions’ reactions to the cuts and the ensuing legislation.3 I refer to these articles 
as appropriate throughout. In Chapter 7, I consider in more detail the objections of 
trade unions and other dissenters to the legislation, showing how the very terms of 
dissent were set to favour the progress of the neoliberal ideology. 
 
                                               
1 Concentrating (for reasons of space) on taught higher education in England, the main debates (whose 
predominance can be measured in terms of Hansard column space) were on: universities and PSHE 
generally; overseas student fees and numbers; and student grants, fees and loans (by far the most 
voluminous part of the record). I therefore largely exclude, except in passing, debates on, inter alia, 
research study and councils, teacher education, lecturers’ pay, the OU and students’ unions. 
2 Other social forms and practices were, of course, instrumental in constructing Thatcherism, notably 
the popular press as, for example, Gilmour discusses in Dancing with Dogma, op.cit., pp. 193-198. 
3 The only in-depth analysis of one piece of the legislation (the 1988 Education Reform Bill), and 
responses to it, is by Julian Haviland in Take Care, Mr Baker!: a selection from the advice on 
education which the government collected but decided not to publish (London: Fourth Estate, 1988). 
 
 123 
 
In one sense, given their parliamentary majorities, the Thatcher Governments could 
enact whatever policies they wished. But the Government had to convince MPs - and 
particularly dissenting Tory backbenchers - and carry them along, lest MPs withheld 
support for particular policies for fear of being voted out at the next election. The 
Government had to make their proposals seem to make sense, with no alternative. In 
short, they needed to gloss over the “reality” of the material conditions and make use 
of inherent contradictions and accidental opportunities to help them build the 
hegemonic domination they sought. For opponents, the parliamentary debates offered 
an opportunity to point up the confusions and contradictions in the Government’s 
arguments, to show that the ideas did not make sense; but they would have needed to 
expose the ideological process at work and how it was distorting the terms of the 
debate. However a unified response was unlikely, given both the splits in the Labour 
Party and - outside Parliament - the antagonisms that existed between the two higher 
education sectors. Some Government proposals ran into delay and compromises had 
to be sought. But, overall, the parliamentary process helped the Government to build 
their ideological domination over time, as objections gave them the opportunity to 
see what, if anything, they really needed to deal with in terms of serious opposition 
and in what ways, if at all, they needed to adjust details in order to get the legislation 
through and keep the underlying ideology on course. If the Government did not 
succeed in enacting a policy in quite the way or in the timescale envisaged, this did 
not matter from a long-term ideological perspective, as long as the Government had 
started to wear down and/or win over opposition - from both within and outside their 
own ranks - to their overall ideological cause.  
 
(ii) The cuts: kick-starting the ideological process 
I shall begin by examining what MPs said about the 1979-1981 university cuts 
(which I argued in Chapter 4 were a fundamental building block in the New Right’s 
assault on higher education), showing how this set up an “ideological pattern” for the 
debates which followed.   
 
It was difficult for those opposing the cuts to engage much public interest. This was 
understandable because higher education (and especially the university sector) was 
still élitist and, of course, many other cutbacks of more immediate concern to most 
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people were being enacted at the same time.
4
 Waldegrave in fact received 3,000 
letters against the cuts between July and November 1981. Significantly, most were 
about the university cuts, and over half were about cuts to specific universities. A 
much smaller number of letters concerned the cuts to PSHE.
5
 An estimated 11,000 
people (mainly university staff) demonstrated outside the House of Commons on 18 
November 1981.
6
 Inside Parliament, far less time was taken in discussing the cuts to 
PSHE than to the universities. First, the cuts to the polytechnics and colleges were 
not so visible, as they were contained within general LEA funding cuts; indeed, no 
co-ordinated record was initially kept of the cuts in the PSHE sector. Second, many 
LEAs minimised cuts to their local polytechnics and colleges. Third, the university 
cuts were passed on by the UGC on a university-specific basis, and so MPs could be 
more easily lobbied to speak against specific cuts to specific universities. And fourth, 
the universities had much higher public status than PSHE - many people not realising 
that polytechnics offered degrees - so that MPs and other public figures were more 
likely to support the universities rather than the relatively new polytechnics. As 
Phillip Whitehead (Labour Shadow Spokesperson on Higher Education), 
condemning the estimated 10% cutback in funding for PSHE in 1982, put it: ‘The 
public sector is not as adequate a publicist of misery as are the universities and the 
vice-chancellors.’7   
 
As we have seen, the cuts allowed a “divide and rule” scenario to develop between 
the universities and PSHE, and this was replicated by the MPs defending them. As 
the debates unfolded, the Government could capitalise on the particular ways in 
which the cuts impacted on each sector differently. How the cuts and subsequent 
follow-up actions were debated and came about - and not just parliamentary approval 
of individual policies - was what was fundamentally important in the construction 
and sustainability of the Government’s two-staged ideological mission: first, to 
weaken higher education and then to win it over to its cause.  
 
                                               
4 As Kinnock identified: HC Deb, 18 November 1981, vol.13, c.292. Also, as Labour Lord Molloy 
pointed out (HL Deb, 19 January 1983, vol.437, cc.1416-1490, p. 31), ‘the sycophantic Tory national 
press’ backed the Government. See, for example, extracts quoted from The Daily Express and The 
Sun: HC Deb, 4 June 1985, vol.80, c.205. 
5 HC Deb, 27 October 1981, vol.10, c.331W; 17 November 1981, vol.13, cc.129-130W. 
6
 HC Deb, 18 November 1981, vol.13, c.362. 
7 HC Deb, 29 July 1982, vol.28, c.1332. 
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What reasons did the Government give in debate for these initial cuts - especially to 
universities - and the policies they then put in place? What support - or opposition - 
did they receive from their own backbenchers and why? What objections did the 
opposition parties raise and did these offer any challenge to the Government’s 
underlying ideology? In order to track the ideological process at work, I shall analyse 
three specific sets of grounds on which the opposition parties objected in the House 
of Commons to the cuts. These can be summarised as follows: (a) the cuts overturned 
the post-war all-party commitment to expand higher education, and did not make 
sense because the country needed more highly-educated people (these were the most 
extensive debates, apart from those on student grants, to which I return later); (b) the 
cuts were not cost-effective, would necessitate more being spent on unemployment 
benefits, and would damage higher education institutions’ local economies; and (c) 
higher education institutions were not a failing industry so did not warrant being cut, 
especially when the Government was spending public money elsewhere.   
 
The parliamentary process meant that the Opposition was always one step behind, 
trying to salvage what they could in piecemeal fashion from the Government’s 
planned public expenditure cuts. To counter this, Labour in particular, as the major 
opposition party, would have needed to present an explicit and robust alternative 
higher education policy; otherwise all they could do - at best - was to defend the 
status quo. Let us consider the objections which Labour put forward and how the 
contradictions that came to the fore in debate helped the developing ideology to start 
to dominate. 
 
(a) First objection 
As noted in Chapter 3, the expansion of higher education slowed down in the 1970s. 
Nevertheless, it was still generally taken as read that a more highly-educated 
population was desirable and of benefit both to individuals and to society as a whole. 
One strand of Labour’s argument was that the cuts constituted an unacceptable denial 
of opportunity to individuals qualified to enter higher education. This was backed by 
some Tory MPs and the findings of the November 1981 House of Commons 
Education, Science and Arts Select Committee.
8
 Labour’s view that access to higher 
                                               
8 HC Deb, 18 November 1981, vol.13, c.322 and cc.293-294 respectively. 
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education was a right was repeatedly expressed by Labour MPs, based on an 
unspoken assumption that it should continue to be funded by the state.
9
 
 
Neil Kinnock, the then Education Spokesperson for the Labour Party, opened the 18 
November 1981 debate by robustly condemning the cuts, calling for 'the 
abandonment of policies which destroy opportunity and contradict the economic, 
technological, scholastic and social needs of the nation'.
10
 Joseph’s response was 
framed in simple monetarist terms: all he was trying to do was to cut public 
borrowing and spending.
11
 Higher education had been growing at a faster rate than 
the country could afford.
12
 The Government’s argument was that the economic 
position regrettably dictated this strategy for higher education: indeed, effectively 
was the strategy for higher education.
13
 The Robbins principle had to be ‘redefined 
by what is going on now’, as common sense dictated.14   
 
As noted in Chapter 4, the Government believed that a positive by-product of the 
cuts would be ‘increased competition for places - and probably, therefore, higher 
standards'.
15
 Kinnock challenged these conclusions, claiming instead that the 
Government was limiting individuals’ access to higher education and reserving it for 
the élite, but that this was being justified under a pretence of arguments about 
‘degeneration’ and upholding ‘standards’.16 The argument about standards did not 
make sense, he maintained, given that the Chair of the CVCP had informed Joseph 
that ‘the quality of the entry this year is higher than it has ever been and that 
[universities] are having to turn away students who, only a year or so ago, would 
have had no difficulty at all in gaining a university place’.17 Kinnock was effectively 
accusing the Government of distorting the truth for ideological purposes, claiming 
                                               
9 HC Deb, 18 November 1981, vol.13, cc.291-376; 21 December 1981, vol.15, cc.740-769; 26 
October 1984, vol.65, cc.911-978. 
10 HC Deb, 18 November 1981, vol.13, c.291. 
11 Ibid., cc.301-302. 
12 Ibid., cc.307-308. As Joseph later claimed: ‘[W]hile higher education is so largely dependent on 
public funds, there must be some link between the prosperity of the economy and the resources 
available to higher education, and that as our economy is fighting to regain profitable competitiveness 
in an increasingly tough world, that relationship is even more unavoidable.’ - HC Deb, 21 May 1985, 
vol.79, c.862. 
13 As Liberal MP Clement Freud pointed out, the Government had ‘no real education policy, only an 
economic policy’: HC Deb, 26 October 1984, vol.65, c.935.   
14 HC Deb, 18 November 1981, vol.13, c.309. 
15 Ibid. 
16
 Ibid., c.292. 
17 Ibid., c.295. 
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that the actual reason for making the cuts was not to save money or maintain 
standards but to further the Government’s ideological agenda of narrowing access to 
higher education. He claimed that ministers 
not only understand but deliberately contrive those consequences. They have long 
believed that there is too much and too great a variety of higher education for too 
many people […], in their narrow concept of higher education, and for their 
narrow purposes of social engineering. […]   
Ministers loathe the so-called Robbins principle. They now fully intend to 
slaughter that principle. They use the argument of national economic  
imperatives to excuse their political assassinations.
18
 
Oonagh McDonald (Labour) echoed Kinnock’s claim that the situation was being 
misrepresented by the Government’s contention that standards had fallen, and she 
insisted that the real reason for the cuts was élitism: 
[The Secretary of State] has already said that proportionally fewer young people 
will get higher education, but that the quality of graduates will probably rise.  
There is no evidence to support that proposition [...]. There is no justification for 
the claim that the Robbins expansion took place too quickly. I believe that what 
lies behind this idea is the élitist principle that few people are qualified to benefit 
from university education. I believe that we draw from a very small pool in this 
country and that the pool could be much larger. Many people are qualified to 
benefit from university education. […] I can only believe that the Secretary of 
State feels that higher education should be limited to the better off, in view of his 
attitude towards maintenance grants and the cuts proposed in that area.
19
 
Similarly, she and Barry Sheerman (Labour) pointed out the irony of the extensive 
cuts to the OU - the embodiment of the ‘self-help’ ethos Thatcher supposedly 
favoured.
20
 These and countless other comments from Labour and other opposition 
MPs demonstrated not just their strong opposition to the cuts but their realisation that 
the “real” - ideological - reason for them was not just the Government’s wish to save 
money or safeguard standards but their ideological commitment to limiting access to 
higher education.   
 
However, Labour’s objections were weakened by a contradiction in their own 
position. On the one hand, they opposed the cuts to higher education and were 
committed to defend the universities and PSHE alike. On the other hand, they were 
ambivalent about defending a university system that was predominantly élitist and 
protecting its interest to remain so by cutting student numbers. This resulted in 
                                               
18 Ibid., c.296. 
19 Ibid., c.351. 
20
 Ibid., c.349-350; 21 December 1981, vol.15, c.756. The OU’s fees doubled between 1979 and 1984: 
HC Deb, 26 October 1984, vol.65, c.971. 
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Labour “side-swiping” at the universities and the UGC (whose representatives were 
drawn predominantly from the more traditional universities), deflecting Labour from 
concentrating its attack on the Government. For example, Kinnock criticised those 
academics who 
never liked the expansion of higher education in the past 20 years. They always 
complained of entrance standards falling when […] standards were actually rising. 
Those few were always irritated by the characteristics of succeeding generations 
of new undergraduates whom they saw as ill-kempt, unruly, ungrateful and 
ungracious, and occasionally even accused them of being ignoramuses.
21
 
Labour MP Dennis Canavan’s comments in the 21 December 1981 debate reinforced 
this, as he criticised 
the academic ivory tower élitists on the UGC who have been trying to protect 
themselves and to deal out hatchet blows to some of the younger universities and 
some of the universities which are not necessarily hidebound by tradition but are 
trying to bring about many of the innovations which are so necessary in  
curriculum, in research and in other aspects of higher education.
22
   
Sheerman interpreted the UGC’s decision to cut student numbers on a selective 
institutional basis as a policy driven by élitist vested interests, suggesting that 
university staff should work harder (as the polytechnics were doing), in order to 
maintain access: 
Surely we should say to the entrenched vested interests "You should work harder. 
You should have higher student and staff loads. You need bigger classes, bigger 
tutorials, larger numbers of entrants." [...] [W]e must tell [the universities] that 
they need to have more students. We must tell them to work harder, expand, and 
use the talents in their institutions to educate more young people. If that is what 
the Government were doing in higher education, they would have my vote. [...] 
We must be tough with the universities. […] We must tell them to educate more 
young people, more scientists and more technologists, so that our country can 
build on strength.
23
   
Thus - crucially - what had started out as a condemnation of Government policy 
became an attack on the universities and the UGC (and I explore the latter’s role 
further in Chapter 7). Christopher Price (Labour, Chair of the Select Committee) 
reinforced - I assume inadvertently - this “divide and rule” stance by pointing out 
something true: 
The university that succeeds in lifting someone with three E grade A-levels to a 
first-class honours degree gets chopped, but the university that succeeds in lifting 
someone with three grade A grade A-levels to a first-class honours degree gets  
                                               
21 HC Deb, 18 November 1981, vol.13, cc.292-293. 
22
 HC Deb, 21 December 1981, vol.15, c.741. 
23 Ibid., c.758. 
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enhanced funding. There cannot be any sense in that.
24
 
Another Labour MP again rightly pointed out the country’s poor record of 
participation in higher education:   
It is a scandal - perhaps the universities should look to themselves as well - that in 
this country social class 4 makes up 18 per cent of the country’s population but 
4.9 per cent only of university entrants; that the unskilled make up 6 per cent of 
the population but 0.9 per cent only of university entrants. It is a scandal that the  
universities must face.
25
   
The point is that, however justified such criticisms might have been, they weakened 
the Opposition’s initial argument that all higher education cuts were unacceptable. 
Furthermore, the Labour Party’s position was compromised by their attempts, 
however laudable, in government to persuade the universities to reform, and the 
Tories latched on to this.
26
 Waldegrave was to some extent justified in claiming that 
Labour’s had been ‘an agenda for retrenchment that was far more radical than any 
policy that we are now pursuing’.27 The Tories could make it look as if they were the 
ones simply acting on common sense - Britain needed to cut public expenditure, after 
all - whereas the Labour Party in government had been the ones who had tried to 
intervene in university affairs. Labour, which in government had set up PSHE and 
the OU precisely to challenge the élitist university system, was now finding it 
difficult to fight effectively to maintain an élitism they did not support, especially at 
a time when so many other public services for their constituents were being 
drastically cut. This ambivalence inevitably weakened their principled stance. My 
purpose here is not to uncover to what extent they realised this, nor to apportion 
blame, but, rather, to show how the contradictions in their position helped to 
strengthen the New Right’s ideological project. 
 
Another strand of Labour’s argument was to object to the cuts from an instrumental 
point of view. Derived from their longstanding support for further education and 
particularly as the architects of the 1966 binary policy, Labour considered that 
                                               
24 HC Deb, 29 July 1982, vol.28, c.1333. 
25 HC Deb, 26 October 1984, vol.65, c.959. 
26 HC Deb, 18 November 1981, vol.13, c.302. For details of Shirley Williams’ 1969 proposals for 
university reform, see Ch. 3, fn.103. William van Straubenzee (Tory, c.315) found himself in 
agreement with Williams’ proposals, which had included cutting some university courses to two 
years. Dennis Canavan (Labour) criticised Williams (now SDP) as the first Secretary of State to 
preside over a reduction, in real terms, in the budget for education and science, for closing more 
colleges of education than before or since, and for confronting the AUT over a modest pay claim: HC 
Deb, 21 December 1981, vol.15, c.744. Canavan’s comments only served to confirm the divisions in 
the Opposition which the Government could exploit. 
27 HC Deb, 21 December 1981, vol.15, c.767. 
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vocational higher education should be expanded. Mocking Joseph’s conclusion that 
the 1981 cuts obviously made sense, Kinnock queried for whom it made sense: 
Does it make sense in terms of national needs and national interests? No, we 
cannot say that, because it is more obvious to this generation than to any previous 
generation that economic development, technological mastery, social stability and 
democratic values depend not on the brilliance of the few, no matter how  
worthwhile it is to nurture, but on the competence of the many.
28
 
But this phrasing gives a mixed message. Equating ‘the few’ - élitism - with 
‘brilliance’ makes it appear as if ‘the many’ should be educated for vocational 
‘competence’. McDonald realised the danger of her fellow Labour MPs using 
utilitarian arguments to justify the expansion of higher education. Although that was 
important, she said, ‘we should not lose track of the importance of the pursuit of 
knowledge for its own sake, and the importance of developing independent, rational 
criticism of our society and others’.29 Nevertheless, many Labour MPs expressed 
their support of higher education primarily in terms of an investment for 
employment, especially ‘a highly vocational and job-oriented interpretation of it’, as 
one MP put it.
30
 This accorded with the Government’s view that, particularly the 
polytechnics, should fulfil this purpose. 
 
Notwithstanding some of the contradictions in Labour’s thinking, could they 
nevertheless mount a successful challenge by exposing the fact that the Government 
claimed to favour economic development while - contradictorily - cutting the very 
means by which this might be achieved? At the beginning of the 18 November 1981 
debate, Kinnock quoted from the Chair of the CVCP's letter to Joseph: 
[W]e are, in comparison with our industrial competitors a sadly under-educated 
and under-trained society. [...] At the same time both the quality and the volume 
of the universities' contribution to basic and applied research will be seriously 
affected at the very time when this contribution has never been more needed or 
more highly valued by British industries.
31
   
As Kinnock and several opposition MPs pointed out, it did not make sense for Joseph 
to criticise the nation's economic failures and the greater success of the UK’s 
industrial competitors, while at the same time imposing cuts on higher education, in 
which other competitors were increasing their investment as a way of improving 
                                               
28 HC Deb, 18 November 1981, vol.13, c.297. 
29 Ibid., c.351. 
30
 HC Deb, 26 October 1984, vol.65, c.967. 
31 HC Deb, 18 November 1981, vol.13, c.294. 
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industrial competitiveness.
32
 Why were the vocational - the allegedly more “useful” -
subjects being cut? Alan Beith (Liberal), for example, queried why ‘universities that 
have deliberately set out to cultivate a close relationship with industry [are] suffering 
particularly under the present round of cuts. One cannot look at what is happening in 
Aston, Bradford or Salford without asking what conceivable policy objectives are 
being served by that part of the UGC's advice to the universities.’33 Martin Flannery 
(Labour) pinpointed the Government’s contradictory position: 
The Government pretend that they wish to build up industry to a strong 
competitive position. […] Vital scientific and technologically based research is  
being cut on a scale that is bound to affect industry.
34
   
Furthermore, Kinnock pointed out, while the Government might be ignoring 
universities’ objections to cuts, it contradicted the Government’s belief in private 
enterprise that they should ignore the views of business people.
35
 Price summed up 
the utilitarian argument: 
The Opposition and, I believe, a majority of Conservative Members regard public 
expenditure on higher education as an essential investment and a service for the 
whole of British industry. None of the profit-making parts of our industry could 
operate without a flow of graduates from our higher education system. [...] [T]he 
Secretary of State, in pursuing his ideological approach to the subject, also said 
that there is no evidence from any other country that investment in higher  
education has any relationship to economic prosperity. He is just plain wrong.
36
 
It surely did not make sense to cut university provision in the very subjects the 
Government professed to support the most!   
 
The Opposition accurately highlighted the Government’s contradictory position in, 
on the one hand, promoting applied science and technology subjects over others and, 
on the other, permitting these subjects to be cut, particularly in the technological 
universities. However, in their energetic promotion of these subjects, Labour was in 
danger of giving the impression that they did not support the expansion of others. 
This was precisely also the view of those traditional Tories who thought that a liberal 
higher education should be available, if only for the élite. Using utilitarian arguments 
in favour of expanding technological subjects alone was a hostage to fortune: it made 
                                               
32 Ibid., cc.324-325. An international competitor, Finland, was increasing its spending on higher 
education by 23%. UK expenditure on higher education as a proportion of GDP was 1% in 1974/5 and 
had only risen to 1.1% by 1983/4: see HC Deb, 15 July 1985, vol.83, c.34W.   
33 Ibid., c.311. See also Canavan: HC Deb, 21 December 1981, vol.15, c.745. 
34 HC Deb, 18 November 1981, vol.13, c.334. 
35
 Ibid., c.296. 
36 Ibid., c.327. 
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it seem that Labour’s primary allegiance was to technological and vocational higher 
education, the very kind of higher education that neoliberal elements of the 
Government were also proposing for ‘the many’. These confusions and 
contradictions weakened the Opposition’s position and strengthened the development 
of the Government’s instrumental view of higher education.   
 
The parliamentary system itself helped to reinforce the “divide and rule” situation 
caused by the UGC’s selective cuts. In their support of their constituencies, MPs 
tried to reverse specific cuts proposed for their local university or polytechnic. In one 
sense, there was strength in that approach and some robust defences were made; but 
it was largely divisive as MPs rarely spoke against the cuts as a whole. Some Tory 
MPs defended liberal higher education in the university in their constituency, but 
usually only for an élite, while others backed the “relevance” of their local 
technological university.
37
 The way the ideology worked was that Labour MPs 
backing the Government’s shift to more applied science and technology courses 
appeared to be supporting the Government’s policy overall.38 The UGC and MPs 
alike thus opened up dichotomies between liberal and vocational subjects, arts and 
sciences, universities and polytechnics, technological universities and the others, 
pitting institutions and departments against one another on the basis of cost.
39
   
 
Several MPs pointed out that it would actually have made more sense to cut science 
and technology subjects, rather than arts and social sciences, if saving money had 
been the real - or only - intention.
40
 Many highlighted the fact that this was not really 
about saving money or promoting science and technology. The very idea - or at least 
the convenient result - was to cut back the arts and, particularly, social science 
subjects in the newer universities and the polytechnics in an attempt to redirect 
students towards employment-related subjects. With the publication of the 1985 
                                               
37 Ibid., c.333; 29 July 1982, vol.28, cc.1335-1336; 26 October 1984, vol.65, cc.926-933. The Tory 
MP for Cambridge, Robert Rhodes James, professed himself to be against whole-hearted support for 
‘relevance’, stating that ‘the concept that universities and polytechnics are institutions for the 
production of technicians is very repugnant to many people, including me’: Rhodes James, R., 
‘Government and higher education’, Higher Education Quarterly, Volume XI, Number 1, January 
1987, p. 21. 
38 HC Deb, 26 October 1984, vol.65, c.956. 
39 For criticism of the ‘badly thought out and badly handled rationalisation exercises’, see AUT paper 
LA/1586, 8 May 1980: UCU archives. 
40 HC Deb, 18 November 1981, vol.13, c.355; 26 October 1984, vol.65, c.917. 
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Green Paper, the position became obvious, as Giles Radice (Labour Shadow 
Education Spokesperson) realised, at least in part: 
Despite the lip service paid in the Green Paper to the importance of arts subjects 
for their own sake and that of industry and commerce, the shift to science and 
engineering will take place - contrary to the UGC’s advice and what the House of 
Lords Select Committee said - at the expense of the arts. That also is nonsense. 
[…] The Government want to cut resources to higher education not because there 
are rational arguments for doing so but because the Cabinet wants to cut public  
spending.
41
 
It was perfectly true, in one sense, that the Government was cutting public 
expenditure in order to save public money. However, the underlying project - at least 
in the early 1980s - was to limit access to higher education, as many Tories believed 
(genuinely or otherwise) that this would drive up standards. At the same time, the 
New Right Tories could profess the need to promote some subjects over others in 
terms that would compromise Labour MPs who supported the expansion of 
vocational higher education. The Government would in time be in a position to argue 
that the bulk of public higher education should be for narrowly vocational and 
instrumental purposes, that it should foster an approach to competitiveness and 
espouse related neoliberal values. With MPs and institutions squabbling over 
diminishing resources, the Government’s two-pronged mission could start to take 
hold: that higher education should be cut and subject provision engineered in ways 
which favoured a neoliberal agenda, controlled by central government. 
 
(b) Second objection 
Although the Government was prepared to countenance high unemployment - in 
higher education as elsewhere - to achieve their ideological ends, there was a risk.
42
 
The position of Tory MPs would be compromised if the cuts led to fewer student 
places and to increased unemployment in their constituencies: this might make MPs 
so unpopular that they would feel they had to act against the Government or lose 
their parliamentary seats. So the fact that some Tory MPs spoke against the proposals 
- albeit usually only in relation to the university in their own constituency - could not 
be completely ignored by the Government.
43
   
                                               
41 HC Deb, 4 June 1985, vol.80, cc.205-245. 
42 The Government estimated that academic staff redundancies would amount to 5,000 (1 in 6) over 
the following two years: HC Deb, 25 January 1982, vol.16, c.275W. For Labour MPs’ estimates of the 
local impacts of higher education cuts, see HC Deb, 18 November 1981, vol.13, c.335; 21 December 
1981, vol.15, cc.740-769. 
43 HC Deb, 18 November 1981, vol.13, c.343; 21 December 1981, vol.15, cc.746-747. 
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Labour tried to show that the cuts did not make sense because they were not cost-
effective. In the same vein, the Select Committee recommended that the Secretary of 
State 'review current policies to take account of the comparative costs of maintaining 
a student at university and an individual on the unemployment register'.
44
 In other 
words, irrespective of whether or not the cuts were morally justified, surely they 
should make sense as a means of saving money, as that was what the Government 
had said they were designed to do? Joseph was challenged to produce the figures, but 
simply replied: ‘It is not possible to give precise figures. We are in the realm of 
assumptions.’45 Waldegrave later added: 'No reliable estimate of the cost of 
redundancies is available.'
46
 However, McDonald demonstrated that it was in fact 
possible to make such an estimate, reporting that the Manpower Services 
Commission had confirmed that the cost of financing an unemployed person was 
equivalent to the cost of financing a student at university.
47
 Clearly, in financial 
terms, cutting jobs and depriving students of university places did not make sense. 
However this was only so because a person not able to become a student with a state-
funded grant would receive unemployment benefit. Second, it would cost more 
money to cut academic posts than it would save only because tenure and no 
redundancy agreements could not be broken without compensation. Canavan asked 
rhetorically (in relation to one university's cuts): ‘What is the point of trying to save 
£4.16 million by spending £8.47 million?'
48
 The answer was obvious. As in other 
political showdowns, the Government was prepared to spend money to make its 
ideology work (‘the demonstration effect’, as noted in Chapter 3), even if that 
ideology was ostensibly about not wasting money. As Dave Nellist (Labour) later 
summed it up:  
The House knows that the money exists, but it is not used in the directions that it 
should be. […] The Government are prepared to waste £4 billion in an attempt to 
break the National Union of Mineworkers. […] The money is there. Rather than 
spend it on higher and further education, the Government want cuts in public  
expenditure to pay for tax cuts for the rich and super rich.
49
 
                                               
44 HC First Report from the Education, Science and Arts Committee, 2 December 1981, paragraph 1. 
45 HC Deb, 18 November 1981, vol.13, c.302. 
46 HC Deb, 1 December 1981, vol.14, c.109W. 
47 HC Deb, 18 November 1981, vol.13, c.349. 
48 HC Deb, 21 December 1981, vol.15, c.743. 
49
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What actually happened was that, as we noted earlier, academic job cuts were 
achieved voluntarily, so the cuts did not cost as much as opponents had claimed; 
applicants who could not get places at universities got places in PSHE instead, rather 
than being unemployed; and the Government must have realised that it would need in 
due course to cut public funding of student grants and welfare benefits, so that the 
same argument could not be used again.   
 
The Government did in the end have to set aside some money for restructuring. The 
UGC allocated some £20 million within the 1981/82 grant for immediate 
redundancies and the Government agreed a further £50 million for 1982/3.
50
 
However, the CVCP and the UGC estimated that a voluntary redundancy scheme 
would cost much more, in fact between £150-180 million. As one Vice-Chancellor 
summed it up: 'We can neither afford to keep the staff nor to sack them.'
51
 In the end, 
redundancies and restructurings cost around £130 million.
52
 As the Chair of the 
CVCP put it, the 1981 cuts did not make financial sense ‘since the savings on 
recurrent grants have to be set off against the cost of compensating staff for 
dismissal’. If there were no savings to be had, it seemed to him that it would ‘have 
been all for nothing’.53 But this was not true in ideological terms. First, it was worth 
spending a one-off sum on redundancies to make an annual saving of £150 million 
each year from 1984/5 onwards - or so the Government calculated - because the 
system would be smaller to fund. It was ‘not a bad deal’, as Waldegrave put it.54 
Second, and more importantly, the ‘demonstration effect’ of the cuts served as a 
crucial building block: it showed people that the Government meant business. It was 
another step in wearing down higher education institutions and their MPs so that they 
would be more inclined to consider and accommodate compromises and, in time, not 
stand in the way of the Government’s drive for hegemonic domination. As a by-
product of this, rather than overturn the Government’s policy, what the objections 
achieved was to put into focus those two issues that were clearly obstacles to the 
                                                                                                                                     
subsidising private schools, expanding the police force, and buying defence missiles: 18 November 
1981, vol.13, cc.324-334; 21 December 1981, vol.15, cc.759-760. 
50 HL Deb, 18 March 1981, vol..418, cc.761-850, p. 57; HC Deb, 21 December 1981, vol.15, cc.743-
748 and 15 February 1982, vol.18, cc.56-57W.  
51 HC Deb, 21 December 1981, vol.15, c.747. 
52 Kogan, M. with Kogan, D., op. cit., p. 57. 
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 HC Deb, 29 July 1982, vol.28, cc.1323-1324. 
54 HC Deb, 16 February 1982, vol.18, c.139. 
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progress of a neoliberal agenda and would need to be tackled (as I shall explore 
further in due course): student grants and academic staff tenure. 
 
(c) Third objection 
A third argument put forward by opposition parties was that the cuts did not make 
sense because universities were not failing financially and were not overspending. 
Such severe cuts, it was argued, would cause damage beyond repair to universities 
and their local communities.
55
 Furthermore, even if universities were failing, other 
failing industries - notably British Leyland - were being bailed out by the 
Government, as one Labour MP pointed out.
56
 Joseph retorted that ‘BL was in a 
market place, and universities are not - to the same extent’. He continued: ‘The 
universities would be far less vulnerable if they were not so dependent upon the 
taxpayer.’57 How did this follow? How did it make sense for a government espousing 
the rules of market forces to bail out one industry but not another? As universities 
were recipients of public money, from the Government’s “common sense” point of 
view they had to be cut, whether they were failing or not. This was the only solution 
to the problem as set up: higher education was costing too much and should seek 
funding from private sources and, furthermore, this would give it more freedom. It 
looked as if universities as public institutions were being set up to fail, and then 
moved towards privatisation, as Labour pointed out.
58
 But Joseph presented his 
ideology under a cloak of reasonableness and common sense: 
I am not postulating a privatisation of universities. I am postulating that it would 
be more healthy for the universities if they did not depend so much upon  
Governments and taxpayers.
59
 
If universities wanted less interference from the Government, all they had to do was 
to seek a greater proportion of their income from private sources: it was as simple as 
that.   
 
In arguing against Joseph’s view that universities were failing, and/or too dependent 
on public money, Opposition MPs understandably gave examples of grants and 
contracts won by universities from private sources. But this justification of 
                                               
55 HC Deb, 18 November 1981, vol.13, c.294. 
56 HC Deb, 18 November 1981, vol.13, c.303. The same point was made by Lord Segal: HL Deb, 18 
March 1981, vol.418, cc.761-850, p. 39. 
57 HC Deb, 18 November 1981, vol.13, c.303. 
58
 Ibid., cc.300-327. 
59 Ibid., c.303. 
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universities’ worth in financial terms provided yet another ideological opportunity 
for the Government. Initially, the Opposition claimed that the cuts would damage 
wealth-creation and investment in local communities and would undermine 
universities' ability to earn private income to support their development and the 
economy as a whole. However, in trying to prove that it did not make sense to say 
that universities were failing, MPs fell into showing that universities did not depend 
(and - by extension - did not have to depend) solely on public funds. This was 
proving precisely Joseph’s point: universities need not be wholly dependent on the 
taxpayer. He could make it look as if the restructurings that universities were having 
to make were all to the good.
60
 After all, Salford had suffered heavy cuts in 1981 but 
by 1982 was, according to Waldegrave, ‘doing what has been asked of it’ in ‘raising 
money from outside and building new connections with industry’.61 The cuts had 
been good for universities, just as Joseph claimed: 
I venture the opinion that both Aston and Salford are better universities through 
the energy, devotion and skill of their vice-chancellors and staff and all who  
work there as a result of what they have had to do.
62
 
Everything was for the best. For example, by 1984, Peter Brooke (Tory Higher 
Education Minister) was able to ‘welcome the industrial sponsorship of students 
reading appropriate subjects, and also welcome resources from private funding 
which, as it is free money, enables the universities to start new initiatives’.63 Andrew 
Bennett (Labour) pointed out the dangers - in rather naïve terms, given he was 
addressing a hard-headed Government intent on privatisation: 
I warn the Government not to go into private funding with great enthusiasm. 
Private funding rarely comes without strings. Many people in the academic world 
are already worried that if they take money from a particular source their 
academic freedom or the academic freedom of their colleagues who may want to 
criticise will be reduced. If a person is asked to give evidence for Friends of the 
Earth and knows that his evidence conflicts with the interests of a large company  
that is sponsoring his institution, he wonders what he should do.
64
 
But Joseph enthused that ‘the more that we can do to enhance the relationship 
between higher education and business, the better’, adding that it would be ‘wise for 
universities and other higher education institutions to inch […] towards a larger 
                                               
60 HC Deb, 15 February 1982, vol.18, cc.56-57W. 
61 HC Deb, 9 November 1982, vol.31, cc.419-420. See also Ch. 4, fns.117-123. 
62 HC Deb, 26 October 1984, vol.65, c.947. 
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contribution to their funds from the private sector’.65 One Tory MP’s contribution in 
particular demonstrated the neoliberal faith in the market: 
[W]e must look towards the market to shape the future. […] Higher education 
must not only prepare people for the world, but must be integral to it. By setting 
the sector free in the market, with adequate backing, the Government will be 
performing the classic Conservative role of linking the nation past and the nation  
present with the nation of the future.
66
 
Joseph took the opportunity to set out the long-term neoliberal vision and how it 
would be attained: 
No one has the romantic illusion - at least I have not - that there will be a sudden 
transformation from near total dependence upon the taxpayer to near total 
dependence upon the private sector. 
Every step that the higher education institutions can take to increase contributions 
from the private sector will be a step towards the greater reality of academic 
freedom and real independence. If we look not a year or even a decade ahead but 
perhaps several decades ahead, a series of individually undramatic but useful steps 
towards greater contributions from the private sector can over a time transform the 
reality of academic freedom.
67
 
He reiterated the view that ‘an increase in the private funding arrangements 
throughout would, I believe, desirably and healthily detach the higher education 
system a little more from dependence upon Government decisions and finance’ and 
repeated that ‘even small steps can be significant over time’.68 Bennett realised the 
dangers: 
Would not the right hon. Gentleman's plea for private funding for higher 
education be far better if he would give a guarantee to those who get it that it will 
be extra? They fear that it will give the Government the excuse to cut further their  
resources.
69
 
But it was too late. Universities were proving that they could survive cuts. By 1985, 
Brooke was able to report that since 1979 contributions to universities from private 
sources had risen by 18% in real terms.
70
 The Government was beginning to be 
proved right. Its policies were self-fulfilling. Universities could, after all, 
increasingly be enjoined to raise more funds from private sources. Cuts would, on the 
one hand, force higher education institutions to seek private resources to make up the 
shortfall and, on the other, would make them more subservient to central 
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Government directives. Who could say but that in the fullness of time universities 
might even freely choose to go completely private? 
 
(iii)   Coming to the ideological rescue 
The Government’s public expenditure plans, involving inter alia the cuts to higher 
education, were approved by Parliament. In one sense, the Government’s ability to 
prevail in the House of Commons was not surprising, given Thatcher’s successive 
electoral majorities. However what happened at a deeper level was that the 
contradictions and confusions in the Opposition and its relationship to a divided 
higher education system inadvertently assisted the Government’s ideological drive. 
The Opposition could not win the arguments: not for want of forceful speeches, but 
because the contradictions in their own and the Government’s positions worked 
together to favour changes that supported a neoliberal agenda.
71
 An “ideological 
drift” took place among both the Opposition and recalcitrant Tory MPs. Various 
factors “came to the ideological rescue” of the Government, enabling it to present 
solutions and make adjustments, without damaging the ideological mission overall.  
MPs (and those whose interests they were representing) were assuaged by this or that 
compromise, a process bringing them closer to the Government’s ideological 
position by the end of the debating process than at the start.   
 
I shall follow this process in the House of Commons in more detail by drawing on 
three examples I have touched on earlier, before turning in Chapter 6 to those that 
particularly dominated the higher education debates in the House of Lords. 
 
(a) Using the polytechnics 
As we saw earlier, the development of the polytechnics - and, in turn, the higher 
education colleges which offered some degrees and aspired to polytechnic status - 
was inextricably and ideologically linked to the assault on university education. 
Having cut university funding, what helped the Government to limit the damage, 
obscure the impact of the university cuts from the general public and hamper 
Opposition arguments, was the opportunity afforded by the binary system to play off 
the two sectors of higher education against one another.   
                                               
71
 For examples of forceful speeches, see HC Deb, 18 November 1981, vol.13, cc.291-376; 21 
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It was expedient for the Tories to keep the two sectors separate at that time so that - 
first of all - the polytechnics could absorb the places lost in university cuts in a 
competitive, rather than collaborative, relationship with the universities. It was more 
difficult for those opposing university cuts to maintain that it did not make sense to 
cut university places, and would damage higher education and young people’s 
chances irreparably, when prospective students found that they could take up degree 
places in PSHE instead.
72
 The polytechnics could come to the rescue with a 
pragmatic solution, their rapid 30% growth being made to look as if it had arisen 
“naturally” in response to the market. Waldegrave could demonstrate the 
maintenance of the Robbins principle: 
There has been a limitation on university places undertaken by the UGC to 
preserve the research output of universities. Despite the pressure on the recurrent 
grants of the local authority institutions, those institutions have managed to take in 
large numbers of students, which perhaps shows that there must have been some  
slack in the system before. The Robbins principle has therefore been maintained.
73
 
Joseph, meanwhile, could claim that standards would be improved:  
Some of the people disappointed in achieving university places will then compete 
for polytechnic places and possibly displace other people with fewer 
qualifications who would, under past assumptions, have found a place in  
polytechnics. […] It obviously makes sense.74  
In reality, fewer people would have access to a higher education, as those at the 
bottom of the hierarchy would lose out. It constituted ‘a knock-on effect’ all the way 
to the dole queue, as one Labour MP put it.
75
   
 
Second, not only could the polytechnics take more students but they were proving 
that they could do it more cheaply than the universities, as one Labour MP helpfully 
pointed out, not even counting the universities’ research costs.76 Polytechnic 
managements were prepared to let their institutions run on a lower unit of resource 
per student for teaching. As Joseph insisted, the cuts needed to apply to both sectors: 
It would be wrong if the universities alone in higher education were being 
squeezed. There is also the non-university sector of higher education. Reduction 
in funding will not be limited to universities alone. Our aim is to encourage a 
more coherent - it will never be completely coherent - disposition of functions  
                                               
72 For the increased intakes to PSHE, see Ch. 4, fn.50. 
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between the local authority sector of higher education and the universities.
77
   
If the unit of resource could be driven down all round, it would be easier to bring the 
two sectors of higher education into the ‘coherent disposition of functions’ - under 
central government funding and control - the Government required. On the other 
hand, for the Opposition parties and those lobbying them, coherence meant bringing 
the two sectors closer together for funding and planning purposes.
78
 For example, 
Beith argued: 
We continually discuss what is happening in universities in total isolation from 
what is happening in the polytechnics and colleges, many of which provide 
courses in the same subjects, to the same standards, and covering the same range, 
and sometimes compete or offer parallel opportunities for the same kind of 
students. There are differences, but one cannot draw any clear distinctions. If the 
Secretary of State wants to draw clear distinctions between the two sectors, he is  
on the wrong track.
79
 
The danger in arguing this was that the polytechnics could provide a blueprint for a 
cheaper and more compliant higher education state apparatus. The Government 
wanted, if anything, to reinforce the two-tier higher education system which the 
Labour Party’s binary policy had instituted.80 If Joseph was going to pursue his idea 
of ‘some converted universities’ where advanced vocational training would take 
place (a return to the CATs?), the polytechnics offered a testing ground.
81
 After all, 
as Labour had also claimed back in 1966, the universities were not always 
responsive, did not always produce the right goods: 
Even before the recession there were many criticisms from business that the 
universities were not producing the trained people that they wanted. The demand 
from business […] was rather in terms of business and industry wanting  
better, rather than more, training in universities.
82
   
By 1985, Joseph was happy to sanction ‘the predominance of, and leadership in, 
academic work by the universities’, alongside the separate ‘indispensible function of 
the polytechnics in fulfilling their role, in which, far more than the universities, they 
serve part-time students’.83 In their support for polytechnics, the Opposition - 
                                               
77 HC Deb, 18 November 1981, vol.13, c.307. 
78 Ibid., c.330. 
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inadvertently - contributed to rationalising a lower-level role for PSHE by running 
various factors together. For example, Radice referred to PSHE’s  
more relevant and practical courses, to the creation and protection of sub-degree 
courses, to the encouragement of mature and part-time students and to the  
general widening of access and educational opportunity.
84
 
However, Radice pointed out,‘[a]lthough, to their great credit, the polytechnics 
accepted many of the students turned away by the universities [...] they did not 
receive matching resources’.85 Arguing for resources after the event was unlikely to 
be successful. Joseph retorted: 
Because the staff-student ratio in the local authority higher education sector was  
so relatively luxurious - about 8:1 - there has been scope, with smaller numbers of 
lecturers and slightly less money, to take in very large numbers of extra students  
while maintaining standards. All credit to those concerned.
86
 
It was also to the polytechnics’ credit, as a Labour MP pointed out, that the 
differential cost for teaching between the two sectors was at least £800 per student, 
that is, the universities received about 25% more funding for teaching.
87
 This meant 
that there were difficulties in particular in teaching science and technologies to the 
same standard in the polytechnics.
88
 Understandably, the NAB was calling for a 
common unit of resource with universities for teaching purposes.
89
 Although 
apparently a perfectly reasonable proposition, such a strategy simply indicated to the 
Government that it would be possible to undercut higher education teaching funding 
all round, rather than bring the polytechnics up to university levels of funding. 
Seemingly unaware of the trap, Radice urged that ‘[t]he more we blur the binary line 
the better it will be for the country’.90 The “flexibility” of the polytechnics could be 
used (by one Tory MP) to redescribe the higher education of the future: 
At present there is a growing programme of short courses involving some 100,000 
students, which result from close collaboration between polytechnics, industry 
and the professions. […]  [T]he young people who are leaving the training 
schemes and many adults who are desperate to get off the dole queues, will look 
to these short courses for help and an opportunity for retraining for a job. There is 
no doubt that a strengthened and well-supported polytechnic sector will benefit 
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industry and do much to lessen the fear of the unemployed that there is nowhere 
for them to go for higher education.
91
 
Higher education could 'help the country meet the challenge of providing more 
useful, cost-conscious and beneficial higher education for many more people'.
92
 
Polytechnics had marketed themselves as the cheaper option, effectively cutting and 
undermining - however unintentionally - the price of higher education across both 
sectors. Angela Rumbold (Tory) was able by 1984 to praise the rise in the student: 
staff ratio (SSR) in PSHE, rejoicing that ‘[o]verall expenditure and funding generally 
has already been brought to a much more satisfactory level’. It could be an exemplar: 
‘My message to the Government for the next very difficult decade, in planning for 
higher education, is to look at the experience that we have already had in the public 
sector.’93 The Opposition could complain that the polytechnics needed more 
resources, or that university staff should work harder, but the polytechnics had 
effectively shown that they could teach more undergraduates from a wider social 
group more cheaply than the universities, apparently without damaging standards. 
And overall, student numbers had increased so, taken as a whole, the Government 
could show that higher education was expanding.
94
 As time went on, the Government 
came increasingly to see that an expanded PSHE could “deliver” higher education on 
neoliberal terms; therefore, once resources eased in the mid-1980s, higher education 
could be expanded to meet that changed ideological purpose. 
 
By 1984 MPs’ comments had begun to reflect the changing language in terms of 
which the debate was conducted. The “training of manpower” was now a much more 
important part of higher education’s role. Bennett asked Brooke 'what steps the 
Government are taking to ensure that resources for higher education in the 
polytechnics and the rest of the public sector are sufficient to meet the demands for 
trained manpower in the event of a recovery in the economy'.
95
 Brooke’s reply 
reflects the growing strength of the changing ideological purpose for higher 
education (my emphasis):  
The National Advisory Body's plans for local authority higher education in 1984-
85 [...] provide for a substantial increase in admissions in subjects of relevance to 
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the economy, including a 15 per cent increase in first year engineering students. 
The Government are considering with the NAB and others what further measures  
may be needed to consolidate this shift of provision in later years.
96
 
What neoliberals needed was the “flexibility” that would permit higher education to 
be changed in response to “customers’ needs”, or whatever the Government chose to 
decide those needs should be, as Joseph demonstrated: 
The principles that should inform our policies are clear and constant, but, unlike 
the brave days of the 1960s, I have no illusions that those policies will allow us to 
lay down a blueprint for the next 20 years. What we have to try to do instead is to 
ensure that not only Government but all who are involved in decision making at 
all levels are able to respond flexibly to changing circumstances. This means more 
and better information about student aspirations and employers' needs, and, 
although much of the responsibility lies with institutions, the Government and 
their advisory bodies must also be able to keep track of developments if necessary  
change is to be sensibly facilitated.
97
 
By the 1985 Green Paper and the 1987 White Paper, it can be clearly seen that the 
Government could be more confident that both sectors could help to contribute to the 
achievement of the Government’s ideological hegemony, crowned by the 1988 
Education Reform Act. Championed by MPs, the polytechnics’ very success was 
helping to craft the Government’s ideological mission for higher education as a 
whole. 
 
(b) The call for “extra time” 
Another solution that helped the progress of the Government’s project was MPs’ call 
in the 1981 debates for “extra time” for universities to make the cuts, as lobbied by 
the UGC and the CVCP, and in accordance with the advice of the Public Accounts 
Committee.
98
   
 
Seeing that they could not persuade the Government to reverse the cuts, MPs on all 
sides started to be deflected from arguments solely against the cuts and towards 
seeking a compromise: an extension of the cuts’ timescale from three years to five or 
six instead. Whilst agreeing that there should be cuts because expansion in the 1960s 
had been “excessive”, numerous Tory MPs argued against the speed at which they 
were being made.
99
 A longer timescale would allow for “natural wastage” to occur 
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instead. One Tory MP said that his local university’s staff were 'deeply concerned 
about the whole process, but what disturbed them most was the timing of it. They felt 
that if the timing could be made more flexible, they might be able to cope.'
100
 
Another Tory MP (also a member of his local university’s governors) claimed that 
'[i]f the reduction in grant were phased over a longer period, and if it did not coincide 
with the reduction in the number of overseas students, it would be manageable in our 
case.'
101
 Brian Mawhinney (Tory), a member of a London medical school, pinpointed 
the difficulty of Tory MPs: 
I am in some difficulty. I support the Government's general policy. [...] However, 
I do not understand how I can be expected to support the Government in their 
policy and at the same time tell my students that their education will not be 
disadvantaged because almost half the teachers will have been moved out.
102
 
One Tory MP seemed to assume that the Government’s primary reason for the cuts 
was to save money but that logic would prevail, once he had pointed out the 
contradictions: 
They want to save money, but, as a result of the timing, they will actually spend 
more money. Because of security of tenure […] - although it is arguable that there 
should be different arrangements for new appointments in future - the likely effect 
of quick redundancy, rather than natural wastage, will be a dis-saving because 
expenditure will exceed the saving.
103
 
The savings could be made ‘only by changing the balance in the short term away 
from the expensive scientific disciplines, which have a higher loading of non-tenure 
employees per undergraduate place, in favour of the arts’.104 As if coming to 
Waldegrave’s rescue, the MP asked him ‘not to say that he has not seen the evidence 
that he has seen, but to draw the logical inferences from that evidence - that the time 
span must be stretched to four years at least’.105 Beith aided the Government by 
proposing how it might avoid opposition by listening to 
the important arguments - which are clearly felt strongly on the Conservative 
Benches - about how the proposed cuts could be phased so that they brought about 
less damage and might even prove more effective in attaining the financial  
objectives that the right hon. Gentleman has set.
106
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Another MP presented the difference in savings over six - as opposed to three - 
years, and pointed out that it would even be more productive financially to make the 
cuts over six years.
107
    
 
But the Government would not accede. In response to all these pleadings, and to 
ward off a backbench revolt, the Government’s only concession was that they would 
put in some £50 million for the following year 1982/3 ‘to restructure the university 
system and to help with the amelioration of the rundown'.
108
 The UGC was permitted 
to use some discretion in timescale but only in respect of specific universities. As one 
Labour MP pointed out, the real reason for the cuts had become clear: 
It is an historic occasion. The hon.Gentleman [Waldegrave] consistently refers to 
the running down of universities. This is the first time that I have heard in the 
House a Minister honest enough to say what the Government are doing.
109
   
 
In one sense, nonetheless, the pleadings for an extension were effective. Some funds 
were produced to pay for the ‘running down’ of universities and MPs saved face with 
their constituents but did not have to disobey the Government. However, in the 
process, opposition was watered down and sidelined into an argument about 
timescale, rather than about cuts per se. Rallying around the call for “extra time” for 
the cuts gave MPs on all sides an honourable way out but it demonstrated the way 
they were prepared to shift ideologically from the initially uncompromising 
Opposition motion against the cuts. At the beginning of the 18 November 1981 
debate, Kinnock explicitly condemned the cuts and called for provision to be 
reinstated. The subsequent repeated interventions of (particularly Tory) MPs, calling 
for a longer timescale, at least for the particular universities in their constituencies, 
had the effect of enabling Joseph to allow MPs to feel they had had their say, whilst 
also enabling him to ascertain their views. In light of this, he could rehearse a more 
subtle - veiled - approach to making the cuts acceptable by making MPs think that 
what they were really arguing about was simply timescale and whether a specific cut 
was in the interests of their particular constituency or not.  He summed up opposition 
arguments and cast himself as a reasonable man, reframing the issue in terms of 
timescale rather than the fundamental matter of the cuts per se: 
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The argument is whether, after a period of sustained expansion, [the universities] 
should have an adjustment that is less sharp and less abrupt than is being asked 
for. For many Conservative Members and, I suspect, many Opposition Members, 
that is the heart of the matter. […]  [However,] we are ready to argue about the  
scale and speed.
110
 
Kinnock's response effectively caves in, seeming to indicate an acceptance of this 
last phrase with the words 'That is good news', even though it turned out not to be, as 
Joseph did not in fact extend the timescale overall. The problem was simply handed 
over to the UGC to discuss with individual universities, some of which did get a 
longer timescale to make the cuts.
111
 Ideological opposition to the principles 
concerned had been dissipated. Furthermore, the 1981 debates about the cuts not 
making financial sense had the beneficial effect of enabling the Government to see 
that one of the next issues to be tackled would have to be academic autonomy and 
the status of hitherto untouchable professional academics, symbolised by the power 
of tenure. 
 
(c) Tenure  
The main reason why academic staff redundancies would cost more money than 
other job cuts was because, contractually, tenured staff had to be compensated. The 
potential costs of making them redundant gave credence to the claim that the cuts did 
not make financial sense. For academics and liberal educationalists, including many 
Conservatives, tenure was a powerful expression of university autonomy and 
academic freedom from state interference: its abolition was rightly seen as 
tantamount to political control. If the Government wanted greater control over 
universities, they would indeed need to challenge tenure as it prevented the 
Government’s (or the funding councils’, the CVCP’s or Vice-Chancellors’ and their 
governing bodies’, acting as the Government’s agents) ability to make cuts quickly 
as and when opportunities arose. Beith seemed to think this was inevitable: 
Clearly, universities will also be forced into somehow bypassing or sidestepping 
the tenure system in the future if they are to expect to be forced to make 
redundancies in the years to come. I foresee many more short-term  
appointments […].112 
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A Government argument in favour of abolishing tenure was that it was an example of 
the universities’ dependence on the state, and that university managers were 
therefore not free to do as they wished - as they would if running private universities. 
The Government thus claimed that tenure demonstrated a lack of academic freedom 
rather than, as those defending it thought, the most powerful expression of it.   
 
Having seen how tenure hampered the flexibility to cut academic jobs quickly in the 
early 1980s, Joseph was in a better position to move to abolish it. At his request, the 
CVCP wrote to universities inviting them to consider how new academic contracts 
could allow for 'dismissal for reasons of redundancy or financial exigency'.
113
 As the 
CVCP received few responses from universities to this proposal, Joseph stated 
that tenure in the strongest form in which it is enjoyed by some universities cannot 
be justified by reference either to the need to protect academic freedom or to the 
case for reasonable security and continuity of employment for academics, both of 
which I accept. Neither requires that academics should be guaranteed continued 
employment until retiring age no matter how the circumstances of their university 
change. 
I therefore propose that tenure should in future be limited. The Government is  
prepared to introduce legislation if this cannot be achieved voluntarily.
114
  
If universities would not ‘act themselves to comply with the Government's wishes’, 
he would in any case introduce legislation.
115
 There seemed to be no alternative. 
Brooke took up the argument: 
Academic tenure in the strictest form in which it is found in some universities is 
incompatible with their dependence on the taxpayer for the bulk of their funding. 
[...] [P]roposals for the limitation of such tenure [...] are designed to give 
universities long-term greater flexibility of response to any future variations in  
their financial circumstances.
116
 
The Chair of the CVCP appeared to be unable to do anything other than cave in, as 
he wrote to Joseph: 
It is evident in the light of the most recent enquiry we made of all Vice-
Chancellors and Principals that the majority do not believe their institutions could 
bring about the changes you envisage by their own volition within the timescale 
you have in mind. […] 
In the circumstances it now remains for you to decide what you want to do. We  
shall expect to be consulted further when you have reviewed the matter.
117
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The CVCP had effectively washed their hands of their responsibility to protect and 
promote academics’ interests in this respect. Despite vigorous defence by opposition 
parties in the House of Commons, the battle to retain tenure was lost.
118
 Now that the 
Vice-Chancellors had caved in, the way was clear for the Government to take control 
and abolish tenure, as enshrined in the 1988 Education Reform Act, and to which I 
return in Chapter 6.
119
 
 
(iv)   Student grants and loans: a thorn in the side or the next step forward? 
The Opposition used the same argument about cuts to student grants as they had in 
opposing other cuts: that this would limit the access of poorer applicants and make 
higher education more élitist. However, what almost derailed the Government was 
the considerable opposition from MPs - and particularly Tory MPs - to these cuts, 
because many of them and their middle-class constituents took student grants for 
granted, effectively supplying a subsidy for their children’s higher education.120 
 
Some Tories had long thought that the means test should be abolished and parental 
contributions reduced, despite the Government’s view that it was up to parents to 
make the contribution they should.
121
 Joseph acknowledged that students were 
suffering financial hardship and suggested that they should try ‘part-time earnings 
[...] or loans or stinting or a combination of these three’.122 This was hardly 
practicable at a time of high unemployment, as various MPs pointed out.
123
 Joseph’s 
attempt not to increase maintenance grants but to increase parental contributions 
instead resulted (as we saw earlier) not just in Opposition objections but also in Tory 
backbench rebellion. Tory MP Tony Marlow in fact used an earlier Opposition 
argument in pointing out that the Chancellor seemed able to afford to reduce taxes in 
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the next budget so there was clearly enough money to decrease parental contributions 
to students’ maintenance.124   
 
As with institutional cuts, most MPs argued on behalf of students in their own 
constituencies. David Steel (Liberal, and Rector of Edinburgh University) broadened 
the argument by observing that students were one of the ‘groups of people in our 
society who are less well off than others [and] are being squeezed under the alleged 
non-incomes policy of the Government’.125 As seen in Chapter 4, Joseph moved in 
1984 to halve the minimum maintenance award - which he then abolished in 1985 - 
and he also attempted to require richer parents to pay tuition fees. On the face of it, it 
seemed reasonable to require rich parents to pay fees.
126
 But Tory backbenchers 
vehemently opposed this, Marlow for instance: 
At the age of 18, a person becomes adult with the right to vote. How on earth can 
the government sustain the argument that any parent anywhere should make a 
contribution in this sense? The European convention on human rights states that 
there shall be no fear or favour about education and that everybody should be 
entitled to it. It also states that there shall be no discrimination and no advantage 
to anyone because of birth. How does the Government proposal stand up before 
the European convention on human rights?
127
 
When Joseph had to withdraw his proposal that richer parents should pay student 
tuition fees, Mark Carlisle (Tory) welcomed the move, describing free tuition as ‘the 
principle of free higher education in this country'.
128
   
 
The move to abolish differential travel allowances for students also met with 
considerable opposition from MPs on all sides. Joseph maintained that moving to a 
flat rate would save money but, when questioned by MPs, Brooke was unable to 
estimate how much the changes would save or whether some students would be 
worse off under the new system.
129
 In the long debates on this issue in 1984, several 
Tories spoke against the proposed flat-rate travel grant, especially those in whose 
constituencies “out of town” universities were based. Beith asked: 
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What is the justification for giving public money to help with travel costs to the 
very students who do not suffer those costs rather than to the students who do? 
[…] The Government have admitted that they did no research on the 
consequences of the change in the travel grant system. [...] The change is utterly 
contrary to reason. […] [T]he Government have turned the system of travel grants 
into not only a mess but a source of real hardship and discouragement to many 
students. The grant system itself has lost any rationality and is not properly related 
to student costs. The Government have made the student more than ever 
dependent on his parents, and they distort the choices which people should be 
making about what sort of education is good for them by the application of such  
financial pressures.
130
  
Without supporting evidence, Brooke continued to insist - generalising, in 
ideological fashion, from the particular - that the existing system was 
'administratively cumbersome and inefficient and therefore inherently expensive' and 
that - even more importantly - it gave no incentive to students to seek the cheapest 
form of travel.
131
 There was fierce opposition from some Tory MPs. For example, 
Fred Silvester (Tory) said that he found it ‘marginally unconvincing that the 
Government's economic policy depends upon depriving students in my constituency 
of £100 a year’. He did not believe the Government’s assertions: 
We have had no figures for the administrative savings that would accrue. [...] The 
Government should face the fact that we have put forward a proposal that is 
giving money to people who have no justification for receiving it, and taking 
money from people who have a justification for receiving it. I am sorry to put it so 
simplistically, but that is what it boils down to. Why on earth should we make 
such a proposal when there seems to be no gain in either equity or public 
expenditure?
132
 
Clearly it was not a matter of saving money and some Tory MPs had realised that 
much. Opposition MPs recognised that the erosion of student grants would aid the 
Government’s plan to cut them altogether, by making it seem as if student loans were 
the only alternative.
133
 The scheme eventually introduced in 1990 was both costly 
and administratively cumbersome. Labour MP Jack Straw produced figures to show 
that ‘uprating’ the grant in line with inflation would be cheaper.134 But objections 
along these lines made no impression. This agenda was about cutting benefit 
payments of all kinds to students, so that a loan scheme - better suited to free market 
                                               
130 HC Deb, 30 October 1984, vol.65, cc.1251-1255. 
131 Ibid., c.1258. 
132 Ibid., c.1268. 
133
 HC Deb, 5 December 1984, vol.69, cc.370-371; 23 November 1982, vol.32, c.813. 
134 HC Deb, 9 July 1990, vol.176, cc.123-148. 
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values and interests - could be brought in, becoming acceptable in time to MPs on all 
sides.
135
 
 
Given that many Tory backbenchers had spoken against loans, why did they in the 
end cave in?
 136
 With the Government remaining firm, MPs started to shift - as they 
had with university cuts in general - towards entertaining the possibility of a loan 
scheme. Some Tories were so strongly against parental contributions and the threat 
of parents paying tuition fees that loans seemed to them to be a freedom from that 
dependency.
137
 Tory backbenchers were appeased and the Opposition could not 
produce a robust alternative. The Student Loans Act received royal assent in April 
1990 and came into operation that autumn.  
 
(v) Ideological step change achieved? 
We have seen how the process of debate in the House of Commons helped to 
strengthen and construct the “ideological step changes” the Government needed to 
achieve. As higher education institutions started to be undermined by cuts and the 
challenge to the assumption that they and students would be automatically funded by 
the state, MPs (with some exceptions) started to compromise. As distortions and 
confusions helped to make the Government’s ideology appear to be the only 
alternative, deeper ideological messages started to become embedded: that higher 
education should be compliant to Government directives; should compete between 
and within institutions to get students and save jobs; should be persuaded to reflect a 
more vocational and entrepreneurial focus; should accept the demise of age-old 
practices (such as tenure); should require students to borrow the money for their 
higher education rather than expect the state to provide; and that higher education 
institutions should seek private funding to shore up diminished public resources. In 
short, higher education was being drawn into becoming an ideological arm of a 
neoliberal state which in turn it was helping to construct. More subtly than can be 
discerned by simply looking at which Acts of Parliament were passed, from reading 
                                               
135 See Ch. 4, fn.31. At the height of the New Labour Government in 2004, the educationalist Ted 
Wragg commented: ‘Instead of expressing complete and utter horror at the very thought of charging 
young people thousands of pounds for what should be their birthright, MPs have become caught up in 
the very same market practices that some claim to abhor.’ - Wragg, T., ‘Opinion: We are now all so 
brainwashed we are no longer shocked when education is sold off like a commodity, says Ted 
Wragg’, The Times Higher Education Supplement, 6 January 2004, p. 5. 
136
 HC Deb, 23 November 1982, vol.32, cc.814-815. 
137 Ibid., c.817. 
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Hansard one discerns a more veiled, incremental process of the construction of 
control, an ideological drift arising from MPs’ caving in to the greater political 
power of the Government, and the weaknesses and contradictions of their own 
position, first by beginning to compromise and then positively to buy in to at least 
part of the Thatcherite agenda. Thus an originally negative attack on the universities 
- the cuts - together with what might be seen for the polytechnics as a positive 
development - that is expansion, albeit on tight resources - developed into a positive 
ideological drive to undermine the whole of higher education. The Government had 
successfully used both the contradictions of their own policies and those of the 
Opposition to mask the reality of the set of ideas they were proposing and thus to 
further their fundamental cause. The Tories could capitalise on the weaknesses 
exposed to promote their underlying ideology, that is an ever more radical agenda 
towards their goal of a smaller, élite system for the few, and a more technical higher 
education for the many, to be pursued through more centralised planning of higher 
education answerable to Government demands. As Radice concluded in 1987, higher 
education had been brought ‘under government diktat’.138   
 
In Chapter 7, I consider in more detail how this process was furthered outside 
Parliament both by those in support and - in part, and unwittingly - by those 
previously against. Meanwhile, I turn next to consider how the ideological process 
was supported or challenged in the House of Lords. 
                                               
138 Quoted in National and Local Government Officers Association (NALGO), ‘Polytechnics and 
major colleges: letter to secretaries of certain local government branches’, 3 April 1987. 
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Chapter 6 Higher education debated: the House of Lords 
 
(i) The struggle for the terms of the debate 
Using the same approach I adopted in reviewing the House of Commons’ debates, I 
focus here on the extent to which the debates in the House of Lords can be 
understood as contributing to the construction of consent to the Government’s 
ideology, or whether they posed a challenge. As with the Commons, we shall see 
first how the contradictions in the Lords’ positions on the early cuts were a building 
block in that construction. On the basis of the same dichotomies I identified earlier - 
élitism, excellence and standards versus expansion; liberal versus instrumental and 
vocational; the free market and privatisation versus public funding, planning and 
control - I consider in particular their debates on two aspects of policy that could be 
said to epitomise the free economy:strong state. In the Lords’ two most extensive 
sets of debates, first, on student grants and loans and, second, on the centralising 
tendencies of the Education Reform Bill 1987/88, we shall see the limitations of the 
Lords’ challenge and how that led some - ironically - to fall back on the 
Government’s preferred option: that higher education should move out of state 
funding and control altogether.    
 
The form and content of the Lords debates were prescribed by the House’s remit and 
constitution. Given its functions are, inter alia, to debate policy matters and to 
consider draft legislation referred from the Commons, its discussions range from 
broad principles to extremely detailed drafting matters. The Lords who spoke on 
higher education in the 1980s often had practical experience of the sector, being, or 
having been, senior academics, members of governing bodies or Vice-Chancellors. 
The Lords’ debates highlight - at times more clearly than those in the Commons - 
that those opposing the Government’s radical assault on established norms grasped 
the ideological significance of the Government’s intentions and the specific actions 
being taken to achieve them. Nevertheless, despite the strength of feeling expressed 
in many debates, the constitutional power of the second house in challenging the 
Government’s overriding numerical and ideological supremacy in the House of 
Commons was limited.   
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There are many instances in the early 1980s’ debates of Lords challenging 
Government peers to clarify their confused and confusing stance on higher 
education.
1
 While it would become clear later in the 1980s that the Government was 
seeking to impose ‘a planned economy of learning’, as Earl Russell termed it, the 
situation in the early 1980s was much less coherent.
2
 In the absence of a Government 
lead, some peers initiated debates on key issues. For example, as student choice had 
taken the post-Robbins expansion predominantly into the arts, humanities and social 
sciences, they asked whether there should be more emphasis on encouraging 
applicants to take up science and technology places, in order to fulfil the Robbins 
Report’s expectation.3 Given that many universities - apart from the technological 
ones - had not taken opportunities to reform and broaden their curricula (as the 
Robbins Report had recommended) nor had fundamentally addressed the problem of 
low intakes from poorer socio-economic groups, how could they be encouraged to do 
so? As PSHE had been formed with a view to concentrating on technological and 
vocational subjects but was predominantly expanding in the same subject areas as the 
universities, should PSHE’s remit be reasserted or changed? Should science and 
technology studies be more applied?
4
 As the binary policy had, if anything, 
reinforced the universities’ insistence on their predominance over PSHE in teaching 
and research, and as funding between the two sectors was so inequitable, should this 
hierarchy be confronted by reconfiguring higher education as a unitary system?
5
 
Should there be a plurality of higher education institutions but with only the “top” 
universities undertaking research?
6
 How could the decline that was about to occur in 
the late 1980s in the number of 18-year olds (by as much as 30%) be used as an 
opportunity to extend access to mature and other “non-traditional” applicants, so that 
the output of graduates could be maintained or even increased, economic growth 
                                                             
1 HL Deb, 19 January 1983, vol.437, cc.1416-1490, p. 37; 14 March 1984, vol.449, cc.745-751, p. 1; 
14 March 1984, vol.449, cc.758-851, p. 17. 
2 HL Deb, 28 June 1988, vol.498, cc.1387-1581, p. 34. 
3 In the 19 January 1983 debate (op.cit., cc.1416-1490), Lord Pennock stated that, within the numbers 
of university first degree candidates already accepted for 1984, 25% of applicants would be admitted 
for social sciences (of which just over 1% would take business studies); 22% for languages, literature 
and the arts; and 25% for science and mathematics, of which 13% would take engineering. 
4 HL Deb, 17 February 1982, vol.427, cc.564-626, p. 19; 14 March 1984, vol.449, cc.758-851, p. 24. 
5 Around 1984, the Labour Party - the very party which had set up the binary system - was proposing 
that higher education should be a unitary system, while - ironically - the Tory Government preferred 
the status quo, at least for the time being. For details of the inequitable funding between the sectors, 
see HL Deb, 14 March 1984, vol.449, cc.745-751, pp. 4-5; cc.758-851, pp. 14-15;   
6 HL Deb, 14 March 1984, vol.449, cc.758-851, p. 7 and p. 24. 
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stimulated and the APR brought closer to that of Britain’s competitors?7 To meet 
“non-traditional” students’ needs, how could more part-time and continuing 
education courses be provided?
8
 These are some of the very pertinent issues raised in 
Lords’ speeches; but, in the main, their views fell on stony ground. The debates 
amounted to little more than a series of interesting points which the Government did 
not need to act upon, showing no interest in initiating a co-ordinated review of higher 
education. And the universities had to rein in their resources, so falling back on 
conservatism rather than reform was the general, and predictable, reaction. There 
was in fact more innovation in curriculum design and pedagogy in the polytechnics, 
as they continued to expand and develop new courses validated by the CNAA.   
 
However, even in the midst of the chaotic speed of the cuts in the early 1980s, some 
Lords continued to voice principled opposition to the Government either on liberal or 
utilitarian grounds. For example, Labour peers initiated a debate in 1983, calling 
attention to ‘the erosion of educational opportunities under the present Government, 
and the adverse effect this will have on economic recovery’.9 Some Lords took a 
traditionally liberal stance, stating that higher education should not be cut back, not 
linked to economic “needs” and not subject to the practices of the market.10 In 1984, 
Lord Flowers considered that it was ‘still not too late for the Government to affirm 
their belief in the importance of having highly educated and well prepared citizens 
[reaching their] full potential’, instead of continuing the policies which had ‘reduced 
the chance of university entry over the last few years by about one in seven’.11 Some 
Lords claimed that the eventual drop in the number of 18-year olds was being used 
by the Government as an excuse to cut higher education, to which access should be 
                                                             
7 Ibid., cc.732-741, p. 1; cc.758-851, p. 19; 28 June 1988, vol.498, cc.1387-1581, p. 3; 27 February 
1990, vol.516, cc.600-723, p. 38. Many Lords – including Lords Butterfield and Dainton and 
Baronesses Seear and Blackstone (the latter, Master of Birkbeck College) - urged the Government to 
find ways of extending access to under-represented groups. Part-time higher education students had 
never been satisfactorily funded under the grants scheme, so some liberally-minded Lords saw this 
debate as an opportunity to resolve that. From the Government’s point of view, there was an incentive 
to promote part-time education as long as students did not receive mandatory grants. There was no 
incentive for universities to take on part-time students: see HL Deb, 16 May 1988, vol.497, cc.83-173, 
p. 57; 12 March 1990, vol.516, cc.1310-1323, pp. 20-31. 
8 HL Deb, 17 February 1982, vol.427, cc.564-626, pp. 15-16. 
9 HL Deb, 19 January 1983, vol.437, cc.1416-1490. 
10
 HL Deb, 24 June 1981, vol.421, cc.1068-1146, p. 32; 19 January 1983, vol.437, cc.1416-1490, p. 1. 
11 HL Deb, 14 March 1984, vol.449, cc.758-851, p. 1. 
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extended.
12
 Lord Fulton considered that ‘[a] modern state simply cannot do without 
strong universities’.13 Lord Alport believed that 
[u]nless this country is prepared to invest in higher education to provide the 
resources which the universities require, to allow the able and dedicated men and 
women who preside over them to have freedom of judgement and initiative which 
is an essential part of our whole academic tradition, then the decline of our 
country’s fortunes to which the Prime Minister has so frequently referred will be a 
reality at an accelerated pace. This will certainly be true if the attitude of the 
Government to the universities continues to be characterised by interference,  
discouragement and parsimony.
14
 
Lord Grimond, speaking straight after this, also stressed the liberal purposes of a 
university.
15
 However, the Government did not heed the Lords’ call for a debate on 
principles. It did not matter to Thatcher and her followers: universities simply had to 
be cut. 
 
As the attention of higher education was diverted towards the immediate problems 
caused by the 1981 cuts, the debates in the Lords came to be dictated by the 
Government’s agenda. Baroness David realised this in 1984: although the original 
motive for higher education cuts ‘seems to have been the simple desire to reduce 
public expenditure’, that motive had ‘now assumed the disguise [my emphasis] of a 
restructuring of the whole of HE’.16 Ideology was working here to usher in a more 
fundamental change than simply cutting expenditure. This threw the Lords onto the 
defensive. When the Government’s opportunity to intervene in higher education 
came about through the agency of the UGC and the NAB (as I consider in more 
detail in Chapter 7), the Lords’ discussions shifted to the validity or otherwise of 
specific Government or sector decisions - or the contradictions inherent in them - 
rather than the broad policy options they had been considering earlier. Reactions to 
piecemeal and ad hoc moves arising from the cuts hijacked the Lords’ debates, just 
as had occurred in the Commons. Consideration of the details clouded the main 
issues. Speaking in a debate in 1981, Lord Crowther-Hunt characterised the response 
of the Minister (Baroness Young) as ‘a smokescreen of trivia [masking] the 
consequences of the very serious cuts that the […] system as a whole is going to 
                                                             
12 HL Deb, 24 June 1981, vol.421, cc.1068-1146, p. 11 and p. 17. 
13 HL Deb, 14 March 1984, vol.449, cc.758-851, pp. 11-18. 
14 Ibid. 
15
 Ibid., pp. 11-13. 
16 Ibid., cc.745-751, p. 3. 
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have to make’.17 Some Lords saw through this ideological smokescreen. For 
example, Lord James in 1981 reminded the Government that  
one of their earliest actions was to make massive reductions in income tax that 
mainly benefited people with incomes of £10,000 a year or over. That is one of 
the reasons why they are short of money for public expenditure now. The 
argument behind it was that if you encourage the rich in that way it will give them 
an incentive, they will all work hard and invent and the wheels of industry will  
turn - just as we see them doing all the time! It is not working.
18
   
Similarly, Lord Molloy in 1983 described the “real” issue as being about ‘the erosion 
of opportunities for all our people’, as he went on to describe how the Government’s 
policies amounted to ‘an increase in opportunities for the wealthy’, whereby ‘part of 
the cuts in education will make a contribution to the massive tax reductions for the 
very well-off so that they can send their children to private schools’.19 As some 
Lords realised (as had some MPs), the cuts revealed the ideological path the 
Government was on. 
 
(ii) Cuts and contradictions 
So did the Lords’ comments on the cuts - like those of MPs - demonstrate 
contradictions that helped to build the Government’s ideological agenda? Those who 
supported the Government’s cuts included those Lords with the traditional Tory view 
that higher education had grown too fast since the 1960s.
20
 To keep universities as 
‘centres of excellence’, ‘contraction’ and ‘rationalisation’ of courses was no bad 
thing, according to Lord Belstead.
21
 Some of those Lords who opposed university 
cuts did not necessarily oppose cuts to PSHE, considering that the establishment of 
the polytechnics had been ‘a big mistake’, resulting in ‘over-provision’, as Lord 
Vaizey put it.
22
 Similarly, Lord James thought that arts and social sciences in 
polytechnics should be cut, and Lord Annan described the expansion of higher 
education through the binary policy as a ‘folly’.23 
 
                                                             
17 HL Deb, 24 June 1981, vol.421, cc.1068-1146, p. 50. 
18 HL Deb, 18 March 1981, vol.418, cc.761-850, p. 53. 
19 HL Deb, 19 January 1983, vol.437, cc.1416-1490, p. 31. 
20 HL Deb, 24 June 1981, vol.421, cc.1068-1146, p. 22. 
21 HL Deb, 18 March 1981, vol.418, cc.761-850, p. 6. 
22 Ibid., p. 18. Vaizey was one of 50 academics who signed a declaration in 1969, resulting in the the 
private University of Buckingham, opened in 1976: ibid., p. 38. 
23
 Ibid., p. 21 and p. 41 respectively. Annan was Provost of University College, London, in the late 
1960s and the Vice-Chancellor of the University of London from 1978-1981. 
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Some Lords challenged - as had MPs - the alleged necessity of the cuts by 
identifying the contradictions in the Government’s policy and practice. For example, 
on the one hand it did not make sense that staff posts had been cut when, on the 
other, money was spent on “restructuring” or hiring back previously redundant staff 
as temporary cover or creating ‘new blood’ posts.24 Furthermore, given that the 
Government was maintaining that there was a need for a more highly-skilled 
population, trained in the applied sciences and developing technologies, cutting the 
very technological universities that were training and educating students in these new 
subject areas did not make sense.
25
 Those opposing Government policy pointed out 
the contradictions in making reductions when growth was needed to enable Britain to 
compete in international markets.
26
 Others pointed out that, because of tenure, the 
cuts would not in fact be cost-effective, maintaining that the loss of prestigious 
academic staff would damage standards to such an extent that institutions’ ability to 
contribute to innovation and growth would be curtailed.
27
 Baroness David summed 
up this chaotic situation, although failing to state how such chaos contributed to the 
Government’s ideological plan:   
The Government’s policy appears to lack all consistency. What can be more 
confusing for those in charge, whether in the university or local authority sector, 
than to be forced to go into an elaborate, time-consuming, painful exercise, 
planning curtailment of the opportunities they are offering and later, when the 
powers-that-be realise the extent of the harm they are doing, to be thrown some 
crumbs and told to rearrange and plan again? How can a service survive and 
prosper when improvisation appears to be all that Ministers can offer? It is  
Government by whim.
28
  
Other contributions to the debate demonstrated contradictions in speakers’ own 
positions; or else their comments were effectively “hostages to fortune” that could be 
exploited by Government supporters. For example, Baroness Seear considered that, 
from her thirty years’ experience of working in higher education, there was ‘room for 
both economy and change and that it [was] not altogether a bad thing’, even though 
she did not agree with the way in which the Government was carrying this out.
29
 
Some peers acknowledged the need for reform but considered that this should be 
                                                             
24 HL Deb, 19 January 1983, vol.437, cc.1416-1490, p. 39 and p. 42; 14 March 1984, vol.449, cc.745-
751, p. 3. 
25 HL Deb, 17 March 1982, vol.428, cc.643-645, p. 2; 19 January 1983, vol.437, cc.1416-1490, p. 8. 
26 HL Deb, 24 June 1981, vol.421, cc.1068-1146, pp.15-19, p. 42; 19 January 1983, vol.437, cc.1416-
1490, p. 39. 
27 HL Deb, 24 June 1981, vol.421, cc.1068-1146, p. 21. 
28
 HL Deb, 19 January 1983, vol.437, cc.1416-1490, p. 43. 
29 Ibid., p. 6. 
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achieved in collaboration with the higher education sectors.
30
 As in the Commons, 
such comments could be seized on to strengthen the Government’s ideological 
position, as Young showed in praising Seear’s contribution and rephrasing it to 
justify the Government’s actions in ‘trying to produce a more efficient and cost-
effective system, more attuned to the needs of the country and the economy’.31 
Similarly, in expressing the view that ‘change was perhaps necessary in universities’, 
Baroness David was effectively supporting Government action, however 
unwittingly.
32
 Forceful though many Lords’ principled statements were, any 
contradictory or weak comments fragmented effective opposition and allowed the 
Government to plug any gaps in their ideological progress. 
 
(iii) Contributing to instrumentalism  
Once the Government’s instrumentalism became more explicit, so did the views of 
opposing Lords. As ‘an unrepentant élitist’, Annan maintained that there should be a 
hierarchy of ‘excellence’ with eight universities at the top, using the American model 
as his guide. This would require the rest to do something “useful”. As his fellow 
Lord Perry stated: ‘The rest need something different, something broader, something 
cheaper.’33 The polytechnics, Annan stressed, should offer only vocational courses. 
This reflected the NAB’s promotion of that focus, as PSHE especially needed to 
serve “national needs” for more highly-qualified “manpower”, particularly in the 
developing technologies.
34
 The Government should require higher education 
institutions to spend less public money, according to Annan, who professed himself 
unable to understand why academic staff and students displayed ‘a reluctance to 
respond to the demands of the market place’.35 For both those who favoured the 
Government’s more vocational focus for higher education, or who had an élitist 
view, interventions to cut student places in the arts and social sciences made sense, 
especially in the polytechnics.
36
     
 
 
                                                             
30 HL Deb, 24 June 1981, vol.421, cc.1068-1146, p. 12. 
31 HL Deb, 19 January 1983, vol.437, cc.1416-1490, p. 10. 
32 HL Deb, 19 January 1983, vol.437, cc.1416-1490, p. 39. 
33 HL Deb, 14 March 1984, vol.449, cc.758-851, p. 21. 
34 Ibid., cc.732-741, p. 5. 
35
 Ibid., pp. 1-3. 
36 HL Deb, 24 June 1981, vol.421, cc.1068-1146, p. 14.  
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(iv) Curbing the Government’s ideological progress 
Albeit a rearguard action, the most effective way in which objecting Lords 
challenged the Government’s ideological drive was at the level of detail in the 
consideration of draft legislation. Objectors could slip in more substantial points to 
debates on proposed amendments. I consider the two areas where the challenge was 
greatest, especially in the latter half of the 1980s. These exemplify the Government’s 
ideological drive towards the “marketisation” of higher education - ironically 
through central government control, by their “nationalising” the means by which it 
could be freed from dependence on state funding.  
 
(a) The free economy: from student grants to loans 
Lords representing the Government initially presented the action taken in relation to 
student grants (such as freezing the grant, cutting various benefits, etc., as noted in 
Chapters 4 and 5) as primarily ‘financial decisions’, driven by the need to cut public 
expenditure.
37
 Opposing Lords maintained that what the Government was “really” 
trying to do in the early 1980s was to abolish grants and bring in loans, as a 
deliberate way of narrowing access. For example, Lords Molloy and Glenamara 
challenged the Government to ‘come clean’ and admit that the Government’s 
intended action would return higher education to ‘an élitist privilege’.38   
 
Although it seemed in the early 1980s that it was a failure on Joseph’s part that he 
was unable to persuade the Cabinet to proceed towards enacting a student loans 
scheme, the Government’s delay in tackling the thorny issue of student support 
served as a means of achieving their desired outcome pragmatically, as if by default. 
With inflation putting a strain on the value of grants and the parental subsidy, the 
Government’s ad hoc actions - such as Joseph’s attempt to get richer parents to pay 
tuition fees (rapidly withdrawn as a proposal in 1984) or Government moves from 
1987 onwards to withdraw students’ access to social security and other incidental 
payments - caused some students extreme anxiety.
39
 As many students were turning 
to banks for loans to complete their studies, these “loans by the back door” paved the 
                                                             
37 HL Deb, 27 November 1984, vol.457, cc.757-759, p. 1; 14 October 1985, vol.467, cc.399-409, p. 5. 
38
 HL Deb, 2 February 1983, vol.438, cc.803-805, p. 2. 
39 HL Deb, 14 October 1985, vol.467, cc.399-409, p. 2; 18 June 1986, vol.476, cc.902-908, p. 2. 
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way for the Government’s preferred solution: a privately-run loans scheme.40 The 
Government seemed to espouse expansion and choice but, in fact, did not need to do 
any more than allow middle class student numbers to carry on increasing overall as 
financial anxieties were clearly not deterring enough of these applicants from higher 
education.   
 
Once the Tories realised that their ideological agenda could be served by an 
expanded higher education system for the middle classes, they moved to cut support 
for students and bring in top-up student loans. Despite repeated calls from the Lords 
and other interested parties from early in the first Thatcher administration for an 
inclusive review of student support, when the time came the Government moved at 
speed. Without proper consultation with vice-chancellors or polytechnic directors, it 
introduced a scheme for which the draft legislation was lacking in attention to detail, 
administrative practicalities and costing.
41
 Once the November 1988 Top-up loans 
White Paper was published as a draft Bill in November 1989, it raised more queries 
than it answered. When it was referred to the Lords, they worked hard to resolve its 
shortcomings but the timescale was tight, as the Government was determined that the 
legislation would take effect from September 1990. In the same way as the 
Commons had tried to get “extra time” for the university cuts to be implemented, the 
Lords tried to slow down the start date of the top-up loans legislation, given that so 
many major flaws were apparent in the draft Bill; but to no avail. The Government 
antagonised all the interested parties in higher education, including the CVCP who 
refused unanimously to support the draft scheme voluntarily. However, the 
Government could of course compel higher education institutions to comply with 
legislation. The CVCP, the Committee of Directors of Polytechnics (CDP) and other 
bodies proposed alternatives to the Secretary of State that involved a graduate 
contribution, for instance through national insurance or a graduate tax levied on 
higher earners, but he flatly refused to consider these.
42
   
 
                                                             
40 HL Deb, 14 October 1985, vol.467, cc.399-409, p. 3. See also, 27 November 1984, vol.457, cc.757-
759, pp. 1-2; 5 December 1984, vol.457, cc.1336-1343, p. 1. 
41 HL Deb, 27 November 1984, vol.457, cc.757-759, p. 1; 18 June 1986, vol.476, cc.896-902, pp. 1-4 
and cc.902-908, p. 1; 19 June 1989, vol.509, cc.34-42, p. 5; 21 December 1989, vol.514, cc.345-349; 
27 February 1990, vol.516, cc.600-723, p. 7 and p. 15, pp. 21-23 and p. 55.  
42
 HL Deb, 19 June 1989, vol.509, cc.34-42, p. 4; 27 February 1990, vol.516, cc.600-723, pp. 20-21 
and p. 34; 19 March 1990, vol.517, cc.100-182, p. 49. See Ch. 4, fn.31. 
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This was clearly not about saving money or increasing access, as several Lords 
pointed out. For example, Lord Mackie stated: ‘The Government say that we must 
save money, but the money for the loans will come out of the Exchequer and there is 
no certainty at all that it will be repaid.’43 Lord Boyd-Carpenter asked: ‘[W]hat is all 
this legislation in aid of?’ He continued by pointing out that ‘according to the 
Government’s calculations there will be no relief to public funds until well into the 
next century’.44 Russell asked ‘whether, with the costs of the administration fully 
calculated, this scheme will result in a net decrease in public expenditure’? If not, he 
asked how the Government was justifying its introduction. Was it, he queried, 
‘simply because it is for the good of the students’ souls?’45 The Government claimed 
that the scheme would increase access, arguing that more students would enter higher 
education if they did not have to rely on parental support.
46
 However, when the 
Government was so unwilling to accept a Lords’ amendment to monitor access as a 
statutory requirement, many Lords expressed their disbelief at the Government’s 
claims, accusing it of using the principle of access as a cover for an ideological 
agenda. As Seear put it:  
If the Government had really meant what they said about recognising the need for 
doubling the number of people in higher education, what would they have done?  
They would not have produced this pathetic little Bill. Months ago they would 
have got together representatives of the various groups concerned with higher 
education. Through some kind of commission or enquiry […], they would have 
thrashed out the problems in advance and come up with the kind of proposals  
which could then have been embodied in acceptable legislation.
47
 
As became apparent from the draft Bill, part-time students, mature students over 50 
and other groups would be disadvantaged or excluded from access to loans as a 
statutory entitlement. Lord Kilmarnock voiced the opinion of many Lords in failing 
to see ‘how [the scheme] will contribute to the expansion of higher education’, as the 
Government’s rhetoric elsewhere had implied. He surmised: ‘That is of course not its 
avowed purpose. Nowhere is such an aim mentioned.’48  
 
                                                             
43 HL Deb, 27 February 1990, vol.516, cc.600-723, p. 21. See also HL Deb, 19 June 1989, vol.509, 
cc.34-42, p. 5. 
44 HL Deb, 27 February 1990, vol.516, cc.600-723, p. 33.   
45 HL Deb, 19 June 1989, vol.509, cc.34-42, p. 3. See also Russell and others on 27 February 1990, 
vol.516, cc.600-723, pp. 8-21, p. 41, p. 70. 
46 HL Deb, 19 June 1989, vol.509, cc.34-42, p. 3. 
47
 HL Deb, 27 February 1990, vol.516, cc.600-723, p. 66.   
48 HL Deb, 12 March 1990, vol.516, cc.1327-1372, p. 18. 
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As the scheme was not about saving money or increasing access, it became clearer to 
the Lords that its purpose was primarily to put into practice the Government’s 
fundamental belief that students should support themselves (or be supported by 
parents who could afford to do so) instead of being supported by the state, as had 
been the case since 1962. Once the student loans proposals came out, the 
Government could be more open about the ideological imperative. One Lord in 1990 
quoted a DES spokesperson admitting that ‘[t]he general philosophy is towards self-
help, encouraging young people to work their way through college’.49 For those like 
Baroness Cox, who deemed that a higher education was ‘a great privilege’, it was 
logical that it should not be paid for wholly by the state, as she saw it as a ‘personal 
investment’. Her fellow Tory, Lord Nugent, also considered that  
to encourage students into […] dependence upon the state – that is, the taxpayer – 
is in my view to undermine the sense of independence and responsibility which 
certainly I want them to learn. I want to encourage students to see their higher 
education as an investment in themselves and to see loans as a help from the 
taxpayer which is to be repayed (sic) when they have reached the stage of having  
a secure job.
50
   
 
Some in opposition realised that this was an ideological agenda. As Baroness 
Blackstone pointed out, the reason why the Government was not considering other 
viable alternatives was because they were ‘indulging in a certain amount of 
ideological clap-trap about students being victims of a culture of dependence’.51 A 
student loans scheme would set up the necessary link between a student’s higher 
education and their earning power. Instead of simply choosing to study “for its own 
sake”, students would need to be concerned about the debt that would accrue, and so 
the choice of course would to some extent need to be an instrumental one: it would 
preferably lead to a job with a high salary. Graduates had to realise that they needed 
to contribute to the enterprise culture, to reject a liberal notion of higher education 
whose graduates fulfilled a life of public service on relatively modest salaries. As we 
have seen, Russell recognised the change of focus: ‘It is central to the thinking 
behind the Bill that it should create an incentive to students to earn higher salaries in 
order to pay off their loans.’52 He wondered why the Government was coming 
forward with a scheme at this particular time, given that they clearly realised that the 
                                                             
49 HL Deb, 27 February 1990, vol.516, cc.600-723, p. 19.   
50 Ibid., p. 35.   
51
 Ibid., p. 71.   
52 HL Deb, 19 March 1990, vol.517, cc.100-182, p. 8. 
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revenue would not be immediately forthcoming and that student loans were 
expensive to administer; their motive was surely, then, ‘other than saving public 
expenditure’. ‘The motive’, he said, ‘was expressed by the Parliamentary Under-
Secretary in the words, “To make students feel the cost of their education”.’53 Like 
Russell, Lord Macaulay realised that the administrative shortcomings and high costs 
inherent in the Bill signified that it was ‘a fake’, a cover, because it hid ‘the reality of 
what [was] really going on and the purpose behind this very small Bill’, for which 
the real reason was ‘to increase economic awareness and self-reliance among 
students’. It would, however, he said, pull ‘the economic rug’ from under poorer 
students, acting as a disincentive to wider access.
54
 Lord Walton also described the 
scheme as ‘potentially most advantageous to the wealthier students while acting as a 
potential deterrent to the poorer’.55   
 
True to the ideology of the market, the loan would be a contract between the 
individual student and the provider of the loan. The provider was originally going to 
be one of the banks but none in the end was prepared to take the risk. Although 
technically “free” to take out the loan, students were - contrary to the notion of the 
free market - ‘a captive market’, as Russell pointed out.56 In the end, a quango (the 
Student Loans Company) had to be created to administer the scheme, it becoming 
effectively “nationalised”, even before it had been set up. At the same time as student 
loans represented ‘the thin end of the wedge to privatisation of higher education’- as 
Kilmarnock had commented back in 1984
57
 - it became another area that had to be 
brought under central government control. The free economy had to be made to work 
by a strong state.   
 
During the Lords’ debates on the Bill, a few spoke in favour of the continuation of a 
grants system and against the creation of student indebtedness to the state.
58
 Many 
                                                             
53 HL Deb, 27 February 1990, vol.516, cc.600-723, p. 6.   
54 Ibid., pp. 49-50.   
55 HL Deb, 12 March 1990, vol.516, cc.1327-1372, p. 4. 
56 HL Deb, 19 March 1990, vol.517, cc.312-314, p. 10. 
57 HL Deb, 5 December 1984, vol.457, cc.1336-1343, p. 2. 
58 Those who spoke against the principle of student loans included the Earl of Longford, Lord Mackie 
of Benshie, Lord Taylor of Blackburn, Lord Macaulay of Bragar (HL Deb, 27 February 1990, vol.516, 
cc.600-723, pp. 42-43, p. 21, p. 59 and pp. 50-52 respectively) and Lord Glenamara on many 
occasions (for example, 12 March 1990, vol.516, cc.1327-1372, p. 6). For others who spoke against 
the detail of the scheme, see, for example, HL Deb, 27 February 1990, vol.516, cc.600-723, p. 22, p. 
26 and p. 31, plus many other debates in 1990. 
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Lords, however, supported the view that students should pay towards their higher 
education, a point on which Annan considered ‘there was general agreement’.59 
Many Lords thought that grants could not continue in an expanded higher education 
system, drawing attention to earlier proposals for some form of loan, to be repaid 
later on an income-contingent basis.
60
 Favouring the idea of a graduate tax scheme, 
Kilmarnock stated that ‘[w]e agree that if a dramatic expansion of higher education is 
to take place, there will have to be some contribution from graduates whose earning 
power has benefited from public funds’.61 Alongside many others, Blackstone 
supported the CVCP’s plan for a graduate tax, on the grounds of fairness as this 
‘would allow the highly paid to contribute more than the low paid’. In her view, 
‘some kind of progressive system for recouping the costs of student maintenance 
would be infinitely preferable to the proposals in the Bill’.62 The poor drafting of the 
Bill opened up the opportunity to present alternatives, some Lords putting forward 
substantial amendments amounting to different schemes, as a tactic to try and change 
the Government’s course in favour of a graduate tax scheme, but none of this was to 
any avail.
63
 Others (including some Tory Lords) simply opposed the details of the 
Government’s particular scheme. There was, as Lord Peston put it, ‘an enormous 
gulf between those of us who believe that we have to look at systems of student 
maintenance as a preparation for a very considerable expansion of higher education 
which this country needs and those who support the loan scheme’.64 However, once 
it was clear that even many opposing Lords agreed with the principle of students 
contributing to their higher education, the Government could present disagreements 
as matters of detail rather than principle. The Lords’ opposition to the idea of student 
loans and to the detail of the Government’s Bill was substantial - as the voluminous 
record proves - but the Government was determined to push the legislation through 
and the Commons did not necessarily have to heed the Lords’ proposed changes.65 In 
the end, the Government successfully brought in their top-up student loans scheme 
                                                             
59 HL Deb, 27 February 1990, vol.516, cc.600-723, p. 24.   
60 Robbins, for example, had predicted as early as 1964 that governments would be likely to replace 
grants with loans: see Lal, D., op. cit., p. 17. Robbins proposed this in the House of Lords in 1982: see 
HL Deb, 17 February 1982, vol.427, cc.564-626, p. 12.   
61 HL Deb, 27 February 1990, vol.516, cc.600-723, p. 14.   
62 HL Deb, 19 March 1990, vol.517, cc.100-182, p. 48. 
63 HL Deb, 12 March 1990, vol.516, cc.1327-1372, pp. 1-5. 
64 Ibid., cc.1310-1323, p. 8. 
65 Many Lords’ debates demonstrate the level of opposition. See in particular: HL Deb, 19 March 
1990, vol.517, cc.100-182, pp. 46-47. For a summary of the amendments carried by the Lords and 
accepted by the Commons, see: HL Deb, 29 March 1990, vol.517, cc.980-1033, p. 33. 
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on time, amended only in terms of some practical details.
66
 The Lords had worked 
hard at devising amendments to make a badly-drafted Bill better. In so doing, they 
had effectively contributed to the possibility of its acceptance on pragmatic grounds, 
as many Lords realised.
67
 Some amendments were so rushed that they had to be dealt 
with later by supplementary regulations.
68
 Importantly, the process had helped shift 
opinion, as Lord Jenkins pointed out, even though he did not himself back the 
scheme or the speed of its introduction: ‘The Government should not be too 
discouraged. Opinion has moved a good deal in favour of the suggestion that in order 
to finance university and polytechnic education one needs some contribution from 
students, whether it be through a student loans scheme or a graduate tax scheme. The 
Government should recognise that that is an advance.’69 The Lords - including 
Jenkins - had, however unwillingly, contributed to shifting the ideological ground: 
indeed, no government has considered the possibility of student grants since.
70
   
 
(b) The strong state: the Education Reform Act 1988 
By the mid-1980s the Government was representing the expansion of higher 
education as if it had been a deliberate policy move on their part. Building on earlier 
pragmatic responses to circumstances, they were able to seize on the opportunity to 
lay down their preferred purposes for higher education in the 1985 Green Paper and 
the 1987 White Paper, and to consolidate structural and governance arrangements in 
the 1987 draft Education Reform Bill. The latter was, as John Tomlinson (Professor 
of Education, University of Warwick) pointed out at the time, ‘designed [my 
emphasis] to be a radical break with the past’. Although his prescient comments 
(which follow) are particularly valid in relation to schools, we can see how the same 
principles apply to what the Government was trying to achieve in respect of higher 
education. Tomlinson continues: 
Once [the Education Reform Act] is in place, the principles underlying the 
provision of public education in England and Wales will be fundamentally 
different from those of the 1944 settlement and earlier.   
The objectives are to create a ‘social market’ in education, establish a national 
curriculum and testing system, make education more responsive to economic 
forces and attract more non-public funding. It is asserted that if achieved these 
                                                             
66 For examples of opposition on the detail, see HL Deb, 19 June 1989, vol.509, cc.34-42, pp. 1-6. 
67 HL Deb, 12 March 1990, vol.516, cc.1327-1372, p. 19; 19 March 1990, vol.517, cc.312-314, p. 84; 
29 March 1990, vol.517, cc.980-1033, p. 36. 
68 HL Deb, 23 April 1990, vol.518, cc.326-351, p. 8. 
69
 HL Deb, 12 March 1990, vol.516, cc.1327-1372, p. 15. 
70 See Ch. 4, fn.31.  
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mechanisms would raise standards, increase consumer choice and make the whole 
system, including higher education, more accountable. 
To establish a social market in education it is necessary to break down the notion 
and system of a publicly planned and provided education service. […]  
Education needs to be seen as a commodity to be purchased and consumed. There  
must be significant differences between goods on offer to make choice apparent.
71
 
How ironic, therefore, that the major thrust of the Bill was (as we saw in Chapters 4 
and 5) to control higher education centrally: the free market required a strong state. 
Moves such as the setting up of the UFC and the PCFC with a direct line of control 
to the Secretary of State, the abolition of tenure, etc., express a refashioned - and 
explicitly ideological - relationship between higher education and the state on the 
Government’s terms, despite their disingenuous protestations in the House of Lords 
and elsewhere that their policies would give more freedom to higher education.
72
    
 
As with the record on student support, the voluminous House of Lords record on the 
Education Reform Bill demonstrates considerable opposition at draft stages, on 
which resistance was mounted by presenting detailed proposals for amendments. The 
objections were fought out on the level of small - but significant - details, which I 
group into two overarching concerns: (i) objections to the reformulating of higher 
education in a business mode; and (ii) objections to the Bill’s centralising tendencies. 
 
(b) (i) Higher education as a business 
To bring about its developing neoliberal vision for higher education, the Government 
needed to make it operate and behave like a business. The previous systems of grants 
to universities - as Croham had recommended be continued on a three-yearly 
planning cycle through a reformed UGC becoming an independent University Grants 
Council
73
 - and of local authority disbursements to PSHE were discarded by the 
Government. Such schemes were not fit for a neoliberal purpose. The new UFC and 
PCFC needed to demonstrate a harder business mode of operation, as the Lords 
noted from the text of the 1987 White Paper, which lay down that   
                                                             
71 Tomlinson, J., ‘Curriculum and market: are they compatible?’ in Haviland, J. (ed.), op. cit., p. 9. 
72 The Secretary of State, Kenneth Baker, protested to the Vice-Chancellors: ‘Some of you see these 
policies, taken together, as tending to intrude on the proper freedom of universities to manage their 
affairs. That is not the direction in which I want to move: quite the reverse’: quoted by Michael Brock, 
Warden, Nuffield College, Oxford, in Brock, M., ‘The debate: who’ll use these new levers of state 
control?’, in Haviland, J. (ed.), op. cit., p. 232. 
73 Croham Report, op. cit., p. 1. 
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[p]ayment of […] grants from public funds does not imply, in the Government’s 
view, unconditional entitlement to support from the taxpayer at any particular 
level. The resources made available are intended to secure delivery of educational 
services which are of satisfactory or better quality and which are responsive to the 
needs of students and employers. Institutions receiving public funds are 
accountable for the uses to which funds are put and for the effectiveness and  
efficiency with which they are employed.
74
 
Although not on the face of the Bill, funding would be via contract, which would 
‘encourage institutions to be enterprising in attracting contracts from other sources, 
particularly the private sector, and thereby to lessen their present degree of 
dependence on public funding’.75 DES guidance explained - by now well into the 
language of business - that ‘institutions will, given reasonable competitiveness as to 
price and quality, be contracting to provide an educational service or services in 
exchange for funding’.76 This was a neoliberal, business model: a customer (the 
government, ironically the sole customer) contracts with a supplier (the higher 
education institution) to “deliver” services. If the service is not satisfactory, the 
contract and funding would be withdrawn. Contracting was opposed by many Lords, 
understandably ‘no less strongly from the political Right than from the Left’, as one 
Oxford College Warden commented.
77
 Traditional Conservative Lords were no more 
in favour of neoliberal practices than those on the Left espousing a socially 
progressive liberalism. Lords Swann and Beloff, for instance, pointed out that ‘not 
one single Peer’ (apart from the Government spokespeople) had defended the 
concept.
78
 Performance indicators would be used ‘to assess institutions’ delivery of 
provision contracted for with public funds’, a relationship Lord Swann derided as 
more ‘like a supermarket manager dealing with his clients’, expressed in 
‘management newspeak’, than a system for funding higher education teaching and 
research.
79
 As Swann queried, how did the Government ‘square’ the idea of contract 
funding with its ‘professed intentions of liberality’?80 Similarly querying this 
contradiction, Annan considered that 
                                                             
74 DES, Higher Education: Meeting the Challenge, op. cit., paragraph 4.16, p. 31. 
75 Ibid., paragraph 4.17, p. 31. 
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 DES (1987c), ‘Changes in structure and national planning for higher education: (iii) Contracts 
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it seems odd that the Government, who have been so conspicuously successful 
and determined to privatise many quangos and other institutions, and to liberate 
them from bureaucratic control, and who generally say that if we are to progress 
along those lines, especially in respect of relations between universities and 
industry, we can do so only if we have much greater freedom of action, have 
come up with this bureaucratic construction of a university funding council with  
contracts.
81
 
The Government’s actions were more akin to ‘detailed centralised control’, Swann 
concluded.
82
 The Lords haggled over wording in the Bill, such as the Government’s 
proposed use of the word ‘payment’ instead of ‘grant’. But as Lord Chase, 
representing the Government, pointed out, even if the Government acceded to such 
amendments, this did not amount to very much: it did not in itself constitute 
protection against direct government control.
83
 The introduction of practices such as 
contracting in the Education Reform Act, together with related business techniques 
would, in any case, change how managers discussed the funding and management of 
their higher education institutions, including the “delivery” of teaching and research.   
 
As we noted in Chapter 4, it was difficult for the Government to remould higher 
education entirely into a business format because it was not like ‘other products’.84 
The Lords pointed out how applying a business model to higher education did not fit 
well with its practices and traditions, such as academic autonomy and representation.  
Lord Beloff, for example, urged the Government to explain more fully what 
contracting would mean, to ensure ‘that under the new funding system universities 
are to be at least as autonomous as they have been hitherto’.85 Contrary to the (then) 
standard practice of academic domination of internal and external higher education 
bodies, the draft Bill indicated that academic membership of the funding councils, 
and constituencies of staff and students on institutional governing bodies, were not to 
be in the majority. Opposing Lords managed to broaden the categories of 
membership in the Act away from such narrowly defined business and commercial 
interests as first drafted in the Bill, but the representation of both academic and 
support staff and students on governing bodies was reduced, as befitted their 
institutions’ redrawn purposes. Many Lords objected to these trends. For example, 
Blackstone described the Government as having ‘become somewhat obsessed with 
                                                             
81 Ibid., p. 42. 
82 Ibid., p. 39. 
83 HL Deb, 28 June 1988, vol.498, cc.1387-1581, p. 12.  
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 See Ch. 4, fn.111. 
85 HL Deb, 16 May 1988, vol.497, cc.83-173, p. 43. 
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representation from industrial and commercial interests’ on institutional governing 
bodies. Peston wondered whether these were ‘still education institutions and that 
academic matters still take first priority’. He was ‘most concerned that we seem to 
have lost sight of that altogether’. He concluded that ‘on the whole business people 
are pretty useless’ on university governing bodies, being often ‘very well meaning’, 
but not having ‘the faintest idea what academic research and scholarship are about’.86  
Similarly, Lord Butterworth objected to the fact that the Government was not taking 
on board the recommendations of the Croham Committee to have academic 
representation on the new UFC. Lords Grimond and Rochester agreed that there 
should be an academic majority on the main committees of the funding councils, to 
guarantee their independence.
87
 Russell mischievously wondered, given ‘the high 
quality of British universities’, whether ‘every British boardroom should contain an 
academic majority’?88 To change norms and practices to reflect a different ideology, 
the Government needed to move higher education institutions away from being 
predominantly governed by academics themselves to being answerable to business 
interests and practices instead. 
 
As demonstrated at the time of the university cuts in the early 1980s, tenure was a 
practice which did not suit a business approach to running higher education. Whether 
naively or otherwise, the Lord Chancellor (on behalf of the Government) represented 
the intended abolition of tenure as simply the need to apply a standard business 
practice. Like any other business, a university simply ‘may have an urgent need to 
make people redundant’, he claimed.89 Vice-Chancellors needed this flexibility as 
CEOs - they did not resist. According to Beloff and Russell, there was little pressure 
from the CVCP to preserve tenure because they had traded this in with the Secretary 
of State in return for certain favours.
90
 Despite bitter opposition in the Lords and the 
eventual insertion of some wording to safeguard academic freedom, the 1988 
Education Reform Act duly abolished tenure and made it possible to dismiss 
academic staff for reasons of redundancy.
91
 The draft Bill even sought to insert - 
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whether by intent or poor drafting - less favourable terms into academics’ conditions 
of employment with regard to redundancy than applied to other sectors’ employees. 
The Lords - particularly Lord Wedderburn - fought hard to achieve the amendment to 
this. However, many other proposed amendments designed to overturn provisions 
that weakened academics’ and universities’ autonomy were not accepted by the 
Government.
92
 The Government largely got their own way: the Education Reform 
Act was the culmination of the Government’s intentions to requisition higher 
education institutions as ideological state apparatuses, with a view to making them 
behave more like businesses. 
 
(b) (ii) Higher education controlled by the state 
The Government needed to ensure that higher education both operated like a 
business and followed the Government’s policy directives to do so, by imposing 
what Russell termed ‘a planned economy of learning’.93 It was crucial in this scheme 
of things for the Secretary of State to assume certain direct powers. In PSHE, powers 
were to be transferred from LEAs to the institutions themselves, “freeing” them from 
that control, while subjecting them to one more centrally influenced - even if the 
polytechnic directors failed to realise this.
94
 The much-disputed clause 94 in the draft 
Bill gave the Secretary of State power to confer such additional functions as s/he 
thought fit on the UFC and the PCFC, although the Government repeatedly stated in 
the House of Lords and elsewhere that it would only use these powers exceptionally. 
Some in Government may have believed that what they were actually trying to do 
through the Education Reform Bill was to devolve power to education institutions 
and “consumers”. As Secretary of State Baker said about the Bill in 1988: ‘It is about 
the devolution of authority and responsibility. It is not about enhancing central 
control.’95 Many, however, thought the evidence proved otherwise. The statutory 
powers of intervention as drafted in the Bill were, according to a submission from the 
University of Oxford, in direct contradiction to ministers’ repeated claims to the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Morton, 19 May 1988, vol.497, cc.433-486, p. 9; Hatch, ibid., p. 12; Grimond and Beloff, ibid., p. 13; 
Russell, ibid., p. 32. 
92 HL Deb, 19 May 1988, vol.497, cc.500-574, p.14; 28 June 1988, vol.498, cc.1387-1581, p. 113; 8 
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93 See fn.2 above.   
94 The desire of the polytechnic directors for independence from the LEAs seems to have rendered 
them oblivious to the risk that the Government would take greater central control, as the CDP’s 
response to the latter’s consultation on the draft 1987 White Paper demonstrates, whereas some PSHE 
institutional and other responses were more cautious: see Haviland, J. (ed.), op. cit., pp. 241-253. 
95 Quoted in Haviland, J. (ed.), op. cit., pp. 262-263. 
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House of Commons back in 1981 that the UGC was not - and should not be - subject 
to ministerial intervention.
96
 As one Vice-Chancellor put it to the Secretary of State:  
‘You have frequently assured vice-chancellors that these powers would be used only 
as a last resort, but your idea of a last resort may be very different from future 
Secretaries of State and their civil servants.’97 What was the point, queried The 
Times, in the Government taking powers, unless it intended to use them?
98
 Seear 
presented a petition of 20,600 signatures to the House of Lords in May 1988 from 
‘members of university communities’ concerned that the Bill would ‘stifle’ 
universities’ autonomy.99 Although the powers of the Secretary of State were in the 
end partly restricted by the Lords’ amendments, the Education Reform Act marked a 
step change in the state’s acquisition of power over higher education. Writing at the 
time, Patrick McAuslan (Professor of Public Law at the LSE) highlighted how the 
Government’s actions threatened the established safeguards cherished by a liberal 
democracy and promoted a neoliberal agenda:   
An important feature of any liberal democracy of which the separation of powers 
is an aspect is the autonomy and freedom of universities and other institutions of 
higher education and research. It is no accident that illiberal regimes around the 
world reject and curb the autonomy of universities, often on the grounds that they 
are not serving the national interest or are inefficient. It is on these grounds that 
autonomy is to be taken away from universities and other institutions of higher 
education and research by the Bill, and they are to be reduced to dancing, by  
contract, to the Government’s tune.100 
Whereas one of the UGC’s duties had been ‘to inquire into the financial needs of 
university education in the UK’, the new UFC would be more answerable to 
government, by being responsible ‘for administering funds made available to the 
Council by the Secretary of State’.101 In business jargon, this reversed the UGC’s 
“bottom up” advice to government on dispersal of funds to the new body - and thus 
to universities. In the House of Lords, Swann pointed out that ‘[e]ven the most 
enthusiastic supporter of this Bill can scarcely deny that it involves throughout a very 
marked increase in the centralised control of the whole education system by the 
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Secretary of State’.102 Lord Hatch went on to identify the ideological process at 
work, as he concluded: ‘That is not an accident; it is part of the philosophy of this 
Government’. He continued: 
[I]t is neither an accident nor a coincidence that throughout the Bill there has been 
a constant strain of centralisation, a constant theme of “the state knows best” and 
a constant increase in the powers of the Secretary of State. When that is put 
together with the other social legislation introduced by the Government - the 
attack on the trade unions and the attack on local authorities - I suggest that the  
Bill undermines the very structure of our cultural life.
103
   
This is why, Hatch pointed out, he and Beloff were on this occasion unusually in 
agreement: the Bill was undermining the cherished principle of freedom of 
expression.
104
 Russell recognised that there was ‘an obvious tension between the 
public funding of higher education institutions and the need to preserve their 
essential autonomy’ but this Bill was going too far.105 The University of London’s 
response to the Bill found the proposals ‘not consonant with the need for higher 
education to remain as independent as possible from the apparatus of the State, even 
when largely funded by it’.106 The Education Reform Act 1988 was a milestone in 
that changing relationship, giving greater power to government over higher education 
than had hitherto been deemed appropriate. 
 
(v) A neoliberal solution 
The Government’s “solution” to concerns about institutional autonomy and academic 
freedom was - as we saw earlier - to encourage higher education institutions to seek 
alternative funding: after all, the free market guaranteed all other freedoms. Speaking 
for the Government in the Lords, the Lord Chancellor in May 1988 affirmed that ‘[a] 
diversified funding base is one of the best safeguards of institutional autonomy’. The 
Government’s words and actions were not simply about saving money. What 
mattered was that universities adopt the right ideology: ‘Some university interests 
assert that the Government encourage private funding solely in order to spare the 
public purse. That is not so.’ Here was a clear expression of the neoliberal 
ideological imperative to defeat “traditional” or social liberalism, encouraging higher 
                                                             
102 HL Deb, 8 July 1988, vol.499, cc.522-586, p. 43. 
103 Ibid.  
104 Ibid. 
105
 HL Deb, 28 June 1988, vol.498, cc.1387-1581, p. 34. 
106 Haviland, J. (ed.), op. cit., p. 238. 
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education institutions ‘to be enterprising in attracting funds’, rather than depending 
on those from government.
107
 
 
We have seen that the Lords - in the main - considered that not all funding for an 
expanded higher education system could or should come from government sources, 
reflecting in part Joseph’s blueprint. We have also seen that many Lords bitterly 
opposed increased government powers over higher education. Universities were in a 
cleft stick. As Russell put it in 1988, they were being controlled by government and 
being enjoined to act more like businesses, but did not have the power to do so. They 
could ‘neither increase [their] sales nor increase [their] prices’. In these 
circumstances, the freedoms of an American university seemed attractive even to 
such a vociferous opponent of the Government as Russell.
108
 This accorded with the 
views of the neoliberal think-tanks who considered (as we noted earlier) that 
education should be taken out of state control.
109
 In the absence of a strong 
alternative, some Lords were coming to the view that it would be better if higher 
education institutions were privatised, that is, if they completely cut their ties with 
controlling, centralising government and became private institutions, seeking their 
own funds and offering the curriculum they thought best.
110
 Ironically, by default, the 
only option left amounted to adopting the Government’s ideal that some of them at 
least had originally opposed: it would be better if higher education were not part of 
state provision at all.
111
 Either way, the neoliberal project could succeed. 
                                                             
107 HL Deb, 16 May 1988, vol.497, cc.83-173, p. 45. 
108 Kedourie, E., Perestroika, op. cit., p. 25. 
109 The IEA strongly opposed the schools legislation in the Education Reform Bill which it dubbed as 
government interference in the professionalism of teachers. Its view was that the most effective 
education system would be set by the market, that is by ‘the consumers of the education service’, not 
by the government: see Haviland, J. (ed.), op. cit., pp. 28-29.   
110 See, for example, Russell in HL Deb, 28 June 1988, vol.498, cc.1387-1581, p. 17.   
111 Professor A. C. Grayling, latterly of Birkbeck College, University of London, similarly argues that 
setting up his private institution in 2011, charging undergraduate fees of £18,000 per annum, is the 
only way to safeguard liberal values against excessive government intervention and demands for 
accountability, and given the withdrawal of public funding to higher education in the humanities: see 
Baker, S., ‘Grayling’s plans for tutorials with the stars receive poor notices from disgruntled critics’, 
Times Higher Education, 9 June 2011: available at 
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/416440.article [accessed 12 June 2011].  
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Chapter 7 Agents, resisters, collaborators 
 
(i) Introduction  
Having seen how aspects of higher education’s history could contribute to the 
Thatcherite hegemonic project, and mindful how the terms of the debate were set in 
Parliament by Government and Opposition alike, I now turn to the role the funding 
bodies, trade unions and other groups played in this process of construction.   
 
In a Gramscian sense, people play their part as ‘structure and agency interact to make 
history’, as Jessop phrases it, after Marx.1 The proponents of Thatcherism - Joseph, 
for instance - were clearly acting in the positive Gramsian/Geussian sense of 
ideology, attempting to transform one given socio-economic context into another. On 
the other side, many academic and support staff and students vehemently and 
repeatedly objected throughout the 1980s to the Government’s neoliberal mission for 
both higher education and the country at large; but individuals were largely able to 
do little more than react angrily at meetings, committees and demonstrations, and 
through letters and articles in the “quality” press.2 Despite this opposition, many of 
the organisations involved became used as agents - however unwittingly or 
unwillingly - in this hegemonic process.
3
 How did those who might have been 
expected to resist get drawn into collaborating? How did this work?   
 
Gramsci claimed - echoed by Hayek
4
 - that, for an ideology to dominate, the 
‘professional intellectuals’ had to be conquered, so that they could carry out a 
                                               
1 Jessop, B. et al. (eds), op. cit., p. 13. For Marx reference, see Ch. 3, fn.76. 
2 For reasons of space, I am unable to review all the letters and articles in the press. As examples, see 
(a) a letter from 37 academics from the University of Bradford at the time of the 1981 UGC cuts: The 
Times Higher Education Supplement (37 academics, University of Bradford), ‘Why we must resist the 
Government’s attack on the university system’, 6 November 1981, p. 27; (b) the letter from 364 
economists to The Times, 13 March 1981, criticising the Government’s monetarist policies: Booth, P. 
(ed.), Were 364 Economists All Wrong? (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 2006): available at 
http://www.iea.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/files/upldbook310pdf.pdf [accessed 1 August 
2013]; and see The Economist online (author not stated), 9 April 2013, ‘How Mrs Thatcher smashed 
the Keynesian consensus’: available at 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013/04/margaret-thatchers-macroeconomic-legacy 
[accessed 2 August 2013]. 
3 Back in 1973, Anthony Arblaster pointed out that not just individual academics but the institutions in 
which they worked were open to being ‘shaped according to the particular political priorities of 
particular governments’: Arblaster, A., ‘Ideology and Intellectuals’, in Benewick, R., Berki, R.N., 
Parekh, B. (eds), Knowledge and Belief in Politics: the Problem of Ideology (London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1973), p. 124.   
4 See Ch. 3, fn.72. 
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mediating role and persuade others to follow suit. The grafting of Thatcherite values 
onto higher education was achieved not solely by the direct imposition of legislation, 
although the 1985 Green and 1987 White Papers culminating in the 1988 Education 
Reform Act reflected a clear neoliberal agenda. A deeper ideological shift occurred 
more subtly through the higher education state apparatus coming to be reworked and 
transformed through practice “on the ground”. Althusser’s “subjects” were recruited 
to implement a changed role for higher education, to internalise this and make it 
make sense to themselves, so as then to reinforce and reproduce it. In this way, we 
can understand how neoliberalism was able to permeate higher education, challenge 
existing values, and move into pole position as the new norm, to come to be 
understood as everyday common sense. 
 
(ii) Contributing to the construction of central control 
To show how the process recruited organisations as agents to reproduce ideological 
domination and manufacture consent, I first consider the role of the two main 
Government agencies. How did these bodies - the UGC/UFC and the NAB/PCFC - 
contribute to building the Government’s vision of higher education, or were they 
effective in resisting? Understandably, the UGC and the NAB largely reflected the 
characteristics of the sectors they served, and thus replicated the contradictions we 
noted earlier. Thus, in sum, the UGC’s main concern between 1979-1981 was to 
conserve “standards”, thereby delivering up cuts in student numbers, while the 
NAB’s was (with some caveats, as we shall see below) to widen access - but “on the 
cheap” and in subject areas aligned to the Government’s instrumental purpose for 
PSHE. What ideological processes worked on the actors concerned in order to gain 
their consent or compliance so that they came to function as either agents or 
collaborators in the Government’s ideological project?   
 
(a) The University Grants Committee as scapegoat 
To take the UGC first: why and how did it move from operating as a buffer between 
universities and government to becoming - with its successor, the UFC - effectively 
the opposite, functioning as executor of government policy and thus coming to 
constitute a ‘stalking horse’ for wholesale change?5   
 
                                               
5 Shattock, M., The UGC, op. cit., p. 140. 
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The UGC’s ethos was ‘liberal, participative and respectful of university autonomy’, 
as Shattock described it. What the furore over the 1981 cuts taught the Government 
was that it needed a new body that would do its bidding, that would ‘be legally 
separate from government but strictly accountable to it’.6 It was the Government 
which eventually abolished the UGC through the 1988 Education Reform Act; but 
the UGC’s ways of working alienated those who should have been in support and 
this contributed to its downfall. First, the UGC system was by 1979, as Shattock puts 
it, ‘in serious disrepair’.7 It was ‘educationally conservative’, reinforced by the fact 
that ‘its members were drawn from universities which themselves were 
conservative’.8 Its subject-based system tended to mould, reflect and conserve 
subjects as they stood. The main committee did not monitor its subject committees, 
whose poor knowledge (at least in some cases) became apparent in the 1981 cuts. For 
example, they proposed to cut some courses/academic departments that no longer 
existed.
9
 According to Shattock, the UGC failed to give a lead, particularly in the 
fast-changing social and educational context of the period 1963-1979. Its 
conservatism also made it vulnerable - like parts of the Conservative Party - to 
radical intervention from the New Right, challenging the vested interests of the 
Establishment. Furthermore, the élite universities had emphasised their national and 
international role but not always their role in local communities. These factors 
resulted in the UGC and many universities not having widespread support - when 
they came to need it - from communities and constituencies of people outside higher 
education who were at best indifferent to their cause.
10
   
 
A second way in which the UGC’s weakness helped to make the Government’s 
ideological onslaught a success was by having no published criteria for distributing 
cuts so, when this was done badly, the UGC laid itself open to criticism. It saw its 
relationship with the universities in simple terms: 
We give block grants to universities […]. [I]t is for the university itself to decide 
on a disposition of resource between a department’s teaching and research and so  
on. This is what is meant by university autonomy.
11
 
                                               
6 Ibid. 
7 Shattock, M., ibid., p. 19. 
8 Ibid., p. 145. 
9 AUT Executive Committee paper EC/1191, July 1981: UCU archives. 
10 Shattock, M., ibid., p. 146. 
11
 Chair of the UGC reporting to the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), quoted in Shattock, M., ibid., 
p. 145. 
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Its advisory role had grown over the years but it was not constituted to intervene in 
universities’ affairs. Once government cut its resources, the UGC’s only two courses 
of action were to resign or to pass on the cuts to the universities - by cutting either 
the unit of resource or student numbers, either differentially or across the board. The 
whole committee did in fact consider resigning (and Robbins added that if he had 
been in membership he would have done so), rather than implement the 
Government’s cuts, but the members remained in position and carried through the 
cuts. Shattock considered it was to their credit that they stayed on ‘to concentrate on 
saving the university system’, while Labour MP Christopher Price thought that the 
UGC’s mass resignation might have led to direct Government control: in retrospect, 
highly ironic observations.
12
 The absence of explicit criteria for making cuts laid it 
open to criticism from universities, MPs, unions and commentators alike, with some 
(including Robbins) considering that an across-the-board percentage cut would have 
been a better course of action.
13
 Once embarked on differential cuts, the UGC 
revealed not only its inadequate knowledge but also an apparently unfair bias in 
cutting the technological universities so drastically. Opposition MPs attacked the 
UGC in the House of Commons: Labour MP Dennis Canavan, for example, called it 
heavily biased in favour of an Oxbridge élite, whose main concern seems to be to 
try to give the maximum protection to a privileged minority within the university 
system without caring about the consequences for some of the younger and more  
innovative universities that are not hidebound by ancient, ivory-tower traditions.
14
 
A speaker at an Association of University Teachers (AUT) Aberdeen branch ‘teach-
in’ in December 1981 (to which I return later) similarly complained that the UGC 
was ‘a group of elderly academics whose instinctive reaction was to protect 
Oxbridge, to protect the conventional and to savage places which are doing anything 
new, exciting, or innovatory’. The speaker accused it of having ‘collaborated in this 
act of educational vandalism’; and, to boot, of having done so ‘with no explanation, 
no discussion of the basis on which they made their allocations’.15   
 
                                               
12 Shattock, M., ibid., p. 24; HC Deb, 21 December 1981, vol.15, c.740 and 29 July 1982, vol.28, 
c.1340. 
13 HC Deb, 18 November 1981, vol.13, cc.342-345; HL Deb, 17 February 1982, vol.427, cc.564-626, 
p. 11; Kogan, M. with Kogan, D., op. cit; Shattock, M., ibid. 
14 HC Deb, 11 May 1982, vol.23, c.605. See also criticisms from: Alan Beith, HC Deb, 18 November 
1981, vol.13, c.312; Edward Lyons, HC Deb, 21 December 1981, vol.15, c.751; Barry Sheerman, 
ibid., c.741. 
15
 Aberdeen AUT, Universities against the Cuts: a Report of the Teach-in held at King’s College, 
University of Aberdeen, on Saturday, 5th December, 1981 (Aberdeen: AUT, 1982), p. 21.  
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These objections clouded the main issue so that the UGC - rather than the 
Government - was often blamed for the cuts. Not even the Government was satisfied 
with the UGC’s actions taken independently, using its powers to cut student numbers 
rather than squeeze the unit of resource, which laid the Government wide open to 
criticism in the House of Commons.
16
 Labour MPs were so critical of the UGC’s 
actions that they demanded the Government intervene to reverse them. This allowed 
the Government - whose cuts to university funding had occasioned the UGC’s 
actions - to take the ideological and moral high ground, turning the situation round to 
make it look as if they were the ones safeguarding the independence of the UGC and 
academic freedom. For example, Joseph maintained in 1981 that ‘it is not for 
Ministers to make the allocation’. He continued: ‘It is the essence of academic 
autonomy that decisions should be made by peer reviews.’17 Similarly, Waldegrave 
made the Opposition look as if it was proposing government interference in the 
UGC’s relationship with the universities. ‘It would be wrong’, he said, ‘for Ministers 
[…] to try to direct the UGC about its judgements on academic policies.’18 Supported 
by other more traditional Tories, this issue then dominated the discussion, concealing 
the original point about the cuts themselves. Furthermore, having defended the UGC, 
Waldegrave could bring his fellow Tory MPs to task for supporting the cuts overall, 
while - contradictorily - seeking Government intervention and special consideration 
for universities in their own constituencies. Intervention, he said, was ‘a self-denying 
ordinance in the sense that the House does not directly intervene in the distribution of 
funds’. ‘If one accepts the principle,’ he continued, ‘it is difficult to oppose the 
individual distributions.’19 So it was those in opposition to the Government - and 
who should have been in support of the UGC - who called with increasing urgency 
for the UGC to be reviewed. Furthermore, when some universities’ failures in 
financial and academic self-governance came to light later in the 1980s, blame was 
apportioned not only to the universities concerned but also to the UGC, whose 
shortcomings made it easier for the Government to justify the imposition of an 
altogether different form of control.
20
  
                                               
16 Shattock, M., ibid., p. 133. 
17 HC Deb, 18 November 1981, vol.13, c.305. 
18 HC Deb, 27 October 1981, vol.10, c.707. 
19 HC Deb, 21 December 1981, vol.15, c.763. 
20 Allegations of financial mismanagement at University College, Cardiff, were reported by a 
whistleblower direct to Thatcher in 1986. The Government intervened and a management consultancy 
review was undertaken. By the time the PAC hearings took place in May 1988, a serious financial 
deficit also had to be investigated at Aberdeen University. - see Shattock, M., ibid., pp. 137-138.  
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Nevertheless, many commentators realised that the UGC was being used by the 
Government as a scapegoat. In the House of Lords in 1984, Crowther-Hunt called it 
a ‘lap dog’ and a ‘poodle’, having now been peopled with government nominees.21  
Other commentators saw the opportunity to advocate its abolition, given it was no 
longer preserving the independence of universities, having become ‘an agency for 
their enfeeblement, a useless “quango” whose only purpose is to do to the 
universities what the Secretary of State for Education and Science would not care to 
do on his own initiative’.22 The more liberal-minded Tory MP Robert Rhodes James 
came to the UGC’s defence: 'If there is criticism of the present policy, it should 
surely be directed against the Government and not against the University Grants 
Committee.’23 But most interventions in both Houses of Parliament blamed the UGC 
for not defending the university system as a whole and for implementing 
Government policy.
24
 For example, Labour MP Bob Cryer termed the UGC ‘the 
handmaiden of the Government's policy’, as it was ‘playing a subservient and 
lickspittle role in complying with the Government's wishes’.25 The AUT expressed 
both confusion and dismay about the UGC which had ‘turned in on us’ and was no 
longer ‘the universities’ watch-dog’ but the Government’s ‘hatchet-man’.26 At the 
AUT Aberdeen branch ‘teach-in’, one speaker identified how the UGC had been 
‘turned into a protective cloak for the Government against pressure from the 
universities which the Government has or will have mutilated’.27 The UGC was 
acting as a “cover” and criticisms of its conservatism, poor organisation and ill-
advised divisive cuts to universities contributed alike to its abolition and the 
consequent weakening of the universities it had been designed to protect.   
 
Joseph needed to be able to direct university policy without the UGC deciding on its 
own approach, as he made clear in 1982, determining that 
the main thrust of policy for the universities must take due account of policy for 
higher education as a whole, and of national social and economic policies; and at 
                                               
21 HL Deb, 14 March 1984, vol.449, cc.758-851, p. 20. 
22 Ferns, H. S., op. cit., p. 27. 
23 HC Deb, 18 November 1981, vol.13, c.322. 
24 See, for example, HC Deb, 18 November 1981, vol.13, c.335 and cc.740-741; 11 May 1982, vol.23, 
cc.605-606. 
25 HC Deb, 21 December 1981, vol.15, c.759. 
26
 AUT President’s Opening Address to Council meeting, 17 December 1980: UCU archives. 
27 AUT Aberdeen, op. cit., pp. 52-54. 
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this level there will be some strategic decisions for which it would be appropriate 
for Ministers to take explicit responsibility and answer to Parliament.
28
 
His new practice of issuing ‘letters of guidance’ was made to seem more democratic 
than the UGC’s deliberations “behind closed doors”. But it was a takeover of matters 
which would previously have been dealt with by the UGC, or simply by individual 
universities. As Price (Labour) put it, ‘[n]eed is now defined in the Government's and 
not the UGC's terms’.29 Although, according to Shattock, by the mid-1980s the UGC 
had become ‘more active and effective than any since the late 1950s’, its eventual 
abolition was not the paradox he considered it to be.
30
 Despite its initial objections to 
the early cuts, the UGC had eventually buckled down and carried out the 
Government’s wishes, but it still had to go. It was not the kind of body the 
Government needed. A review of the UGC duly took place but was hijacked by the 
Government to put in place the kind of state apparatus that would be more compliant 
with - and complicit in - the Government’s ideological agenda. In the 1988 
Education Reform Act, the UGC was transformed into the UFC, whose first Chair 
was Lord Chilver, a close ally of the Prime Minister. The way was now clear for, as 
Shattock puts it, ‘a radical switch to a market-driven approach to expansion’, 
overseen by a new body designed to be ‘more managerial, more subordinate to 
government and much less responsive to the universities’.31 The UGC and those who 
should have been its supporters had collaborated – however unwittingly – as agents 
in its demise.  
 
(b) The National Advisory Body: the means to its own end 
How did those involved in setting up and operating the NAB contribute to the New 
Right’s hegemonic project?   
 
A planning and resourcing body was initially welcomed by the sector in 1982, 
because the rapid and uncoordinated growth in PSHE course approvals, and the 
knock-on effects of the university cuts, had made planning and development within 
and between PSHE institutions under different LEAs extremely difficult.
32
 The 
                                               
28 HC Deb, 29 July 1982, vol.28, c.1340. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Shattock, M., The UGC, p. 27. 
31 Ibid., pp. 135-140. 
32
 This section draws on my own experience as a senior administrator in this area of work in a 
polytechnic at the time, and on Harriet Greenaway’s article: Greenaway, H., ‘The National Advisory 
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Government’s July 1981 consultative document planned to take PSHE out of LEAs 
and transfer co-ordination to a new body, on the lines of the UGC.
33
 However, the 
furore surrounding the UGC decisions meant that a planning body for PSHE was best 
ushered in quietly, so the NAB was set up simply by Government executive action. 
PSHE institutions continued to be administered by the LEAs for the time being. The 
Chair of the NAB’s senior committee was the Higher Education Minister (initially 
William Waldegrave, then Peter Brooke, then George Walden) and the Chair of the 
Board (the lower tier) was appointed by the Secretary of State. LEA and DES 
officers (so not those directly involved in operating the institutions on the ground) 
were in the majority on the Board, to the anger of the polytechnic directors - but at 
least they now had their own planning body.
34
  
 
As with the UGC, the NAB’s operations gave rise to criticisms from those who 
might have been its supporters. Set up hurriedly, its first few months were chaotic 
and confusing. It could not concentrate on strategy and PSHE’s relationship with the 
universities but had to work immediately on the Government’s agenda: how to 
implement a 10% cut in real terms between 1982/3-1984/5, as demanded by the 1982 
Public Expenditure White Paper. Despite the Chair of the Board’s repeated insistence 
- backed by NATFHE - that the unit of resource could not be lowered any further 
without damaging standards,
35
 Labour MPs blamed the NAB itself, just as they had 
the UGC, for embarking on cutting student numbers. For example Phillip Whitehead 
complained that: 
[The NAB is] now saying not that there will be a worsening of the staff-student 
ratio or a diminution of the unit of resource but that in absolute overall terms they 
want fewer places, fewer courses and fewer institutions in the public sector of 
higher education, beyond the decimination that has already been visited on the 
universities.
36
 
To devise a rationale for the cuts, the NAB undertook a consultative exercise in 
1983, but the Secretary of State was setting the terms of the debate: 
It is important that traditional assumptions be questioned […]. I hope that this 
debate will include discussions with the UGC on whether the trend towards a 
                                                                                                                                     
Body – the polytechnic administrator’s viewpoint of a major British development’, Journal of 
Tertiary Educational Administration, Volume 6, Number 1, May 1984, pp. 55-62. See also Salter, B. 
and Tapper, T., The State and Higher Education, op. cit., pp. 140-147. 
33 DES, Higher Education in England outside the Universities, op. cit. 
34 Greenaway, H., op. cit., p. 62. 
35 See, for example, as reported to HC Deb, 26 October 1984, vol.65, c.936. See also NATFHE, Green 
Paper – Bleak Future (London: NATFHE, 1985), p. 9. 
36 HC Deb, 29 July 1982, vol.28, c.1332. 
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homogenous higher education system with the precedence given to 3-year first 
degrees at the expense of other more vocationally orientated courses is in the best 
future interests of the nation. As the 18-year-old population declines, it will 
become increasingly important for the local authority higher education sector to 
develop its existing ability to cater for a range of ages through a variety of modes  
of attendance at different levels of study.
37
   
The Government was signalling that there should be a brake on the sector’s drift 
towards providing degrees like the universities. They needed to reposition the 
polytechnics back into the further education system from which they had sprung, 
rather than let them creep into the university sector. The NAB’s 1983 consultative 
document treads a difficult line between Government cuts and the sector’s 
commitment to access, trailing several proposals (such as extension of access to more 
part-time and mature students) which the Government could later appropriate for the 
1985 Green Paper.
38
 But even by being so “flexible”, there would either have to be 
cuts to the sector, or resources would have to be stretched very thinly indeed.   
 
The NAB ended up having to effect the Government’s agenda of cuts and this 
contributed to its eventual demise, and the rise of the Government’s ideological 
supremacy, just as it had in the case of the UGC. The planning methodology which 
the NAB used was untested, based on poor data and rushed consultation with the 
sector’s officers. Asking institutions which subject areas they would class as low 
priority antagonised them from the start. On receipt of the returns, the NAB officers 
had problems co-ordinating and analysing the data. All this made the NAB unpopular 
with managements and unions alike, just as the UGC had antagonised universities. 
After bargaining on both sides, adjustments were made and cuts achieved through 
early retirements and voluntary redundancies, but the NAB had become dubbed 
predominantly as the Government’s agent rather than as the supporter of PSHE 
institutions as the sector had initially hoped.   
 
For its second planning exercise for 1987/88, the NAB prioritised the development of 
the Government’s preferred subjects (such as engineering, computing and business 
                                               
37 Secretary of State’s letter of guidance (February 1983), quoted in NAB, Towards a Strategy for 
Local Authority Higher Education in the late 1980s and beyond (London: NAB, 1983), paragraph 22, 
p. 7. 
38 Ibid; DES, The Development of Higher Education into the 1990s, op. cit. 
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studies).
39
 However, if the NAB sought to maintain the unit of resource and meet the 
Government’s subject demands, this required - as the UGC had found earlier - that 
student numbers be cut. For the NAB this meant cuts in the Government’s “non-
favoured” areas - the humanities, visual and performing arts and social sciences.  
Once inflation and pay rises had been taken into account, the NAB warned by early 
1986 that this could require cutting 16,000-18,000 first year student numbers to 
maintain the unit of resource, amounting to a cut of as much as 50% in “non-
favoured” areas. Under pressure, the NAB reworked their figures but their 
communication to institutions in April 1986 warned that still as many as 9,000 
student places might have to be cut from PSHE - the very sector championing access. 
Polytechnics and colleges reacted sharply to the proposed cuts and lobbied their 
MPs, many of whom spoke against the cuts in the House of Commons.
40
 Like the 
UGC, the NAB, not the Government, was blamed; and of course the Government 
sought to distance itself from the decision.
41
 Ironically, this led to a degree of accord, 
from various quarters uniting against the NAB: the Government had to avoid 
political “fallout” from cutting student numbers in PSHE, as well as in the 
universities; the Labour Party simply reflected its traditional position on expansion 
and access; and the polytechnic directors did not want to curb growth in their 
institutions. At the NAB Committee on 2 October 1986, George Walden, the Chair, 
informed members that the Secretary of State would not be prepared to accept 
recommendations for an overall intake which could have the effect of denying 
access, neither would [he] endorse individual proposals for course closures, the 
only justification for which was to constrain overall intakes within the total  
currently proposed.
42
  
In the end, the exercise was completed, Salter and Tapper report, ‘without a single 
closure or merger’; but the sector had to get used to “doing more with less”.43 
 
The Secretary of State, Kenneth Baker, announced in December his acceptance of 
the NAB’s recommendation to increase student numbers by 3,000 but in the ‘priority 
areas of science, engineering and other vocational disciplines’ and subject to a 
                                               
39 Knight, P., ‘The National Advisory Body Planning Exercise 1987-88: a shot in the foot’, Higher 
Education Quarterly, Volume 41, Number 4, Autumn 1987, pp. 317-328. 
40 HC Deb, 8 April 1986, vol.95, cc.40-41W; 10 June 1986, vol.99, cc.160-161. 
41 HC Deb, 15 April 1986, vol.95, cc.343-344W; 16 April 1986, vol.95, c.383W; 10 June 1986, 
vol.99, cc.160-161; 8 July 1986, vol.101, cc.151-153. 
42
 Quoted in Knight, P., ibid., p. 324. 
43 Salter, B. and Tapper, T., The State and Higher Education, op. cit., p. 146. 
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competitive bidding process.
44
 Thus a Tory Government came to be in the forefront 
of promoting access and expansion - but only on their terms. PSHE institutions were 
“squeezed” harder as staff buckled down to teaching larger numbers of students on 
the basis of a lower unit of resource than the NAB secretariat had originally deemed 
advisable.
45
 Neither the Government nor the Labour Party had lost face, and the 
polytechnic directors could still expand their institutions. And all those involved had 
contributed to demonstrating that higher education could be delivered “on the 
cheap”. 
 
In proposing student number cuts, the NAB secretariat - with the support of the CDP 
and some MPs - had been trying to resist the erosion of the unit of resource and 
pressurise the Government for funding equal to the universities, but this backfired.
46
 
When the NAB’s 1987 Good Management Practice report recommended inter alia 
independent governance for the polytechnics but within an LEA framework, the 
polytechnic directors were dismayed: they wanted their institutions to be 
independent, just like the universities. They called a meeting with the Secretary of 
State at which they strongly advocated that the polytechnics should be taken out of 
LEA control.
47
 They were pushing at an open door. Effectively they provided the text 
for the 1987 White Paper: the NAB was abolished and the CDP greeted the removal 
of the polytechnics from the LEAs as ‘very good news’.48 The Secretary of State, 
Kenneth Baker, describes how easy it was in the end to take the polytechnics out of 
LEA administration:   
I […] found out that [the polytechnics] were thirsting to be free of local 
government. […] We tried in 1980-81 […] to move polytechnics out of local 
authority control, but it got nowhere – the whole proposal ran into the sand. But I 
learnt from this experience. When we did it in 1986 it went through easily – it was 
among the least controversial things which I did. Former Labour MPs working in 
the sector looked upon me almost as a hero. […] [T]hey wanted independence and 
more academic freedom to run their institutions. They wanted greater business 
and managerial freedom even more than academic freedom. […] They wanted to 
be able to get on and expand, and this was a time in which this was the big  
expanding area of higher education.
49
   
                                               
44 HC Deb, 19 December 1986, vol.107, cc.721-723W.  
45 See Ch. 4, fns.51 and 57. 
46 HC Deb, 26 October 1984, vol.65, c.936. 
47 Knight, P., ‘After the storm, a brighter era dawned’, The Guardian, 20 March 2007: available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2007/mar/20/highereducation.comment [accessed 19 October 
2012]. 
48
 NALGO letter, 3 April 1987, op. cit. 
49 Ribbins, P. and Sherratt, B., op. cit., p. 94.   
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Less euphoric than the polytechnic directors, the PSHE support-staff union - the 
National and Local Government Officers Association (NALGO) - claimed that 
‘[t]his will not be the prosperous free-for-all expected by many who have sought 
independence for polytechnics in the past’.50 Likewise, Opposition MPs 
characterised it as another step towards centralisation. But, with the CDP on their 
side, the Government could make the Opposition look as if the latter was against the 
polytechnics.
51
 PSHE and the NAB had served their purpose but the Government 
realised it could go further: it could cut all ties between the LEAs and higher 
education and abolish the NAB. The Government could now subject both 
‘nationalised’ sectors to curbs on funding, as had successfully been applied to the 
universities since 1979. The action of the polytechnic directors in pushing to become 
more like the universities - together with the Vice-Chancellors’ collaboration with 
the Government, as we noted earlier
52
 - contributed to the Government’s imposition 
of greater control over both national funding bodies. An expanded higher education 
system could be brought closer together and under the control of a central 
government working to a neoliberal agenda.   
 
(c) The new agents: the Polytechnics and Colleges  
Funding Council and the Universities Funding Council 
The 1984 joint UGC/NAB statement demonstrates the growing cross-binary 
collaboration that might have resulted - if history had worked out differently.
53
  What 
the Government needed instead was a competitive ethos, centrally organised and 
driven. The polytechnics ‘came of age’, but at the expense of weakening the 
universities, and only on the Government’s terms - which by 1987 Baker could 
confidently set out.
54
 Polytechnics had to be given ‘a more effective lead from the 
centre’ so that they could enjoy 
the reward of success and enterprise in meeting new national needs, in place of a 
system giving undue weight to local interests.   
                                               
50 NALGO letter, 3 April 1987, op. cit. 
51 HC Deb, 1 April 1987, vol.113, cc.1091-1100. 
52 For collaboration on the 1988 Act, see Ch. 6, fn.90. In relation to the 1981 cuts, Tory MP Robert 
Rhodes James was struck by ‘how certain vice-chancellors were denouncing the Government in 
public while privately urging us to carry on as we were’: Rhodes James, R., op. cit., p. 21. 
53 Joint statement in UGC, A Strategy for Higher Education into the 1990s: the University Grants 
Committee’s advice (London: HMSO, September 1984). See also Shattock, M., The UGC, op. cit., p. 
26.  
54 HC Deb, 1 April 1987, vol.113, cc.1091-1100.  
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In particular, polytechnics should be free from local constraints and encouraged to 
build on their individual strengths so that some at least can become recognised  
leaders in particular vocational and technological fields.
55
 
With the new framework inscribed in the 1988 Education Reform Act, the 
Government was in a position to exercise practical and ideological control over 
higher education centrally through financial constraints and selective initiatives, via 
the agency of the new funding bodies, under the cloak of greater openness that the 
contracting model seemed to demonstrate. Once the polytechnics had provided the 
benchmark for lower costs, the Government’s intention - that costs per student had to 
be kept down - started to become accepted. Despite both sectors’ efforts to regain 
year-on-year level funding, the Government could permit student numbers to rise 
only once it was certain that this would be on a lower unit of resource.
56
  
 
In Althusserian mode, the Government had finally gained control of its ideological 
state apparatus, which could in turn be expected to reproduce the dominant ideology.  
Once the funding councils were staffed with those who either supported or could not 
resist Thatcher’s ideological mission, then it also followed that internal higher 
education management structures and practices had to change accordingly.
57
 As one 
contemporary commentator realised, there would be ‘a greater stress upon the role of 
management within polytechnics and colleges, especially insofar as there has been a 
concern to express a corporate image and identity as a platform for the bidding 
process’.58 A whole range of business techniques was brought into use: contracting; 
short-term planning models; the ‘increasing selective deployment of resources on 
particular priorities with clear conditions attached to their use’;59 and - as we noted in 
Chapter 6 - there was now minority academic membership on the funding councils 
                                               
55 DES, Higher Education: Meeting the Challenge, op. cit., paragraph 4.6, p. 29. 
56 The Chevening Discussion Paper (op. cit.) decried the fact that universities had been ‘particularly 
successful in defending traditional unit costs’. PSHE, however, had played the game ‘less 
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of 10% in university funding but, importantly, this was not in “real terms”, as the AUT pointed out in 
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57 Watson and Bowden point out (op. cit., p. 1) that the terms “the Government” - on the one hand - 
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Newsletter, 1990. 
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and on higher education institutional committees. Administrators became managers, 
polytechnic directors and vice-chancellors became CEOs, mission statements and 
strategic plans were drawn up, academics were offered “staff development” more 
suited to training business professionals than teachers of higher education students. It 
was, of course, reasonable to expect those using public funds to account for 
expenditure. But the need to demonstrate openness and efficiency was not the main 
point. What mattered much more was the need to revolutionise the internal culture of 
higher education institutions, now that their external relationship to the state had 
been changed. Higher education had to be moved from grudgingly accepting that 
there was no alternative, to a position of internalising and actively reproducing the 
new ideology, through using its terminology and practices on the ground. 
 
(iii)   The resistance  
Two groups offered the possibility of objections to - or a brake on - Thatcher’s 
ideological project. The first was the trade unions.
60
 The second was dissenters in the 
Tory Party itself, comprising two sub-groups: (i) the traditional and/or more 
liberally-minded Conservatives for whom the Government was going too far with 
university cuts and in promoting higher education’s links with employment; and (ii) 
the extreme neoliberals - the “free marketeers” - for whom centralised control had 
gone too far and who thought that the Government was not going far enough in 
opening up higher education to the market and privatisation. Taken together, these 
“resisters” are strange bedfellows. In part, they posed a challenge to Thatcher’s 
project but - particularly unions - could either be ignored or vilified for their extreme 
“ideological” positions, opposed to the Government’s plain “common sense”.   
 
(a) The trade unions  
It is not within the scope of this thesis fully to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses 
of the higher education trade unions in the 1980s. Rather, the task here is to highlight 
- concentrating mainly on the two major academic staff unions, NATFHE and the 
AUT - to what extent their resistance impeded the Government’s ideological project; 
                                               
60 The campus unions were the Association of University Teachers (AUT), the National Association 
of Teachers in Further and Higher Education (NATFHE), the National and Local Government 
Officers Association (NALGO), the National Union of Public Employees (NUPE), the Association of 
Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staff (ASTMS), and the National Union of Students (NUS).   
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and, if it did not thwart it, how weaknesses or contradictions in their positions 
contributed to the ideological drift towards the Government’s goals. 
 
For much of the 1980s, the unions were fighting hard battles on lecturers’ pay and 
combating the threat of compulsory redundancies - battles which they won. At the 
national level, the Government did not entertain the idea of involving trade unions at 
all in policy discussions. This meant that union resistance to Government budget cuts 
and policy documents was inevitably reactive, one step behind the Government. No 
wonder the latter held the ideological advantage. The staff and unions were often in 
shock from the power of the ideological onslaught.
61
 Prior to 1979, they had become 
used to local and national government support and funding. Politicians might have 
argued about the extent to which higher education should be expanded but they had 
not generally been against it or its self-determined values per se. Public expectation 
was that higher education should and could be progressively extended to more of the 
population. Higher education staff - especially tenured academic staff in the élite 
universities - were accustomed to being in a privileged and respected position in 
society. They were not used to being almost completely ignored. They were not 
practised in justifying their existence or managing their operations in times of 
austerity. Ironically, and crucially, they were not used to having to form arguments 
or construct an ideological position on the subject of higher education itself. They 
were ill-prepared to counter a government intent on challenging the very worth of 
higher education and their profession. The resistance was not co-ordinated 
effectively across the binary line and it was difficult - as we saw earlier - to gather 
sufficient public support against the cuts - ‘a small reverse with sad consequences for 
a relatively small minority’, as Joseph put it62 - or to change the way higher 
education was being reformed. In the main, union resistance was not strong enough 
to dent the Government’s ideological progress. 
 
What would have constituted effective resistance? There would have had to have 
been a realisation of the ideological process taking place and a strategic approach to 
countering that ideology. From my research in the teaching unions’ archives, it is 
clear that a set of papers from the Aberdeen AUT branch ‘teach-in’ attended by 400 
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 See Ch. 1, fn. 63. 
62 Keith Joseph speaking on Radio 4, 29 November 1981, quoted in AUT Aberdeen, op. cit., p. 31. 
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people on 5 December 1981 is the only document from that source to provide 
evidence of a concerted union attack on the Government’s ideological agenda.  At 
that event, a Labour councillor highlighted for the university participants the evident 
irrationality and contradictions inherent in the cuts, but how this signalled an 
ideological attack in progress: 
In Lothian Region, the Secretary of State has taken nearly £10 million from our 
education budget, which concerns the mass of children in the region, while two 
Education Acts this year have resulted in increased grants to private schools. This 
government wants to cut only some aspects of public expenditure, and there is a 
class logic in their decisions. 
What lessons can be learnt from Lothian’s struggle with the Secretary of State?  
First, never compromise. […] 
Secondly, it is folly to think that you can fight alone. You cannot have socialism 
in one Region; and you cannot have “no cuts” in one university. We failed partly 
because of our own mistakes, and partly because of the failure of certain elements 
in the labour and trade union movement. […] 
The Universities also face this danger of a divided campaign: of university being 
set against university, department against department, colleague against colleague, 
academics against technical and manual staff, and staff against students. The 
struggle of one is the struggle of all, and that must be understood if this 
government is to be defeated.
63
 
In other words, unless higher education mounted a concerted counter-ideological 
attack on Thatcherism, the efforts of individuals or particular bodies acting on their 
own were likely to fail. One contributor described how the Scottish AUT had tried to 
persuade the Principals of the Scottish universities to resist the cuts en masse, but all 
had, in the end, spoken in support only of their own university. It was another 
instance of “divide and rule” which gave the Government an ideological advantage.  
Supporting the Labour councillor’s views, an AUT National Executive member also 
identified the ideology at work, as he pointed out the apparent contradictions: 
[The Secretary of State] is daring to tell us that less means better. We are asked to 
believe that this government looked impartially at the system of higher education 
in this country, and decided that a cut four times greater than the average cuts in 
public expenditure (15% instead of an average cut of 4%) is just what higher  
education needed to make it better.
64
 
A student contributor similarly highlighted the contradictions at work: 
The universities have been told to cut student numbers this year, while 
applications from home students to universities has gone up by 7%. That means 
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we are limiting access even more. It means that the universities are being forced 
to make themselves more elitist.
65
 
What the Government was doing made sense only if viewed as part of an overall 
ideological plan, as a Bradford speaker concluded: 
They are undermining, indeed, trying to liquidate, a wide range of basic gains in 
democracy and opportunity - basic democratic rights […]. We are talking about 
policies for universities which are part of an overall policy by the present  
government.
66
 
A University of Sheffield member similarly concluded that the Government wanted 
to undermine higher education as a whole, and he criticised the AUT’s weakness in 
adopting a position that defended universities individually against cuts. The AUT’s 
counter-attack was insufficiently robust: the Government would simply cut another 
university, thus retaining a small group of universities while the remainder, together 
with the polytechnics, would become broader-based or technological teaching 
institutions for the masses.
67
 Another speaker pointed out how the Government’s 
ideological onslaught on the universities was designed to make them more 
compliant, more conservative, and thus more open to being undermined politically: 
In the present situation, the universities are in no state to respond to the needs of 
society. Unless the pressure is relieved by reversing the cuts, they will become 
more inward-looking. Academics will be concerned only about keeping their jobs, 
and not about what they should be doing in their jobs.
68
 
Another speaker also realised the strategic game being played: 
[A]s the government moves to reduce student demand for places, by cutting the 
real value of grants, one begins to suspect that there is something resembling a  
plan involved. Various pieces of the programme are emerging bit by bit.
69
 
What was really going on, participants realised, was that the Government was using 
universities as a means of achieving central government control: 
[The Government’s] policies are clearly incompatible with safeguarding the future 
of free expression and the pursuit of scientific research. When people speak here 
about totalitarian and corporatist tendencies in their attitude towards local 
government and education it is a real thing. Everybody who works in a university 
knows that the process has already begun. As soon as you threaten a workforce 
with redundancy, a portion of that workforce puts its head down in the hope that it 
will not be picked off when the shooting starts. They do not express themselves as 
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freely. They do those things that people tell them are contributing positively to the 
future of the institution, or of the nation.
70
 
The speaker concludes that ‘the attack on universities is not an accidental side-swipe, 
because the government is looking for somewhere to save some money to justify 
monetarism’. What was happening, he claimed, was ‘the beginning of thought 
control’, ‘the imposition of central authority’.71 It was part of an ideological 
endgame. As a Strathclyde University member realised, the Government’s actions 
towards universities were part of their plans to ‘[pass] into private hands the 
production of goods and services’.72 It was part of a much wider assault, and he 
stressed that 
this understanding must influence the campaign to defend [goods and services].  
There must be a united and imaginative fight within the universities, but we must 
also look to the struggle outside. What did you do about the Lothian Region’s 
struggle against cuts? Or about the fight for jobs at Linwood, and at Lee Jeans? If 
you did nothing, do we not have to think again about the relationship between our 
fight and the struggles going on in the community at large?
73
 
 
But in the main, head office documents and publications from the early 1980s 
demonstrate the campus unions’ impotence at the national level in the face of the 
ideological struggle in progress. This is particularly so in the case of the AUT, 
reflecting the shock felt by a sector moving ‘from complacency to panic’, as a branch 
AUT document put it.
74
 For example, the minutes of a 1979 AUT Council meeting 
weakly state that ‘[t]he message to the new Government in terms of maintaining 
standards was that it would be silly for them to carry on impoverishing the 
universities because in so doing they were impoverishing the country’.75 In his 
address to the AUT Council meeting in December 1979, the AUT President 
concludes that ‘[t]here is more to life than the production of material wealth, 
important though that may be’; but he would have had trouble convincing the 
Government of this version of “reality” - or many members of the general public, 
attracted by the possibility of attaining it.
76
 AUT pamphlets in the early 1980s simply 
state - rather than argue - universities’ intrinsic worth, together with the expectation 
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of pre-1979, or even increased, funding.
77
 The union takes it as a given that ‘[a]s far 
as one can measure in financial terms the contribution made by universities to the 
nation, it is undoubtedly true that in relation to public money invested in them, the 
nation as a whole makes a financial gain’.78 It seems unable to understand why 
universities could not just carry on the way they were, ‘quietly […] fulfilling their 
responsibility’.79 In its evidence to the Education Select Committee in March 1980, 
the AUT expresses its belief that ‘without central direction universities have proved 
willing and able to adopt a flexible attitude towards subject demand and provision of 
courses and [that the Association sees] very little reason why the universities cannot 
be expected to continue this process’.80 AUT papers from this period reflect a deep 
despair and incredulity at what is taking place. One President describes it as 
‘frightening […] that any Government should so blindly adopt policies which 
threaten the quality and extent of the higher education system that the nation has so 
proudly developed over the past forty years’.81 A pamphlet from 1980 asserts: ‘It is 
no way for any Government to run the university system of an advanced, industrial 
nation.’82 The Association was not used to taking direct action. Even a branch motion 
calling for mass resignation from university committees making cuts did not get the 
support of the Executive Committee.
83
 The authors of the 1980 pamphlet seem 
scarcely able to believe that university funding had been cut: ‘The Government 
financial support of universities will not cover known or expected costs unless 
economies are made by the universities in their expenditure.’84 Constituting an “own 
goal”, the pamphlet continues by pointing out what the Government itself might well 
have said: ‘Universities have no significant sources of income other than 
Government finance.’85 There is no realisation that the rules of the game were 
changing, that universities could no longer expect automatic state funding but were 
to be forced to participate in the market. In relation to the cut of the overseas student 
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fees subsidy, the AUT pamphlet complains that ‘there is no transfer of public funds 
from overseas students to home students’.86 As if assuming that the Government did 
not appreciate what it was doing, the union points out that ‘[a] substantial proportion 
of university income will be subject to unknown and imperfect market forces’. It 
assumes that ‘[i]t might have been expected that the Government, before rushing in 
with its decisions on overseas students, would have assessed carefully the 
quantifiable and non-quantifiable benefits to Britain of foreign students’, that 
decisions should not be taken ‘for purely financial reasons with little regard to 
academic merit’.87 The union apparently does not understand the ideological process 
in which it is involved, that what the Government was actually trying to do was to 
undermine universities’ expectations of government funding and support and force 
them to participate in the neoliberal marketplace. But the union simply admonishes 
the Government, stating that ‘[s]imply driving university students away from arts 
subjects will not automatically increase the number of science students’.88 The union 
did not realise that the individual policies and their execution did not need to make 
sense for the ideology to succeed. 
 
The AUT was resolutely opposed to the UGC’s selective approach to cuts in 1981, 
but even this could look as if it was against the UGC and not the Government.
89
  
University staff and unions and the sector bodies, the CVCP and the CDP, lobbied 
their MPs effectively to speak out in the House against the cuts; although, as we saw 
earlier, the message became fragmented as MPs mainly represented their particular 
constituency. Stronger criticisms are apparent in union documentation from the mid-
1980s. For example, the AUT’s March 1985 pamphlet - responding to the 
Government’s consultation prior to the 1985 Green Paper - roundly condemns 
Government policy, although the analysis is limited to attacking the Government on 
its failure to fund higher education adequately for the nation’s needs, rather than 
identifying the Government’s ideologically-determined agenda.90 The argument that 
higher education should be expanded - or at least restored to previously planned 
levels - was valid (similar to that put by the Labour Party in Parliament) but the 
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hardline Thatcherites were unlikely to take any notice. Assertions about the ‘positive 
investment’ that should be made in universities, as opposed to ‘the purely negative 
cost of wasted talent and unemployment’, not backed up with statistics to prove their 
case, was unlikely to diminish the Government’s ideological intent.91 
 
Most strikingly, it is apparent from the documentation that higher education staff’s 
ability to mount a coherent response, let alone attack, was hampered to a significant 
extent by the fact that a “divide and rule” was set up in each institution and across 
institutions as cuts were proposed or effected, with the arts against the sciences and 
vice versa, and department against department. Furthermore, the two separate sectors 
were represented by separate trade unions. From time to time all the campus unions 
combined to mount a concerted resistance, in collaboration with the NUS, such as the 
relatively large (11,000) mass lobby of Parliament on 18 November 1981.
92
 But, for 
the most part, even though there were official cross-binary and cross-union 
discussions, the unions responded separately to Government policies and this 
fragmented their opposition. Joseph effectively pointed this out in his 12 February 
1982 response to the AUT General Secretary. As the AUT had calculated the cuts to 
academic posts only, Joseph could use his overall figures on costs and savings to 
obfuscate that particular challenge.
93
 AUT papers are particularly striking in their 
almost complete lack of reference to PSHE. The university union clung steadfastly to 
its side of the binary divide, fearing that its abolition would give rise to some 
teaching-only universities.
94
 The effect was to fragment union opposition rather than 
strengthen the AUT’s case for research-led universities. From the other side of the 
binary divide, NATFHE was backing the NAB’s call for a higher education review 
and rational transbinary planning, considering it ‘unrealistic to suggest that students 
seeking humanities places in universities can be diverted to vocational and 
technological courses in the public sector. The future distribution of students 
between sectors […] can only satisfactorily take place if an evenhanded transbinary 
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approach is adopted, with genuine co-operation between NAB and UGC.’95 
However, NATFHE’s very defence of PSHE is at times expressed as an anti-
university stance. For example, in defending the continuation of arts and humanities 
subjects and of research in the sector, the union’s arguments were mainly financial: 
this provision was cheaper in PSHE than in the universities.
96
 They were in effect, 
even if not intentionally, helping to prove to the Government what could be done 
with less, given that ‘the public sector system for assuring objective quality and 
comparability from one institution to another is superior to that of the universities’.97  
Similarly, in defence of short, sub-degree and two-year degree courses in the 
polytechnics and colleges, the union promoted PSHE’s ‘flexible courses to meet 
student and employer needs’ and the ‘relevance’ of the provision.98 NATFHE was 
providing the Government with its script: degrees could be shorter and public 
expenditure on higher education could be kept down.
99
 This was not constructive in 
terms of building cross-binary resistance to the cuts as a whole.  
 
AUT HQ did express in speeches from time to time some realisation of the wider 
ideological context, as one AUT President put it: ‘At a time when three million are 
unemployed it seems that the government is prepared to find more money to make 
more people unemployed because it wants a smaller university system and reduced 
opportunities for eighteen year olds.’100 Expressing their objections much more 
tactically and strategically than earlier, an AUT Press Statement in 1982 pointed out 
that ‘the Government had just approved a compensation scheme to throw 5,000 
university teachers onto the dole queues whereas for a lesser sum of money those 
university teachers could be kept at work’.101 This was reinforced in a joint unions’ 
publicity flyer in April 1982.
102
 However, on the outbreak of the Falklands War, it 
was - as the AUT realised - a bad time to be trying to get press coverage.
103
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101 AUT Press Statement, 1 February 1982: UCU archives. 
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 Joint unions’ flyer ‘Cuts in Universities: A New Form of Madness’, April 1982: UCU archives. 
103 See Ch. 3, fn.41. 
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Although the unions proved unable to counter the Government’s ideological 
onslaught in the early 1980s, their opposition had been clear. However, towards the 
end of the 1980s, the evidence demonstrates a shift at national level, as the unions are 
drawn into collaborating on terms set by the Government. As resources were released 
and the Secretary of State, Kenneth Baker, embarked on expansion, the two sectors 
lined up to compete for a share of the market in student numbers, especially mature 
students. The AUT’s General Secretary admonished universities for having ‘so far 
made so little progress in extending access to higher education to non-traditional 
students’, as she identified the need for the universities to change as ‘essential for 
reasons of social justice, cultural vitality, and sheer economic utility’. It was 
important, she said, to ‘[change] ourselves to meet both what the country needs and 
what is wanted by our student clients’.104 The “reality” of diminishing resources and 
the desirability of treating students as ‘clients’ was now not just on the Government’s 
agenda but on the AUT’s - and, to boot, the union had even adopted the 
Government’s language of the marketplace. 
 
(b) The Tories  
In what ways did anti-Thatcherite tendencies within the Tory Party constitute any 
kind of resistance to, or at least put a brake on, the Government’s ideological assault 
on higher education?   
 
(b) (i) The traditionalists 
We have already seen that even the more traditionally-minded Tory MPs in the main 
supported Government cuts to higher education and the legislation of the 1980s, 
despite the contradictions inherent in simultaneously representing their constituents’ 
interests. Some Tory MPs, Lords and educationalists were not in favour of the 
Government’s emphasis on the instrumentalisation of a university education; nor did 
they welcome the centralising moves of the late 1980s. For example, MP Enoch 
Powell - reminiscent of Newman and Mill - thought that universities should be 
‘dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, regardless of the 
consequences or applications of the knowledge thus acquired’.105 For this, they 
needed ‘the freedom to pursue, and to teach others to pursue, knowledge for its own 
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 AUT and SCUE, Widening Access, op. cit: speech by Diana Warwick, AUT Secretary, p. 9. 
105 Powell, E., Of Universities and Polytechnics (London: Centre for Policy Studies, 1991), p. 5. 
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sake in whatever guise it presents itself [as that is universities’] very essence’.106 He 
saw no contradiction in the state providing ‘the lion’s share’ of the resources, this 
being ‘an act of faith’ from one generation to the next. He considered that the 
Government should not align higher education to employment, it being a ‘fatal 
fallacy […] to try to turn the world inside out and make economic progress the 
criterion of the pursuit of knowledge’. PSHE could train people in the ‘study of the 
processes in which an adult industrial population will overwhelmingly be involved’, 
in ‘activities which follow and obey economic forces, the workings of supply and 
demand in the market’.  Research should be reserved for the universities ‘where 
knowledge sought for its own sake is the only prize on offer’. Universities should not 
be under state control as there was ‘something about a university which is naturally 
antipathetic to the state. That is its autonomy.’107 Similarly, a Conservative student at 
the AUT Aberdeen debate defended ‘the investment’ in university education as 
not merely in technical skills, such as are provided by courses in engineering, or 
medicine, or business administration. The investment is much more fundamental, 
and it cannot be measured purely in terms of economic utility. Universities play a 
vital part in the development and dissemination of those virtues and values, which 
are the basis of a free and decent society. We must be wary of fashionable attacks 
on “useless” subjects, such as history and literature.  The purpose of universities is 
not simply to produce technicians, but to develop that intellectual and personal 
character, which may be of inestimable value to the individual, and to the society  
which he serves.
108
 
However, this liberal higher education would be suitable only for a few, as Powell 
confirms: ‘Given the spread of aptitudes and personalities in any population, it is 
unlikely that more than a minority of each generation will be irresistibly attracted and 
accordingly benefited by exposure to the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake in a 
university environment.’109 Given the built-in élitism, these views did not constitute a 
threat to the Government’s vision, which - by the end of the 1980s - could be seen 
more clearly: that the bulk of higher education should serve government-dominated 
instrumental purposes. And, given that, it could of course expand. 
 
(b) (ii) The “free-marketeers” 
As we saw in Chapters 3 and 6, the neoliberal “free-marketeers” led and influenced 
the Government’s thinking, and wanted to go even further. Joseph had argued that it 
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would be better - morally - for universities to be liberated from state subsidy as this 
would bring about their financial and academic independence. The think-tanks were 
critical of the Government’s cuts in the early 1980s and the centralising moves later 
on, so did this constitute a challenge? 
 
As we have seen from some of their number in the Lords, the blueprint of the 
neoliberal “free-marketeers” was that higher education institutions should become 
private, like the University of Buckingham (set up by the CPS in 1973). Some 
prominent neoliberal academics argued that the post-Robbins expansion of a state-
funded higher education system had led necessarily to central - and ideological - 
control.  Deepak Lal (Professor of Political Economy, University College, London) 
characterised the ‘open ended commitment of public expenditure which the Robbins 
principle entails’ as ‘indefensible’.110 He and others accepted the Government’s need 
to reduce public expenditure but considered that cutting university funding was doing 
irrevocable damage and would result in the loss of prestigious academic staff to the 
USA. A dependency on the state, it was argued, had the harmful effect of 
government being able to dictate to universities how their public funding should be 
spent - or cut.
111
 Elie Kedourie (Professor of Politics, the LSE) described the controls 
and legal powers which the Government was taking over the universities as 
‘paradoxical at a time when the cry is so loud for parental choice in school education, 
and opting out of local authority control’. Reflecting the views of Earl Russell,112 
Kedourie pointed out the contradictions: ‘Why it should be thought right and 
necessary for universities to be submitted to a regime akin to that of a command 
economy is quite obscure.’113 He considered it ‘quite mysterious [that] a 
Conservative administration should have embarked on a university policy so much at 
variance with its proclaimed ideals and objectives’.114 Even Robert Jackson (the 
Higher Education Minister), Kedourie reported, had ‘frankly avowed that what the 
Education Reform Act had effected in universities was nationalisation - 
nationalisation of higher education funding, he called it’. But Jackson had maintained 
that ‘it was a mistake to see the Act as a centralising measure’, but that ‘on the 
contrary: it will enable us “to strike in the direction of decentralisation” ’. How, 
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Kedourie queried, could it be claimed that ‘decentralisation’ could be achieved 
‘through extreme centralisation’? Surely ‘the world described by Mr Jackson is, to 
borrow a Hegelian expression, an inverted world’?115 Lal attacked the same 
contradictions:   
In July 1988 Mr Kenneth Baker, so it seemed, nationalised Britain’s universities, 
contravening the principles professed by the Government which he serves. For is 
not this Government committed to enlarging freedom and developing a free 
market economy? […] Mr Baker can plausibly cloak himself in the pragmatic 
garb of a traditional Tory who has followed post-war dirigisme to its tidy 
conclusion. But it should be noted that Thatcherism (at least as proclaimed) is 
based on defending a set of principles whose objective is the demise of socialism, 
whilst Mr Baker’s nationalisation of universities must go beyond the wildest 
dream of any socialist - if only they could regain power!
116
 
He continued:     
At a time when the Government, by privatising industry, is turning its back on 
decades of dirigisme it is ironic that it should appear to be doing the reverse in 
respect of universities.
117
 
 
Indeed so. However, it is also ironic that these “free-marketeers” seemed not to 
recognise the irony of their own position. Lal et al could go further than the 
politicians, providing the solution to what they saw as the problem: ‘[P]rivatisation 
of Britain’s universities remains essential not only for their future but also to resolve 
the most ironic paradox of the contemporary political scene’.118 But, ironically, he 
recognised that ‘public action might be required to “force them to be free”!’.119 
Universities should not be a publicly-funded state commodity to which there was 
universal entitlement, but should operate in the free market, ‘[taking] their chance in 
a hazardous world where, like everyone else, unless they know how to swim, they 
will surely sink’.120 Ferns maintained that there would be no need for the state to plan 
or fund student numbers because the market would decide ‘[t]he size of the 
university population […] [to] be determined only by that part of society which 
freely chooses to use and support them - not by politicians and civil servants’.121 
Kedourie argued: ‘If it is a public interest that the young should be educated, then let 
those who have the greatest interest in their welfare, namely their parents, themselves 
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attend to the education.’122 As Lal pointed out, as almost 22% of university students 
(at that time - 1989) came from private schools, surely their parents could afford to 
pay university fees too?
123
 There could be some student subsidies through grants or 
loans and, if students were paying for their education ‘by hire purchase’, they would 
be more careful with taxpayers’ money.124 Expressing the neoliberal belief in the 
market, Ferns concluded that ‘some universities are bound to use their independence 
well. Others may go under. Bankruptcy, not government, will sort the sheep from the 
goats.’125 His colleague John Burton (an Economics lecturer, University of 
Birmingham) argued that the polytechnics should similarly be given independence 
from the state.
126
 
 
As some Lords had also maintained, Kedourie argued that bringing higher education 
out of state control and privatising it was the only way to safeguard liberal - as 
opposed to utilitarian - values.
127
 Contrary to Powell’s views, Kedourie considered 
that the Robbins Report’s insistence on university autonomy could not be reconciled 
with their dependence on state funding.
128
 Similarly, Burton warned that, if 
government regulation were to continue, ‘the system is eventually likely to evolve 
into one of fully centralised direction of higher education’.129 Lal juxtaposed 
Newman’s liberal views with those of Jackson who (speaking at the University of 
Cambridge in 1988) stated ‘that the Government’s interest in higher education - 
while it embraces […] the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake - also has a 
stronger, more dynamic element in it which is this sense of the way in which higher 
education is important in the functioning [my emphasis] of a modern society’.130 It 
was a mistake, Lal thought, to assume that the acquisition of a higher education 
contributed to national economic growth, that ‘relevant’ and vocational courses 
should predominate, that costly official checks and performance indicators were 
needed to measure universities’ contribution to growth and whether the 
government’s investment was giving ‘value for money’. He considered that the 
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requirement for universities to provide more places in science and technology to be 
grossly interventionist (and, to boot, foolish, vindicated - he maintained - by the 
shortfall in women taking up these places).
131
 Reminiscent of Joseph’s view we 
noted earlier,
132
 Lal criticised the use (by Joseph’s own Government!) of central 
planning mechanisms, with their large number of officials, papers and ‘obsessive 
momentum, aspiring to a scientific exactitude’.133 Governments were able to do this, 
he claimed, because higher education institutions and their students were heavily 
dependent on state funding. Kedourie proclaimed that a university is ‘not a business’ 
and should not be subjected to the language and methods of the commercial sphere, 
such as contracting, nor central controls more akin to the Soviet Union, such as 
‘manpower planning’ and ‘social engineering’.134 If privatised, universities - fewer in 
number, of course - could be set up by whoever would fund them and run the way 
they wished, as Sidney and Beatrice Webb had founded the LSE, or using the US 
model of commissioning research and consultancy from private corporations.
135
 
Diversity and choice were needed because, as Burton argued, ‘the genuine guarantor 
of an objective search for truth is the existence of competition in the production of 
knowledge’.136 Privatisation was in the universities’ best interests. So although these 
commentators were opposed to the centralising tactics of the Thatcher Governments, 
they did not constitute a threat to the progress of the ideology because they shared 
the same goal: the neoliberalisation of the universities.
137
 
 
(iv) Turning resistance into collaboration and acceptance 
Despite the objections of many in higher education to the Government’s neoliberal 
agenda, the organisations and groups involved in planning and resourcing institutions 
and representing their staff became used as agents in the Government’s hegemonic 
process. It was possible for the Government to exploit the divisions between and 
across the two sectors, together with the operational shortcomings and ideological 
contradictions in the sector bodies, and to use government power to put its own 
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structures in place. To privatise higher education outright might have been the wish 
of some neoliberals but, by the end of the 1980s, a more complex process was taking 
place. The Government had begun to shape and requisition an expanded and state-
controlled higher education system to help it rework society in a neoliberal mould. 
Exploiting the contradictions, the Government had nationalised higher education in 
order to neoliberalise it. Those within had been led - whether in confusion, by 
compromise or by default, through lack of alternative policies - into a state of 
collaboration. By the end of the 1980s, higher education - or at least its policymakers 
and managers - had started to accept and take on the Government’s preferred policy 
directions, and to internalise and reproduce the new values, practices and language as 
the only common sense way of “delivering” higher education.   
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Chapter 8 Conclusion: ‘Coherence comes at the end of the process.’1 
 
(i) The question 
Why and how did the shift from an inherently liberal to an explicitly government-led 
instrumental view of higher education take place and take hold? This thesis has 
considered the development of the relationship of higher education to the state under 
the New Right governments of Britain in the 1980s, on which basis, I maintain, that 
question can best be answered through the ideological model I have employed. 
  
I considered in Chapter 1 aspects of others’ accounts of higher education’s history, 
noting some commentators’ claims that, once British higher education had become 
predominantly state-funded and had moved from an élite to a mass system, 
governments would - as if automatically or inevitably - make higher education serve 
their interests. In that sense, the Robbins Report can be said to represent not the 
quintessential expression of universities’ liberal values - as is often claimed - but the 
beginnings of greater government control over higher education, ushering in all that 
followed. On the one hand, it can be seen as another expansionist policy of the post-
war social democratic welfare state, extending higher education to more students, 
entitled to state-funded grants. On the other hand, the Report can be seen as marking 
a much more explicit and direct relationship between the state and the higher 
education it was funding. While not denying that universities as consumers of public 
money and educators of others should operate some forms of self-regulation, 
financial accountability and academic peer review, these are not issues with which I 
am concerned here. What I have been seeking to establish is that the relationship 
between the state and higher education re-drawn under Thatcher was the outcome of 
an ideological process in pursuit of hegemony. This process was in part achieved 
through the implementation of a deliberate agenda and in part unfolded in the way 
ideology functions to distort reality, play on contradictions and build consent.   
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(ii) The ideological explanation 
I therefore analysed how a publicly-funded and autonomous university system, free 
at the point of delivery for most undergraduate students since 1962, was 
reconstructed radically between 1979-1990 into being understood as answerable to, 
and at the service of, a state whose governments attacked existing academic values in 
order to put neoliberal norms, values and practices in their place.
2
 Was it not 
contradictory that the Thatcher Governments ended up wanting to requisition higher 
education for their cause? One might have expected New Right governments to have 
privatised it but this did not happen.
3
 Instead, the Thatcher Governments (and their 
successors) kept - and even expanded - higher education as a state-run concern, 
strengthening central controls over it. Although this might seem paradoxical, in so 
doing they secured its participation - slowly but surely - in their ideological cause, 
making it operate explicitly as an ideological arm of the state.
4
 To understand how 
that was possible, I considered how an ideology is produced, functions and succeeds. 
I drew on two interpretations of how ideology works: first, as a set of ideas whose 
development and shifts I tracked through documents and debates; second, as a 
medium for framing, transmitting and embedding those ideas, functioning through 
universalising from selective and partial presentations of reality, and recruiting 
agents to help construct consent. The first needed the second to make it work. Once 
higher education was destabilised, and in the absence of strong alternatives, the 
ideological process could work on the contradictions inherent in both the social 
democratic consensus and in Thatcherism to shift ideas and practices to serve the 
construction of a neoliberal version of reality. We have seen that the Thatcher 
Governments made use of various incoherent and contradictory ideas and practices, 
                                               
2 Labour MP Roland Boyes noted: ‘As history shows that Right-wing Governments always find it 
necessary to attack their country’s intellectuals, and as the Government values are leading to the 
erosion of democratic rights and freedoms and civil liberties, was it not entirely predictable that our 
universities and academics would be similarly attacked?’ - HC Deb, 21 May 1985, vol.79, c.868.   
3 See Ch. 4, fn.5. 
4 In 1993, Lord Annan summarised the situation (HL Deb, 6 December 1993, vol.550, cc.791-792, my 
emphasis): ‘The HEFC was set up, not like the UGC as a buffer between government and the 
universities, but as an arm of government under direction of the Department for Education. Let me 
not mince words. The Government treat universities like so many piles of dung. The Government no 
longer trust universities to assess their own activities. They intend to reshape higher education, taking 
business as their model, giving universities a bottom line as low as possible and adding a few 
increments to some to take account of special excellence in teaching or research. The excellence is to 
be judged by quangos set up to push the universities around. […] The Government have announced a 
programme of massive de-regulation. Why not start with a little de-regulation of the universities? The 
Home Secretary has said that the police are hampered in fighting crime by excessive paperwork. The 
universities are hampered by exactly the same thing at the moment.’ 
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in an ad hoc and pragmatic fashion, but nonetheless as part of an ideological 
“endgame” to which some were deliberately - and others unknowingly - party. The 
Governments were able to promote their ideological agenda by taking advantage of 
the contradictions in their and their opponents’ ideas and of situations as they arose. 
There had to be a “new deal” between higher education and the state so that the 
former, as Stuart Maclure realised (writing in 1992), could help to ‘create a nation of 
enterprise and to discredit the “dependency culture” associated with the forty years 
after World War Two’. Higher education institutions were ‘to be paid for doing what 
the Government tells them to do, or not paid at all’, as Maclure summarised it.5 
Through an analysis of the documents and parliamentary debates, I have 
demonstrated the hegemonic process whereby higher education was brought to 
operate according to neoliberal practices and values, a new consensus emerging from 
the New Right’s zealotry to acquire political, organisational and intellectual 
domination.   
 
(iii) The struggle for hegemony 
But was domination in fact achieved? And how can this be judged? I use four ways 
in which to assess whether a successful challenge was made to a liberal higher 
education system and whether its relationship to the state changed fundamentally.   
 
The first is to consider the extent to which the system withstood the onslaught of the 
neoliberal attack. In comparison with the extent to which neoliberal values and 
moves towards privatisation were imposed on other public services in the 1980s, 
higher education was remarkably resilient to neoliberal incursions - at the time. 
Although cuts destabilised the institutions, no university closed and neither 
university nor polytechnic academics were made compulsorily redundant. University 
academics held on for a while to long-established liberal traditions and practices, 
such as tenure, that would be dislodged only by legislation passed towards the end of 
the 1980s. The polytechnics opened up access to higher education; and their 
independence in 1988, followed by acquisition of university status and degree-
awarding powers from 1992, are seen by many as liberalising moves, strengthening 
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higher education overall.
6
 Many students unable to find university places went to 
PSHE institutions instead. Higher education thus expanded in the 1980s, with many 
more students undertaking degrees. The early radical proposals, such as student 
vouchers and the withdrawal of all state funding from higher education institutions, 
recommended by the CPRS, were a step too far for many liberal-minded Tory MPs 
and did not command sufficient political support to be enacted.
7
 Similarly, Tory 
MPs’ opposition to Joseph’s proposals to charge tuition fees delayed their 
introduction until the 1990s.
8
   
 
While many New Right gurus and advisers came from academe, the majority of 
academics held on to their liberal values (whether in “social democratic” or 
“conservative” mode) unscathed, as Anderson commented in 1992: 
The new Right had always been relatively weak in the academy, and lacked the 
cadres to impose its vision at large. The great bulk of the British intellectual 
establishment held fast to its moderate liberal verities, indifferent or hostile to 
creeds of either Left or Right. The deep structures of its inherited outlook 
remained largely unshaken through all the zig-zags of British politics in these  
years.
9
   
As part of the Establishment, traditional universities reflected conservative British 
values, which Thatcherism attacked but did not destroy. While the polytechnics and 
their vocational subjects expanded, a liberal university education at the “top” 
universities was - and still is - available and is still considered in popular terms to be 
the “best” higher education to be had, especially for the élite. Furthermore, such an 
education came increasingly to be offered more widely by the polytechnics 
themselves. Nevertheless, others - including many students - now see higher 
education in much more instrumental terms. In many - albeit by no means in all -
universities and departments what was once a student-teacher learning relationship is 
being replaced by a predominantly consumer-producer relationship.
10
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A second way of assessing the extent to which neoliberalism succeeded in 
undermining a liberal higher education system is to consider what factors contributed 
to changing that system to reflect neoliberal values. The challenge came about in a 
number of ways. First, the selective UGC cuts made in response to government cuts 
to the university grant in the early 1980s shocked and disoriented universities. This 
was not just because it was a resources cut, but also because an external body (the 
UGC, which universities had previously characterised as on their side) was deciding 
for them which subjects in which universities should be cut, and for financial rather 
than academic reasons. This constituted a direct intervention in their affairs. Second, 
in denying (at least initially) a higher education to many, the cuts undermined the 
view that had held sway since the end of the Second World War that a university 
education was worthwhile per se, irrespective of the subject chosen. Third, as 
PSHE’s response was progressively to cut the unit of resource, this would come to 
result in weakening higher education as a whole - an acceptance of government 
funding at a lower unit level. As the quality of liberal higher education declined, for 
example in terms of contact hours and class sizes, so its traditional value became less 
clear and harder to defend. Fourth, higher education institutions started raising much 
more of their income from private sources, thus beginning to pave the way for what 
was to develop in the 2000s. Fifth, and relatedly, successive reports and legislation 
impressed upon higher education the need to reject liberal values and a higher 
education “for its own sake” (except for the few) and to see it instead in instrumental 
terms, predominantly as a preparation for employment, with the result that the liberal 
arts and humanities were “de-valued” during the period, with some areas of the 
social sciences being positively vilified. Sixth, and continuing and developing the 
instrumental trend just outlined, reports and legislation imposed nationally 
determined requirements of accountability (both financial and academic) upon 
individual higher education institutions, undermining notions of academic autonomy 
and self-regulation, and needing internal administrations, governing bodies and 
external quangos at once to manage compliance and encourage entrepreneurial 
responses to extra cash incentives. Seventh, the practice of students being funded at 
public expense - that is, the very idea of a full-time student - was eroded, it being no 
longer accepted that they could draw on a living maintenance grant and have tuition 
fees paid at public expense, so that all but the richest students had to rely on a 
combination of student loans and “working their way through college”. Eighth, the 
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Thatcher rhetoric engendered what Maclure calls ‘a heightened public anxiety’ 
against higher education (as against all public services), leading people to think of it 
as a drain on “taxpayers”, rather than a valued public resource.11 The status of 
academics was undermined: they were no longer seen as an esteemed profession but, 
rather, as inhabitants of “ivory towers”, out of touch with “the real world”. British 
intellectuals - as Anderson puts it - ‘now felt not so much, perhaps, disaffected as 
disestablished’.12   
 
A third way of assessing the extent to which a neoliberal approach to higher 
education had become accepted by the end of the 1980s is to consider how the social, 
historical and cultural norms of the sector contributed to the ideological process of 
neoliberalising itself and the wider British context. In the preceding thirty years or 
so, government moves had tended to reinforce the hierarchical divide between the 
universities and the further education sector: for example, the remit of the Robbins 
Report did not include aspects of higher education taking place in the further 
education colleges.
13
 Higher education remained dominated and divided by whether 
institutions were inside or outside a unitary university system. The situation was 
further confused, rather than ameliorated, by the Labour Government’s binary policy, 
even though this expressly identified a new public sector of higher education to 
challenge the universities’ prestige. To counter this, universities would increasingly 
seek to differentiate themselves in a hierarchy of “research-led” institutions. In an 
attempt to preserve the universities’ higher unit of resource, which supported their 
ability to undertake research, the UGC cut student numbers in the early 1980s - but 
this led to PSHE expansion, often in subjects (such as business studies, IT, etc.) that 
accorded with – and thereby strengthened - the Government’s instrumental view of 
higher education. So instead of there being more new universities with more students 
(which would have happened if all the Robbins’ proposals had been carried through 
and student numbers had risen in response to market demand), the way the two 
sectors were positioned by the 1980s encouraged them to compete - something 
encouraged by a hierarchical higher education structure that discouraged 
collaboration. Furthermore, as Peter Scott has pointed out, ‘the binary policy let the 
universities off the reform hook’ back in the 1960s, as some of the PSHE institutions, 
                                               
11 Maclure, S., op. cit., p. 173. 
12
 Anderson, P., op. cit., p. 198 
13 See Ch. 3, fn.92. 
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supported by the peer review system operated by the CNAA, took the lead on 
pedagogical developments and support for “access” and “non-traditional” students. 
As Scott continues, ‘the existence of “alternative” institutions cast university 
development in an entirely new, and possibly more conservative, light’.14 Their 
conservatism laid them open to a stronger ideological challenge, especially given the 
contradictions inherent in their wish to remain independent and autonomous, while 
drawing almost exclusively on public money and with very little accountability. To 
keep a liberal higher education for the élite meant that greater differentiation would 
increasingly have to be drawn between the “excellence” of the “top research” 
universities and all the rest, which would be more closely aligned to training and 
employment - the instrumental needs of neoliberal governments.   
 
A fourth way of judging the extent to which neoliberalism came to dominate as the 
prevailing ideology in higher education is to judge it not simply by what the Thatcher 
Governments managed to achieve at the time but to consider - briefly - the legacy of 
neoliberalism post-Thatcher. As noted in Chapter 1, Hall explains how material 
practice can ‘change the nature of the terrain itself’ and bring about ‘a new balance 
of political forces’.15 How an ideology is “materialised” (in Althusser’s sense), 
becomes clearer when viewed retrospectively. It might well not always have seemed 
at the time as if neoliberal values had obtained a foothold in higher education but - 
with the benefit of hindsight - we can now see how the practice of neoliberalism has 
“changed the terrain” of higher education, and indeed of British society as a whole. 
As Michael Gove, Tory Secretary of State for Education, commented in 2013 (on 
another matter): ‘Coherence comes at the end of the process.’16 Almost as if 
following Althusser, Joseph had realised that not all reforms could be put in place 
immediately but that it was important to set up basic structures and pass initial 
legislation.
17
 As Stuart Sexton reflected in 1987 (on a matter concerning schools):   
[T]he mistake has been to assume that we can get from where we are now to 
where we want to be in one giant stride […]. After a hundred years of state-
managed education, it will take more time to accommodate the schools, the 
                                               
14 Scott, P., The Crisis of the University, op. cit., p. 191. 
15 See Ch. 1, fn.71.  
16
 See fn.1 above. 
17 See Ch. 5, fns.67 and 97. 
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teachers and above all the parents themselves to a system of free choice; from a 
producer-led system to a consumer-led system, which is what it ought to be.
18
 
The story of this “long revolution” is about ‘bringing views which were once 
regarded as unacceptable into common currency’, thereby changing ‘the boundaries 
of debate’, as Maclure describes it.19 In time, as Schwarz points out, ‘yesterday’s 
outrage becomes tomorrow’s norm’.20 The struggle for hegemony in higher 
education would take time to accomplish; but it is a measure of its success that it has 
now become possible to propose legislation firmly embedding the neoliberal agenda 
- such as charging £9,000 annual undergraduate tuition fees, withdrawing public 
funding from arts and humanities subjects, and considering the extension of degree-
awarding powers and the university title to commercial enterprises.
21
 These kinds of 
changes were impossible under Thatcher; her achievement, rather, was to make what 
was once politically impossible become increasingly politically inevitable, to 
paraphrase Friedman.
22
 The neoliberal “battle of ideas” - in higher education, as in 
other areas - was initiated under Thatcher; it defeated its initial opponents by the 
mid-1990s; and it is now capitalising on those successes.
23
  
 
 
                                               
18 Sexton, S., Our Schools: A Radical Policy (Warlingham: Institute of Economic Affairs Education 
Unit, 1987). Andrew Denham drew attention to this quote in his Think-Tanks, op. cit., p. 85. 
19 Maclure, S., op. cit., p. 165. By 1992, Anderson confirmed how ‘an unabashed capitalist ethos’ had 
taken hold under Thatcher, concluding: ‘The best evidence of this political ascendancy was the 
transformation of the Labour Party under it, the most enduring single achievement of Thatcher’s rule. 
Here lies, indeed, the central difference between the conjunctures of 1963 and 1991.’ - Anderson, P., 
op. cit., p. 306.   
20 Schwarz, B., op. cit., p. 125. 
21 BIS, Higher Education: Students at the Heart of the System, op. cit. 
22 See Ch. 1, fn.64.  
23 As John MacGregor (Secretary of State for Education and Science in 1989) later pointed out: ‘[T]he 
Labour party, having opposed so much of what we carried through in the 1980s, have now come 
around to the recognition that we were right, and will not attempt to reverse most of the reforms. 
Listening to Tony Blair’s speeches recently, I have been struck by the extent to which he is claiming 
that the Labour party would pursue policies which, when I and other Secretaries of State were taking 
them through Parliament in the 1980s, were being bitterly opposed by Labour spokesmen […]. This is 
just another example of how the Conservatives won the battle of political ideas in the 1980s, and of 
how politics have now moved firmly on to our ground.’ - Ribbins, P. and Sherratt, B., op. cit., p. 7. 
Demonstrating this shift, New Labour Minister for Further and Higher Education in 2002, Margaret 
Hodge, expressed to Vice-Chancellors her bemusement that universities as autonomous and  
independent institutions ‘expected a guaranteed and permanent underwriting of their activity and 
funding by the state’ and that she wanted to ‘enable the market to play a much stronger role in 
determining student choice and research investment’: Clare, J., ‘Failing universities to lose 
government funding’, The Telegraph, 12 September 2002: available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1406954/Failing-universities-to-lose-government-funding 
[accessed 2 May 2012]. By 2010, Tory Cabinet Office Minister, Francis Maude, announced that the 
new Coalition Government  would be looking to push though ‘more vigorous reforms’, building on 
the work of both Thatcher and Blair: Wintour, P., ‘Minister: we’re more radical than Thatcher’, The 
Guardian, 31 July 2010, p. 1. 
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(iv) Embedded neoliberalism 
The Thatcher Governments had initially seemed intent on returning university 
provision to pre-Robbins days and making PSHE institutions into providers of 
vocational courses only; and in both cases on reduced funding as part of public 
expenditure cuts. However, it became apparent to them in the mid- to late 1980s that 
they could turn an expanded higher education system - over which they had by then 
acquired central control - into an ideological arm of the state, in order to “liberate” it. 
What had seemed ideologically incoherent turned out not to be: centralisation was a 
route to the marketisation and commodification of higher education.
24
   
 
It was necessary for Thatcher and her followers to appropriate the higher education 
system because its extension beyond the élite to others in the 1960s and 1970s had 
shown that expansion could lead to a loss of government control. If too many 
students became too critical of established power structures, higher education 
institutions might all too easily turn into an institutionalised oppositional force and 
this would destabilise capitalism. The Thatcher Governments needed to regain 
control not just over the economy, to favour their own interests, but also over “the 
ruling ideas”. Instead of casting higher education into the private domain, the 
Thatcher Governments realised they could turn it into a re-formed and explicitly 
ideological state apparatus. They could use the state to attack the state, so to speak, 
and to assist in embedding their ideology at a deeper level. A neoliberal re-
interpretation of the purpose of a higher education was to be achieved not simply by 
government diktat but by building on contradictions to arrive at a re-presentation of 
“reality”. Liberal ideas and practices could be appropriated and transformed to meet 
other ends. For example, academic practices of peer review in research and teaching 
could be used as the means to build compliance to a market-led agenda, centrally 
controlled. Then surveillance becomes no longer necessary as the inmates come to 
police themselves, as Barnett puts it.
25
 Grudging acquiescence could be turned into 
active support, thereby shifting the terms of the debate and ensuring that new codes 
of practice and behaviour became internalised and would endure. In Marxian terms, 
capitalism needed a subservient labour force. Education, as Althusser recognised, 
                                               
24 See Ch. 4, fn.139. Similarly, in 2013, schools are being forced to come out of ‘the control of elected 
councils and into the hands of central government and private sponsors’: Monbiot, G., ‘With threats 
and bribes our schools are forced to be “free” ’, The Guardian, 5 March 2013, p. 32. 
25 Barnett, R., Beyond All Reason, op. cit., p. 46. 
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needed to be appropriated as an ideological state apparatus to make the system 
work.
26
 Those studying and employed in higher education not only needed to adopt 
neoliberal values themselves, but the structures in which they worked needed to be 
changed to reflect and institutionalise those ideas, beliefs and practices, so that they 
would be reproduced for others to perpetuate. And the coherence would come once 
neoliberal practices and values had become adopted and “owned” (in the jargon) by 
those who had originally opposed them.   
 
With the conversion of many intellectuals and university managers to neoliberal 
ways of thought and modes of expression, the ‘logic of competition’ has now been 
internalised ‘deep into how universities work’, as Callinicos puts it.27 To take just 
one example: Collini has to challenge his colleagues to recognise the process that has 
occurred (with specific reference to the Research Excellence Framework):  
[W]e need to try to use a more adequate language in public discussion lest these 
officious abstractions start to colonize our minds. One reason why measures such 
as these do not now provoke more vociferous opposition is that over the past three 
decades our sensibilities have been numbed by the proliferation of economistic 
officialise: “user satisfaction”, “market forces”, “accountability”, and so on. 
Perhaps our ears no longer hear what a fatuous, weaselly phrase “Research 
Excellence Framework” actually is, or how ludicrous it is to propose that the 
quality of scholarship can be partly judged in terms of the number of “external  
research users” or the range of “impact indicators”.28 
Furthermore, with the higher education state apparatus on board, similar forms of 
expression, ways of thinking and behaving can be reproduced and passed on to 
others, as Harvey explains: ‘[O]nce the state apparatus made the neoliberal turn it 
could use its powers of persuasion, co-optation, bribery, and threat to maintain the 
climate of consent necessary to perpetuate its power’.29 If change becomes 
internalised and embedded, then further changes are possible and seem “natural”.   
                                               
26 See Ch. 2, fns.73-76.  
27 Harvey, D., op. cit., p. 40; Callinicos, A., Universities, op. cit., p. 11. For a vigorous defence by a 
Vice-Chancellor of the need to apply market principles to higher education, see Waterhouse, R., 
‘Serve the customer’, The Times Higher Education Supplement, 20/27 December 2002, p. 14. He 
considered that universities were ‘just another service industry and must respond to the market’. 
Similarly, a fellow Vice-Chancellor Steven Schwartz (the then VC of Brunel University and Chair of 
a Government inquiry into university admissions in 2004) asserted that universities should operate a 
free market in admissions based on student vouchers. He added: ‘If funding followed students through 
the use of vouchers, universities would be cut loose from quotas and allowed to enrol as many or as 
few students as they wished.’ - quoted in Association of University Administrators, ‘Press Digest No. 
364’, 20 August 2004. 
28 Collini, S., ‘Impact on humanities’, op. cit. See also Robinson, A. and Tormey, S., op. cit., for a 
detailed decoding/debunking of New Labour language in the 2003 higher education White Paper. 
29 Harvey, D., op. cit., p. 40. 
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In exploring why the idea of publicly-funded higher education is under threat in 
Britain today, James Vernon argues that ‘[p]reventing the headlong rush to a new 
idea of the consumer-orientated and profit-centred university requires more than 
outrage [and] protest’. He emphasises that  
[w]e must first try to understand how we arrived at the point where a redirection 
of public funds to support sub-prime loans for student-debt-financing of higher 
education seemed natural and inevitable. It is no longer sufficient to nostalgically 
invoke a better idea of the university, of a golden age of public funding, without 
understanding how it became so vulnerable to a critique that has eventually  
eviscerated it.
30
   
An ideological analysis of what happened to higher education under Thatcher shows 
us how a new relationship of higher education to the state was constructed. However, 
we do not need to consider that construction as the only possible outcome of the 
history of higher education prior to 1979 nor the only “natural”, “common sense” 
response to the contexts and issues of the 1980s up to the present day. It is instead 
the result of government decisions being strengthened and opponents’ compliance 
assured through an ideological process that, once understood, can be challenged so 
that other alternatives can be built.
31
 Although people are the products of 
circumstances, they also have the potential to change them.
32
 
                                               
30 Vernon, J., ‘Canary in the coal mine’, Times Higher Education, 1 December 2011: available at 
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/features/canary-in-the-coal-mine/418284.article [accessed 16 
April 2012]. 
31 Challenging Joseph’s claim that between 10,000-20,000 student places per year were ‘inevitably’ 
going to be lost from the universities as a result of the early 1980s’ cuts, Cliff Slaughter (University of 
Bradford) queried (AUT Aberdeen, op. cit., p. 36): ‘What does the word “inevitable” mean? It is not 
inevitable at all. It is a decision of the government - unless Sir Keith believes that the decisions of this 
government are part of the natural order of things! It is not inevitable, and it is not inevitable that the 
government will stay in office either.’   
32 Editor’s Introduction to Engels, F. and Marx, K., The German Ideology, ed. Arthur, C. J. (London: 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1970), p. 23. 
 
 216 
 
 
Bibliography    
 
Aberdeen Association of University Teachers, Universities against the Cuts:  
a Report of the Teach-in held at King’s College, University of Aberdeen, on Saturday,  
5
th
 December, 1981 (Aberdeen: AUT, 1982). 
 
Althusser, L., For Marx (London: Verso, 1969).  
 
Althusser, L. and Balibar, E., Reading Capital (London: NLB, 1970).  
          
Althusser, L., Essays in Self-Criticism (London: NLB, 1976). 
 
Althusser, L., 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses', in Essays on Ideology 
(London: Verso, 1984), pp. 1-60.      
 
Anderson, P., English Questions (London: Verso, 1992). 
 
Arblaster, A., ‘Ideology and Intellectuals’, in Benewick, R., Berki, R.N., Parekh, B. 
(eds), Knowledge and Belief in Politics: the Problem of Ideology (London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1973), pp. 115-129.   
 
Arblaster, A., 'Scruton: Intellectual by Appointment', New Socialist, November 1985, 
pp. 16-20.  
 
Ashby, E., Technology and the Academics (London: Macmillan, 1963). 
 
Association of University Administrators, ‘Press Digest No. 364’, 20 August 2004. 
 
Association of University Teachers, Universities at Risk (London: AUT, January 
1980). 
 
Association of University Teachers, The Universities’ Contribution to the Nation: a 
Report (London: AUT, 1980). 
 
Association of University Teachers, Universities and Higher Education – the Case for 
Expansion (London: AUT, March 1985). 
 
Association of University Teachers, The Case for Increased Investment in our 
Universities: Association of University Teachers’ submission to the Department of 
Education and Science - to be considered in the Government’s Public Expenditure 
Review 1989 (London: AUT, July 1989). 
 
Association of University Teachers, Universities and National Needs: evidence 
submitted to the Department of Education and Science to highlight the needs of 
universities (London: AUT, June 1990). 
 
Association of University Teachers, Goodwill under Stress: morale in UK universities 
(London: AUT, Autumn 1990). 
 
 217 
 
Association of University Teachers and Standing Conference on University Entrance, 
Widening Access to University Education: Conference Report, the Barbican,  
25 April 1988 (London: AUT and SCUE, 1988). 
 
Baker, S., ‘Grayling’s plans for tutorials with the stars receive poor notices from 
disgruntled critics’, Times Higher Education, 9 June 2011: available at 
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/416440.article [accessed 12 June 2011].  
 
Ball, C. and Eggins, H. (eds), Higher Education into the 1990s: New Dimensions 
(Milton Keynes: SRHE and the Open University Press, 1989). 
 
Barnes, J. and Barr, N., Strategies for Higher Education: the Alternative White Paper 
(London: Aberdeen University Press, LSE, 1988). 
 
Barnett, C., The Audit of War (London: Macmillan, 1986). 
 
Barnett, R., The Idea of Higher Education (Buckingham: SRHE and the Open 
University Press, 1990). 
 
Barnett, R., Beyond All Reason: Living with Ideology in the University (Buckingham: 
SRHE and the Open University Press, 2003). 
 
Bell, R., Fowler, G. and Little, K. (eds), Education in Great Britain and Ireland: a 
Source Book (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul with the Open University Press, 
1973). 
 
Benewick, R., Berki, R.N., Parekh, B. (eds), Knowledge and Belief in Politics: the 
Problem of Ideology (London: Allen and Unwin, 1973).    
    
Benton, T., The Rise and Fall of Structural Marxism: Althusser and his Influence 
(London: Macmillan, 1984).      
 
Bird, R., ‘Reflections on the British Government and Higher Education’, Higher 
Education Quarterly, Volume 48, Number 2, 1994, pp. 73-85. 
 
Boggs, C., Gramsci's Marxism (London: Pluto Press, 1976).  
 
Booth, P. (ed.), Were 364 Economists All Wrong? (London: Institute of Economic 
Affairs, 2006): available at 
http://www.iea.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/files/upldbook310pdf.pdf 
[accessed 1 August 2013]. 
 
Bottomore, T. (ed.), Modern Interpretations of Marx (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981). 
 
Brecher, B., ‘Complicity and modularisation: how universities were made  
safe for the market’, Critical Quarterly, Volume 47, Issue 1-2, 2005, pp. 72-82. 
 
Brecher, B., Fleishmann, O. and Halliday, J. (eds), The University in a Liberal State 
(Aldershot: Avebury, 1996). 
 
 218 
 
 
Brock, M., ‘The debate: who’ll use these new levers of state control?’, in Haviland, J. 
(ed.), Take Care, Mr Baker!: a selection from the advice on education which the 
government collected but decided not to publish (London: Fourth Estate, 1988), pp. 
231-233. 
 
Callaghan, J., ‘Towards a national debate: speech by the Prime Minister James 
Callaghan at a foundation stone-laying ceremony at Ruskin College, Oxford, on  
18 October 1976’: available at 
http://education.guardian.co.uk/thegreatdebate/story/0,9860,574645,00.html  
[accessed 2 October 2012].  
 
Callinicos, A., Althusser's Marxism (London: Pluto Press, 1976).   
 
Callinicos, A., Marxism and Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983). 
 
Callinicos, A., Universities in a Neoliberal World (London: Bookmarks Publications, 
2006). 
 
Callinicos, A., The Revolutionary Ideas of Karl Marx (London: Bookmarks 
Publications, Fourth Reprint, 2010). 
 
Carswell, J., Government and the Universities in Britain: Programme & Performance 
1960–1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).   
 
Centre for Policy Studies, Annual Review: the Power of Ideas (London: CPS, 1988). 
 
Chevening Discussion Paper, ‘ “Manpower planning” in higher education’,  
25 July 1988 (leaked July 1988). 
 
Chitty, C., Towards a New Education System: the Victory of the New Right? (Lewes, 
Sussex: Falmer Press, 1989). 
 
Clare, J., ‘Failing universities to lose government funding’, The Telegraph,  
12 September 2002: available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1406954/Failing-universities-to-lose-
government-funding [accessed 2 May 2012]. 
 
Clark, A. and Tarsh, J. (as officers of the Department of Education and Science), 
‘How much is a degree worth?’, Education & Training UK 1987: an economic, social 
and policy audit (London: Policy Journals, 1987), pp. 109-115. 
 
Cohen, M., ‘Reversing into trouble’, Times Higher Education, 9 December 2010: 
available at http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/414510.article [accessed 12 
December 2010].  
 
Collini, S., ‘Impact on humanities: Researchers must take a stand now or be judged 
and rewarded as salesmen’, The Times Literary Supplement, Number 5563,  
13 November 2009, pp. 18-19. 
 
 
 219 
 
 
Collini, S., ‘Browne’s gamble’, London Review of Books, Volume 32,  
Number 21, 4 November 2010, pp. 23-25: available at 
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v32/n21/stefan-collini/brownes-gamble [accessed 8 November 
2010]. 
 
Collini, S., ‘From Robbins to McKinsey’, London Review of Books, Volume 33, 
Number 16, 25 August 2011: available at http://www.lrb.co.uk/v33/n16/stefan-
collini/from-robbins-to-mckinsey [accessed 28 August 2011]. 
 
Collini, S., What Are Universities For? (London: Penguin Books, 2012). 
 
Committee on Higher Education, Higher Education: Report of the Committee 
appointed by the Prime Minister under the Chairmanship of Lord Robbins 1961-3 
(Robbins Report), Cmnd. 2154 (London: HMSO, 1963): available online at 
http://www.educationengland.org.uk/documents/robbins/ [accessed 16 July 2012].    
 
Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals, Report of the Steering Committee for 
Efficiency Studies in Universities (Jarratt Report) (London: CVCP, March 1985). 
 
Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals, Academic Standards in the 
Universities (Reynolds Report) (London: CVCP, 1986).   
 
Conservative Party, The Conservative Manifesto (London: Conservative Central 
Office, April 1979). 
 
Conservative Party, The General Election Manifesto, The Conservative Party: the 
Challenge of our Times (London: Conservative Central Office, 1983). 
 
Conservative Party, The Conservative Manifesto: The Next Moves Forward  
(London: Conservative Central Office, May 1987). 
 
Council for National Academic Awards, The Planning and Funding of Higher 
Education, CNAA Information Services, Briefing Paper 3 (London: CNAA, March 
1988). 
 
Cowan, A., ‘History UK (HE)’, The Institute of Historical Research, 2008: available 
at http://www.history.ac.uk/makinghistory/resources/articles/HE.html [accessed 31 
December 2012]. 
 
Cowling, M. (ed.), Conservative Essays (London: Cassell, 1978). 
  
Cox, C. B. and Dyson, A.E. (eds), The Black Papers on Education (London: 
Broadwick House, 1971). 
 
Dale, I. (ed.), Labour Party General Election Manifestos 1900-1997 (London: 
Routledge, 2000. 
 
Denham, A., Think-Tanks of the New Right (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing  
Company Limited, 1996). 
 220 
 
 
Denham, A. and Garnett, M., Keith Joseph (Durham: Acumen, 2001). 
 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Securing a Sustainable Future for 
Higher Education: an Independent Review of Higher Education Funding & Student 
Finance (Browne Report), 12 October 2010: available at 
www.independent.gov.uk/browne-report [accessed 15 October 2010]. 
 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Higher Education: Students  
at the Heart of the System, White Paper, Cm. 8122, June 2011: available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://discuss.bis.gov.uk/hereform/white-
paper/, and Government Response, June 2012, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32405/
12-890-government-response-students-and-regulatory-framework-higher-
education.pdf [accessed 20 July 2012]. 
 
Department for Education, Further and Higher Education Act 1992 (Norwich: The 
Stationery Office, 1992). 
 
Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills, Higher Education at Work - High 
Skills: High Value (London: DIUS, April 2008).  
 
Department of Cultural Studies, University of Birmingham, Education Limited: 
Schooling, Training and the New Right in England since 1979 (London: Unwin 
Hyman Ltd., 1991). 
 
Department of Education and Science, A Plan for Polytechnics and Other Colleges: 
Higher Education in the Further Education System, Cmnd. 3006 (London: HMSO, 
May 1966). 
 
Department of Education and Science, Education: a Framework for Expansion,  
White Paper, Cmnd. 5174 (London: HMSO, December 1972). 
 
Department of Education and Science, Report of the Working Group on the 
Management of Higher Education in the Maintained Sector (Oakes Report), Brown 
Paper, Cmnd. 7130 (London: HMSO, March 1978).    
 
Department of Education and Science and the Scottish Education Department,  
Higher Education into the 1990s: a Discussion Document, Brown Paper (London: 
HMSO, 1978).    
 
Department of Education and Science, Higher Education in England outside the 
Universities: Policy, Funding and Management, Green Paper (London: HMSO, July 
1981). 
 
Department of Education and Science, Report by HM Inspectors on the Polytechnic of 
North London: BSc Sociology, BA Applied Social Studies courses, Inner London, 
inspected 27-29 April and 3-6 May 1983, DES 177/83 (London: HMSO, 1983). 
 
 221 
 
Department of Education and Science, Academic Validation in Public Sector Higher 
Education (Lindop Report), Green Paper, Cmnd. 9501 (London: HMSO, April 1985). 
 
Department of Education and Science, The Development of Higher Education into the 
1990s, Green Paper, Cmnd. 9524 (London: HMSO, May 1985).   
 
Department of Education and Science, Higher Education: Meeting the Challenge, 
White Paper, Cm. 114 (London: HMSO, April 1987). 
 
Department of Education and Science, Review of the University Grants Committee 
(Croham Report), Cm. 81 (London: HMSO, 1987). 
 
Department of Education and Science, ‘Changes in structure and national planning for 
higher education: (i) Polytechnics and Colleges Sector; (ii) Universities Funding 
Council; (iii) Contracts between the funding bodies and higher education institutions’, 
May 1987. 
 
Department of Education and Science, Education Reform Act (No. 2) (London: 
HMSO, July 1988). 
 
Department of Education and Science, Top-up Loans for Students, Cm. 520 (London:  
HMSO, November 1988).  
 
Department of Education and Science, ‘Shifting the balance of public funding of 
higher education to fees: a consultation paper’, April 1989.  
 
Department of Education and Science, Higher Education: a New Framework, White 
Paper, Cm. 1541 (London: HMSO, May 1991). 
 
Dewey, J., ‘Liberal education’, in Monroe, P. (ed.), A Cyclopedia of Education, 
Volume 4 (New York: Macmillan, 1913), pp. 4-6. 
 
Dolphin, A. M. (as an officer of the Department of Education and Science), ‘The 
demand for higher education’, Employment Gazette (London: HMSO, July 1981),  
pp. 302-305. 
 
Drucker, H. M., The Political Uses of Ideology (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1974). 
 
Drucker, H., Dunleavy, P., Gamble, A., and Peele, G. (eds), Developments in British 
Politics 2 (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1989). 
   
Dunleavy, P. and O’Leary, B., Theories of the State: the Politics of Liberal 
Democracy (London: Macmillan, 1987). 
 
Dunleavy, P., Gamble, A., and Peele, G. (eds), Developments in British Politics 3 
(Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1990). 
 
Eagleton, T., Ideology: an Introduction (London: Verso, 1991). 
 
 222 
 
Eccleshall, R., Geoghegan, V., Jay, R., Kenny, M., MacKenzie, I. and Wilford, R., 
Political Ideologies: An Introduction (London: Routledge, Second Edition, 1994). 
 
The Economist (author not stated),18 September 1982, ‘Thatcher’s think-tank takes 
aim at the welfare state’, pp. 25-26. 
 
The Economist online (author not stated), 27 April 2010, ‘Empty shelves’: available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/15996751/print [accessed 17 June 2012]. 
 
The Economist online (author not stated), 9 April 2013, ‘How Mrs Thatcher smashed 
the Keynesian consensus’: available at 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013/04/margaret-thatchers-
macroeconomic-legacy [accessed 2 August 2013]. 
 
Elliott, G. (ed.), Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists and 
other essays - Louis Althusser (London: Verso, 1990).  
 
Elliott, G., Labourism and the English Genius: the Strange Death of Labour England? 
(London: Verso, 1993). 
 
Elliott, G. (ed.), Althusser: a Critical Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).   
         
Engels, F. and Marx, K., The German Ideology, ed. Arthur, C. J. (London: Lawrence 
and Wishart, 1970). 
 
Evans, M., ‘A home of one’s own’, Times Higher Education, 12 April 2012,  
p. 26: available at 
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?sectioncode=26&storycode=419623 
[accessed 14 April 2012].   
 
Femia, J. V., Gramsci's Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness and the 
Revolutionary Process (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1981). 
 
Ferns, H. S., How Much Freedom for Universities? Towards Independent Universities 
(London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1982).     
    
Flude, M. and Hammer, M. (eds), The Education Reform Act 1988: its Origins and 
Implications (Lewes, Sussex: Falmer Press, 1990). 
 
Freeden, M., Ideologies and Political Theory: a Conceptual Approach (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1996). 
 
Freeden, M., Ideology: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003). 
 
Friedman, M. with the assistance of Friedman, R., Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago 
and London: University of Chicago Press, 1970). 
 
Friedman, M. and Friedman, R., Free to Choose (London: Penguin, 1980). 
  
 223 
 
Fuller, T. (ed.), The Voice of Liberal Learning: Michael Oakeshott on Education 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989). 
 
Fulton, O., Gordon, A., Williams, G. (eds), Higher Education and Manpower 
Planning: a Comparative Study of Planned and Market Economies (London and 
Paris: International Labour Office and UNESCO, 1982). 
 
Gamble, A., The Free Economy and the Strong State: the Politics of Thatcherism 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, Second Edition, 1994). 
 
Geuss, R., The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
 
Gilmour, I., Inside Right: a Study of Conservatism (London: Hutchinson, 1977). 
 
Gilmour, I., Dancing with Dogma: Britain under Thatcherism (London: Simon and 
Schuster, 1992). 
 
Gould, J. (ed.), The Attack on Higher Education: Marxist and Radical Penetration – 
Report of a Study Group of the Institute for the Study of Conflict (London: Institute for 
the Study of Conflict, 1977). 
 
Gramsci, A., Selections from the Prison Notebooks, eds Hoare, Q. and Nowell  
Smith, G. (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971).  
 
Gramsci, A., Selections from Political Writings 1921-1926, ed. Hoare, Q. (London: 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1978).  
 
Gray, J., Enlightenment’s Wake (London: Routledge, 1995). 
 
Green, A., ‘The peculiarities of English education’, in Department of Cultural Studies, 
University of Birmingham, Education Limited: Schooling, Training and the New 
Right in England since 1979 (London: Unwin Hyman Ltd.,1991), pp. 6-30. 
 
Greenaway, H., ‘The National Advisory Body – the polytechnic administrator’s 
viewpoint of a major British development’, Journal of Tertiary Educational 
Administration, Volume 6, Number 1, May 1984, pp. 55-62. 
 
The Guardian (author not stated),14 April 2008, ‘Man with a mission to open 
universities to the many’, interview with John Denham, Labour Secretary of State for 
DIUS (2007-2009): available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2008/apr/14/highereducation.accesstouniversity 
[accessed 20 June 2010]. 
 
Halcrow, M., Keith Joseph – a Single Mind (London: Macmillan, 1989). 
 
Hall, S., The Hard Road to Renewal (London: Verso in association with Marxism 
Today, 1988). 
 
Hall, S., ‘The neoliberal revolution’, Soundings, Issue 48, Summer 2011, pp. 9-27. 
 224 
 
 
Hall, S. and Jacques, M. (eds), The Politics of Thatcherism (London: Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1983). 
 
Halliday, J., 'Maoist Britain?  the ideological function of vocationalising the higher 
education curriculum', Curriculum Studies, Volume 1, Number 3, 1993, pp. 365-382. 
 
Halpern, B., ' "Myth" and "ideology" in modern usage', History and Theory, Volume 
1, 1961, pp. 129-149. 
 
Halsey, A. H., Decline of Donnish Dominion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). 
 
Hamlyn, D. W., ‘The concept of a university’, Philosophy, 71, 1996, pp. 205-218. 
 
Harding, N., Lenin’s Political Thought, Volume 1: Theory and Practice in the 
Democratic Revolution; Volume 2: Theory and Practice in the Socialist Revolution 
(London and Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1977). 
 
Harvey, D., A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007).  
 
Haviland, J. (ed.), Take Care, Mr Baker!: a selection from the advice on education 
which the government collected but decided not to publish (London: Fourth Estate, 
1988). 
 
Hayek, F. A., The Constitution of Liberty (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960). 
 
Hayes, M., The New Right in Britain: an Introduction to Theory and Practice 
(London: Pluto Press, 1994). 
 
Henkel, M. and Little, B. (eds), Changing Relationships between Higher Education 
and the State (London: Jessica Kingsley, 1999). 
 
Hennessy, P., Morrison, S., Townsend, R., Routine Punctuated by Orgies: the Central 
Policy Review Staff, 1970-83, Strathclyde Papers on Government and Politics, series 
ed. Jeremy Moon, Number 31, December 1984. 
 
Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, The Education Act 1944 (London: HMSO, 1944). 
 
Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, Technical Education (White Paper), Cmd. 9703 
(London: HMSO, 1956). 
 
Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, Council for Scientific Policy: Enquiry into the Flow 
of Candidates in Science and Technology into Higher Education (Dainton Report), 
Cmnd. 3541 (London: HMSO, 1968).  
 
Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, The Government’s Expenditure Plans 1980-81 to 
1983-84, Cmnd. 7841 (London : HMSO, March 1980). 
 
 
 225 
 
Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, Education Act 1980, April 1980: available at  
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1980/20/pdfs/ukpga_19800020_en.pdf  
[accessed 21 July 2013]. 
 
Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, The Government’s Expenditure Plans 1981-2 to 
1983-84, Cmnd. 8175 (London: HMSO, March 1981). 
  
Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, Education (No. 2) Act 1986 (London: HMSO, 1986). 
 
Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, Education (Student Loans) Act 1990 (London: 
HMSO, 1990). 
 
Hibbin, S. (ed.), Politics, Ideology and the State (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 
1978). 
 
Hobhouse, L. T., Liberalism (London: Thornton Butterworth Ltd., 1934). 
 
Holmes, M., Thatcherism: Scope and Limits, 1983-87 (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 
1989). 
 
Hotson, H., ‘Don’t Look to the Ivy League’, London Review of Books, Volume 33, 
Number 10, 19 May 2011, pp. 20-22: available at 
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v33/n10/howard-hotson/dont-look-to-the-ivy-league [accessed 
15 August 2013]. 
 
House of Commons, First Report from the Education, Science and Arts Committee, 
session 1981-82 – Expenditure Cuts in Higher Education: the Effects on the ‘Robbins 
Principle’ and on the Universities (London: HMSO, 2 December 1981). 
 
House of Commons, ‘Higher education funding: University Grants Committee and the 
National Advisory Body for Local Authority Higher Education’, minutes of evidence, 
Monday 28 March 1983. 
 
Hutton, W., The State We're In (London: Jonathan Cape, 1995). 
 
Jacka, K., Cox, C., Marks, J., Rape of Reason: the Corruption of the Polytechnic of 
North London (London: Churchill Press, 1975). 
 
Jenkins, S., Accountable to None: the Tory Nationalization of Britain (London: 
Hamish Hamilton, 1995).   
 
Jessop, B., The Capitalist State: Marxist Theories and Methods (Oxford: Martin 
Robertson, 1982).  
 
Jessop, B., Bonnett, K., Bromley, S. and Ling, T., ‘Authoritarian populism, two 
nations, and Thatcherism’, New Left Review, 147, September/October 1984, pp. 32-
60. 
 
Jessop, B., Bonnett, K., Bromley, S. and Ling, T. (eds), Thatcherism: a Tale of Two 
Nations (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988).    
 226 
 
 
Johnson, R., ‘A new road to serfdom? A critical history of the 1988 Act’, in 
Department of Cultural Studies, University of Birmingham, Education Limited: 
Schooling, Training and the New Right in England since 1979 (London: Unwin 
Hyman Ltd., 1991), pp. 31-86. 
 
Jones, K., Right Turn: the Conservative Revolution in Education (London:  
Hutchinson Radius, 1989). 
 
Joseph, K., Freedom under the Law (London: Conservative Political Centre, 1975). 
 
Joseph, K., Reversing the Trend (Chichester and London: Barry Rose Publishers 
Limited, 1975). 
 
Joseph, K., Stranded on the Middle Ground? Reflections on Circumstances and 
Policies (London: Centre for Policy Studies, 1976). 
 
Joseph, K., ‘Speech to the North of England Education Conference in Sheffield, 6 
January 1984’, Oxford Review of Education, Volume 10, Number 2, 1984, pp. 137-
146.   
  
Joseph, K., Maude, A. and Percival, I., Freedom and Order (London: Conservative 
Political Centre, 1975). 
 
Kavanagh, D., Thatcherism and British Politics: the End of Consensus? (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, Second Edition, 1990). 
 
Kavanagh, D. and Seldon, A. (eds), The Thatcher Effect - a Decade of Change 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).       
 
Kedourie, E., Diamonds into Glass: the Government and the Universities (London: 
Centre for Policy Studies, Policy Study Number 89, 1988). 
 
Kedourie, E., Perestroika in the Universities (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 
Choice in Welfare Series, Number 1, 1989). 
 
Kekes, J., ‘What is Conservatism?’, Philosophy, Volume 72, Number 281, July 1997, 
pp. 351-374. 
 
Kerr, C., Observations on the Relations between Education and Work in the People’s 
Republic of China: Report of a Study Group (Berkeley, California: Carnegie Council 
on Policy Studies in Higher Education, 1978). 
 
Klein, N., The Shock Doctrine (London: Allen Lane, 2007). 
 
Knight, C., The Making of Tory Education Policy in Post-war Britain 1950-1986 
(Lewes, Sussex: Falmer Press, 1990). 
 
 227 
 
Knight, P., ‘The National Advisory Body Planning Exercise 1987-88: a shot in the 
foot’, Higher Education Quarterly, Volume 41, Number 4, Autumn 1987, pp. 317-
328. 
 
Knight, P., ‘After the storm, a brighter era dawned’, The Guardian, 20 March 2007: 
available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2007/mar/20/highereducation.comment 
[accessed 19 October 2012].   
 
Kogan, M. with Kogan, D., The Attack on Higher Education (London: Kogan Page, 
1983). 
 
Kogan, M. and Hanney, S., Reforming Higher Education (London: Jessica Kingsley, 
2000). 
 
Laclau, E., Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory (London: Verso Editions/NLB, 
1982).  
 
Lal, D., Nationalised Universities: Paradox of the Privatisation Age (London: Centre 
for Policy Studies, Policy Study Number 103, 1989). 
 
Larrain, J., Marxism and Ideology (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1983). 
 
Lawlor, S. (ed.), An Education Choice: Pamphlets from the Centre 1987-1994 
(London: Centre for Policy Studies, 1995). 
 
Lawton, D., The Tory Mind on Education 1979-94 (London: Falmer Press, 1994).  
 
Lefebvre, H., The Sociology of Marx (London: Allen Lane, Penguin Press, 1968).   
 
Lenin, V. I., What Is To Be Done? (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1973).  
          
Letwin, O., Aims of Schooling: the Importance of Grounding (London: Centre for 
Policy Studies, 1988).  
 
Letwin, O., Privatising the World (London: Cassell, 1988). 
 
Letwin, S. R., The Anatomy of Thatcherism (London: Fontana, 1992). 
 
Levidow, L., ‘Marketizing higher education: neoliberal strategies and counter-
strategies’, in Robins, K. and Webster, F. (eds), The Virtual University? Knowledge, 
Markets and Management’ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 227-248: 
available at oro.open.ac.uk [accessed 1 September 2013]. 
 
Levitas, R. (ed.), The Ideology of the New Right (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986). 
 
Maclure, S., Education Re-formed: a Guide to the Education Reform Act (London: 
Hodder and Stoughton, Third Edition, 1992). 
 
 228 
 
Mao, Tse-Tung, Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung (The Little Red Book) 
(The Foreign Languages Publishing and Distribution Administration, The People’s 
Republic of China, n.d.). 
 
Marx, K., Capital, Volume I (London: Dent, Everyman’s Library, 1974).  
      
Marx, K. and Engels, F., The Communist Manifesto (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: 
Penguin, 1967). 
 
Marx, K. and Engels, F., Selected Works in One Volume: Karl Marx and Frederick 
Engels (London: Lawrence and Wishart, Revised Edition, 1991). 
 
Massey, D., ‘Ideology and economics in the present moment’, Soundings, Issue 48, 
Summer 2011, pp. 29-39. 
 
McAuslan, P., ‘The Constitution: does the Bill offend it?’, in Haviland, J. (ed.), Take 
Care, Mr Baker!: a selection from the advice on education which the government 
collected but decided not to publish (London: Fourth Estate, 1988), pp. 264-266. 
 
McCarney, J., The Real World of Ideology (Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1980).    
 
McLellan, D. (ed.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1977). 
 
McLellan, D., Ideology (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1986). 
 
McLellan, D., Marx (London: Fontana Press, Second Edition, 1986). 
 
Mepham, J., 'The theory of ideology in Capital', Radical Philosophy, Volume 2, 
Number 2, 1972, pp.12-19. 
 
Meszaros, I., The Power of Ideology (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989). 
         
Miliband, R., 'Class war Conservatism', New Society, 19 June 1980, pp. 278-281. 
 
Miliband, R., ‘Counter-hegemonic struggles’, in Miliband, R. and Panitch, L. (eds), 
The Socialist Register (London: Merlin Press, 1990), pp. 346-365. 
 
Mill, J. S., On Liberty (London: The World’s Classics, Oxford University Press, 1952 
[1859]). 
 
Mill, J. S., ‘Inaugural Address Delivered at the University of St Andrews, 1 February 
1867’, in Cavenagh, F. A. (ed.), James and John Stuart Mill on Education 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931). 
 
Millar, F., ‘Gove is careering towards an omnifiasco over the baccalaureate’, The 
Guardian, 7 January 2013, p. 34: available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2013/jan/07/gcse-ebacc-michael-gove-reforms 
[accessed 8 January 2013].  
 
 229 
 
Million Plus, ‘Economic cost of higher tuition fees almost 6.5 times greater than 
potential Treasury savings’, 18 February 2013: available at 
http://www.millionplus.ac.uk/press-releases/latest-press-releases/economic-cost-of-
higher-tuition-fees-almost-6.5-times-greater-than-potential-treasury-savings/ 
[accessed 25 March 2013]. 
 
Ministry of Education, Grants to Students (Anderson Report), Cmnd. 1051 (London: 
HMSO, 1960).   
 
Molyneux, J., The Point is to Change it: An Introduction to Marxist Philosophy 
(London: Bookmarks Publications, 2012). 
 
Monbiot, G., ‘For the Tories, this is not a financial crisis but a long-awaited 
opportunity’, The Guardian, 19 October 2010, p. 31. 
 
Monbiot, G., ‘With threats and bribes our schools are forced to be “free” ’, The 
Guardian, 5 March 2013, p. 32. 
 
Moodie, G. C., ‘Le roi est mort; vive le quoi? Croham and the death of the UGC’, 
Higher Education Quarterly, Volume 41, Number 4, Autumn 1987, pp. 329-343. 
 
Moore, C., Margaret Thatcher: The Authorised Biography – Volume One: Not for 
Turning (London: Allen Lane, 2013). 
 
Morgan, J., ‘Reforms’ impact on deficit may be less than zero, says Hepi’, Times 
Higher Education, 25 October 2012, p. 6: available at 
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/421590.article [accessed 25 October 2012].  
 
Mouffe, C. (ed.), Gramsci and Marxist Theory (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1979). 
 
Nairn, T., ‘Enoch Powell: the New Right’, New Left Review, Number 61, 1970,  
pp. 3-27. 
 
National Advisory Body for Local Authority Higher Education, Towards a Strategy 
for Local Authority Higher Education in the late 1980s and beyond (London: NAB, 
1983). 
 
National Advisory Body for Local Authority Higher Education, Management for a 
Purpose: the Report of the Good Management Practice Group (London: NAB, 7 
April 1987). 
 
National and Local Government Officers Association, ‘Polytechnics and major 
colleges: letter to secretaries of certain local government branches’, 3 April 1987. 
 
National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education, Britain’s Future: 
the Economy and Higher Education (London: NATFHE, 1984). 
 
National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education, Green Paper – 
Bleak Future (London: NATFHE, 1985). 
 230 
 
 
National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education, Across the Binary 
Divide (London: NATFHE, 1986). 
 
National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education, Higher Education 
at the Crossroads: NATFHE’s Response to Government Plans for Higher Education 
(London: NATFHE, 1987). 
 
National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education, Higher Education in the 
Learning Society (Dearing Report) (London: HMSO, July 1997): available at 
https://bei.leeds.ac.uk/Partners/NCIHE/ [accessed 22 March 2013]. 
 
Neocleous, M., ‘Radical conservatism, or, the conservatism of radicals: Giddens, Blair 
and the politics of reaction’, Radical Philosophy, Number 93, January/February 1999, 
pp. 24-34. 
 
Newman, A., ‘Don’t let the Labour Right tell fairy stories about the 1980s’, Left 
Futures, 2 June 2011: available at http://www.leftfutures.org/2011/06/dont-let-the-
labour-right-tell-fairy-stories-about-the-1980s/ [accessed 24 September 2011]. 
 
Newman, J. H., The Idea of a University (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1996 [1899]).   
 
Nicolaus, M. and Fowkes, B. (eds), Karl Marx: Grundrisse (London: Penguin Books 
in association with New Left Review, 1973). 
 
Official Report of the House of Commons Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 5th 
series, Volumes 967-1000 (9 May 1979-13 March 1981); 6th series, Volumes 1-181 
(16 March 1981-29 November 1990): available at 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/sittings/ [accessed 20 January 2012]; and the 
debate on 10 April 2013, vol.560, c.1663: available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmhansrd/cm130410/debtext/13
0410-0002.htm#13041013000082 [accessed 15 April 2013].  
 
Official Report of the House of Lords Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 5th series, 
Volumes 400-523 (9 May 1979-29 November 1990): available at 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/sittings/ [accessed 15 June 2012]. 
 
Orwell, G., Nineteen Eighty-Four (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970). 
 
Paggi, L., ‘Gramsci’s general theory of Marxism’, in Mouffe, C. (ed.), Gramsci and 
Marxist Theory (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), pp. 113-168. 
 
Parekh, B., Marx's Theory of Ideology (London: Croom Helm, 1982). 
 
Plamenatz, J., Ideology (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1971). 
 
Plant, R., ‘Ideology’, in Drucker, H., Dunleavy, P., Gamble, A. and Peele, G. (eds), 
Developments in British Politics 2 (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1989),  
pp. 8-33. 
 231 
 
 
Polytechnic and Colleges Funding Council, Funding Choices: a Consultative 
Document (London: PCFC, March 1989). 
 
Possony, S. T. (ed.), Lenin Reader (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1966). 
 
Powell, E., Of Universities and Polytechnics (London: Centre for Policy Studies, 
1991).  
 
Powell, E., ‘Speech at Trinity College, Dublin’, 13 November 1964: available at 
http://enochpowell.info/Resources/July-December1964.pdf [accessed 16 November 
2012].  
 
Pratt, J. and Burgess, T., Polytechnics: a Report (London: Pitman, 1974).  
 
Pring, R., ‘Liberal Education and Vocational Preparation’, in Williams, M., 
Dougherty, R. and Banks, F. (eds), Continuing the Education Debate (London: 
Cassell, 1992), pp. 54-64. 
 
Pritchard, R. M. O., 'Government power in British higher education', Studies in 
Higher Education, Volume 19, Number 3, 1994, pp. 253-265. 
 
Rhodes James, R., ‘Government and higher education’, Higher Education Quarterly, 
Volume XI, Number 1, January 1987, pp. 16-24. 
 
Ribbins, P. and Sherratt, B., Radical Education Policies and Conservative Secretaries 
of State (London: Cassell, 1997). 
 
Ricoeur, P., ‘Althusser’s Theory of Ideology’, in Elliott, G. (ed.), Althusser: a Critical 
Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 44-72.   
 
Riddell, P., The Thatcher Government (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985). 
 
Robbins, L., Higher Education Revisited (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1980). 
 
Robinson, A. and Tormey, S., ‘New Labour’s neoliberal Gleichschaltung: the case of 
higher education’, The Commoner, Spring/Summer 2003: available at 
http://www.thecommoner.org [accessed 22 February 2012].  
 
Robinson, E., The New Polytechnics (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1968).  
 
Rothblatt, S., The Modern University and its Discontents (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997). 
 
Runciman, D., ‘Rat-a-tat-a-tat-a-tat-a-tat’, London Review of Books, Volume 35, 
Number 11, 6 June 2013, pp. 13-18. 
 
Ryan, A., Liberal Anxieties and Liberal Education (London: Profile Books, 1999). 
 
 232 
 
Ryan, D., 'The Assault on Higher Education', New Left Review, Volume 227, 
January/February 1998, pp. 3-32. 
 
Salter, B. and Tapper, T., The State and Higher Education (Ilford, Essex: Woburn 
Press, 1994).  
 
Salusbury, M., Thatcherism Goes to College (London: Canary Press, 1989). 
  
Schwarz, B., ‘The Thatcher Years’, in Miliband, R., Panitch, L. and Saville, J. (eds), 
The Socialist Register (London: Merlin Press, 1987), pp. 116-152. 
 
Scott, P., The Crisis of the University (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1984). 
 
Scott, P., ‘On the silly side’, Editorial, The Times Higher Education Supplement, 11 
November 1988, p. 40. 
 
Scott, P., ‘Goodbye to vouchers?’, Editorial, The Times Higher Education 
Supplement, 5 May 1989, p. 40. 
 
Scott, P., ‘Higher Education’, in Kavanagh, D. and Seldon, A. (eds), The Thatcher 
Effect - a Decade of Change (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 198-212. 
 
Scott, P., The Meanings of Mass Higher Education (Buckingham: SRHE and the 
Open University Press, 1995).     
 
Scott, P., ‘The Case for Public Universities’, The Future of Public Universities 
 (web forum) (New York: Social Sciences Research Council, 2006): available at 
http://publicuniversities.ssrc.org/commentaries/ [accessed 4 June 2013].  
     
Scruton, R., The Meaning of Conservatism (London: Macmillan, 1980). 
 
Scruton, R., Conservative Texts (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991). 
 
Sexton, S., Our Schools: A Radical Policy (Warlingham: Institute of Economic 
Affairs Education Unit, 1987). 
 
Shattock, M. (ed.), The Structure and Governance of Higher Education (Guildford, 
Surrey: SRHE, 1983). 
 
Shattock, M., The UGC and the Management of British Universities (Buckingham: 
SRHE and the Open University Press, 1994). 
 
Sherlock, M., ‘Real cost of pay as you learn’, The Times Higher Education 
Supplement, 25 November 1988. 
 
Showstack Sassoon, A. (ed.), Approaches to Gramsci (London: Writers and Readers, 
1982).  
 
Silver, H., A Higher Education: the Council for National Academic Awards and 
British Higher Education 1964-1989 (Basingstoke: Falmer Press, 1990). 
 233 
 
 
Silver, H. and Brennan, J., A Liberal Vocationalism (London: Methuen, 1988). 
 
Sizer, J., ‘British universities’ responses to events leading to grant reductions 
announced in July 1981’, Financial Accountability and Management, Volume 4, 
Number 2, June 1988, pp. 79-98. 
 
Smith, A., An Inquiry into the Wealth of Nations, Volumes 1 and 2, eds Campbell, R. 
H. and Skinner, A. S. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976). 
 
Stedman Jones, D., Masters of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of 
Neoliberal Politics (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2012). 
 
Stevens, R., University to Uni: the Politics of Higher Education in England since 
1944 (London: Politico’s, 2004). 
 
Suchting, W. A., Marx: An Introduction (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1983). 
 
Tapper, T. and Salter, B., Education and the Political Order: Changing Patterns of 
Class Control (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1978). 
 
Tapper, E. R. and Salter, B. G., ‘The changing idea of university autonomy’, Studies 
in Higher Education, Volume 20, Number 1, March 1995, SRHE, pp. 59-71. 
 
Tarsh, J. (as an officer of the Department of Education and Science), ‘What happens 
to new graduates?’, Education & Training UK 1987: an economic, social and policy 
audit (London: Policy Journals, 1987), pp. 50-60. 
 
Thatcher, M., What’s Wrong with Politics? (London: Conservative Political Centre, 
1968). 
 
Thatcher, M., Let Our Children Grow Tall: Selected Speeches 1975-1977 (London: 
Centre for Policy Studies, 1977). 
 
Thatcher, M., The Revival of Britain: Speeches on Home and European Affairs, 1975-
1988 (London: Aurum Press, 1989). 
 
Thatcher, M., speeches: available on the Margaret Thatcher Foundation website 
[accessed 26 July 2013]: 
- Speech to Federation of Conservative Students Conference, 24 March 1975, 
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/102663;  
- Speech to Conservative Party Conference, 10 October 1975, 
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/102777;  
- Speech to Christian Democratic Union Conference, 25 May 1976, 
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/103034; 
- Speech to Greater London Young Conservatives (Iain Macleod Memorial 
Lecture), 4 July 1977, http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/103411;  
- Speech to the Bow Group, 6 May 1978, 
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/103674;  
- Interview for Sunday Times, 3 May 1981, 
 234 
 
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104475;  
- Speech to Federation of Conservative Students Annual Conference, 6 April 
1984, http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/105653.  
 
Thatcher, M., The Downing Street Years (London: Harper Collins, 1993). 
 
The Stationery Office, Teaching and Higher Education Act 1998 (London: The 
Stationery Office Ltd., 1998): available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/30/pdfs/ukpga_19980030_en.pdf  
[accessed 2 January 2013]. 
 
The Times Higher Education Supplement (37 academics, University of Bradford), 
‘Why we must resist the Government’s attack on the university system’, 6 November 
1981, p. 27. 
 
The Times Higher Education Supplement (author not stated), ‘Costs mean loans will 
lose money’, 6 January 1989.  
 
Tomlinson, J., ‘Curriculum and market: are they compatible?’, in Haviland, J. (ed.), 
Take Care, Mr Baker!: a selection from the advice on education which the 
government collected but decided not to publish (London: Fourth Estate, 1988), pp. 9-
12. 
 
Trow, M., ‘Binary dilemmas – an American view’, Higher Education Review, 
Volume 1, Number 3, 1969, pp. 27-43.  
 
University and College Union (UCU) archives, 1979-1990: internal correspondence, 
minutes of meetings, statements and press releases from UCU’s precursor unions – the 
Association of University Teachers (AUT) and the National Association of Teachers 
in Further and Higher Education (NATFHE), and from other higher education bodies 
including the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals (CVCP), the National 
Advisory Body (NAB), and the University Grants Committee (UGC): available at 
UCU, London. 
 
University Grants Committee, A Strategy for Higher Education into the 1990s: the 
University Grants Committee’s advice (London: HMSO, September 1984). 
 
University Grants Committee, Circular Letter 13/79 to universities, 15 August 1979.  
 
University Grants Committee, Circular Letter 16/79 to universities, 15 October 1979. 
 
University Grants Committee, Circular Letter 24/80 to universities, 30 December 
1980.  
 
University Grants Committee, Circular Letter 8/81 to universities, 15 May 1981. 
 
University Grants Committee, Circular Letter 10/81 to universities, 1 July 1981. 
 
University Grants Committee, Circular Letter 16/83 to universities, 1 November 1983. 
 
 235 
 
University Grants Committee, Circular letter 12/85 to universities, 9 May 1985. 
 
University Grants Committee, Circular letter 22/85 to universities, 1 December 1985. 
 
University Grants Committee, Report of the University Grants Committee to the 
Secretary of State for Education and Science, Cmnd. 3820 (London: HMSO, 
November 1968). 
 
Vernon, J., ‘Canary in the coal mine’, Times Higher Education, 1 December 2011: 
available at http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/features/canary-in-the-coal-
mine/418284.article [accessed 16 April 2012]. 
 
Waterhouse, R., ‘Serve the customer’, The Times Higher Education Supplement, 
20/27 December 2002, p. 14. 
 
Watson, D., ‘The contracting environment: contracts and the implications for history’, 
in PUSH Newsletter, 1990. 
 
Watson, D. and Bowden, R., Ends without Means: the Conservative stewardship of 
UK higher education 1979-1997 (Brighton: University of Brighton Education 
Research Centre Occasional Paper, April 1997). 
 
Wheen, F., Karl Marx (London: Fourth Estate, 1999). 
 
Wiener, M. J., English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit 1850-1980 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
 
Williams, G., ‘Graduate Employment and Vocationalism in Higher Education’, 
European Journal of Education, Volume 20, Numbers 2-3, 1985, pp. 181-192.  
 
Williams, G., ‘Sipping the fee-paying chalice’, The Sunday Times, 30 April 1989. 
 
Williams, G., ‘Higher Education’, in Flude, M. and Hammer, M. (eds), The Education 
Reform Act 1988: its Origins and Implications (Lewes, Sussex: Falmer Press, 1990), 
pp. 257-271. 
 
Williams, M., Dougherty, R. and Banks, F. (eds), Continuing the Education Debate 
(London: Cassell, 1992). 
 
Wintour, P., ‘Minister: we’re more radical than Thatcher’, The Guardian,  
31 July 2010, p. 1. 
 
Wragg, T., ‘Opinion: We are now all so brainwashed we are no longer shocked when 
education is sold off like a commodity, says Ted Wragg’, The Times Higher 
Education Supplement, 6 January 2004, p. 5. 
 
Young, H., One of Us (London: Macmillan, Final Edition, 1993).   
 
Zizek, S., The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 1989). 
 
 236 
 
 
Other websites accessed 
 
BBC Politics website  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/special/politics97/background/pastelec/ge79.shtml 
[accessed 24 June 2013]. 
 
Council for the Defence of British Universities  http://cdbu.org.uk  
[accessed 5 March 2013].  
 
Campaign for the Public University   http://publicuniversity.org.uk 
[accessed 5 March 2013].  
 
Centre for Policy Studies    http://www.cps.org.uk/ 
[accessed 30 June 2012].  
 
Mont Pelerin Society     www.montpelerin.org 
[accessed 10 September 2012].  
 
 
